Plato on Necessity and Disorder

In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation： purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider the latter part of this account and argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of necessity. I will first outline how the notion of necessity is introduced in the dialogue. Next I will show how a mechanistic account of necessity fails to capture Plato＇s purpose of treating it as a causal factor; and, finally, I will argue that this purpose is better understood as an attempt, on Plato＇s part, to account for the causal origin of disorder and irrationality, an origin articulated in terms of a pre-cosmic situation and the notoriously difficult notion of the third kind.     

A Neo-Confucian Criticism of Daoism: Wang Fuzhi’s Contradictory Remarks on the Laozi

Based on Zhu Xi’s statement that Laozi’s teachings were very cruel, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi as a crafty, petty person in his Confucian commentaries. Yet, he had to understand the Laozi or Daodejing sympathetically when he commented on it in Laozi Yan老子衍 (Extended Commentary on the Laozi). As a result, he showed inconsistency in his criticism and evaluation of the author. Some scholars have noted this problem but have not shed ink analyzing it. This essay finds that Wang Fuzhi’s ambiguous attitude toward Laozi results from his Confucian prejudice against other schools and his failure to grasp the breadth and depth of Laozi’s thought. From the perspective of Heaven, Laozi promoted accommodation and non-interference in self-cultivation and governance, summed up by the maxim that “the sage manages affairs without deliberation, and spreads teachings without words.” In contrast, Wang Fuzhi stuck to the distinction between Confucianism and Daoism, and tried to use humanity and ritual propriety to supplement that which Heaven does not provide; as such, he criticized Laozi as crafty and irresponsible. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism neither hits the mark regarding Laozi’s weakness nor maintains a concordance with his earlier sympathetic appraisal in Laozi Yan; the reason for this is that Wang Fuzhi could not fully grasp Laozi’s thought from a Confucian and anthropocentric perspective.     

Introduction： Study Plato in China

Plato （427BC-347BC） is the philosopher of ancient Greece, perhaps the greatest one. His thought has played an important role in the development of the ideas of Western philosophy as well as in that of the whole culture. Regarding to his foundational and profound influence, Plato may be compared to Confucius who played similar role in the Chinese traditional culture. Plato＇s works is the most representative crown in the treasury of the ancient Greek culture, which belongs not only to Westerners but also to all mankind.     

Xiong Shili on the Nature,the Mind and the Origin of Badness as Evidenced in Ming Xin Pian 明心篇 (Explaining the Mind )

The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian明心篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.     

The Deaths of One Conceptual Metaphor in Two Languages

This title refers to what I see as the state of synonymy between the word “husbandry” in English and the word se 嗇 in Chinese. There are points of striking similarity, not only in the meaning and usage of these two words, but also in the changes in their usage over time, and I have found a comparative study of the etymology of these two words to be mutually illuminating. The similarity and potential for mutual analysis between these two case studies speaks to the universality of metaphor in thought and its expression, as well as the influence of shared experiences, such as agricultural practices, on how we talk about ideas that are more abstract. In English, the idea of a general practice of husbandry derived from the idea of the husbandman or farmer in Late Medieval English (C13th onwards). A more abstracted sense of husbandry, understood as an attitude that may be applied to abstract and intangible objects is witnessed in Shakespeare’s sonnets in the C16th. This sense of husbandry, the husbandry of intangible resources, is also precisely the sense that is developed by a small and specialised group of writers in China represented by texts dating from the pre-Qin period to the Eastern Jin dynasty, following a similar progression from agricultural to ever more metaphorical senses of the practice of husbandry. The similarity of the process through which these abstracted meanings developed from concrete usage in both cases makes the pair mutually illustrative as I hope to show in this paper.     

Daoism and the German Mission in Martin Heidegger’s “The Thing”

In this article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s 1950 lecture/essay “The Thing” (Das Ding) in two ways. First, as a piece influenced by chapter 11 of the Daodejing. And second, as a postwar writing which can be interpreted vis-à-vis the Black Notebooks and his other writings. There are instances in “The Thing” which are analogous to his statements found in the Black Notebooks and his other writings which describe and clarify his controversial political affiliation. In brief, I suggest here that Heidegger’s articulation of the concept of wu 無 of chapter 11 of the Daodejing as the void of the jug in “The Thing” may potentially describe his controversial engagement with German National Socialism as part of his response to the call for German mission. Notably, the fundamentality of the void of the jug is comparable to the exclusivity and exceptionality of the Germans in their mission; and the use of the void of the jug as outpouring is an interesting way to emphasize his disagreement with the regime by pointing out that his support to German National Socialism is not to the extent of brutally annihilating the Jews.     

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,Moral Psychology Volume 4： Free Will and Moral Responsibility

This book is the fourth volume of a series on moral psychology edited by philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Each of these volumes is organized in debate format, with ten or so main essays each followed by responses from two critics, with an opportunity for the author of the main essay to make a final reply.The present volume takes on the question of free will and moral responsibility, and addresses the question of what implications recent discoveries in neuroscience and social psychology have for our traditional notions of moral and legal responsibility, as well as for popular and philosophical notions of free will. Given the constant barrage of media coverage of scientists declaring that science has now proven that free will is an illusion, and even that morality itself is an illusion, this volume covers a topic that is timely, relevant, and important.     

The Earth Garden: Going Back or Going Forward to Nature?

Against the background of a short meditation on the contrasting ways in which landscape has been represented and idealized in Eastern and Western painting traditions,the article will try to show,using some striking examples,that the development of landscape painting in the last two centuries reflects the changing relationship of humanity and nature,leading in both the East and in the West to either the expression of a nostalgic longing for nature to be back as it once was,or to a gloomy expression of the vanishing of nature amidst the modern,technological world.Connecting to both the concept of "harmony," which is a key concept in Eastern aesthetics,and to some recent reflections in Western philosophy on the relationship of nature and technology,a post-nostalgic conception of nature and natural beauty is defended,in which nature and technology are no longer seen as opposing categories,but rather as poles that are intertwined in an ever-lasting process of co-evolution.It is argued that we should not so much strive to go "back to nature," but rather to go "forward to nature" and establish a new harmony between human and non-human nature and technology.The article ends with some reflections on the role artists and aestheticians may play in this transformation.     

Goblet Words and Indeterminacy：A Writing Style that Is Free of Commitment

The Zhuangzi is a collection of ancient Chinese anecdotes and fables that serves as a foundational Daoist text. The style in which it is written is significant because it obscures rather than reveals the text’s philosophic positions. If the text cannot be translated into plain language while preserving its content, as the Mozi or the Mencius generally can be, then the writing style is not merely rhetorical. The style is itself indispensable to the content. In this study, I analyse a linguistic device mentioned in the Zhuangzi and use it to reflect the text’s writing style—namely, “goblet words” (zhi yan 巵言). I argue that various logical forms of goblet words defy the act of fixing a definite answer in any conceptual distinction or disputation. The forms, which include dilemmatic questions, oxymora and double denial, all serve to preserve indeterminacy. Reading goblet words may affect readers by making them more open-minded towards distinctions. However, readers cannot ascertain that the text’s authors produced this effect intentionally. Therefore, the text may cause readers to be open-minded while the authors remain free of commitment.     

Principle,Knowledge, and Personality： Some Reflections on ＂the Good＂ according to Plato

This paper focuses on Plato＇s ＂Form of the Good,＂ or ＂the Good,＂ with an interest in Plato＇s riddle that ＂the Good is the One.＂ Unlike the traditional approach to explaining the Good in the Republic as ＂rational order＂ or a unity of Forms, this ]paper argues that the Good is the unique transcendent principle, like the apex of a hierarchy, but does not encompass the whole structure. According to its Ontological position, its multiple facets （functions） include the Ontological foundation of uniting ＂to be＂ and ＂ought to be,＂ the ultimate source of knowledge, and the Ideal goal of uniting the common good and individual goods. The practical dimension of the Good is highlighted in exploring the lifelong study of the Philosopher-Kings and their political personality. It is also pointed out that ＂sudden enlightenment＂ plays an important role in their path toward the Good. Finally, this paper proposes that the Good should be the a priori beginning of education and the end of the practice of virtues in the community.     

The Tradition of Emotive Writing in the Zhuangzi and Its Echoes in Later Generations

As the concluding part of a series of essays on theories of humanity in the Zhuangzi, this essay aims at describing the theme of qing 情 (emotion) as a dual-directional attitude towards qing as a partner to xing 性 (nature) and the influence of this domain of thought on later generations and their continued discussion of it. Faced with a forcible divorce of qing and xing at the hand of Han Dynasty Ruists, which would lock perceptions into a rigid dualist framework, the Wei and Jin period saw authors such as Wang Bi and Ji Kang return to a more faithful rendering of the theme of qing in the classics, the Laozi and Zhuangzi, seeing it become an ever more explicit philosophical topic and beginning a lengthy period of discussion of the theme of qing. In the Northern Song period, representative thinkers Zhang Zai and Wang Anshi The Northern Song tradition constitute a continuance of Pre-Qin Daoist philosophical ideas, providing a logical reinterpretation of the indivisibility of qing and xing from a syncretist approach to the Daoist and Ruist traditions, in a way that drastically differs from the Southern Song preference for xing at the cost of qing, as represented by thinkers such as the Brothers Cheng and Zhu Xi. At the bottom of it, this continued tradition draws from themes that appear in the Zhuangzi, a holistic approach to life and the relationship between humanity and nature, an important and continuous thread in the fabric of human civilisation.     

Thinking Environmentally: Introduction to the Special Issue on Environmental Ethics

"Thinking environmentally!" If I were asked to point out one of the major trends in the field of applied philosophy in the last few decades,"thinking environmentally" would naturally come to my mind as a term with a wide range of implications.Since the 1970s,environmental ethics has been studied and taught in universities and colleges,and there is an increasing interest in environmental studies both in philosophy and inter-disciplinarily.This interest reflects environmental movements that started in Europe and the North America,but soon spread to all comers of the world."Thinking environmentally" cultivates serious awareness of environmental problems caused by rapid industrialization and urbanization,and supports a new attitude towards natural resources and laws.     

Wang Fuzhi’s Interpretation of Spirit/Shen in His Annotation on the Zhuangzi

This essay systematically explores the concept “spirit” (shen 神) in Wang Fuzhi’s Annotation on the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi Jie 莊子解). Following Zhuangzi, Wang Fuzhi interprets spirit as a mass of vital force/jingqi, and regards spirit as the master of human life and human body. Through preserving one’s spirit, one will not only be able to preserve one’s body, but also keep all creatures immune from sickness and plague. This can be accomplished, since a well-preserved spirit will contribute harmonious and pure qi to the universe and make the whole universe more harmonious. In an effort to achieve this purpose, Wang Fuzhi proposes “forgetting all external things” and aiming for an empty and detached mind, on one hand, and asks a person to concentrate his spirit with a constant will, one the other hand. Once one’s spirit is well concentrated, one will be a spiritual person (shenren 神人), who will transcend life and death, fortune and misfortune, always living a leisurely and carefree life. One will also forget all cognitive distinctions and fully become one with the transformation of things and Heaven (tian 天). In this way, one’s spirit will achieve eternity, and fully realize the meaning of human life.     

Love and the Paradoxes of Unity: Zhu Xi's Debate with Followers of Cheng Hao over "Perceptual Oneness"

At the end of the twentieth century,there was a trend in Chinese literature towards characterizing Chinese culture as the "unity of Tian (Heaven) and humanity天人合一.” Rather than arguing against such a view,I present in this paper a series of debates over the paradoxes within the concept of unity as well as various notions of love,hoping to demonstrate the depth and complexity of this seemingly simple and dogmatic dictum so that those who cite it can be alert to its potential intricacies.I will discuss three elements which threaten to render the pursuit of oneness an impossible project:(1) the relation between naming and the named,which makes any conceptual attempt to attain oneness an infinite regress,as can be seen in Zhuangzi's莊子 argument against Hui Shi's惠施 oneness;(2) the gap between contemplation and practice,as can be seen in the contrast between Zhang Zai's張載 contemplative oneness and Cheng Hao's程顥 perceptual oneness;and (3) the self-bifurcating attentive acts of the heart-mind,which render any conscious endeavor to attain oneness a self-defeating project.Unlike Cheng Hao's emphasis on the subjective experience of perceptual oneness,his followers posit its underlying metaphysical substance as qi or xing (nature) and believe that moral self-cultivation should start from a metaphysical insight into this substance.Zhu Xi 朱熹 rejects the approach of grounding ethics on metaphysics and argues that love is not based on the notion of unity in terms of qi.He sees the ultimate comprehension of unity rather as a "metaphysical promise," a goal to be attained by following the Confucian Way of selfcultivation,which starts simply from reflection and practice on things near at hand.     

James Legge's Hermeneutical Methodology as Revealed in His Translation of the Daxue

With a focus on The Great Learning (Daxue大學),this paper explores the specific exegetical or hermeneutical methodology adopted by James Legge in his translation of this Confucian canonical text.It begins with an analysis of the translation theory endorsed by Legge,comparing his translation with those of Ku Hung-ming and Wing-tsit Chan.The second part aims to explicate the hermeneutic dilemma faced by Legge in his dealing with this text.It looks at the intellectual context in which Legge's scholarship on the Chinese classics had developed,as well as the academic standard he was required to maintain throughout his translation.Overall,Legge's familiarity with Qing scholarship makes it interesting to determine where and why he follows or rejects Zhu Xi.Given Legge's Christian missionary background and the sense of mission pervading Zhu Xi's commentary,we conclude that Legge's affinity with Zhu Xi is much more subtle and complex than previously speculated:the difference in their approach to Confucian texts cannot be reduced to a contrast between construction and deconstruction or between canonization and decanonization.     

Growth,Experience and Nature in Dewey's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

Growth is an important concept in Dewey's philosophy,and,indeed,its ultimate focus.It is not,however,an easy task to posit growth as an ethical ideal,for here Dewey immediately faces a metaphysical dilemma:whether to offer us an objective standard of growth,which becomes a type of absolutism,or to inevitably fall into relativism.This paper explores how Dewey avoids this dilemma with his concept of experience,which is interrogated through the relationship between human beings and nature.Still,human growth in nature involves the cultivation of virtuosities (de德) in accordance with the rhythm of nature,and requires a completely different way of life other than our technological one.For this reason,I use Chinese philosophy,specifically ideas from the Yijing,to show how growth can be illustrated through the interaction between humans and the natural world.     

Introduction: Finding out the Right Way to Understand Virtue Ethics

It is very apparent that a discussion on virtue ethics—perhaps even a hot debate,the origin of which can be traced back to the late 1950s,has been going on during the past two decades,and has marked the philosophical domain we call ethics.Three authors' views on this topic will be seriously examined in this special theme. Chen Lai treats the topic in the context of Confucianism.He carefully explores Mencius' theory of virtue,and sees two main contrasts between the ideas of Mencius and those of Confucius,as well as three main features they both share.     

Beyond a Theory of Human Nature： Towards an Alternative Interpretation of Mencius＇ Ethics

By following the Wittgensteinian view that the sense of an ethical term such as “nature” (xing 性) should be understood through an examination of its function in its actual philosophical context, this article takes a look at the notion of xing in the Mencius from an alternative perspective. Proceeding from this perspective, it re-examines the view that xing in the Mencius should be understood in biological terms. A discussion of xing in relation to the “Why be moral?” question follows. I then offer an alternative interpretation of Mencius’ ethics by focusing on the meaning of the ethical particulars. Contrary to common perception, I argue that Mencius’ theory of human nature (renxing 人 性) need not occupy a central place in his moral philosophy; the ultimate foundation of Mencius’ moral philosophy lies in the meaning or sense of morality. Through participating in concrete, ethical thinking and by paying attention to the ethical particulars, human beings develop their grasp of moral and ethical meaning.