Recent Debates Over Structural Realism

Summary  In recent years Structural Realism has been revived as a compromise candidate to resolve the long-standing question of scientific realism. Recent debate over structural realism originates with Worrall’s (1989) paper “Structural Realism: The best of Both Worlds”. However, critics such as Psillos contend that structural realism incorporates an untenable distinction between structure and nature, and is therefore unworkable. In this paper I consider three versions of structural realism that purport to avoid such criticism. The first is Chakravartty’s “semirealism” which proceeds by trying to show that structural realism and entity realism entail one another. I demonstrate that this position will not work, but follow Chakravartty’s contention that structural realism need not imply that scientific knowledge can only be of mathematical structure. I advance from this conclusion to sketch a version of structural realism that is consistent with recent deflationary approaches to the scientific realism question. Finally, I consider a third approach to structural realism Ladyman’s “metaphysical structural realism” which tries to avoid the difficulties of earlier versions by taking structure to be ontologically primary. I show that the deflationary approach to structural realism undermines the rationale behind Ladyman’s approach.     

A Different Type of Individualism in Zhuangzi

Individualism is not only a Western tradition. In the Zhuangzi we can also identify some elements which may be appropriately attributed to “individualism.” However, due to its particular cultural and philosophical background, Zhuangzian individualism has unique characteristics, which distinguish it from the variety of other individualist thoughts that have emerged in the West. Zhuangzi has a dynamic and open view on individual “self,” considering individuals as changing and unique beings rather than fixed and interchangeable “atoms”; he sets the unlimited Dao as the ultimate source for individuals to conform to, thus releasing individual mind into a realm of infinite openness and freedom. The Zhuangzian individualism is “inward” rather than “outward,” concentrating on individual spirit rather than material interests and rights in social reality. The individualism in the Zhuangzi provides a spiritual space for the development of individuality in ancient China. It also provides an alternative understanding of individual as an existence.     

A defence of informational structural realism

This is the revised version of an invited keynote lecture delivered at the 1st Australian Computing and Philosophy Conference (CAP@AU; the Australian National University in Canberra, 31 October–2 November, 2003). The paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not all relata (structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome is informational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. The paper has been discussed by several colleagues and, in the second half, ten objections that have been moved to the proposal are answered in order to clarify it further.     

人生终极的理性自觉——儒家"命"的观念

The Confucian idea of “ming 命 (destiny)” holds that in the course and culmination of human life, there exists some objective certainty that is both transcendent and beyond human control. This is a concept of ultimate concern at the transcendental theoretical level in Confucianism. During its historical development, Confucianism has constantly offered humanist interpretations of the idea of “destiny”, thinking that the transcendence of “destiny” lies inherently within the qi endowment and virtues of human beings, that the certainty of “destiny” is in essence contingency at the beginning of life and linear irreversibility towards its end, and that to live in light of ethics and physical rules — having a “commitment to human affairs” — means putting “destiny” into practice. As all these facts show, the Confucian ultimate concern regarding human life is full of rational awareness. __________ Translated by Huang Deyuan from Kongzi yanjiu 孔子研究 (Study on Confucius), 2008, (2): 4–11     

A. F. Losevs personalistische ontologie

A. F. Losev, one of the most important Russian philosophers and historians of ancient aesthetics and culture in the 20th century, develops in his ‘Dialectics of the Myth’ (Dialektika mifa), 1930, a personalistic ontology by using elements of neoplatonic philosophy and Orthodox Christian belief. According to Losev reality in all its different expressions and ontological strata must be understood as “mythical”, i.e. as “living mutual exchange of subject and object”. The subjective and personal aspect of reality is not grounded in man’s epistemic relation to it alone; reality in itself has to be characterized as personal and subjective. The main philosophical opponent is Descartes, the founder of “modern rationalism and mechanism”.

     

The mineness of experience

In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.

Pragmatic encroachment,stakes, and religious knowledge

It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”     

Discussions Quinton’s Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism

Summary  This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists.     

道德与自然:"形上之道"与"形而上学"的本质区别

Both thinkings on Dao in Chinese philosophy and metaphysics in Western philosophy investigate things on a spiritual level that transcends experience, but there are incommensurable differences between them. The objective of “metaphysics” is ontological knowledge about nature from the perspective of epistemological “truth-pursuing”. Western metaphysics is thus a “metaphysics of nature”. Dao in Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, more often manifests itself in “good-pursuing” by means of the internal, experiential pursuit of moral stature and spiritual security. Philosophy of Dao is thus a “metaphysics of ethics”. The cause of this difference can be traced back to the differences between the rational tradition of the West, characterized by the dualism of the subject and the object, and the moral tradition of China, characterized by the integration of man and nature. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Lunlixue yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethics), 2007, (4): 62–65     

"以生言性"的传统与孟子性善论

This article analyses the tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng” and related other expressions, and also examines the debate between Mencius and Gaozi concerning “xing is known by sheng.” It claims that while Mencius’ “human nature is good” discourse is influenced by the interpretive tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng”, Mencius also transcends and develops this tradition. Therefore it is only when Mencius’ views about the goodness of human nature are understood in the context of this interpretive tradition that his ideas can be fully understood. Utilizing this framework, the Confucian understanding of rights is then explored. Translated by Andrew Lambert from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (7): 36–42     

An exposition of Zhou Yi studies in modern Neo-Confucianism

The representatives of modern Neo-Confucianism all greatly value Yi Zhuan and regard it as one of their spiritual resources, and give their own creative interpretations and transformations. Xiong Shili’s ontological-cosmological theory takes “qian yuan” as its center; Ma Yifu has a theory of ontology-cultivation centered on “nature-principle”; Fang Dongmei has a metaphysics of production and reproduction; Mou Zongsan takes the view of “completely knowing the fathomless and understanding transformation” as a moral metaphysics; and in Tang Junyi there is a theory of the harmony of doctrines on Heaven and man in which “the knowledge of divine understanding” is its key concept. They employ modern philosophical concepts and thinking to illustrate the cosmology, ontology, theory of life, theory of human nature, theory of spiritual worlds, axiology and their connections in Zhou Yi. They affirm that the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are different from Western philosophy consist in a naturalist view of vital life, a harmonious view of totality, an axiological view that values exist in natural universe and the world of fact, the pursuit of Good and Beauty, and intuitive experience of inner world. __________ Translated from Zhou Yi Yanjiu 周易研究 (Zhou Yi Studies), 2004 (4) by Hao Changchi     

Some philosophical thoughts on the nature of technology

Much of the effort put into discovering or defining the nature of technology has been along “party lines,” for example, either favoring technology or not. Although there is a clear divergence in the stand that various authors take with respect to this topic, I believe they share a common assumption, namely, that there is such a thing as “the essence” or “nature” of technology. My claim in this paper is that the broad use to which we put the term “technology” is better understood on the model of “family resemblance,” a model put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, than it is on models that utilize the notion of “essence” or “nature.” Not only does the family resemblance model serve us better in understanding the wide variety of uses of the term, but it also helps to ameliorate the antipathy between the parties that their discussions often invoke.     

Building the virtual city: Public participation through e-democracy

In this paper, we outline how we have developed a series of technologies that enable planning information to be disseminated to affected citizens so that professionals and politicians can engage with these stakeholders in realizing more effective plans. Our main theme is based on the generic idea of the “virtual city” which is conceived in terms of the geography and geometry of the real city. This is a digital representation using a variety of software and multimedia, made interactively available over the web. We begin with a brief comment on different types of virtual city and then summarize the key problems of using such virtualities in public participation, more recently considered as part of the e-democracy movement. We outline our previous attempts to engage in such online participation in east London for these have been an essential prerequisite to the development of “Virtual London,” the application reported here which is currently being fashioned for widespread dissemination of planning information by the Greater London Authority (GLA). We then argue that virtual cities should go well beyond the traditional conceptions of 3D GIS and CAD into virtual worlds and online design. But we also urge caution in pushing the digital message too far, showing how more conventional tangible media is always necessary in rooting such models in more realistic and familiar representations. He has pioneered various multimedia, virtual reality methods 3D GIS, and CAD for problems of public participation in planning. He is currently the director of the Greater London Authority’s Virtual London project within CASA. Amongst his recent contributions, he has published (with S. Evans, M. Batty, and S. Batty) “Community Participation in Urban Regeneration Using Internet Technologies,” in London: A Sustainable World City and “30 Days in ActiveWorlds: Community, Design, and Terrorism in a Virtual World,” in The Social Life of Avatars, Presence and Interaction in Shared Virtual Environments. Stephen Evans is also a senior research fellow at CASA. His background is in GIS and he has worked on several projects including LEO—London Environment Online, PROPOLIS—the development of GIS interfaces to urban land use transportation models, and currently on the Virtual London and Camden Panoramas projects. Amongst his recent work, he has published (with P. Steadman) “Interfacing Land-Use Transport Models with GIS: The Inverness Model,” in Advanced Spatial Analysis: The CASA Book of GIS and (with A. Hudson-Smith and M. Batty) “Homes in Hackney Point to the Future,” Planning, 12 July 2002. Michael Batty is professor of Spatial Analysis and Planning and director of CASA. He has a joint appointment between the Department of Geography and the Bartlett School of Architecture and Planning. His books range from Urban Modelling to Fractal Cities. He is editor of Environment and Planning B. The work of his group can be seen at 〈http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk〉 and in the recent book Advanced Spatial Analysis. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2001 and was awarded the CBE for “services to geography” in 2004.     

Professionalizing the Practice of Public Policy in the Prevention of Violence

The State of the Science Conference Statement on “Preventing Violence and Related Health-Risking Social Behaviors in Adolescents” accurately summarizes the state of knowledge regarding risk factors for violence and intervention efficacy. The Statement missed an opportunity, however, to move the field of prevention practice and policy forward by advocating for more systematic, central review of preventive interventions through a new federal regulatory body, such as an “FDA for Preventive Interventions.” This body would provide review of evidence-based programs and aid decision-making in funding. As a complement to this body, decision-makers also need guidelines in evidence-based practice in ambiguous circumstances, which characterize much of the reality of public policy. Therefore, this new regulatory body should be accompanied by guidelines for evidence-based practice in intervention and policy. Finally, in order to move forward both of these concepts, a National Academy of Sciences Panel should convene to deliberate how these concepts can be implemented.     

Inspirational Patterns for Embodied Interaction

The concern of this work is how knowledge based on design experience can be developed, disseminated, articulated, and acquired. We propose the notion of inspirational patterns, or i-patterns, which refers to abstractions of core ideas and essential elements from a class of coherent examples, pointing to promising regions in the design space. Most current work on patterns concentrates on proven solutions to recurring problems; i-patterns, on the other hand, are oriented toward the innovative and inspirational. The design domain of interest to us is interaction design, which can be roughly defined as design with digital materials. More specifically, we focus on the intersection of tangible interfaces and social computing that is called embodied interaction. The paper presents nine i-patterns for embodied interaction, including “Virtual information is tied to positions in the material world” and “Heterogeneous virtual information fuses into a few sensory parameters.” Published in Proc. Nordes 2005, submitted for republication in Knowledge, Technology and Policy.     

Sometimes One is More Than Two: When Collaboration Inhibits Knowledge Construction

In this paper I suggest that to better understand knowledge construction in science, and the role of social processes and collaboration in it, it is useful to distinguish between “elaborative knowledge” and “emergent knowledge.” Elaborative knowledge is constructed for solving clearly defined problems in established theoretical frameworks, and emergent knowledge refers to the knowledge constructed to reach a hierarchically higher and more complex level of scientific understanding. There are also two types of collaboration. On the one hand there is “dialogical collaboration” in which team members contribute to reaching the common clearly defined objective so that a team as a whole becomes qualitatively more complex than its members alone. On the other hand there is “unidirectional collaboration” where the result of collaboration is determined by one person, should be distinguished. There is evidence from multiple perspectives indicating that “elaborative knowledge” can be developed in both kinds of collaboration and sometimes ‘dialogical collaboration” is necessary for knowledge construction. However, for building “emergent knowledge,” it is argued, only individual or “unidirectional collaboration” is productive, and “dialogical collaboration” can hinder or even prevent the construction of this kind of knowledge.

Nature, Interthing Intersubjectivity, and the Environment: A Comparative Analysis of Kant and Daoism

The Kantian philosophy, for many, largely represents the Modern West’s anthropocentric dominance of nature in its instrumental-rationalist orientation. Recently, some scholars have argued that Kant’s aesthetics offers significant resources for environmental ethics, while others believe that Kant’s flawed dualistic views in the second Critique severely undermine any environmental promise that aesthetic judgments may hold in Kant’s third Critique. This article first examines the meanings of nature in Kant’s three Critiques. It concludes that Kant’s aesthetic view toward sensible nature is indeed inconsistent. The article, however, also suggests that the “I” as “transcendental apperception” discussed in the paralogisms of the first Critique holds some promise of “interthing intersubjective” thinking. The second half of the article demonstrates that Daoism with a dialectic concern similar to Kant’s has something insightful to offer in its idea of interthingness based on a phenomenal account of nature. The article investigates important Daoist ideas of interthing analogical experience, qi, spiritual exercise, and wuwei in its dialect relation to zizan. By bringing Daoism and Kant into dialogue, the author hopes to bring forth a synthetic approach that is better suited to today’s environmental concerns.     

Aufbau to Animism: A sketch of the alternate methodology and major discovery in Dorion Cairns's revision of Edmund Husserl's “Fifth Cartesian Meditation”

After a review of his revisions of Husserl's methodology, Cairns's new version of the procedure of Abbauor unbuilding is followed from the Objective world down to the primordial world and then from there down to the phantom world within which sensa fields can be analyzed. Then the abstractive epochēs by which lower strata were reached are successively relaxed in the Aufbau or upbuilding procedure and, most interestingly, the sense “psychophysical thing” originally constituted within primordial automaticity is found to be transferred automatically and with presumptive certainty to everything in the Objective world. Any differences between “animate” and “inanimate” things are only constituted at a higher level and pertain then to culture and not nature.     

Ernst Cassirer as cultural scientist

The article investigates Cassirer’s developing interest in the cultural sciences to display how his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms constitutes a philosophy of culture. The core concept in such a philosophy of culture is the symbolic formation that both possesses a structured-structuring dimension and appears as an historical process in which culture shows itself as a temporal creation. The philosophy of culture displays ‘life in meaning’, that is reality as it exhibits human reality manifested in and through the medium of linguistic, artistic, religious, scientific “and so on” action and behaviour. This reality, therefore, is mediation between culture and nature through human spirit. Cassirer’s philosophy of culture connects back to Kant’s transcendental idealism by emphasizing that any concept of reality establishes itself through a modalization of reality, e.g. that reality constitutes itself in the mode of interpretation. This makes the basis for Cassirer’s characteristic understanding of hermeneutics where cultural development is regarded as drama.     

The ontologicalization of the Confucian concept of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Xin Xing</Emphasis>: Zhou Lianxi’s founding contribution to the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism

The Confucian concept of “cheng” (integrity) emphasizes logical priority of value realization over “zhen shi” (reality or truth). Through value realization and the completion of being, zhenshi can be achieved. Cheng demonstrates the original unity of value and reality. Taking the concept of cheng as the core, Zhou Lianxi’s philosophy interpreted yi Dao (the Dao of change), and integrated Yi Jing (The Book of Changes) and Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of the Mean). On the one hand, it ontologicalized the Confucian concept of xin xing (mind nature), and proved and established the significance of Dao ti (the ontological Dao) as the principle and origin of the utmost goodness. On the other hand, it also extended the significance of value realization to the process of qi hua (transformation of qi) and transformation of myriad things. He proved li yi (the One Principle) of Dao ti from its many manifestations and established his own metaphysical system. Zhou Lianxi’s philosophy sets up a new theoretical direction for the Song-Ming Confucians to reconstruct Confucian Metaphysics. __________ Translated from Beijing Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Beijing Normal University)(Social Sciences Edition), Vol. 186, 2004 (6) by Yan Xin