Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language

In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in OckhamÕs mental language. It turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can help in the determination of truth values within the scope of simple predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of sentences, whose truth does not depend on whether the terms supposit for the same things or not for the same things.     

Truth as Translation – Part B

This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate – this is possible if truth is based on a nonstandard translation mapping. However, this result has only been proved for languages without quantifiers. In Part B we now extend the result to first-order languages, and we show that this can be done in three different ways. In each case, the addition of a truth predicate to an interpreted language with a high degree of expressiveness leads to changes in the ontology of the language.     

The return of the Sophists

The author argues against a foundational epistemology and thus sides with the Greek Sophists. He shows that the search for foundations of knowledge and truth is the outcome of a referential theory of language. He finds that Nietzsche and Saussure pioneered attacks on and substitutions for this theory. Wittgenstein, Derrida and Rorty, inter alia, continued this trend. The author discusses the criticisms and theories of these philosophers and finds that he agrees with their criticisms and many of their positive moves but that he cannot accept their social relativism because it cannot account for inter- and transcultural understanding and the regulative role of truth. He looks for a theory of language and truth which will also comply with these requirements.     

Quine's truth

W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may be perfectly legitimate, even though, to some extent, they may be applicable in different contexts. Roughly speaking, a sentence is true in the empiricist sense if it belongs to a theory which entails all observation sentences which would be assented to by the speakers of the language in question (and no observation sentences which would be dissented from by these speakers). Various objections to this idea are discussed and rejected.     

The Concept of Truth in a Finite Universe

The prospects and limitations of defining truth in a finite model in the same language whose truth one is considering are thoroughly examined. It is shown that in contradistinction to Tarskirs undefinability theorem for arithmetic, it is in a definite sense possible in this case to define truth in the very language whose truth is in question.     

试论语义悖论的弗完全理论

弗完全理论通过限制排中律的使用,弱化经典逻辑,采用非经典的三值语言来处理语义悖论,最终使得形式语言能够一致地包含自身的真谓词。文中我们讨论了弗完全理论的两种基本形式——基础的弗完全理论和高级的弗完全理论。基础的弗完全理论引入了＂真值空缺＂的思想,认为句子除了真假之外还有＂既不真也不假＂的第三值,像说谎者这样的语义悖论语句就落在真假之空缺中,该理论借助于对不动点的归纳构造过程证明了形式语言中真谓词的存在性。高级弗完全理论在前者的基础上引入一个适当的条件句,定义了一个＂更强的真＂,发展出了既满足真的素朴模式又具有不动点解释的、一致的高级弗完全理论。     

James Fodor's Christian Theory of Truth: Is it Christian?

The 'task confronting contemporary theology', says James Fodor, 'is that of the rehabilitation or recovery of a distinctively Christian vision of truth' ( Christian Hermeneutics [Oxford, 1995] p. 72). In this paper I examine Fodor's attempt to construct a Christian or transformational theory of truth. I argue that his analysis of truth in terms of transformation leads to a concept of truth which is both subjective and relative. I argue further that Fodor's truth theory is either committed to a version of creative anti-realism, according to which the existence of basic structure of the world is determined by our linguistic activities, or it implies that although our language doesn't correspond to the world, we should go on making our theological truth claims anyway. I conclude that Fodor's Christian theory of truth is in most crucial respects not Christian at all.     

Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language

A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in (or translatable to) our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. (1) Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, (2) language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this context. I argue that, if deflationism is to remain consistent with its motivations, then it must opt for a language-immanent conception of truth.

     

奎因对模态逻辑的批评

奎因对模态逻辑的批评包括：(i)因为模态语境是指称不透明的,所以对其量化纳入没有意义;(ii)一些关于必然真理的经验知识与关于必然性的语言学理论不相容;(iii)模态语境中的量化纳入承诺了“亚里士多德式的本质主义”。丘奇,克里普克和福雷斯达尔对奎因提出了批评。他们提出,模态构造应该是外延上不透明但指称上透明的。奎因式诉诸于模态环境指称不透明的批评,在不采用单称词项的模态逻辑中不成立。他对本质主义的批评引入了一种必然性,但这种必然性没有办法用语言陈述词项进行解释。通过对语言中名称使用的讨论,我们可以看出,有关包含名称的同一性陈述的真值的经验知识,和卡苏洛称之为“一般模态地位”的先验知识是相容的。既然奎因论证了真同一性陈述的必然真是逻辑真,而且所有逻辑真都遵循戴维森式的意义理论（另文讨论）,那么我们可以给出一个关于包含名称的同一性的真陈述的模态地位的先验知识的语言学理论。     

Deflationary Truth and Pathologies

By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated; we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the notion of pathology we adopt. It turns out in particular that a certain natural closure condition imposed on a satisfaction class—namely, closure of truth under sentential proofs—generates a nonconservative extension of a syntactic base theory (Peano arithmetic).     

Tarski ‐ a dilemma

Tarski's correspondence theory of truth (which he spells out in his semantic conception of truth) is open to two interpretations. This ambiguity in the theory has led philosophers to find support in it for metaphysical reali sm. In fact, Tarski's theory turns out to support a form of ontological relativism. In different passages Tarski himself gives support to each of these interpretations. The first interpretation leads to ontological relativism, while the second sacrifices the connection between language and the world. I clarify the dilemma that I see in having to choose between these two interpretations, explain how these interpretations have their source in different problems which occupied Tarski, and consider a possible solution to the dilemma. Finally, finding good reasons to claim that Tarski's theory is indeed a correspondence theory of truth, I argue in favour of the first interpretation with its relativistic implications.     

The Limits of Learning: Habermas' Social Theory and Religion

Habermas' view that contemporary philosophy and social theory can learn from religious traditions calls for closer consideration. He is correct to hold that religious traditions constitute a reservoir of potentially important meanings that can be critically appropriated without emptying them of their motivating and inspirational power. However, contrary to what he implies, his theory allows for learning from religion only to a very limited degree. This is due to two core elements of his conceptual framework, both of which are key features of his account of postmetaphysical thinking. The first is the requirement of ethical agnosticism; this requires philosophy and social theory to refrain from offering guidance on questions of the good life. The second is his language‐immanent conception of truth in the domain of practical reason; this follows from his rejection of any source of validity beyond human communication in this domain. I make the case for a more robust account of learning from religious traditions and metaphysical worldviews, arguing that for this purpose Habermas must modify his requirement of ethical agnosticism and relinquish his language‐immanent conception of truth.     

Review

I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth compatible with a realist ontology, that a redundancy theory cannot account for the value of truth, and that the only kind of truth theory which can account for the value of truth, and is compatible with a realist ontology, is a pragmatic theory. The kind of truth theory I wish to defend is objective and naturalistic, and the ontology is realistic. My position is, therefore, one of objective, naturalistic realism.     

Weak and Strong Theories of Truth

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.     

Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning

Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the metalanguage in which we develop an account of meaning. The former view is compatible with the truth-conditional theory of meaning for the object language, the latter is incompatible with it. However, the former view is also trivially true; hence we should endorse the claim that any form of deflationism worth being interested in is incompatible with understanding meaning truth-conditionally.     

Deception, catholicism, and hope: understanding problems in the communication of unfavorable prognoses in traditionally-catholic countries

The doctor's use of deception in appropriate circumstances has commonly been considered a necessity of the medical art. Resistance to full and frank communication is typical of many traditionally Catholic countries, and particularly of Italy, a western country where Catholicism remains particularly influential. The Catholic teaching on truth and lies, and the problem of telling the truth to a severely ill patient is discussed. It is suggested that the contemporary Catholic model of gradually telling a terminal patient the truth, which looks reasonable and feasible in theory, is rarely followed in practice, as in the majority of cases the truth is not told tout court. Problems stem from the way in which medicine is currently practiced in Italy; from the synergism between Catholicism and the medical tradition's grounded paternalism; and from the ambiguity of the term 'hope'. Catholic ethics in fact recommends that the truth must be told without destroying hope, but the Catholic meaning of 'hope' is very different from its meaning in current language.     

Are you for real? Exploring language use and unexpected process questions within the detection of identity deception

The current study was to test whether reality monitoring and language use could distinguish identity liars from truth tellers when answering outcome questions and unexpected process questions. Truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 30) discussed their identity in a recruitment interview. No differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in the details they provided. In terms of language use, liars used more positive language than truth tellers, whereas truth tellers used more cognitive process words than liars. However, neither were more pronounced when asking process questions. Overall, process questions elicited more cognitive process and cause words than outcome questions. Therefore, process questions may be able to contribute to the cognitive load approach. The findings suggest that reality monitoring may not be diagnostic when applied to identity deception. We discuss the language use differences in relation to impression management theory.     

Das prädiskursive Einverständnis. Wissenschaftlicher Wahrheitsbegriff und prozedurale Rechtfertigung

The pre-discoursive agreement. Theory of scientific truth and procedural justification. — On basis of the constructive philosophy of science, the attention is focussed to the pre-discoursive elements of discoursive theories of truth. By using a pragmatic approach it is shown that foundation of those pre-discoursive elements, like discourse rules or the basic terminology, is possible though the discourse rules are not available at this level. Propositions which can be shown in the presented theory to be true, always describe a know-how instead of a knowledge about the world. As a result, the relevance of the presented analysis for prototheories of scientific disciplines is investigated. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Bradley and the impossibility of absolute truth

Bradley thought that there is a connexion between the theory of reality and the theory of truth. The theory of reality to which he subscribed, Monism, rules out a correspondence theory of truth, he thought, since it denies the existence of a plurality of facts, or things, in virtue of correspondence to which a judgment could be true. But though he rejects the correspondence theory he insists on the independence of truth from belief, wish and hope. For him the test of truth is coherence, which has two aspects, system and comprehensiveness. However, he does not think that this test yields ‘absolute’ truth. This, he maintains, for at least three different reasons, is unobtainable. Judgments can only be partially true. However, since there are degrees of truth, some judgments are closer to the truth than others, even though none are, or could be, unconditionally true.