Psychometric evaluation of trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder assessments in persons with severe mental illness

Interrater reliability, internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent validity were examined for the Trauma History Questionnaire (THQ), the Clinician-Administered Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Scale (CAPS), and the PTSD Checklist (PCL) in 30 clients with severe mental illnesses. Interrater reliability for the THQ and CAPS was high, as was internal consistency of CAPS and PCL subscales. The test-retest reliability of the THQ was moderate to high for different traumas. PTSD diagnoses on the CAPS and PCL showed moderate test-retest reliability. Lower levels of test-retest reliability for PTSD diagnoses were related to psychosis diagnoses and symptoms. However, when more stringent criteria for PTSD were used on the CAPS, it had excellent test-retest reliability across all clients. CAPS and PCL diagnoses of PTSD showed moderate convergent validity. The results support the reliability of trauma and PTSD assessments in clients with severe mental illness.     

The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.