Phenomenal Feel as Process1

Phenomenal character (or feel) is the what‐it's‐likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first‐personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third‐personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism.     

What can Heidegger's being and time tell today's analytic philosophy?

Abstract

Heidegger's Being and Time sets out a view of ourselves that shows in positive terms how a reification of ourselves as minded beings can be avoided. Heidegger thereby provides a view of ourselves that fits into one of the main strands of today's philosophy of mind: the intentional vocabulary in which we describe ourselves is indispensable and in principle irreducible to a naturalistic vocabulary. However, as far as ontology is concerned, there is no commitment to the position that being minded is something beyond the physical. In particular, this paper shows how Heidegger's claim that being minded is tied to being‐in‐the‐world links up with (a) externalism and (b) a social theory of intentionality.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

Toward the “overthrow of Platonism”: Processist critical social ontology and ameliorative discourse

In this article, I argue that, for the purpose of developing an effective critical social ontology about gender groups, it is not simply sufficient to carve gender groups at their joints: one must have in view whether the metaphysical categories we use to make sense of gender groups are prone to ideological distortion and vitiation. The norms underpinning a gender group's constitution as a type of social class and the norms involved in gender identity attributions, I propose, provide compelling reason to think critical social ontological discourse is more processist-orientated, rather than substantival-orientated. The advantages of a processist critical social ontology of gender groups are that, unlike substance-discourse, process-discourse recognizes how gender group talk and gender identity talk are often messy and therefore require a conceptual scheme that can transform vocabulary for the emancipatory purpose of ending oppression, domination, and marginalization.     

IS JOHN ZIZIOULAS AN EXISTENTIALIST IN DISGUISE? RESPONSE TO LUCIAN TURCESCU

This essay responds to Lucian Turcescu's article, “ ‘Person’ versus ‘Individual’, and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa”, Modern Theology Vol. 18 no. 4 (October, 2002) in which he argues that John Zizioulas's relational ontology of trinitarian personhood is indebted more to modern personalism and existentialism than to the Cappadocian Fathers. Turcescu's focus on Gregory of Nyssa does not warrant the claim that a relational ontology of personhood cannot be found within the thought of the Cappadocian Fathers. More substantively, Turcescu never addresses Zizioulas's interpretation of the Cappadocian affirmation of the monarchy of the Father, which, I argue, is central to Zizioulas's relational ontology insofar as such an ontology attempts to express the realism of divine‐human communion.     

Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein

Being and Time argues that we, as Dasein, are defined not by what we are, but by our way of existing, our “existentiell possibilities.” I diagnose and respond to an interpretive dilemma that arises from Heidegger's ambiguous use of this latter term. Most readings stress its specific sense, holding that Dasein has no general essence and is instead determined by some historically contingent way of understanding itself and the meaning of being at large. But this fails to explain the sense in which Being and Time is a work of fundamental ontology, concluding in Heidegger's claim to have found the meaning of Dasein's being in the concept of originary temporality. On the other hand, readings that stress the general sense of “existentiell possibilities” find Heidegger on a fruitless quest for the transcendental conditions necessary for Dasein's existence, which seems to founder on the claims that Dasein is constitutively thrown, factical, and “in‐each‐case‐mine” [jemeinig]. Both readings are problematic and, I contend, result from a failure to disambiguate and explain the ontologically unique relationship between the specific and general aspects of Dasein's essence. I argue that we can better explain this relationship, Heidegger's method for investigating it, and the sense in which Dasein has an essence that is open to philosophical investigation, if we read Being and Time's ontology of Dasein in terms of what Anton Ford calls “categorial” genus‐species relationships.     

Contingentism versus Necessitism: The Tractatus Standpoint

The paper provides an interpretation of section 2.013 of the Tractatus which casts light on the strategic role that that section plays in the early Wittgenstein’s version of the ontology of logical atomism. The far‐reaching consequences that the proposed interpretation has on the issue of the metaphysical nature of objects are spelled out, and the identification of Tractatus objects with phenomenal qualities, that is with phenomenal abstract universals, is shown to be fully consistent with those consequences. As a by‐product of the analysis, the standpoint of the Tractatus with respect to both contingentism and necessitism is clarified.     

SPINOZA AND PROCESS ONTOLOGY

In this paper, I put forward some remarks supporting a reading of Spinoza's metaphysics in terms of process ontology, that is, the notion that processes or activities, rather than things, are the most basic entities. I suggest that this reading, while not the only possible one, offers advantages over the traditional substance‐properties interpretation. While this claim may sound implausible vis‐à‐vis Spinoza's language of ‘substance’ and ‘attributes’, I show that process ontology illuminates important features of Spinoza's thought and can facilitate solutions to some interpretive problems.     

Grounding and anchoring: on the structure of Epstein’s social ontology

Brian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology?     

Arendt,Augustine And Evil

The publication of Hannah Arendt's doctoral these Love and Saint Augustine forces reappraisal of the view that Arendt's concept of evil originates in her experience of totalitarianism and coverage of the Eichmann trial. Augustine's account of the original nature of evil in the contexts of ontology, society and divine providence in fact provides the basis for Arendt's analysis of the banality of evil in the individual, the social, and the political spheres. Augustine's internal and external mental triads moreover contribute to Arendt's own thinking‐willing‐judging triad and allow a clearer understanding of its dynamics. The fact that Arendt's analysis derives much of its power from her appropriation of Augustinian theological concepts suggests a need for the increased diffusion of theological concepts in political thought.     

Knowing God Beyond Imagining: A Critical Appraisal of the Relation between Systematic Theology and Concrete Reality in John Milbank's Thought

John Milbank's work repeatedly invites two fundamental criticisms: he supposedly prioritises abstract thought over concrete reality, and he claims for himself a God's eye perspective on reality that is forgetful of any epistemological limits concerning a truthful human vision of the whole. Contrary to the first criticism, this article appreciates the way in which Milbank follows twentieth‐century Ressourcement theologies in relating concrete reality and abstract systematic thought. The second criticism does not disqualify Milbank's ontology, but encourages a more consequent application of this ontology in his assessment of concrete reality. As a corrective, Edward Schillebeeckx's contribution to Ressourcement theologies is revisited, as his work bears the promise of attaining an ever more limitless vision of God, via the path of contemplating concrete reality.     

The future of religion: Intersections of Rorty,Vattimo and Zabala

The following work builds and expands on a number of critical themes that were raised and discussed in a colloquy initiated by Santiago Zabala on the topic ‘the future of religion’ (which carries the title of the published version) with the American philosopher Richard Rorty and Italian political activist Gianni Vattimo. But, on top of the essay's principal aim, a re-appropriation of the critical voices of Nietzsche and Heidegger is all the more necessary to begin with: both are known to have pioneered an examination of the progress of humanity following the death of God, an expression that strikes a broader reference to religion. This essay continues from Rorty's assessment of ‘the weakening and/or death of ontology’, in the post-modern age. (Vattimo would translate this Rortyian position into a ‘philosophical slide into sociology’ or the ‘turn to social sciences,’ while Zabala would set out as far as denying the God of monotheism [and its corollary in organised faith and ecclesiastical authority] of its pre-eminent place among the highest ‘goals of knowledge’). But, notwithstanding an otherwise valid criticism of religion in the light of his deconstructive notion of Being, this essay also hopes to spell out, on the contrary even, that Rorty must have missed the point in conflating religion with ontology or, God with Being in view of which his concept of weak ontology that is derived from the death of God (hence the death of ontology) is quickly drawn. Indeed, there is still Being; though it may still resist definition, as Heidegger underscored rather sardonically in the opening pages of his celebrated work Being and Time, it is no longer the other name for God. As this essay also aims to promote, Being is an expression of the private transcendental or rather an exercise in nihilism that is at the core of religion.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.     

RESPONSE‐DEPENDENCE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL CLAIMS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Abstract: The analysis here is an attempt to show how the current epistemological theory of response‐dependence (R‐D) may be relevant to understanding putative ontological claims of the empirical social sciences. To this end I argue that the constitutive features of human response, central to R‐D theory, can be made explicit for social science. I conclude that for the empirical social sciences the implication of combining R‐D and certain forms of statistical analyses leads to the possibility of an events‐based ontology.     

Heidegger and the source of meaning

Sandra Lee Bartky criticises the account of meaning contained in Heidegger's ontology in Being and Time. In her view, Heidegger must choose between the claim that meaning is received and the claim that it is created, but is unable to do so. This paper argues that Bartky's criticism is misconceived, by showing that meaning, as Heidegger understands it, is necessarily both created and received. According to a number of influential commentators, the ultimate source of meaning is das Man – Heidegger's conception of the social world. This paper initially considers, but ultimately rejects, the view that the source of meaning, as Heidegger presents it, is social. Instead, this paper argues that meaning is rooted in what Heidegger calls ‘letting be’. Letting be articulates a distinctive relationship between the human being (Dasein) and entities. This relationship, it is argued, accommodates the notion of meaning as both received and created, by reconstituting these terms within a context that defines the human being as an interpreting entity, therefore showing that letting be should be understood as the ultimate source of meaning in Heidegger's ontology.     

Pragmatist Feminism as Ecological Ontology: Reflections on Living Across and Through Skins

In my response to the comments of Vincent Colapietro, Charlene Seigfried, and Gail Weiss on Living Across and Through Skins ( Sullivan 2001 ), I explain pragmatist feminism as an ecological ontology that understands bodies and environments as dynamically co‐constitutive. I then discuss the relationship of pragmatist feminism to phenomenology, psychoanalysis, Nietzschean genealogy, and Darwinian evolutionary theory. Some of the specific concepts I examine include the anonymous body, the bodying organism, truth as transactional flourishing, and the preservation of racial and ethnic categories.     

Freedom and the psychoanalytic ontology of quantum physics

Jung's paper ‘Synchronicity – an acausal connecting principle’, defining the phenomenon as a ‘meaningful’ coincidence depending on archetypal activation, was published in 1952, together with a conceptually related piece by physicist and Nobel Laureate Wolfgang Pauli entitled, ‘The influence of archetypal ideas on the scientific theories of Kepler’. Slavoj ?i?ek, in The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, suggests that, in contrast to any notion of a ‘pre‐modern Jungian harmony’, the main lesson of quantum physics was that not only was the psychoanalytic, empty subject of the signifier constitutively out‐of‐joint with respect to the world, but that the Real in itself was already incomplete, out‐of‐joint, ‘not‐all’. Yet while ?i?ek frequently tries to separate Jung from his own ontology, this paper shows that his ontology is not as different as he suggests. Consistent with our earlier publications on Jung and Zizek, a closer investigation reveals an underlying congruence of both of their approaches. In this paper we show that this affinity lies in the rejection by both Jung and ?i?ek of the ideology of reductive materialism, a rejection that demonstrably draws on quantum physics in similar ways. While Jung posits an inherently meaningful universe, ?i?ek attempts to salvage the freedom of human subjectivity by opposing his Lacanian ‘dialectical materialism’ to reductive materialism.     

Associations of self‐esteem and temperament traits to self‐ and teacher‐reported social status among classmates

Hintsanen, M., Alatupa, S., Pullmann, H., Hirstiö‐Snellman, P. & Keltikangas‐Järvinen, L. (2010). Associations of self‐esteem and temperament traits to self‐ and teacher‐reported social status among classmates. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 51, 488–494. The present study examined the validity of self‐ and teacher‐reported social status and its relations to self‐esteem and temperament in a geographically representative cohort of Finnish adolescents (N = 3941, mean age 15.1 years). High agreement was found between self‐ and teacher‐rated social status (r = 0.42). Different aspects of self‐esteem were differently related to social status. When other temperament and self‐esteem variables were included in the analyses, strongest predictor for self‐rated social status in both genders was social self‐esteem (p < 0.01) and for teacher‐rated social status general self‐esteem (p < 0.01). The strongest temperamental predictors of social status were lower inhibition in girls (p < 0.01, self‐ and teacher‐rated) and higher impulsivity (p < 0.01, self‐rated) and activity (p < 0.01, teacher‐rated) in boys. The present findings are consistent with the view that social functioning and peer relations are associated with individual differences in self‐concept and temperament dimensions.