Motivation to Act in Confucianism and Christianity: In Matteo Ricci’s The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu Shiyi 天主實義)

The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu Shiyi 天主實義) is a Chinese text of the 17th century written by the Italian sinologist and missionary Matteo Ricci. It contains, among other topics, a discussion between a Confucian scholar and a Christian about the motivation to act. For Confucianism a good action should be performed for its own sake, without any thought of future reward. For Christianity it seems that good actions are performed in order to go to Heaven. Ricci argues that human actions are complex. The ultimate motivation for goodness comes from a relation with God. The Confucian scholar claims that actually not all actions need a motive. Sometimes things “just happen.” Also, a good tradition can move people to behave properly. Dealing with topics such as soul, eternal life, causes, descendants, tradition, happiness and proper behavior, this dialogue offers a great insight of the meeting of two great traditions: Confucianism and Christianity.     

He Lin and German Philosophy in the Zhanguoce School: An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform

The Zhanguoce School emerged in 1940 and actively responded to the crisis caused by the Sino-Japanese War. The cultural morphology of Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) inspired most of the leading Zhanguoce scholars to reflect on the culture, history, and status quo of China. They believed that China was suffering from a total war with world superpowers and that it was in a new Warring States epoch; they thus advocated radical cultural reform as a necessary condition for victory and invoked Nietzschean philosophy to champion heroism and power. However, He Lin 賀麟 (1902–92), a philosopher in this school, looked to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) for different theories of cultural reform and history. This article examines He’s integration of the philosophies of Hegel and Fichte into his cultural and historical thought. Based on the Hegelian notion of Spirit, He rethought the nature of culture and the relationship between Chinese and Western cultures; he also interpreted history by comparing the historical theories of Hegel and Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–92). Furthermore, He investigated individual realization with reference to Fichte and repudiated radical heroism.     

Between Mind and Trace — A Research into the Theories on Xin 心 (Mind) of Early Song Confucianism and Buddhism

From Han Yu’s yuan Dao 原道 (retracing the Dao) to Ouyang Xiu’s lun ben 论本 (discussing the root), the conflicts arising from Confucianists’ rejection of Buddhism were focused on one point, namely, the examination of zhongxin suo shou 中心所守 (something kept in mind). The attitude towards the distinction between mind and trace, and the proper approach to erase the gap between emptiness and being, as well as that between the expedient and the true, became the major concerns unavoidable for various thinkers to integrate the two teachings and to propel academic development. “To understand by mind” and “to blame for matter” were of crucial methodological significance for transcendence in both Confucianism and Buddhism. The arguments of Confucian scholars like Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers on the identity of mind and trace and the unity of void and solid are mutually manifested. The same mind with the same principle means “mind is principle.” The “common axis of Confucianism and Buddhism” exists in the emphasis on mind beyond trace. The unification of mind and trace or the accordance of body and function has actually become the cardinal foundation for the possible mergence of the Three Teachings.     

Instructions for Submissions

Frontiers of Philosophy in China （FPC） aims to disseminate new scholarly achievements in the field of broadly defined philosophy, and to promote philosophical research of the highest level by publishing peer-reviewed academic articles that facilitate communication and cooperation among philosophers in China and abroad. The journal covers nearly all the main branches of philosophy, with priority given to original works on Chinese philosophy and to comparative studies between Chinese philosophy and other types of philosophy in the world.     

Instructions for Submissions

Frontiers of Philosophy in China （FPC） aims to disseminate new scholarly achievements in the field of broadly defined philosophy, and to promote philosophical research of the highest level by publishing peer-reviewed academic articles that facilitate communication and cooperation among philosophers in China and abroad. The journal covers nearly all the main branches of philosophy, with priority given to original works on Chinese philosophy and to comparative studies between Chinese philosophy and other types of philosophy in the world.     

A Neo-Confucian Criticism of Daoism: Wang Fuzhi’s Contradictory Remarks on the Laozi

Based on Zhu Xi’s statement that Laozi’s teachings were very cruel, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi as a crafty, petty person in his Confucian commentaries. Yet, he had to understand the Laozi or Daodejing sympathetically when he commented on it in Laozi Yan老子衍 (Extended Commentary on the Laozi). As a result, he showed inconsistency in his criticism and evaluation of the author. Some scholars have noted this problem but have not shed ink analyzing it. This essay finds that Wang Fuzhi’s ambiguous attitude toward Laozi results from his Confucian prejudice against other schools and his failure to grasp the breadth and depth of Laozi’s thought. From the perspective of Heaven, Laozi promoted accommodation and non-interference in self-cultivation and governance, summed up by the maxim that “the sage manages affairs without deliberation, and spreads teachings without words.” In contrast, Wang Fuzhi stuck to the distinction between Confucianism and Daoism, and tried to use humanity and ritual propriety to supplement that which Heaven does not provide; as such, he criticized Laozi as crafty and irresponsible. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism neither hits the mark regarding Laozi’s weakness nor maintains a concordance with his earlier sympathetic appraisal in Laozi Yan; the reason for this is that Wang Fuzhi could not fully grasp Laozi’s thought from a Confucian and anthropocentric perspective.     

Daoism and the German Mission in Martin Heidegger’s “The Thing”

In this article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s 1950 lecture/essay “The Thing” (Das Ding) in two ways. First, as a piece influenced by chapter 11 of the Daodejing. And second, as a postwar writing which can be interpreted vis-à-vis the Black Notebooks and his other writings. There are instances in “The Thing” which are analogous to his statements found in the Black Notebooks and his other writings which describe and clarify his controversial political affiliation. In brief, I suggest here that Heidegger’s articulation of the concept of wu 無 of chapter 11 of the Daodejing as the void of the jug in “The Thing” may potentially describe his controversial engagement with German National Socialism as part of his response to the call for German mission. Notably, the fundamentality of the void of the jug is comparable to the exclusivity and exceptionality of the Germans in their mission; and the use of the void of the jug as outpouring is an interesting way to emphasize his disagreement with the regime by pointing out that his support to German National Socialism is not to the extent of brutally annihilating the Jews.     

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正Founded in 2008,as the first journal in China dedicated to logic and related disciplines,Studies in Logic publishes research articles of high quality in English and Chinese and appears quarterly.The Journal is jointly sponsored by Sun Yatsen University and the Chinese Association of Logic,and published by Institute     

The Limits of a Confrontational Approach: Fabian Fukansai’s Critiques of Neo-Confucianism and Christianity

This paper analyzes the critique of Neo-Confucianism by the Japanese Jesuit Brother Fabian Fukansai (c. 1565–1621) in the Myōtei Dialogues (Myōtei Mondō 妙貞問答) (1605), as well as Fabian’s later critique of Christianity. It clarifies the author’s understanding of Neo-Confucian theory and his apology for Christianity by analyzing his explanation of the Great Ultimate (Tai’kyoku/Taiji 太極) and Principle (ri/li 理), which Fabian sees as nothing but an expression of Buddhist monistic mentalism. It also demonstrates that his explanations of the Great Ultimate and Principle have a crucial flaw: they do not sufficiently explain Zhu Xi’s metaphysics, which tried to make the immanent and transcendental characteristics of the Great Ultimate and Principle compatible. This is because Fabian addresses only the elements of “local” religions including Neo-Confucianism with novel keywords that support the framework of Christian Creationism and the Anima Rationalis theory. However, his later work Deus Destroyed (Ha Daius 破提宇子), written after he had rejected Christianity, overturned his former claim by accepting the Neo-Confucian concept of Principle. Fabian’s works are a historical example showing the potential limits of a confrontational approach toward other religions.     

The Deaths of One Conceptual Metaphor in Two Languages

This title refers to what I see as the state of synonymy between the word “husbandry” in English and the word se 嗇 in Chinese. There are points of striking similarity, not only in the meaning and usage of these two words, but also in the changes in their usage over time, and I have found a comparative study of the etymology of these two words to be mutually illuminating. The similarity and potential for mutual analysis between these two case studies speaks to the universality of metaphor in thought and its expression, as well as the influence of shared experiences, such as agricultural practices, on how we talk about ideas that are more abstract. In English, the idea of a general practice of husbandry derived from the idea of the husbandman or farmer in Late Medieval English (C13th onwards). A more abstracted sense of husbandry, understood as an attitude that may be applied to abstract and intangible objects is witnessed in Shakespeare’s sonnets in the C16th. This sense of husbandry, the husbandry of intangible resources, is also precisely the sense that is developed by a small and specialised group of writers in China represented by texts dating from the pre-Qin period to the Eastern Jin dynasty, following a similar progression from agricultural to ever more metaphorical senses of the practice of husbandry. The similarity of the process through which these abstracted meanings developed from concrete usage in both cases makes the pair mutually illustrative as I hope to show in this paper.     

On Confucian Political Philosophy and Its Theory of Justice

Traditional Confucian political culture (including its concepts, systems, practices and folk customs) has a legacy that deserves careful reconsideration today. Its theories, institutions, and practices address the source, legitimacy, division and balance, and restriction of political power. Confucian politics is a type of “moral politics” which sticks to what ought to be and what is justifiable, and holds that political power comes from Heaven, mandate of Heaven or Dao of Heaven, which implies that justification and standards rest with the people referring to scholars peasants, workers and merchants. This type of justification is rooted in the public space and the autonomous strength of the people, and it finds guidance in the involvement, supervision, and criticism of the class of scholar-bureaucrats (shi 士). In this article, Western political philosophy will be taken as a frame of reference for evaluating Confucian conception of justice as well as Confucian ideas of distribution, fairness of opportunity, caring kindness for “the least advantaged,” and institutional construction. It will argue that the leading characteristic of Confucian political theory is that of “substantive justice.”     

毁庙焚书——中印世俗化运动比较(英文)

The paper discusses problems inherent in the secularist project,by an examination of secularisms in India and China.Different motives,historical backgrounds,political situations and cultural considerations etc.have led to different paths and results in the two countries’ secularization efforts in modern times,the study of which will further our understanding of the secularist project.     

Instructions for Submissions

Frontiers of Philosophy in China （FPC） aims to disseminate new scholarly achievements in the field of broadly defined philosophy, and to promote philosophical research of the highest level by publishing peer-reviewed academic articles that facilitate communication and cooperation among philosophers in China and abroad. The journal covers nearly all the main branches of philosophy, with priority given to original works on Chinese philosophy and to comparative studies between Chinese philosophy and other types of philosophy in the word.     

Instructions for Submissions

Frontiers of Philosophy in China （FPC） aims to disseminate new scholarly achievements in the field of broadly defined philosophy, and to promote philosophical research of the highest level by publishing peer-reviewed academic articles that facilitate communication and cooperation among philosophers in China and abroad. The journal covers nearly all the main branches of philosophy, with priority given to original works on Chinese philosophy and to comparative studies between Chinese philosophy and other types of philosophy in the world.     

Encounter between Soul and Human Nature: An Examination of Xia Dachang’s “Xingshuo”

Matteo Ricci introduced into China the Western theory of soul, a term which he translated as linghun 靈魂. Afterwards, two other Italian Jesuits, Giulio Aleni and Francesco Sambiasi, separately completed two Chinese interpretations of the De Anima (On the Soul), the former privileging the word linghun, and the later, yanima 亞尼瑪, a transliteration for anima. Xia Dachang 夏大常 (Mathias Hsia) is probably the first Chinese person to write specifically on the topic of the soul. However, he used a different term, lingxing 靈性 (human spiritual nature), and also he titled his work “The Theory of Human Nature” (“Xingshuo” 性說). Xia’s work has received little scholarly attention, and this paper aims at investigating how he adopts the Western theory of the soul, why he still uses the concept of lingxing, and which Chinese editions of De Anima or other works written by the Jesuits had influenced him. We shall also see how Xia Dachang uses traditional Chinese sources and Catholic doctrine to support his viewpoint of human nature and how he criticizes theories of human nature within Chinese philosophy. This will enable us to comprehend how Chinese Christians in the Early Qing dynasty understood the theory of the soul and to reflect on the contemporary relevance of this theory in Chinese culture today.     

James Legge's Hermeneutical Methodology as Revealed in His Translation of the Daxue

With a focus on The Great Learning (Daxue大學),this paper explores the specific exegetical or hermeneutical methodology adopted by James Legge in his translation of this Confucian canonical text.It begins with an analysis of the translation theory endorsed by Legge,comparing his translation with those of Ku Hung-ming and Wing-tsit Chan.The second part aims to explicate the hermeneutic dilemma faced by Legge in his dealing with this text.It looks at the intellectual context in which Legge's scholarship on the Chinese classics had developed,as well as the academic standard he was required to maintain throughout his translation.Overall,Legge's familiarity with Qing scholarship makes it interesting to determine where and why he follows or rejects Zhu Xi.Given Legge's Christian missionary background and the sense of mission pervading Zhu Xi's commentary,we conclude that Legge's affinity with Zhu Xi is much more subtle and complex than previously speculated:the difference in their approach to Confucian texts cannot be reduced to a contrast between construction and deconstruction or between canonization and decanonization.     

Towards Gratitude to Nature: Global Environmental Ethics for China and the World

This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics.As Gao Shan has argued,the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature,and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics.This is related to Gao's rejection of most—if not all—Western "rationalist" environmental ethics,a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though I remain neutral about it theoretically).Gao argues that the Daoist notion of living in harmony with nature can instead become the basis of a Chinese environmental ethics.However,the involved Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is,in my view,based on an aesthetic property.The paper argues that despite the appeal of the Daoist view for a Chinese environmental ethics,an aesthetic property cannot provide the basis for a global environmental ethics.The paper also considers another version of Daoist environmental ethics,which does not rely on an aesthetic notion,but I argue that it too fails as such a candidate.As an alternative,the paper considers and applies contemporary Western thinkers on gratitude (such as Robert Emmons and Elizabeth Loder),proposing that gratitude to nature (environmental gratitude)can indeed provide the needed basis.