The self and action in theory of mind research

Research on children's developing theories of mind has contributed to our understanding of the developmental relation of self and action (1) by exploring the relation of the development of self knowledge to the development of knowledge of others' minds and (2) by investigating the relation between theory of mind development and the development of action control. We argue that evidence on theory of mind reasoning in children with deficient action control (ADHD-diagnosed children) is especially relevant to the second issue and we present some first evidence supporting the bi-directional hypothesis, that is, the view that theory of mind leads to improved action control which in turn supports the ability to represent mental states on-line.     

Towards Dialogical Models of Radicalization and de-Radicalization

According to social psychology, radicalization occurs for a variety of reasons reasons. They include a sense of exclusion, threatened identity, loss of meaning and significance, negative emotions and defensive identification with a group representing power and a clear-cut ideology. In the terms of the Dialogical Self Theory, radicalization implies atrophy of the internal polyphony and dialogical functions of the self. Two hypothetical models of the radicalized self are proposed. The first posits the creation of a powerful I-position that represents a “universal” truth that is not open to doubt. The second introduces twin I-positions, one representing a sense of insecurity and another depicting a redemptive idea. Both types imply lowered openness and reduction of social and internal dialogs, resulting in a dysfunctional, rigid organized self. The question discussed in this article is: How can such an internal organization of the self be changed? Thus it aims to describe and explain the process of de-radicalization, which is proposed to consist of three elements: (1) reorganization of the self-structure and stimulation of a promoter position, (2) restoration of security, which can awaken the polyphony and dialogicality of the self, and (3) supporting internal dialog, promoter functions and a meta-position by reference to values that are significant for the relevant I-positions and the system as a whole.     

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.     

Dialogical Self and the Changing Body During the Transition to Motherhood

This article explores the transition to first-time motherhood and focuses on the analysis of integration in the self-system of a new I-position – the maternal one. This dialogical interchange between dynamically related I-positions (I-as-pregnant and I-as-mother) is the arena where the personal affective core of the self and the sociocultural background of social role demands are intertwined. During pregnancy and childbirth, the I-as-pregnant position becomes transformed into the lasting I-as-mother I-position. This process is seen as an activity of the subject to organize general dialogical relations within the self under conditions of bodily transformations which result from fetal development.     

“I’m Just Who I Am”: Self-Continuity and the Dialogical Self in a Study of Migrants

Drawing on dialogical self theory, this study aimed to develop understanding of the processes of self-continuity in migrants with complex trajectories. Twelve participants of various nationalities and ages took part in qualitative interviews in the United Kingdom and the United States. An iterative, three-step analysis for multivoicedness suggested participants initially adopted stabilizing I-positions that acted as foundations for subsequent development and evolution of new selves. A clear and dynamic progression of positioning, repositioning, and innovation in the dialogical self emerged. Findings suggest that change and rupture may act as catalysts for positive development and innovation, resulting in a robust, enhanced sense of self-continuity.     

Using Drawings to Elicit Nonverbal Constructs in Experiential Personal Construct Psychotherapy

Clients who have experienced psychological wounds prior to the use of language frequently struggle to articulate and make sense of their core constructs around self and others. These early wounds can have a significant influence on future relational interactions, even though they may be experienced at a nonverbal level. While eliciting these preverbal constructs may be essential to the healing process, without verbal representation the therapeutic task can be difficult. In this article, we will discuss the use of symbolism within personal construct psychology as well as the use of drawings as representations of nonverbal constructs. We will then discuss experiential personal construct psychotherapy and its focus on the ways we both connect and disconnect from others. Finally, we will present Kristen, a therapy client who experienced early relational wounds and increasingly dissociated in response to relational stress as she matured. Kristen's work in therapy around her fragmented sense of self included drawing her internal self-parts. Only then was she able to wrap words around that which she previously experienced nonverbally. In this case study, Kristen's drawings and her core constructs as elicited during four years of therapy will be presented and discussed.     

Development of theory of mind and executive control

Several recent studies have demonstrated a developmental link, in the age range of 3–5 years, between the acquisition of a ‘theory of mind’ and self control. In this review, we consider the existence of such a link in assessing five competing theoretical hypotheses that might help us to understand the nature of this developmental advance: (1) executive control depends on theory of mind; (2) theory of mind development depends on executive control; (3) the relevant theory of mind tasks require executive control; (4) both kinds of task require the same kind of embedded conditional reasoning; (5) theory of mind and executive control involve the same brain region. We briefly describe these theoretical accounts and evaluate them in the light of existing empirical evidence. At present, only account (3) can be ruled out with some confidence.     

A Service Member's Self in Transition: A Longitudinal Case Study Analysis

Adopting a narrative approach with a dialogical framework, a longitudinal case study is presented that describes a service member's self in transition from active service into the civilian population. An analysis and interpretation of the case study leads to the hypothesis that if a dominant military I-position appears in the self, a transition may initially create decentering movements of the self that in turn decrease integration and dialogical capacity of the self. New narrative concepts of who one is to become may take time to shape and anchor in corresponding I-position(s) of the self, and self-adaption may only reach a certain level of integration. However, the rise of a third position may unify two conflicting parts, or I-positions, of the self. This may prove to be a promising development for integration and dialogue of the self. Future research is encouraged that examines this hypothesis more broadly.     

From Indian philosophy to cognitive neuroscience: two empirical case studies for Ganeri's <Emphasis Type="Italic">Self</Emphasis>

In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest new questions and constraints for Ganeri's theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri's self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.     

Mind, Self, and Personality: Dynamic Interactions from Late Childhood to Early Adulthood

This paper aims to integrate research on mind, personality, and self-development using a general model which hypothesizes that mind and personality are organized in 3 levels. The first level includes environment-oriented, domain-specific systems that specialize in the representation of and interaction with particular types of relationships in the environment in both the cognitive and the social realms. The second level comprises self-oriented monitoring and representation processes that build maps of the environment-oriented systems. Self and identity derive from the interaction between these 2 levels, which is subject to the constraints and the system's processing capacity at the successive ages. These constraints may be taken as the third level of the self. Efficiency in overcoming these constraints is determined by the self-oriented processes, generating feelings and self-representations of self-worth. These feelings are idiosyncratic, and function as a personal constant, which is applied on self-evaluation and self-representations. This constant is rescaled and differentiated with development. Thus, we have simultaneously both modular and transmodular constructs in the mind and the self, which change with relative independence of each other under the constraints of the general processing capabilities and the personal constant. A series of studies are presented to support this model, and its implications for life-span theories of development are discussed.     

"I-I" AND "I-ME": TRANSPOSING BUBER's INTERPERSONAL ATTITUDES TO THE INTRAPERSONAL PLANE

Hermans' polyphonic model of the self proposes that dialogical relationships can be established between multiple I-positions1 (e.g., Hermans, 2001a). There have been few attempts, however, to explicitly characterize the forms that these intrapersonal relationships may take. Drawing on Buber's (1958) distinction between the "I-Thou" and "I-It" attitude, it is proposed that intrapersonal relationships can take one of two forms: an "I-I" form, in which one I-position encounters and confirms another I-position in its uniqueness and wholeness; and an "I-Me" form, in which one I-position experiences another I-position in a detached and objectifying way. This article argues that this I-Me form of intrapersonal relating is associated with psychological distress, and that this is so for a number of reasons: Most notably, because an individual who objectifies and subjugates certain I-position cannot reconnect with more central I-positions when dominance reversal (Hermans, 2001a) takes place. On this basis, it is suggested that a key role of the therapeutic process is to help clients become more able to experience moments of I-I intrapersonal encounter, and it is argued that this requires the therapist to confirm the client both as a whole and in terms of each of his or her different voices.     

Seeing minds in others: Mind perception modulates low-level social-cognitive performance and relates to ventromedial prefrontal structures

In social interactions, we rely on nonverbal cues like gaze direction to understand the behavior of others. How we react to these cues is affected by whether they are believed to originate from an entity with a mind, capable of having internal states (i.e., mind perception). While prior work has established a set of neural regions linked to social-cognitive processes like mind perception, the degree to which activation within this network relates to performance in subsequent social-cognitive tasks remains unclear. In the current study, participants performed a mind perception task (i.e., judging the likelihood that faces, varying in physical human-likeness, have internal states) while event-related fMRI was collected. Afterwards, participants performed a social attention task outside the scanner, during which they were cued by the gaze of the same faces that they previously judged within the mind perception task. Parametric analyses of the fMRI data revealed that activity within ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was related to both mind ratings inside the scanner and gaze-cueing performance outside the scanner. In addition, other social brain regions were related to gaze-cueing performance, including frontal areas like the left insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus, as well as temporal areas like the left temporo-parietal junction and bilateral temporal gyri. The findings suggest that functions subserved by the vmPFC are relevant to both mind perception and social attention, implicating a role of vmPFC in the top-down modulation of low-level social-cognitive processes.     

Traveling Without a Destination? A Dialogical Analysis of Professional Identity Construction Among Australian Double Degree Psychology Students

This paper presents findings from a study of Australian double degree psychology students’ construction of professional identity. Dialogical self theory was used as a framework to conceptualize professional identity construction and to identify the I-positions, the voices of others, and the relationships between these voices within the self. Results revealed that conflicting voices were heard within the self, creating tensions in students’ professional identification. Moreover, it seems that when trying to navigate their study journeys, students rely on several, sometimes unintentional, value orientations to assist them in moving forward from these struggles. Findings are considered in the context of further developing dialogical self theory and the enhancement of curricula that focus on multiprofessional and interdisciplinary learning and teaching.     

时间距离、自我差异的自动激活与价值偏好

本研究对时间距离对自我差异的自动激活假说进行了检验。研究首先启动个体不同的时间自我知觉,然后利用评价性条件反射使先前激活的自我知觉中止,以检验对价值偏好的影响。结果证实了本研究的假设,当消极情绪词语和自我词语同时启动时,先前激活的自我知觉回落到未激活前的基线水平,并使得远期时间距离所引发的可能自我差异或近期时间距离所引发的当前自我差异减弱,从而导致价值偏好不再随时间线索发生系统改变。研究最后讨论了这一发现对自我调节研究的意义。     

AMAB: Automated measurement and analysis of body motion

Technologies that measure human nonverbal behavior have existed for some time, and their use in the analysis of social behavior has become more popular following the development of sensor technologies that record full-body movement. However, a standardized methodology to efficiently represent and analyze full-body motion is absent. In this article, we present automated measurement and analysis of body motion (AMAB), a methodology for examining individual and interpersonal nonverbal behavior from the output of full-body motion tracking systems. We address the recording, screening, and normalization of the data, providing methods for standardizing the data across recording condition and across subject body sizes. We then propose a series of dependent measures to operationalize common research questions in psychological research. We present practical examples from several application areas to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed method for full-body measurements and comparisons across time, space, body parts, and subjects.     

Metaphors of a bodily mind

Patients' metaphors in analysis may allow access to ineffable experiences. This is understandable, since the mind is a bodily mind, and language is a fully embodied function of this mind. That is, both are dependent for their existence upon the physical body. The ontogenic accumulation of perceived sensory impressions and affective processes far exceeds what can be put into words. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that the active mind functions in such a manner that later perceptions are organized by means of earlier ones. However, since the mind can know only its own representations, it inhabits two ever unknown realms: the external world itself, and the domain of internal unconscious processes that sustain the mind's functions. As a result, the world and the self we know are constructed by the mediation of our bodies. In language also, the active mode by which we perceive, process, and feel makes our understanding of words dependent on previous experience. The fact that the limbic system is activated immediately in the moment of processing experience means that all modalities of representation include an affective valuation.This inevitable processing of information through the mediation of affectively valued bodily perceptions gives the metaphorical function-the human capacity to organize experience and life in metaphoric ways-the ability to create linguistic metaphors that can capture and express otherwise inexpressible psychic experiences. This manner of understanding metaphor has implications for psychoanalytic technique.     

Relative efficacy of different encoding structures and judgment topics in a cued-recall task

Existing research on the relative efficacy of the self as an encoding structure applies more to the self as an object than as a cognitive structure that guides the organization of incoming information. In order to provide a task that would be more directly relevant to encoding, subjects were asked to watch an interview of a resident assistant (RA) candidate by the housing department and to attend throughout to how similar the candidate's presentation was to the one they themselves or a typical RA would have given in the situation. Furthermore, judgments of similarity were divided into personality, ability, and nonverbal style. The dependent variable was a surprise cued-recall task, administered 20 min after the videotaped interview had ended. Consistent with prediction, subjects instructed to encode from a self-perspective exhibited better recall than those instructed to encode from a typical RA perspective. Also, as predicted, subjects who judged personality or ability similarity recalled more of the interview than those who judged nonverbal style similarity. Enhanced recall from the self-encoding perspective was consistent across all three types of judgments (personality, ability, nonverbal style), suggesting that the self is an efficient processing structure across a variety of diverse judgment topics.     

Belief attribution despite verbal interference

False-belief (FB) tasks have been widely used to study the ability of individuals to represent the content of their conspecifics' mental states (theory of mind). However, the cognitive processes involved are still poorly understood, and it remains particularly debated whether language and inner speech are necessary for the attribution of beliefs to other agents. We present a completely nonverbal paradigm consisting of silent animated cartoons in five closely related conditions, systematically teasing apart different aspects of scene analysis and allowing the assessment of the attribution of beliefs, goals, and physical causation. In order to test the role of language in belief attribution, we used verbal shadowing as a dual task to inhibit inner speech. Data on 58 healthy adults indicate that verbal interference decreases overall performance, but has no specific effect on belief attribution. Participants remained able to attribute beliefs despite heavy concurrent demands on their verbal abilities. Our results are most consistent with the hypothesis that belief attribution is independent from inner speech.     

Has Average Joe Got Inner Conflicts? Positioning the Self and the Meaning of Mid-Range Scores on the Big Five Traits

In this article we explore dilemmas with interpreting mid-range scores on Big Five personality traits. Using dialogical self theory, we hypothesized that mid-trait individuals would report more conflict between I-positions congruent with the trait domain concerned, for example, conflict between I-as-bold and I-as-reserved in the domain of Extraversion. A community sample of 147 participants completed a Big Five trait measure, the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R), and the I-Position Inventory (IPI). The IPI contains 88 I-position statements generated from previous research and clinical assessments. Fifty-two of the statements form 26 opposing pairs (e.g., I-as-optimist vs. I-as-pessimist). To measure the most salient I-position conflicts, respondents were asked to rank these pairs (only the top five pairs were ranked). In support of the conflict hypothesis, for three of the Big Five traits, individuals who scored mid-range reported more conflict between I-positions congruent with the trait than did respondents in the upper and lower quartiles of the distribution (significant for Extraversion, Openness to Experience, and Agreeableness). We argue the findings highlight problems of interpretation for mid-range trait scores that arise from the limitations of aggregation methods, but also from a compromised theoretical foundation. Trait theory masks dynamic processes as well as social contexts.     

Improvement of nonverbal behaviour in Japanese female perfume‐wearers

The present study addressed the issue of whether people who use perfume improve their “visual” interpersonal impression. This expectation comes from the possibility that those who wear perfume may modify their nonverbal behaviour through positive mood changes generated by the pleasant odour of perfume or through an increase of public self‐consciousness. Thirty‐one Japanese females were assigned to either a perfume or a no‐perfume group. A screening test held in advance confirmed that all the participants in the perfume group preferred the smell of the perfume used in this study. They participated in an interview and answered questions asked by a female confederate. In the middle of the interview, the interviewees in the perfume group put on the perfume. The improvement of their nonverbal behaviour in the latter half of the interview was evaluated by 18 neutral observers, who watched silent video clips of the interviews. The observers were not informed that some of the interviewees used perfume. The results of observer ratings showed that the interviewees in the perfume group showed significantly less nonsymbolic movement (touching their hair or nose, or shifting their posture such as rotating on a swivel chair) when wearing perfume. Analysis of the video clips showed that the interviewees in the perfume group decreased their nonsymbolic movement for about 6 s per minute after putting on the perfume. The female observers also rated the interviewees in the perfume group as more self‐confident. These findings suggest that wearing perfume inhibits behaviours that project negative impressions. Analysis of the subjective mood showed that the inhibition of an interviewee's nonsymbolic movement might have resulted from a wearer's positive mood change. Although several methodological issues limit the conclusions drawn from these results, the present study showed that wearing perfume has the potential to cause changes in nonverbal behaviour and to improve visual impressions.