James Legge's Hermeneutical Methodology as Revealed in His Translation of the Daxue

With a focus on The Great Learning (Daxue大學),this paper explores the specific exegetical or hermeneutical methodology adopted by James Legge in his translation of this Confucian canonical text.It begins with an analysis of the translation theory endorsed by Legge,comparing his translation with those of Ku Hung-ming and Wing-tsit Chan.The second part aims to explicate the hermeneutic dilemma faced by Legge in his dealing with this text.It looks at the intellectual context in which Legge's scholarship on the Chinese classics had developed,as well as the academic standard he was required to maintain throughout his translation.Overall,Legge's familiarity with Qing scholarship makes it interesting to determine where and why he follows or rejects Zhu Xi.Given Legge's Christian missionary background and the sense of mission pervading Zhu Xi's commentary,we conclude that Legge's affinity with Zhu Xi is much more subtle and complex than previously speculated:the difference in their approach to Confucian texts cannot be reduced to a contrast between construction and deconstruction or between canonization and decanonization.     

On Cheng Chung-Ying’s Bentiyong Onto-hermeneutics

The onto-hermeneutic approach to bentiyong 本体用 championed by Cheng Chung-Ying 成中英 is a valuable addition to comparative philosophy. In his well-honed reading, bentiyong is described as the continuous, integrative substance at the base of things, which becomes known through an ongoing hermeneutic integration and interpretation of reality. However, his use of the English word “substance” to describe bentiyong is problematic, mainly because substance, being without properties and existing without change, cannot be read as part of a hermeneutic process. Luckily, there are resources within the Chinese philosophical tradition that can help in overcoming some of the difficulties in translation presented here. Namely, the way that Zhu Xi 朱熹 approaches ti-yong as a principle (li 理) provides a better and more fittingly discursive basis for expressing the onto-hermeneutic character of bentiyong intended by Cheng, and allows English translation of the term with a firm footing in mainstream Neo-Confucianism.     

Quine on Quantification and Existence

Quine's justly famous paper "On What There Is" introduced a criterion of ontological commitment which has been almost universally accepted by analytic philosophers ever since.In this paper I try to unpack some of the substantive and controversial philosophical commitments that are presupposed by this criterion.The aim is not to show that the criterion is incorrect,but merely that it is not as obvious as it is taken to be by many,and that we might have reasons to explore alternative ways of thinking about ontological commitments.     

Western Marxism's Misreading of Marx's Critique of Capitalism

Since its advent in the early 1920s,Western Marxism has undergone a torturous process from anti-liberalism to virtually liberalism.The main theoretical deficiency behind this process is the over-estimation of Marx's cultural critique of capitalism.As his economic research gradually deepened,Marx's dual critique of capitalism from economic and cultural perspectives matured.When the leading proponents of Soviet Marxism gave prominence to Marx's economic critique,as circumstances required,they and some key figures in the Second International misread his theory with emphasis on economic determinism.In contrast,Georg Lukács and most Western Marxists proceeded to develop a Marxian cultural critique with the consequence that his economic research being marginalized.Without the counterbalance of a continuous and consistent economic theory to challenge a confident international capitalism,cultural critique is consequently reorganized in confluence with liberalism,which is centered on an individual ontology.Re-excavating Marxian dual critical theory may help Westem Marxism escape the dilemma.     

Environmental Ethics and Linkola＇s Ecofascism： An Ethics Beyond Humanism

Ecofascism as a tradition in Environmental Ethics seems to burgeoning with potential. The roots of Ecofascism can be traced back to the German Romantic School, to the Wagnerian narration of the Nibelungen saga, to the works of Fichte and Herder and, finally, to the so-called volkisch movement. Those who take pride in describing themselves as ecofascists grosso modo tend to prioritize the moral value of the ecosphere, while, at the same time, they almost entirely devalue species and individuals. Additionally, these ecofascists are eager to reject democracy, the idea of progress in its entirety, as well as industrialization and urbanization. They also seem to be hostile towards individual autonomy and free will. In this short essay I will present and discuss Kaarlo Pentti Linkola＇s approach to environmental ethics, one that could be well described as the epitome of Ecofascism. I will argue that his arguments are neither sound nor documented, and I will conclude that Linkola＇s overall approach is, in my view, contrary to the purpose as well as to the very essence of morality.     

Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher? Wittgenstein vs Russell

This article is in six main sections.In the first three sections,some indication of how and why philosophers have differed in their response to the title question is given by describing Wittgenstein's encounters with Camap,and by examining Wittgenstein's commitment to clarity and argument in philosophy,illustrating this commitment by reference to his Philosophical Investigations discussion of the will.In the remaining three sections,Russell is taken as a paradigm example of a central kind of analytic philosopher.The answer to the title question is unfolded by sketching Wittgenstein's and Russell's treatments of a few philosophical topics and problems,focusing on theories and questions surrounding propositions,judgments,and their constituents,in particular Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment and the question of the unity of the proposition.This approach displays,and does not merely assert,Russell's deployment of (sometimes repeated variants of) technical solutions to philosophical problems and how that deployment contrasts with Wittgenstein's attempts to make such problems disappear.     

＂I Effaced Myself＂ and ＂The Disappearance of the Subject＂： A Comparison between Zhuangzi and Jean Baudrillard＇s Anti-Subjectivism

In the chapter ＂The Adjustment of Controversies＂ in his eponymous work, Zhuangzi has the character Nanguo Ziqi declare ＂I effaced myself,＂ thereby holding that one can return to the state of naturalness only after breaking with the ＂self＂ that is in opposition to ＂objects,＂ abandoning his subject-object standpoint and entering a state of ＂effacement＂ wherein one fuses with the Dao. Coincidently, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard also repeatedly stresses the ＂disappearance of the subject＂ in his later philosophy, trying to dissolve subject-centrism by means of a counterattack by the object wherein its logic would entrap the subject. Although they lived in different times, both Zhuangzi and Baudrillard note the same human predicament--the situation wherein the ＂I as subject＂ constantly obscures the ＂real I.＂ Their resolutions of the predicament are similar： both put their hopes in the dissolution of the ＂I＂ or self in subject-object relations, with Zhuangzi declaring ＂I effaced myself＇ and Baudrillard mooting the ＂disappearance of the subject.＂ They differ, however, on how to dissolve the ＂I＂ （myself）. Briefly, Zhuangzi advocates ＂effacing myself through the Dao,＂ that is, quitting one＇s ＂fixed mindset＂ and ＂egoism＂ and returning to the Dao by means of ＂forgetting＂ or ＂effacing＂; Baudrillard, on the other hand, proposes to ＂efface oneself through the object,＂ i.e., replace the supremacy of the subject with that of the object. Baudrillard＇s theory has often been criticized as pataphysics because of its nihilism without transcendence; in contrast, Zhuangzi＇s view, which construes the whole world as the unfolding of the Dao, seems more thought-provoking.     

The Principle of Production and a Critique of Metaphysics： From the Perspective of Theory of Baudrillard

In this article, I discuss Baudrillard＇s critique of metaphysics based on his work The Mirror of Production, in which he stresses the principle of production--i.e., dichotomy and derivation. In the development of classical German philosophy, the principle of production was speculatively established, first as Descartes＇ cogito, then as Fichte＇s Tathandlung, and finally as Hegel＇s labor, and grew to be a major principle of modem metaphysics. At the article＇s conclusion, the meaning of Symbolic Exchange--Baudrillard＇s utopian condition lying beyond the principle of production--will be discussed.     

BOOK REVIEW——Brook Ziporyn,Ironies of Oneness and Difference： Coherence in Early Chinese Thought

If there is one thread running through the history of Chinese philosophy, Ziporyn would identify it as the concept of ＂coherence.＂ It is no exaggeration to say that Ironies of Oneness and Difference is a gronndbreaking work, in which Ziporyn makes a case for the primacy of coherence in Chinese ontology. This is the first installment of a two part study. The second volume, Beyond Oneness and Difference.＂ Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents, examines explicit articulations of the concept li ~, traditionally translated as ＂principle,＂ ＂reason,＂ or ＂pattern,＂ but which he argues should be understood as a form of coherence. The first volume examines the discourses in pre-Qin texts that prefigure its development. Ziporyn attempts to plot continuities of meaning and usage over time that may be interpreted as stages in the emergence of an explicit concept of li. He makes his case with impeccable sinological scholarship, extensive familiarity with the relevant texts, and mastery of philosophical concepts, discourses, and methodologies.     

A Neo-Confucian Criticism of Daoism: Wang Fuzhi’s Contradictory Remarks on the Laozi

Based on Zhu Xi’s statement that Laozi’s teachings were very cruel, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi as a crafty, petty person in his Confucian commentaries. Yet, he had to understand the Laozi or Daodejing sympathetically when he commented on it in Laozi Yan老子衍 (Extended Commentary on the Laozi). As a result, he showed inconsistency in his criticism and evaluation of the author. Some scholars have noted this problem but have not shed ink analyzing it. This essay finds that Wang Fuzhi’s ambiguous attitude toward Laozi results from his Confucian prejudice against other schools and his failure to grasp the breadth and depth of Laozi’s thought. From the perspective of Heaven, Laozi promoted accommodation and non-interference in self-cultivation and governance, summed up by the maxim that “the sage manages affairs without deliberation, and spreads teachings without words.” In contrast, Wang Fuzhi stuck to the distinction between Confucianism and Daoism, and tried to use humanity and ritual propriety to supplement that which Heaven does not provide; as such, he criticized Laozi as crafty and irresponsible. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism neither hits the mark regarding Laozi’s weakness nor maintains a concordance with his earlier sympathetic appraisal in Laozi Yan; the reason for this is that Wang Fuzhi could not fully grasp Laozi’s thought from a Confucian and anthropocentric perspective.     

Socrates’ Humaneness: What His Last Words Meant

Confucius emphasises the importance of humaneness (ren 仁) and rites (li 禮). Socrates, on the other hand, is often interpreted as a person who places far more importance on rational thinking, even to the exclusion of natural human feelings, especially on the ground of his attitude towards the sorrow of his wife and friends on his last day as described in Plato’s Phaedo. Through clarifying two long-time riddles in this dialogue—namely, “What did Socrates mean by his last words, requesting Crito to offer a cock to Asclepius?” and “Was Plato really absent from the prison on Socrates’ last day, due to illness, as is mentioned by Phaedo?”—this paper argues that Socrates kept in mind the best interest of his wife and friends even at the moment of his death, and that his humane attitude is expressed in his last words, which were not only an expression of gratitude for Plato’s recovery from a critical illness but also an exhortation to his friends to continue their care of the soul.     

Introduction： Study Plato in China

Plato （427BC-347BC） is the philosopher of ancient Greece, perhaps the greatest one. His thought has played an important role in the development of the ideas of Western philosophy as well as in that of the whole culture. Regarding to his foundational and profound influence, Plato may be compared to Confucius who played similar role in the Chinese traditional culture. Plato＇s works is the most representative crown in the treasury of the ancient Greek culture, which belongs not only to Westerners but also to all mankind.     

WANG Zisong et al. 2010. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 4. Beijing： People＇s Publishing House, 1797 pp., ISBN： 9787010090878.

In Chinese Academia, the publication of this volume has gained a great deal of applause, about which little more needs to be said here. As its name indicates, this entry in the series aims to reveal the fourth and the last stage of the history of ancient Greek philosophy, which covers the Hellenistic and Roman periods （about 800 years in total）. Additionally, its appendix also serves as a brief summary of the foregoing volumes, which is quite helpful. This final volume is the end result of a marvelous academic project, which has lasted for 28 years. Prof. Wang Zisong is the Chief Editor of the whole project, and Prof. Chen Chun-fu is the executive editor of this volume. The new authors, who are mainly responsible for this volume, include Prof. Bao and Prof. Zhang.     

Structuring Reality: The Metaphysics of Harmony in Zhang Zai’s Zhengmeng Philosophical System

The essay aims to analyze the concept and the paradigm of harmony in the metaphysical system of the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai. It argues that Zhang Zai’s concept of Great Harmony not only inherits the traditional centrality of this idea within the Confucian tradition, but actually presents the most advanced idea of harmony up to his time. In Zhang Zai’s philosophy, harmony becomes the Way itself, which includes the realm of principles and the outward and functional manifestations of reality. This essay will deal with harmony in two ways: first with Zhang Zai’s direct use of the concept in the Zhengmeng and second, applying the paradigm of harmony to other of Zhang Zai’s key concepts such as qi 氣, void (xu 虛) and natural dispositions (xing 性).     

Was John Stuart Mill a Pluralist?

In his Autobiography,John Stuart Mill,the 19th-century British political philosopher,portrayed his On Liberty as being "a kind of philosophic text-book" dedicated to a single truth,that is,"the importance,to man and society,of a large variety in types of character,and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions." The Mill of On Liberty may seem to be a pluralist who tends to prefer difference per se to goodness of a uniform pattern,many-sidedness to conformity,and eccentricity to mediocrity.This paper seeks to challenge this argument by paying close attention to the text.It argues that the Mill of On Liberty was far from a single-minded pluralist.Two divergent positions are found throughout his reasoning:one is a pluralist idea that an individual's own plan of life is the best,no matter how base or licentious it might be;the other is the belief that there exist a limited number of ideal ways of life which define what the good life is.The two positions are,if not mutually exclusive,at least in important aspects indicative of some profound tension at the center of Mill's thought.     

The Consolations of Boethius

The paper considers the account of happiness given in Boethius＇s Consolations of Philosophy. This account claims that happiness requires security of possession, and argues from this requirement to the conclusion that worldly goods, which of their nature cannot be securely possessed, cannot provide happiness. This argument is shown to depend on assuming a life-driven account of human motivation, rather than a goods-driven account of human motivation. The life-driven account, according to which voluntary actions are ultimately motivated by the pursuit of a certain kind of life, is defended against the goods-driven account, according to which actions are motivated by the pursuit of goods the enjoyment of which can only be episodes in a human life. It is claimed that Boethius is right in holding a life-driven account, and that his account of happiness follows from it.     

Original mind and cosmic consciousness in the co-creative process

This article will investigate the issue of accessing benxin 本心 (original mind), subsequent operation from Self and, in that process, union with the “greater universe” or benti 本体 (original substance)—a state expressed in the West as “cosmic consciousness.” It is proposed that this allows one to participate as a partner in the creative process of one’s own life and the surrounding world. The equally important question of how to gain contact with original mind will also be addressed, as well as the consequences of doing so with regard to the human condition. The concept of original thought is introduced, being important here as it is held to be that thought which is generated in the pure condition of original mind, devoid of influence from finite physical existence.     

Xiong Shili on the Nature,the Mind and the Origin of Badness as Evidenced in Ming Xin Pian 明心篇 (Explaining the Mind )

The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian明心篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.     

On the Philosophical Relevance of Marx＇s Views Today

This paper revisits some of Marx＇s central philosophical ideas with the attempt to understand the thinker＇s real place in the history of the Western philosophical tradition. It does not only show that the philosophical dimension is central to Marx＇s economic and political works, and therefore his contributions to philosophy merit special investigation, but it also argues that Marx is a descendant of classic German philosophy, and thus his views should be assessed in the context of the development of the philosophical ideas that emerged within that tradition.