Acceptance of External Versus Internal Excuses by an Externally or Internally Oriented Audience

Men and women evaluated a male student who was caught by his professor cheating on a make-up test. The student either gave an external excuse, gave an internal excuse, or accepted responsibility for his action. The prediction that an internal excuse would be favored by participants with an internal locus of control and that an external excuse would be favored by participants with an external locus of control was not supported. It appeared that, because the student was caught in the act of cheating, the use of an excuse as an accounting strategy was not appropriate. The student was evaluated more favorably when he accepted responsibility than when he offered an excuse for his cheating. Harsher punishment was recommended by participants with an internal locus of control. Results were integrated with research studies testing the effectiveness of excuses in moderating the punishment recommended for people who are guilty of an antisocial or illegal act.     

The Donor's Dilemma: Recipient's Reactions to Aid from Friend or Foe1

Subjects participating as decision-makers in the Tactical and Negotiations Game experimental simulation encountered a programed emergency and then received an offer of aid from either an ally or an enemy donor. Findings indicate that recipients of aid from an ally donor perceived the donor to be more positively motivated and perceived the aid to reflect greater effort and to be of greater value than recipients of an equal amount of aid from an enemy donor. In addition, aid from an ally precipitated a positive shift in recipient perceptions of the donor and a negative shift in recipient perceptions of the enemy nondonor, while aid from an enemy had essentially no effects. The applied implications of these findings are discussed.     

Algebraic Semantics for Deductive Systems

The notion of an algebraic semantics of a deductive system was proposed in [3], and a preliminary study was begun. The focus of [3] was the definition and investigation of algebraizable deductive systems, i.e., the deductive systems that possess an equivalent algebraic semantics. The present paper explores the more general property of possessing an algebraic semantics. While a deductive system can have at most one equivalent algebraic semantics, it may have numerous different algebraic semantics. All of these give rise to an algebraic completeness theorem for the deductive system, but their algebraic properties, unlike those of equivalent algebraic semantics, need not reflect the metalogical properties of the deductive system. Many deductive systems that don't have an equivalent algebraic semantics do possess an algebraic semantics; examples of these phenomena are provided. It is shown that all extensions of a deductive system that possesses an algebraic semantics themselves possess an algebraic semantics. Necessary conditions for the existence of an algebraic semantics are given, and an example of a protoalgebraic deductive system that does not have an algebraic semantics is provided. The mono-unary deductive systems possessing an algebraic semantics are characterized. Finally, weak conditions on a deductive system are formulated that guarantee the existence of an algebraic semantics. These conditions are used to show that various classes of non-algebraizable deductive systems of modal logic, relevance logic and linear logic do possess an algebraic semantics.     

The end of analysis for the analyst (Translated by Ann Kutek)

This paper is an account of an analyst's personal exploration to make conceptual sense of the delicate closing stages of an analysis. Jung's theory of complexes provides a model of the functioning of the analytic relationship as an integral whole which itself is the locus of the process that brings an analysis to completion. Clinical vignettes are used to illustrate this.     

Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections

There are two distinct views on how to formulate an objective consequentialist account of the deontic status of actions, actualism and possibilism. On an actualist account, what matters to the deontic status of actions is only the value of the outcome an action would have, if performed. By contrast, a possibilist account also takes into account the value of the outcomes that an action could have. These two views come apart in their deontic verdicts when an agent is imperfect in an avoidable way, viz., when agent brings about less good than she could. In this paper, I offer an argument against actualism that draws on the connection between moral obligation and practical reasons.     

Agent-Basing,Consequences, and Realized Motives

According to agent-based approaches to virtue ethics, the rightness of an action is a function of the motives which prompted that action. If those motives were morally praiseworthy, then the action was right; if they were morally blameworthy, the action was wrong. Many critics find this approach problematically insensitive to an act’s consequences, and claim that agent-basing fails to preserve the intuitive distinction between agent- and act-evaluation. In this article I show how an agent-based account of right action can be made sensitive to an act’s consequences. According to the approach which I defend, an action is right just in case it realizes an agent’s morally praiseworthy motive. Conversely, an action is wrong just in case it realizes a morally blameworthy motive. Specifying act-evaluation in terms of the realization, rather than the expression, of an agent’s motives allows an agent-based approach to distinguish between agent- and act-evaluation. This is because an agent may act from a morally praiseworthy motive, but fail (either through bad luck or poor judgment) to realize that motive. Her action will therefore not have been the right one, despite its being the expression of morally praiseworthy motives.     

Acting with Feeling from Duty

A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action's manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action.     

Mere exposure and the endowment effect on consumer decision making

Previous researchers (e.g., J. A. Bargh, 1992, 2002) demonstrated the importance of nonconscious processes on consumer choice behavior. Using an advertisement, the authors determined the effect of two nonconscious processes--the mere exposure effect, which increases object preference by increasing consumer exposure to an object, and the endowment effect, which increases object valuation by providing consumer possession of an object--on consumer behavior. Although the mere exposure effect and endowment effect did not produce an interaction, they produced independent effects. The endowment effect increased object valuation but not object preference. The mere exposure effect increased object preference but not object valuation. Thus, at the unconscious level, an increase in object preference does not lead to an increase in object valuation, nor does an increase in object valuation lead to an increase in object preference. The authors discuss the importance of developing measures of unconscious process in advertising effectiveness.     

An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning: Abductive problem and abductive solution

We propose a study of abductive reasoning addressing it as an epistemic process that involves both an agent?s information and the actions that modify this information. More precisely, we present and discuss definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution in terms of an agent?s information, that is, in terms of knowledge and beliefs. The discussion is then formalised by ‘implementing’ our definitions in a dynamic epistemic logic framework, where the properties of these definitions are studied, an epistemic action that represents the application of an abductive step is introduced, and an illustrative example is provided. A number of the most interesting properties of abductive reasoning (those highlighted by Peirce) are shown to be better modelled within this approach.     

Categorical and algebraic aspects of Martin-Löf Type Theory

In the paper there are introduced and discussed the concepts of an indexed category with quantifications and a higher level indexed category to present an algebraic characterization of some version of Martin-Löf Type Theory. This characterization is given by specifying an additional equational structure of those indexed categories which are models of Martin-Löf Type Theory. One can consider the presented characterization as an essentially algebraic theory of categorical models of Martin-Löf Type Theory. The paper contains a construction of an indexed category with quantifications from terms and types of the language of Martin-Löf Type Theory given in the manner of Troelstra [11]. The paper contains also an inductive definition of a valuation of these terms and types in an indexed category with quantifications.     

Learning algorithm for an intelligent decision making system based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures

The paper presents the formalism of an intelligent decision-making system based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures, which has an architectural similarity to the human brain. An invariant of the organizational and functional structure of the intellectual decision-making process based on the multi-agent neurocognitive architecture is developed. An algorithm for teaching intelligent decision-making systems based on the self-organization of the invariant of multi-agent neurocognitive architectures is presented. Using this algorithm, an intelligent agent was trained and the architecture of the learning process was built on the basis of an invariant of neurocognitive architecture. Further research is related to training an intelligent agent in more complex behavior and expanding the capabilities of an intelligent decision-making system based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures.     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.     

Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas When Equality Is Perceived as Unfair1

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that in an asymmetric social dilemma, perceived fairness of the distribution promotes cooperation. In support of the hypothesis, Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to voluntarily and anonymously pay for child care was related to ratings of perceived fairness of equal and equitable distributions of the quality of child care when it was a public good (provided by the municipality) or a market good (provided by a private business). Study 1 also showed that an equal distribution of the public good was perceived to be fairer than an equal distribution of the market good, whereas the reverse was true for an equitable distribution. Study 2 showed that when quality differences were explicit, an equitable distribution was perceived as fairer than an equal distribution. Study 3 showed that an equitable distribution of quantity of child care was perceived to be fairer and increased willingness to pay as compared to an equal distribution.     

Why Don’t We Report Sexual Harassment? An Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior

The study found that an individual’s attitudes toward the behavior, normative beliefs, and perceived behavioral control predicted an individual’s intention to report an incident of hostile environment sexual harassment. Even though women indicated a greater intention to report, there was not a gender difference in whether an individual reported an incident of hostile environment sexual harassment. Our findings provide support for the theory of planned behavior as a model for predicting an individual’s intention to report sexual harassment. These findings provide insight for the formulation of policy and procedures and the development of training programs to facilitate reporting of incidents.     

Effect of a signalled delay between an action and outcome on human judgement of causality

Three experiments examined the influence of a stimulus inserted between an action (pressing the space bar of a computer) and an associated delayed outcome (a triangle lighting up on the screen) on ratings of the causal effectiveness of that action. In Experiment 1, subjects rated an action that produced an outcome immediately as more causally effective than an action that produced a delayed outcome. The rating of the causal effectiveness of an action that produced a delayed outcome in which the delay was filled by a stimulus was higher than the rating of actions that produced the outcome after an unsignalled delay. In Experiment 2, the effect of a stimulus presented uncorrelated with the action or the outcome was examined and found not to enhance the rating of causal effectiveness of an action that produced a delayed outcome. In Experiment 3, the degree of correlation between the stimulus and the consequence was examined. Ratings of the causal effectiveness of the action were greater the higher percentage of delay intervals that were signalled.     

The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for informative and uninformative arguments

This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings were consistent with such an analysis.     

Hume and the phenomenology of agency

Some philosophers argue that Hume, given his theory of causation, is committed to an implausibly thin account of what it is like to act voluntarily. Others suggest, on the basis of his argument against free will, that Hume takes no more than an illusory feature of action to distinguish the experience of performing an act from the experience of merely observing an act. In this paper, I argue that Hume is committed to neither an unduly parsimonious nor a sceptical account of the phenomenology of agency.