How eyewitnesses talk about events: implications for memory

Eyewitnesses to traumatic events typically talk about them, and they may do so for different reasons. Of interest was whether qualitatively different retellings would lead to differences in later memory. All participants watched a violent film scene; one third talked about their emotional reactions to the film (as one might do when talking to a friend), one third described the events of the film (as the police might request), and one third did unrelated tasks. Following a delay, all participants were tested on their memories for the clip. Talking about emotions led to better memory for one's emotions, but also led to subjectivity and a greater proportion of major errors in free recall. Differences were minimized on tests providing more retrieval cues, suggesting that retellings' consequences for memory are greater when retellers have to generate their own retrieval structures. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to protect eyewitness memory against the misinformation effect: A meta-analysis of post-warning studies

Four decades of research and hundreds of studies speak to the power of post-event misinformation to bias eyewitness accounts of events (see e.g., Loftus’ summary, 2005). A subset of this research has explored if the adverse influence of misinformation on remembering can be undone or at least reduced through a later warning about its presence. We meta-analyzed 25 such post-warning studies (including 155 effect sizes) to determine the effectiveness of different types of warnings and to explore moderator effects. Key findings were that (1) post-warnings are surprisingly effective, reducing the misinformation effect to less than half of its size on average. (2) Some types of post-warning (following a theoretical classification) seem to be more effective than others, particularly studies using an enlightenment procedure (Blank, 1998). (3) The post-warning reduction in the misinformation effect reflects a specific increase in misled performance (relative to no warning), at negligible cost for control performance. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical and practical implications.     

Absolut memory distortions: alcohol placebos influence the misinformation effect

Can the simple suggestion that you have consumed alcohol affect your memory for an event? Alcohol placebos affect social behaviors but not nonsocial ones, and have not previously been shown to affect memory. We investigated the effect of alcohol placebos using materials that revealed both the social and the nonsocial influences of memory Subjects drank plain tonic water, but half were told it was a vodka and tonic; then all subjects took part in an eyewitness memory experiment. Subjects who were told they drank alcohol were more swayed by misleading postevent information than were those who were told they drank tonic water, and were also more confident about the accuracy of their responses. Our results show that the mere suggestion of alcohol consumption may make subjects more susceptible to misleading information and inappropriately confident. These results also provide additional confirmation that eyewitness memory is influenced by both nonsocial and social factors.     

Repetition, not number of sources, increases both susceptibility to misinformation and confidence in the accuracy of eyewitnesses

Are claims more credible when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on automatic processes—factors known to change people's judgments. In Experiment 1, people took part in a “misinformation” study: people first watched a video of a crime and later read eyewitness reports attributed to one or three different eyewitnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, people who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. People were more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, regardless of how many eyewitnesses made them. We hypothesize that people interpreted the familiarity of repeated claims as markers of accuracy. These findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and highlight the power of a single repeated voice.     

Pilgrims sailing the Titanic: Plausibility effects on memory for misinformation

People rely on information they read even when it is inaccurate (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, Journal of Memory and Language 49:519–536, 2003), but how ubiquitous is this phenomenon? In two experiments, we investigated whether this tendency to encode and rely on inaccuracies from text might be influenced by the plausibility of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we presented stories containing inaccurate plausible statements (e.g., “The Pilgrims’ ship was the Godspeed”), inaccurate implausible statements (e.g., . . . the Titanic), or accurate statements (e.g., . . . the Mayflower). On a subsequent test of general knowledge, participants relied significantly less on implausible than on plausible inaccuracies from the texts but continued to rely on accurate information. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results with the addition of a think-aloud procedure to elicit information about readers’ noticing and evaluative processes for plausible and implausible misinformation. Participants indicated more skepticism and less acceptance of implausible than of plausible inaccuracies. In contrast, they often failed to notice, completely ignored, and at times even explicitly accepted the misinformation provided by plausible lures. These results offer insight into the conditions under which reliance on inaccurate information occurs and suggest potential mechanisms that may underlie reported misinformation effects.     

Social suggestibility to central and peripheral misinformation

This study used a laboratory-based paradigm to investigate social influences on participants' susceptibility to misleading suggestions. Participants viewed a video clip of an action sequence with one or more peers, and then were required to discuss the event with the co-witness or with the group of co-witnesses. During the discussion a confederate, posing as a peer, presented misinformation about central and peripheral features of the co-witnessed event. Results indicated that participants were more susceptible to misleading suggestions during one-on-one discussions than during group discussions. In addition, participants were susceptible to misleading suggestions about central features of the witnessed event, although to a lesser extent than they were susceptible to misleading suggestions about peripheral features.     

Social suggestibility to central and peripheral misinformation

This study used a laboratory-based paradigm to investigate social influences on participants’ susceptibility to misleading suggestions. Participants viewed a video clip of an action sequence with one or more peers, and then were required to discuss the event with the co-witness or with the group of co-witnesses. During the discussion a confederate, posing as a peer, presented misinformation about central and peripheral features of the co-witnessed event. Results indicated that participants were more susceptible to misleading suggestions during one-on-one discussions than during group discussions. In addition, participants were susceptible to misleading suggestions about central features of the witnessed event, although to a lesser extent than they were susceptible to misleading suggestions about peripheral features.     

Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: Cognitive factors

This research investigated the cognitive correlates of false memories that are induced by the misinformation paradigm. A large sample of Chinese college students (N=436) participated in a misinformation procedure and also took a battery of cognitive tests. Results revealed sizable and systematic individual differences in false memory arising from exposure to misinformation. False memories were significantly and negatively correlated with measures of intelligence (measured with Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), perception (Motor-Free Visual Perception Test, Change Blindness, and Tone Discrimination), memory (Wechsler Memory Scales and 2-back Working Memory tasks), and face judgement (Face Recognition and Facial Expression Recognition). These findings suggest that people with relatively low intelligence and poor perceptual abilities might be more susceptible to the misinformation effect.     

Automatic and intentional processes in children's recognition memory: the reversed misinformation effect

This study investigated the contribution of automatic and intentional memory processes to 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children's suggestible responses in a reversed misinformation paradigm. The temporal order of the conventional eyewitness paradigm was altered such that children were initially presented with a pre‐event narrative containing misinformation that was either read to them or was self‐generated in response to semantic and linguistic cues, and the following day were presented with a witnessed event in the form of a picture story. Children then completed a standard forced‐choice recognition memory test under two instruction conditions. In the inclusion condition children were reminded about the presentations of the pre‐event narrative and the original story and asked to chose the witnessed event item. In the exclusion condition children were instructed to exclude pre‐event suggestions. Suggestibility effects were found with the magnitude of such effects differentially affected by the encoding of misleading suggestions and test instructions. In the exclusion condition, children were more likely to correctly reject suggestions that were ‘self‐generated’. Both automaticity and intentional recollection contributed to children's suggestible responding. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Undoing suggestive influence on memory: The reversibility of the eyewitness misinformation effect

Presenting inconsistent postevent information about a witnessed incident typically decreases the accuracy of memory reports concerning that event (the misinformation effect). Surprisingly, the reversibility of the effect (after an initial occurrence) has remained largely unexplored. Based on a memory conversion theoretical framework and associated refined assessment strategy, we report three experiments to demonstrate that suggestive influence can be completely undone. Initially established misinformation effects were eliminated - even after a period of 5weeks (Exp. 3) - through (a) an enlightenment procedure ensuring an adequate representation of the memory task as a search for potentially two contradictory items (instead of "the" single "correct" answer) and (b) using a memory state test that unconfounds the performance contributions of item and source memory by assessing them separately. Specifically, memory for original event details that were the target of misinformation was restored to the level of non-misled control performance, and even beyond (Exp. 3). This remarkable reversibility of misinformation influence highlights the central role of memory conversion processes in the misinformation effect (but does not principally exclude the contribution of traditional interference processes). We discuss the compatibility of our findings with previous research and make suggestions for real-world eyewitness interrogation.     

Correcting false information in memory: Manipulating the strength of misinformation encoding and its retraction

Information that is presumed to be true at encoding but later on turns out to be false (i.e., misinformation) often continues to influence memory and reasoning. In the present study, we investigated how the strength of encoding and the strength of a later retraction of the misinformation affect this continued influence effect. Participants read an event report containing misinformation and a subsequent correction. Encoding strength of the misinformation and correction were orthogonally manipulated either via repetition (Experiment 1) or by imposing a cognitive load during reading (Experiment 2). Results suggest that stronger retractions are effective in reducing the continued influence effects associated with strong misinformation encoding, but that even strong retractions fail to eliminate continued influence effects associated with relatively weak encoding. We present a simple computational model based on random sampling that captures this effect pattern, and conclude that the continued influence effect seems to defy most attempts to eliminate it.     

Recognition performance level and the magnitude of the misinformation effect in eyewitness memory

The issue of whether misleading postevent information affects performance on the modified recognition test introduced by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) was examined in a meta-analysis. Results indicated that a misinformation effect can be obtained with the modified test. The meta-analysis also revealed that recognition hit rates are higher in studies that yield a misinformation effect than in studies in which the misinformation effect is not significant. The data from the meta-analysis were also used to assess whether the misinformation effect is related to the length of the retention interval. Results showed that a misinformation effect is more likely to be obtained with long retention intervals, although in the available data there is a confound between the length of the retention interval and the recognition level obtained.     

Children's eyewitness memory: Repeating post-event misinformation reduces the distinctiveness of a witnessed event

Children may incorporate misinformation into reports of witnessed events, particularly if the misinformation is repeated. One explanation is that the misinformation trace is strengthened by repetition. Alternatively, repeating misinformation may reduce the discriminability between event and misinformation sources, increasing interference between them. We tested trace strength and distinctiveness accounts by showing 5- and 6-year-olds an event and then presenting either the “same” or “varying” items of post-event misinformation across three iterations. Performance was compared to a baseline in which misinformation was presented once. Repeating the same misinformation increased suggestibility when misinformation was erroneously attributed to both event and misinformation sources, supporting a trace strength interpretation. However, suggestibility measured by attributing misinformation solely to the event, was lower when misinformation was presented repeatedly rather than once. In contrast, identification of the correct source of the event was less likely if the misinformation was repeated, whether the same or different across iterations. Thus a reduction in the distinctiveness of sources disrupted memory for the event source. Moreover, there was strong association between memory for the event and a measure of distinctiveness of sources, which takes into account both the number of confusable source and their apparent temporal spacing from the point of retrieval.     

A theoretical review of the misinformation effect: Predictions from an activation-based memory model

This article reviews the major empirical results and theoretical issues from over 20 years of research on people’s acceptance of false information about recently experienced events (see, e.g., Loftus, 1975). Several theoretical perspectives are assessed in terms of their ability to account for the various and sometimes conflicting results in the literature. Theoretical perspectives reviewed include the trace alteration hypothesis, the blocking hypothesis, the task demands/strategic effects hypothesis, source monitoring, and an activation-based semantic memory account. On the basis of its ability to account for the reviewed data and other cognitive phenomena, an activation-based semantic network model of memory is suggested for understanding the data and planning future research in the area.     

Misinformation effects in eyewitness memory: the presence and absence of memory impairment as a function of warning and misinformation accessibility

The authors report 5 experiments investigating how exposure to misleading postevent information affects people's ability to remember details from a witnessed event. In each experiment the authors tested memory using the modified opposition test, which was designed to isolate retrieval-blocking effects. The findings indicate that retrieval blocking occurs regardless of whether the misleading information is presented before or after the witnessed event. In addition, when people are warned immediately about the presence of misleading information, they can counteract retrieval-blocking effects but only if the misinformation is relatively low in accessibility. The authors discuss the findings in terms of the retrieval-blocking hypothesis and a hypothetical suppression mechanism that can counteract retrieval-blocking effects in some circumstances.     

Effects of contextual cues in recall and recognition memory: The misinformation effect reconsidered

Research in semantic word list‐learning paradigms suggests that presentation modality during encoding may influence word recognition at test. Given these findings, it is argued that some previous misinformation effect research might contain methodologies which are problematic. Misleading information groups typically receive erroneous information in written narratives, which may be further impeded by written tests. Results may therefore be explained by misinformation or encoding specificity. In two experiments, participants received restated, neutral, and misleading post‐event information through auditory or written modalities. Participants' recognition and recall of critical details about the source event were tested. In a recognition test using the standard testing procedure, there were no condition differences for post‐event information presented via an auditory modality. However, for post‐event information presented in the text modality, recognition performance was more accurate for restated information relative to neutral information, which in‐turn was better than the misled condition. Using the modified testing procedure, the differences were again limited to the text condition. Better performance was evident in the restated condition relative to the average of the neutral and the misled conditions, and there was no difference in performance between the neutral and the misled conditions. Using a recall test, however, there was no effect of modality. Memory was significantly better for restated information than for the average of the neutral and the misled conditions and poorer in the misled condition relative to the neutral condition. Results are discussed in terms of the effects of contextual cues at test, and methodological and interpretational limitations associated with previous research.     

Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinformation

Does mood influence the accuracy of eyewitness recollections, and people’s susceptibility to misleading information in particular? Based on recent affect-cognition theories and research on eyewitness memory, three experiments predicted and found that positive affect promoted, and negative affect inhibited the incorporation of misleading information into eyewitness memories. This effect was obtained for both positive and negative events (Experiment 1), and for recorded as well as real-life incidents (Experiment 2). Participants had no meta-cognitive awareness of these mood effects, and affect-control instructions were ineffective in preventing them (Experiment 3). The cognitive mechanisms responsible for mood effects on eyewitness memories are discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday memories, forensic practice and for current affect/cognition theorizing are considered.     

Intoxicated eyewitnesses: The effect of a fully balanced placebo design on event memory and metacognitive control

Few studies have examined the impact of alcohol on metacognition for witnessed events. We used a 2 × 2 balanced placebo design, where mock witnesses expected and drank alcohol, did not expect but drank alcohol, did not expect nor drank alcohol, or expected but did not drink alcohol. Participants watched a mock crime in a bar‐lab, followed by free recall and a cued‐recall test with or without the option to reply “don't know” (DK). Intoxicated mock witnesses' free recall was less complete but not less accurate. During cued‐recall, alcohol led to lower accuracy, and reverse placebo participants gave more erroneous and fewer correct responses. Permitting and clarifying DK responses was associated with fewer errors and more correct responses for sober individuals; and intoxicated witnesses were less likely to opt out of erroneous responding to unanswerable questions. Our findings highlight the practical and theoretical importance of examining pharmacological effects of alcohol and expectancies in real‐life settings.