Association between synesthetic colors and sensitivity to physical colors changed by type of synesthetic experience in grapheme-color synesthesia

Grapheme-color synesthesia is a condition in which visual perception of letters induces simultaneous perception of a specific color. Previous studies indicate that grapheme-color synesthetes are more sensitive to physical colors than non-synesthetes. Synesthetic colors are found to be concentrated in multiple regions of the color space, forming “synesthetic color clusters”. The present study investigated whether color sensitivity corresponding to synesthetic color clusters (clustered colors) is higher than color sensitivity that does not correspond to synesthetic color clusters (non-clustered colors). However, we found no difference in the color sensitivity for clustered and non-clustered colors. We also investigated whether the color sensitivity is dependent on the synesthetic experience (associators and projectors). We found that the greater the tendency toward associator characteristics, the greater the sensitivity for clustered colors compared to that for non-clustered colors. Our findings suggest an association between synesthetic colors and physical color sensitivity that is modulated by synesthetic experience.     

Color constancy and dispositionalism

This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of the most challenging objections that have been pressed against it. It explains why colors do not seem to “come on” when the lights come on, and why the right thing to say seems to be that the light causes the objects to reveal their colors. It explains why the content of visual experience need not be problematically circular. It eliminates the problem of intrapersonal variation in color appearance. And it even provides resources for dealing with the problem of interpersonal variation. It is true that in moving to the more complex view, the dispositionalist becomes subject to a new objection, which has been called “the problem of unity.” The paper offers a solution to this problem as well.     

Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint

The relations among consciousness, brain behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke's "inverted spectrum argument" about the undetectability of color transformations. A symmetry analysis of color space shows that the literal interpretation of this argument--reversing the experience of a rainbow--would not work. Three other color to color transformations might work, however, depending on the relevance of certain color categories. The approach is then generalized to examine behavioral detection of arbitrary differences in color experiences, leading to the formulation of a principled distinction, called the "isomorphism constraint," between what can and cannot be determined about the nature of color experience by objective behavioral means. Finally, the prospects for achieving a biologically based explanation of color experience below the level of isomorphism are considered in light of the limitations of behavioral methods. Within-subject designs using biological interventions hold the greatest promise for scientific progress on consciousness, but objective knowledge of another person's experience appears impossible. The implications of these arguments for functionalism are discussed.     

What's That Smell?

In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and place them front and center. I ask: What are smells? For many philosophers, the view that colors can be explained in purely physicalistic terms has seemed very appealing. In the case of smells, this kind of nonrelational view has seemed much less appealing. Philosophers have been drawn to versions of relationalism—the view that the nature of smells must be explained (at least in part) in terms of the effects they have on perceivers. In this paper, I consider a contemporary argument for this view. I argue that nonrelationalist views of smell have little to fear from this argument.     

Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning and the Meaning of Music

On the basis of some ideas of Wittgenstein’s, an argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning, as manifested in the “fine shades” of use and behaviour, is central to Wittgenstein’s late conception of meaning. In explicating the basic elements involved here, I first try to clarify the notion of feeling and its relationship to meaning, emphasising its central role in music as explanatory of its use in language. The feeling of words, in this sense, is an objective feature of their meaning and use, and should be distinguished from feelings as psychological processes or experiences that may accompany the use of words. I then explain its philosophical significance by arguing that word‐feeling, and the “experience of meaning,” are basically instances of Wittgenstein’s general conception of aspect and aspect‐perception, which are important elements in his later conception of meaning and of thought. The nature of this experience is explicated in terms of grasping internal relations and relevant comparisons, which is manifested in a “mastery of a technique,” or “feeling at home” in a certain practice. In this sense, I argue, the ability to experience the meaning of a word is essential to the very intentionality of our thought and language. The ability to experience meaning is also a precondition for using words in a “secondary sense,” which is of great significance in itself. I conclude by pointing to the application of these notions of understanding, feeling and experience, as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relations and mastery of technique, to music, where they are so apt and natural.     

盲童心中的颜色概念及其组织

以黑、白、红、橙、黄、绿、蓝、紫、棕、灰、粉红11种基本颜色词为材料,运用颜色概念测试和颜色词分类的方法,研究了盲童的颜色概念及其组织。被试是85名盲校学生。结果表明：（1）盲童的颜色概念测试通过的顺序和明眼儿童的颜色命名的顺序既相似,又存在着差异;（2）盲童的基本颜色词的语义空间中有两个维度：①“彩色/非彩色”;②“实物色/背景色”。(3)盲童的颜色概念组织具有主题关联和slot-filler联系的性质,即根据自身的知识和经验,强调事物的功能、语境以及事件之间的联系     

Preattentive and cognitive effects on perceptual completion at the blind spot

Our findings indicate that preattentive processes, such as the filling in of homogeneously colored areas, discrete dots, or bars across the blind spot, take into account both the color and the form that stimulate the retina around the optic disk. Perceptual completion of the “junction” of two opposite colors facing each other on opposite sides of the blind spot was resolved by simultaneous segregation of the two colors at the location of a filled-in perpendicular line that suggested a boundary separating the two colors. Orientation preference and relative salience of one color versus the other determined which color was perceptually completed in a forced-choice situation that involved perceptual completion at the intersection of a cross formed by bars of opposite colors. A 1-min exposure to these stimuli presented an ambiguous situation for perceptual completion of either color within the blind spot, and resulted in a perceptual “flip-flop” from one color to the other, much like the phenomenon that occurs in figure reversal. Instructions to speed up this reversal process led to a fivefold reduction in latency to first reversal.     

Nodding in dis/agreement: a tale of two cultures

Head movement is commonly used to communicate positive versus negative response. However, whereas in US culture, vertical head movement denotes positivity (nodding to say “yes”) and horizontal head movement is associated with negativity (shaking heads to say “no”), in Bulgaria, this response pattern is reversed, that is, horizontal head movement means “yes” and vertical head movement means “no.” Thus, these two cultures spatially “embody” agreement via different movement directions. We examined the effect of such cultural differences on cognitive processing that has no communicative intent by comparing ratings of likeability, brightness, and positive feeling associated with different color moving dots. Participants followed the dots’ movement with their heads in a 2 (direction: vertical vs. horizontal) by 2 (speed: fast vs. slow) design. We found a two-way country by speed of movement interaction such that Bulgarian participants associated colors with more positive feeling when those were perceived in combination with slower head movement irrespective of movement direction. US participants, on the other hand, rated color dots as better mood-enhancing in combination with faster head movement. There was a similar two-way country by movement speed interaction for likeability ratings but none for brightness. Findings are discussed in terms of variability in gestural meaning and culture-specific embodiment patterns.     

Testing the Cross-Cultural Generality of Hering's Theory of Color Appearance

This study examines the cross-cultural generality of Hering's (1878/1964) color-opponent theory of color appearance. English-speaking and Somali-speaking observers performed variants of two paradigms classically used to study color-opponency. First, both groups identified similar red, green, blue, and yellow unique hues. Second, 25 English-speaking and 34 Somali-speaking observers decomposed the colors present in 135 Munsell color samples into their component Hering elemental sensations—red,green,blue, yellow, white, and black—or else responded “no term.” Both groups responded no term for many samples, notably purples. Somali terms for yellow were often used to name colors all around the color circle, including colors that are bluish according to Hering's theory. Four Somali Grue speakers named both green and blue elicitation samples by their term for green. However, that term did not name the union of all samples called blue or green by English speakers. A similar pattern was found among three Somali Achromatic speakers, who called the blue elicitation sample black or white. Thus, color decomposition by these Somali-speaking observers suggests a lexically influenced re-dimensionalization of color appearance space, rather than a simple reduction of the one proposed by Hering. Even some Somali Green-Blue speakers, whose data were otherwise similar to English, showed similar trends in yellow and blue usage. World Color Survey data mirror these results. These within- and cross-cultural violations of Hering's theory do not challenge the long-standing view that universal sensory processes mediate color appearance. However, they do demonstrate an important contribution of language in the human understanding of color.     

孟荀的“性—情”结构论及艺术本体性

本文从孟子和荀子思想中的“性”与“情”两大范畴入手 ,构建了一个作为生命本体存在形式的“性—情”结构论样式。通过对统领“性—情”结构论的“心”本体的聚合和分解作用 ,梳理了一个心—性—情的逻辑脉络。将“乐”作为形式本体与审美快感体验的主要体现方式进行解剖 ,而使之成为艺术本体存在和审美愉悦的现实参照。本文认为 ,由“心”本体而建构的“性—情”结构论 ,是后世的艺术创造活动中人们提出的所谓“吟咏情性”和“心统性情”等命题的始基 ,它既有张扬艺术情感而创构艺术魅力的作用 ,也有以伦理文化制约艺术一审美体验的局限性。     

Towards a literary account of mental health from James' Principles of Psychology

The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James' “The Psychologist's Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James' spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James' central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.     

Achromatic color categories

Sternheim and Boynton’s (1966) continuous judgmental color-naming technique was used to assess the elemental nature of achromatic colors. Results from three subjects indicate that the names “black” and “white” are necessary and sufficient to describe achromatic test lights associated with the name “gray.” On the basis of the criteria that establishes a color as elemental, black and white were confirmed as elemental, whereas gray was not. These findings support the assumption of various opponent processing models that there are only two elemental achromatic sensations. In addition, the results support Hering’s (1920) view that black and white differ from the paired-chromatic opponent colors in that they are not mutually exclusive.     

Do the colors of your letters depend on your language? Language-dependent and universal influences on grapheme-color synesthesia in seven languages

Grapheme-color synesthetes experience graphemes as having a consistent color (e.g., “N is turquoise”). Synesthetes’ specific associations (which letter is which color) are often influenced by linguistic properties such as phonetic similarity, color terms (“Y is yellow”), and semantic associations (“D is for dog and dogs are brown”). However, most studies of synesthesia use only English-speaking synesthetes. Here, we measure the effect of color terms, semantic associations, and non-linguistic shape-color associations on synesthetic associations in Dutch, English, Greek, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Spanish. The effect size of linguistic influences (color terms, semantic associations) differed significantly between languages. In contrast, the effect size of non-linguistic influences (shape-color associations), which we predicted to be universal, indeed did not differ between languages. We conclude that language matters (outcomes are influenced by the synesthete’s language) and that synesthesia offers an exceptional opportunity to study influences on letter representations in different languages.     

Internal representations and the conceptual operation of color in pure alexia with color naming defects

This research examined the structure of internal representation and the conceptual operation of color in two pure alexic cases (Case I and Case II) with color naming defects. Experiment I investigated the structure of the internal representation of different kinds of colors using a similarity judgment task. Experiment II examined categorical judgments of perceived colors using a two-alternative-forced choice task. Experiment III tested the classification of perceived colors using a color sorting task. The performance of Case I essentially fell within the normal range while the results of Case II showed some impairment in the conceptual operation of color. Analysis of the responses obtained from these experiments indicated that the color naming defects in Case I can be explained in terms of visual-verbal disconnection. However, the naming defects in Case II reflect disfunction in some other higher cortical processes coupled with visual-verbal disconnection.     

The Impact of Stimuli Color in Lexical Decision and Semantic Word Categorization Tasks

In two experiments, we examined the impact of color on cognitive performance by asking participants to categorize stimuli presented in three different colors: red, green, and gray (baseline). Participants were either asked to categorize the meaning of words as related to the concepts of “go” or “stop” (Experiment 1) or to indicate if a neutral verbal stimulus was a word or not (lexical decision task, Experiment 2). Overall, we observed performance facilitation in response to go stimuli presented in green (vs. red or gray) and performance inhibition in response to go stimuli presented in red. The opposite pattern was observed for stop‐related stimuli. Importantly, results also indicated that color might also be used to categorize neutral stimuli. Overall, these findings provide support to the green‐go and red‐stop color associations and test the potential functional autonomy acquired by these colors and the boundary conditions to their effects on stimuli categorization.     

Color primitivism

The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available – if the colors are primitive sui generis properties – this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind–body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-reductive physicalism are staples, realist primitivism is by and large a recent addition to the color literature. And it remains a minority position, although one that is perhaps gaining support. In this paper, we investigate whether it should be accepted, and conclude it should not be.     

The “Religiously Mediated Change” of 11 Gay Men: A Case of Unexceptional Sublimation

This article addresses the current controversy in churches concerning homosexuality, especially the claim that the sexual orientation of homosexual males may be changed through religious interventions. Following personal accounts of the uses of “religiously mediated change” discourse in discussions of homosexuality in mainstream Protestant churches, the article focuses on the frequently cited article by Pattison and Pattison (1980) that evaluates 11 white males “who claimed to have changed sexual orientation from exclusive homosexuality to exclusive heterosexuality through participation in a Pentecostal church fellowship” (p. 1553). We evaluate the article in terms of its research design, findings, and conclusions; discuss its claim that the men “changed” in light of Freud’s concept of the sublimation of socially unacceptable psychic energies; and assess the Pentecostal church’s contention that homosexuality is an expression of psychological immaturity. We conclude that in light of the fact that the sublimation of sexual desires and impulses is a common experience among men, and homosexuality is not an expression of psychological immaturity, “religiously mediated change” discourse needs to go beyond claiming that change is possible and present a convincing argument that the change, if effected, will have demonstrable benefits to humanity that would not be realizable if the change did not occur.     

Colors without circles?

Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.     

Outflow and inflow in movement duplication

Following prolonged exposure to two vertical grating patterns differing in spatial frequency—one pattern illuminated in green light alternated with the other pattern illuminated in red light—human observers will sometimes report seeing desaturated complementary colors when presented with a neutrally illuminated test field consisting of adjacent halves of the two adapting gratings. The number of such color reports increases as the difference between the spatial frequencies of the adapting gratings increases. This frequency-specific chromatic aftereffect is similar to that obtained with orientation-specific color adaptation and may be mediated by neural “channels,” sensitive to both color and frequency input, which are similar to units known to exist in the visual systems of lower organisms.