偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响机制

本研究旨在探讨偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响及影响机制。本研究包括两个实验, 在被试进行决策前, 分别采用图片和短片诱发其与当前决策任务无关的偶然情绪, 然后要求被试完成选择任务, 并从决策结果和决策过程两个角度考察偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响及影响机制。结果发现, 当可选项中不存在1个优势选项时, 与正性情绪相比, 个体在负性情绪下会更倾向于延迟选择, 而个体对决策信息的加工深度在偶然情绪对延迟选择的影响中具有中介作用。这可能是因为相比于正性情绪, 个体在负性情绪下会采用更深入的加工策略, 增加了决策难度, 进而提高了个体的延迟选择倾向。     

情绪对成就动机与风险决策关系的调节效应

本研究在验证成就动机对风险决策倾向的预测作用的基础上,进一步探索情绪在成就动机和风险决策关系中的调节效应。通过对三所学校随机抽取的150名被试进行筛选,采用成就动机量表和自编风险决策任务问卷等对120名有效被试实施问卷调查。结果发现：情绪启动使大学生风险决策行为产生一致性效应,即心境一致性;情绪在成就动机和风险决策中起到了一定的调节作用,无论是高成就动机者还是低成就动机者,在愉悦情绪下都表现出更多的风险寻求倾向,并达到了极其显著的水平,而在悲伤情绪下,低成就动机者表现出更多的风险规避,高成就动机者的风险规避倾向虽有所增加,但并未达到显著水平。     

具体情绪与人格特质对决策信息加工过程的影响

研究选取120名大学生,探讨了具体情绪与人格特质对平均决策时间、决策的信息搜索深度和决策的信息搜索模式的影响。结果发现:(1)在平均决策时间上,具体情绪与人格特质主效应显著,并且交互影响决策的信息加工过程。在悲伤情绪下,内控型比外控型人格的个体平均决策时间要长。内控型个体在悲伤情绪比高兴情绪状态下平均决策时间长。(2)在决策信息搜索深度上,具体情绪与人格特质主效应显著,并且交互影响决策的信息加工过程。在悲伤情绪下,内控型比外控型人格的个体信息搜索深度要深。内控型个体在悲伤情绪比高兴情绪状态下信息搜索深度要深。(3)在决策信息搜索模式上,具体情绪与人格特质主效应显著,但两者交互作用不显著。内控型比外控型人格特质的被试在悲伤状态下更倾向于基于选项加工,内控型个体在悲伤状态比在高兴状态下也倾向于选项加工,而外控型个体在高兴情绪状态比在悲伤情绪状态下更倾向于线索加工。     

情绪对职业决策的影响

职业决策是决策研究领域的重要课题,引起了心理学家和决策研究者的高度关注.本文在以往研究的基础上,引人情绪和职业种类变量探讨了情绪对职业决策的影响,结果显示:(1)无论是四种还是八种职业决策任务,积极情绪的被试同消极情绪的被试相比,信息搜索的时间较长,信息搜索的深度显著增加;(2)在职业选择策略上,积极情绪的被试更加倾向于基于选项的加工,而消极情绪的被试随着从四种职业决策任务到八种决策任务的转变,逐渐倾向于基于属性的加工;(3)情绪影响了决策者职业决策的信息加工能力.     

风险来源与决策:背信规避现象及人际联结需求的作用

经典的风险决策研究及相关理论模型关注人们如何对以不同概率出现的损益结果进行评价与选择,但很少区分和探究在相同概率和损益值下不同风险来源对决策的影响。事实上,决策情境中的风险既可能源自客观因素,也可能源自人为因素。与相同大小的客观风险相比,人们更规避人为风险,这种现象被称为"背信规避"。本研究采用信任博弈任务,通过最小可接受概率法和决策选择法两种方式探讨风险来源对决策冒险性的影响。结果发现:(1)中国被试存在"背信规避"现象,即对人为风险的规避程度高于客观风险;(2)当恐惧情绪被唤起时,被试对人为风险的规避程度降低,使得背信规避现象消失,甚至出现"反背信规避"倾向;(3)人际联结需求影响背信规避,人为风险下人际联结需求中介了恐惧情绪对决策冒险性的影响。上述结果有助于加深我们对风险来源影响决策的现象及其机制的理解。     

人格特征对不同类型框架下决策的影响

以159名大学生为被试,考察三种框架下,人格因素对框架效应下决策的影响。结果表明,风险决策框架中,敢为者倾向于选择高风险选项,忧虑者倾向于选择低风险选项;女生更容易出现框架效应。目标框架下,忧虑越高,越易出现框架效应。在归因框架中,支配性越强,越倾向于做"健康"判断;敢为性越强者,越倾向于做出"安全"判断;敏感、忧虑、内向者,倾向于做悲观判断。自律性越高者框架效应越小;男生更容易出现框架效应。     

情绪智力及相关变量对职业决策线索加工的影响

以66名应届或往届大学生为被试,运用何小蕾（2004）修订的情绪智力量表和信息板技术探讨了决策时限、选项数量及情绪智力对职业决策过程中线索加工的影响。结果发现：（1）决策时限和选项数量影响职业决策过程中各条线索的平均点击次数和平均加工时间,说明完成信息板任务过程中被试加工线索的策略会因为决策时限和选项数量的变化而发生改变;（2）情绪智力水平对职业决策中的信息搜索模式有显著影响,高情绪智力水平者倾向于采用基于选项的复杂搜索策略;（3）情绪智力的各维度对职业决策中信息加工的平均决策时间、搜索深度和搜索模式具有不同的影响,其中管理情绪、表达情绪对决策时间和搜索深度均有显著影响,理解情绪对决策时间有显著影响,利用情绪对搜索深度和搜索模式有显著影响,而情绪发展对决策时间有显著影响。     

封面故事、选项框架和损益概率对风险偏好的影响

以股市投资为背景设计决策问题,考查了问题的封面故事类型、备择选项框架和风险项的概率水平对327名股民被试和465名大学生被试的风险偏好的影响。结果表明,股民被试的风险偏好不同于大学生被试,前者在所有实验处理上呈现出稳定的风险回避倾向。大学生被试在不同类型的封面故事下呈现出不同的风险偏好。在传统的坏封面故事下,风险偏好只受到备择选项框架的影响,不受损益概率的影响,即出现经典的框架效应现象。在好封面故事下,风险偏好受到备择选项框架、损益概率及两者交互作用的影响,即在高概率水平上出现框架效应现象,在低概率水平上出现框架效应反转现象     

先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响

研究考察了先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响。结果发现：(1)先前情绪的主效应显著, 积极情绪比消极情绪的个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求;过度自信的主效应显著, 高过度自信比低过度自信个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求。(2)先前情绪和过度自信水平交互影响灾难事件后继风险决策。高过度自信者在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下更倾向于风险寻求; 消极情绪状态下过度自信水平不同的个体之间没有显著差异。     

认知需求和认知闭合需求对风险决策中外语效应的影响

外语效应指相比于母语背景,个体在外语背景下风险决策偏差会降低。针对影响外语效应的因素研究大多聚焦于外部因素和与个体外语水平相关的因素,少有研究探讨认知风格的作用。本研究通过524名成人被试,探索认知需求和认知闭合需求对外语效应的影响。结果表明:(1)风险决策中存在外语效应,相比于母语背景,外语背景下框架效应被削弱,且个体更偏向风险寻求。(2)对于认知需求和认知闭合需求都高或都低的个体,语言类型会影响风险决策,在母语环境下倾向于风险规避,在外语环境下倾向于风险寻求;而对于认知需求和认知闭合需求高低不一致的个体,语言类型对其风险决策倾向的影响不显著。本研究为认知风格如何综合影响风险决策提供了进一步的证据。     

Individual differences in skewed financial risk-taking across the adult life span

Older adults are disproportionately targeted by fraud schemes that advertise unlikely but large returns (positively skewed risks). We examined adult age differences in choice and neural activity as individuals considered risky gambles. Gambles were symmetric (50% chance of modest win or loss), positively skewed (25% chance of large gain), or negatively skewed (25% chance of large loss). The willingness to accept positively skewed relative to symmetric gambles increased with age, and this effect replicated in an independent behavioral study. Whole-brain functional magnetic resonance imaging analyses comparing positively (vs. negatively) skewed trials revealed that relative to younger adults, older adults showed increased anticipatory activity for negatively skewed gambles but reduced activity for positively skewed gambles in the anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal regions. Individuals who were more biased toward positively skewed gambles showed increased activity in a network of regions including the nucleus accumbens. These results reveal age biases toward positively skewed gambles and age differences in corticostriatal regions during skewed risk-taking, and have implications for identifying financial decision biases across adulthood.     

Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.     

Risky decision: Attention and path dependency as a function of response mode

It was previously shown and was here replicated that the amount of money required to induce a subject to exchange one gamble for a second and then the second for a third depends on the second (intermediate) gamble. This path dependency cannot be explained by any of the algebraic models (including SEU), nor can it be explained as a simple attention effect. A model was put forward which explains the effect in terms of differential masking depending on a kind of stimulus—response compatibility. The effect of response mode on path dependency was examined in this study; similarity judgements showed no consistent path dependency nor did difference in rated attractiveness of gambles presented in pairs, but rated attractiveness was different for gambles presented singly. Since it might be that monetary response emphasises the monetary aspects, that is, the winning amount of the gamble, it was thought that a probability response would emphasise the probability of winning. However, when subjects were asked to set the probability of winning $ 12 which would induce them to exchange one gamble for another, not only was no path dependency observed, but the subjects' responses seemed to depend only on the difference in expected value of the gambles. This suggests the possibility of developing response-display modes which would eliminate or at least attenuate the inconsistencies observed in risky decision processes.     

Sizing up information distortion: quantifying its effect on the subjective values of choice options

When choosing between options, people often distort new information in a direction that favors their developing preference. Such information distortion is widespread and robust, but less is known about the magnitude of its effects. In particular, research has not quantified the effects of distortion relative to the values of the choice options. In two experiments, we manipulated participants’ initial preferences in choices between risky three-outcome monetary gambles (win, lose, or neither) by varying the order of five information items (e.g., amount to win, chance of losing). In Experiment 1 (N = 397), the effect of initial information on gambles’ certainty equivalents (subjective values) was mediated by the distortion of later information. The indirect effect on the difference between gambles’ certainty equivalents averaged 27% of the gambles’ mean expected value. In Experiment 2 (N = 791), we increased the difference between gambles on a later information item to overcome the effect of initial information on participants’ choices. The required change averaged 31% of the gambles’ mean expected value. We conclude that the effects of information distortion can be substantial.     

Risky choice: An examination of information acquisition behavior

The monitoring of information acquisition behavior, along with other process tracing measures such as response times, was used to examine how individuals process information about gambles into a decision. Subjects indicated preferences among specially constructed three-outcome gambles. The number of alternatives available was varied across the sets of gambles. A majority of the subjects processed information about the gambles in ways inconsistent with compensatory models of risky decision making, such as information integration (Anderson & Shanteau, 1970). Furthermore, the inconsistency between observed information acquisition behavior and such compensatory rules increased as the choice task became more complex. Alternative explanations of risky choice behavior are considered.     

Thinking styles and risky decision‐making: Further exploration of the affect–probability weighting link

People usually overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities leading to the familiar inverse S‐shaped weighting function. This research explores the link between affect and the structure of probability weighting from the perspective of thinking dispositions, a concept central to dual system theories of reasoning. The effects of affective priming and cognitive load on both probability weighting and the value function are also examined. The evidence suggests that thinking styles do have predictive implications for risky decision‐making. Participants with a more affective thinking style tend to be more risk‐seeking in small probability gambles. However, increasing access to the affective system by affective priming or cognitive load manipulations tend to reduce risk‐seeking behavior in small probability gambles as well as reduce risk averse behavior in large probability gambles. Previous research, manipulating the affective nature of lottery outcomes, found evidence for an increase in curvature (more overweighting of small probabilities and more underweighting of large probabilities) of the weighting function for affect‐rich outcomes, lending support to a hope‐and‐fear deconstruction of probability weighting. The present research suggests that increased anticipatory emotions characterized by the elevation of the weighting function (more overweighting at all probabilities) is also important and could sometimes be more significant than hope‐and‐fear in decision‐making under risk. An integrated approach incorporating the impact of affect on all three, the elevation and curvature of probability weighting as well as the curvature of the value function explains the empirical findings. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.