成人空间视角采择的自动性

设计新的空间视角采择任务,考察成人空间视角采择的自动性。结果发现：（1）在other任务中,随着人偶与被试的角度差异增加,反应时和错误率升高。（2）在self任务中,空间关系一致时正确率高于不一致时,且150°-180°间的一致性效应不显著;随着角度差异增加,反应时升高;小球与人偶的空间关系和空间关系的一致性交互作用不显著。本研究结果表明：本实验任务对成人而言是一个有效的空间视角采择任务;成人可以自动地做空间视角采择;人偶与被试的角度差异影响成人空间视角采择的自动性;小球与人偶的空间关系不影响成人空间视角采择的自动性。本研究首次证明了成人可以自动做空间视角采择。     

视觉观点采择需要抑制控制的参与：一项负启动研究

从抑制控制模型出发,采用负启动范式考察视觉观点采择的认知机制。实验1采用自身体转换任务(N=35) 、实验2采用圆点数量判断任务(N=33)分别考察成人在完成二级和一级视觉观点采择任务时是否需要抑制控制的参与。结果发现,成人在完成两类视觉观点采择任务时均出现了负启动效应,说明当他人观点和自我观点不一致时,个体需要抑制自我的观点才能成功采择他人的观点。     

多对象情境中一级视觉视角采择的自发性表现

本研究设计了3项实验探究多对象情境中一级视觉视角采择的自发性表现。实验1通过改编经典的任务范式,验证了一级视觉视角采择的过程是可以自发产生的观点。实验2增加了一个虚拟对象,结果发现存在多个对象的情况下,尤其是对自我视角进行判断时,虚拟对象所看到的客体数量一致性会产生群体视角作用,影响任务绩效。实验3将虚拟对象看到的客体数量设定为不一致,证明对象间视线的一致性也会吸引被试的注意,在自我视角和他人视角条件下产生不同的影响作用。总之,在多对象情境中,无论该视角是否为目标视角,人都会高度灵活、自发地对他人视角进行采择,这一过程受到“本人-目标对象-无关对象”三者间关系的影响,呈现出基于情境的特有表现。     

群组视角观点采择：自动加工的证据

基于经典的视觉观点采择范式,本研究探讨人们如何采择群组视角观点。研究创设了自我视角信息与群组视角信息一致与不一致条件,比较两种条件下被试对自我视角信息判断的反应时。若被试在视角信息不一致条件下的反应时显著长于其在一致条件下时,提示被试在判断自我视角信息时受到了群组视角信息的干扰,即自动加工了群组视角的观点。结果显示,相比视角信息一致条件,被试在视角信息不一致条件下反应时更长。当虚拟人物群组被箭头替代后,被试自动加工群组视角信息效应消失。该结果揭示,人们会自动地加工社会群组的视觉信息,且该效应不能由物理层面的指向所解释。     

儿童空间观点采择的自动性及其发展

使用空间观点采择任务,探究7~11岁儿童的空间观点采择的自动性和发展趋势。结果发现：（1）在他人任务中,正确率随着角度的增长而减小;（2）在自我任务中,相比于空间关系不一致时,一致时的正确率更高,且反向的一致性效应出现在150°~180°间。本研究结果显示：本项空间观点采择任务对儿童有效;7~9岁的儿童可以自动进行空间转换;11岁的儿童可以自动进行需要判断左右位置的空间观点采择。本研究首次证明,11岁是儿童自动进行需要判断左右位置的空间观点采择的相对年龄转折点。     

视觉观点采择的发生发展及其影响因素

通过总结视觉观点采择的概念和研究范式,概括发展心理学和比较心理学中视觉观点采择演化发生和个体发展的已有研究,分析视觉观点采择与心理理论的关系及语言和文化等影响因素,指出将来的研究需要归纳测验不同水平视觉观点采择的一系列研究范式,系统考察不同物种间视觉观点采择的演化发生过程,还可将不同水平的实验范式与脑成像研究相结合来考察视觉观点采择的脑神经机制,并关注影响视觉观点采择发展的因素.     

自我与他人视角的动态信息加工：一项行为振荡研究

为了实现流畅的社会互动,个体需要同时加工自我与他人视角下的信息,并能有效地区分二者。然而个体对自我与他人视角下的信息存在共享神经表征,那么大脑是如何在同时完成自我与他人视角信息加工的前提下又不至于混淆二者的呢？本文通过创新性的、具有高时间分辨率的内隐视觉观点采择任务,发现对于自我视角和他人视角下的信息加工存在频率约为1 Hz的行为振荡现象,并且二者存在180°左右的相位差。这一结果说明在有他人在场的社会情景中,自我视角与他人视角下的信息加工是一种具有周期性的交替优势的过程。     

空间观点采择过程中自我视角表征的旋转和回位

观点采择是用于理解别人的想法、观念的能力,允许人们从另一个人的观点和视角来看待事物和客体。已有研究表明空间观点采择涉及自我旋转(self-rotation),在此基础上,我们假设自我视角表征在旋转到目标位置后将缓慢旋转回位,提出了"旋转-回位"的假说。通过两个包含连续观点采择任务的实验,研究结果表明两个任务的目标之间角度差越大,判断所需反应时越长,且角度差与反应时间的关系类似于单个空间观点采择任务中目标与被试位置间的角度与反应时的关系;且两个任务间时间间隔的增长减弱了角度差对反应时的影响。研究初步支持了"旋转-回位"假说:空间观点采择过程中个体的自我视角表征先向目标位置旋转,在任务完成后逐渐回位。这一结果和结论巩固并补充了现有的关于观点采择的理论,并对理解观点采择过程中对视角表征进行的认知操作具有启发意义。     

语言加工过程中的观点采择及其认知机制

观点采择是指个体从他人或他人所处情境出发, 想象或推测他人观点与态度的心理过程。对相关研究综述发现: (1)观点采择是否存在自我中心偏向依然存在争论; (2)观点采择自我中心偏向不是始终存在的, 其原因可能是个体受到时间压力和特定类型任务的要求; (3)他人存在影响观点采择自我中心偏向, 并且这种影响是自动化的, 不受任务类型的影响; (4)观点采择的认知机制主要包括交互对齐、记忆提取和概率计算。未来研究需要: (1)整合已实现的计算模型; (2)进一步探究观点采择能力与心理理论的关系; (3)探究观点采择中私有信息的作用; (4)提高观点采择研究的生态效度; (5)采用不同的技术手段进行汇聚性验证。     

自动观点采择：内隐心智化与潜心智化的争议

自动观点采择现象已有很多研究证实, 但其产生机制还存在争议。目前存在内隐心智化与潜心智化两种观点：前者认为自动观点采择是自发采择他人视角的领域特殊加工; 而后者提出自动观点采择实质为反射性注意定向、位置的空间编码等领域一般加工, 模拟了心智化在社会环境中的作用。在内隐心智化和潜心智化可独立或共同运行的基础上, 提出了内隐心智化和潜心智化协同作用模型。未来研究应借助先进的技术手段研究多样的被试群体, 探索自动观点采择的作用机制。     

Similarities and differences in visual and spatial perspective-taking processes

Processes for perspective-taking can be differentiated on whether or not they require us to mentally rotate ourselves into the position of the other person (Michelon & Zacks, 2006). Until now, only two perspective-taking tasks have been differentiated in this way, showing that judging whether something is to someone’s left or right does require mental rotation, but judging if someone can see something or not does not. These tasks differ firstly on whether the content of the perspective is visual or spatial and secondly on whether the type of the judgement is early-developing (level-1 type) or later-developing (level-2 type). Across two experiments, we tested which of these factors was likely to be most important by using four different perspective-taking tasks which crossed orthogonally the content of judgement (visual vs. spatial) and the type of judgement (level-1 type vs. level-2 type). We found that the level-2 type judgements, of how something looks to someone else and whether it is to their left or right, required egocentric mental rotation. On the other hand, level-1 type judgements, of whether something was in front of or behind someone and of whether someone could see something or not, did not involve mental rotation. We suggest from this that the initial processing strategies employed for perspective-taking are largely independent of whether judgements are visual or spatial in nature. Furthermore, early developing abilities have features that make mental rotation unnecessary.     

The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments

This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.     

From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at

ABSTRACT

Two paradigms have shown that people automatically compute what or where another person is looking at. In the visual perspective-taking paradigm, participants judge how many objects they see; whereas, in the gaze cueing paradigm, participants identify a target. Unlike in the former task, in the latter task, the influence of what or where the other person is looking at is only observed when the other person is presented alone before the task-relevant objects. We show that this discrepancy across the two paradigms is not due to differences in visual settings (Experiment 1) or available time to extract the directional information (Experiment 2), but that it is caused by how attention is deployed in response to task instructions (Experiment 3). Thus, the mere presence of another person in the field of view is not sufficient to compute where/what that person is looking at, which qualifies the claimed automaticity of such computations.     

Chimpanzees really know what others can see in a competitive situation

Chimpanzee’s perspective-taking abilities are currently disputed. Here we show that in some food competition contexts, subordinate chimpanzees do take the visual perspective of dominant individuals, preferentially targeting a hidden piece of the food that the dominant cannot see over a piece that is visible to both individuals. However, the space where the animals compete is critical in determining whether subjects demonstrate this skill. We suggest that competition intensity, as mediated by these spatial factors, may play an important role in determining the strategy chimpanzees utilize in competitive contexts. Since some strategies may not require visual perspective taking in order to be successful, chimpanzees may not always demonstrate this skill. Differences in spatial arrangement may therefore account for the conflicting results of past studies.     

3岁幼儿的二级观点采择及合作互动的影响

研究以经典的乌龟任务(实验1)和改良的滤镜任务(实验2)对3岁幼儿的二级观点采择进行探究, 并探讨其在短暂的社会互动前后的变化。结果表明：(1) 3岁幼儿尚难以自发进行二级观点采择, 但已具备进行这一加工的潜质; (2)短暂的合作互动可在一定程度上提高幼儿采择他人观点的成功率, 而竞争互动则无类似影响。该发现为从建构主义角度解释视觉观点采择发展提供了新的证据。     

读心的比较研究：非人灵长类与人类在心理理论上的异同点及其解释

利用非人灵长类开展比较研究是探索心理理论本质、起源和进化动因的重要途经。大量实证研究显示非人灵长类可以表现出一些基础心理理论成分, 包括联合注意、意图理解和一级观点采择, 这表明心理理论在灵长类动物的进化谱系中具有进化连续性。然而, 非人灵长类无法像人类一样达成二级观点采择和错误信念理解, 潜心智化假说、替代表征假说、最小限度心理理论假说和意识关系假说试图对此差异进行解释。尽管视角与具体内容不同, 但这些假说都强调, 非人灵长类无法对其他个体关于外部世界的心理信念形成表征, 信念表征是非人灵长类与人类读心能力的重要分界点。未来研究需要重点澄清共享意图、语言机制以及社会生态环境因素与心理理论产生的相互影响作用。     

Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.