Taking Seriously Dual Systems and Sex

In response to Ann Ferguson and Claudia Card, I argue that Gayle Rubin's analysis of sex-gender systems supports the hypothesis that heterosexual domination is a distinctive axis of oppression. While gender domination places women in disad-vantaged positions, heterosexual domination displaces lesbians and gay men from society. In response to Chris Cuomo, I argue that same-sex desire is part of lesbians’ gender ambiguity; but I agree that nvy work has underemphasized sexual desire.     

Response

This essay is a response to the comments and critique, included in this issue, of Claudia Card and Marilyn Friedman to my book, A Passion for Friends. In this response, I emphasize the crucial distinction between female separation and dissociation from the world, so as to register the difference between the positive and negative separations in which women are engaged. I also expand the discussion of individuality and individualism. The latter has arisen within the context of a feminist liberal campaign for sexual liberation which defends, among other things, sadomasochism, prostitution, pornography, and surrogacy.     

Compulsive checking and anxiety in a nonclinical sample: Differences in cognition,behavior, personality,and affect

This study addresses the question of why some highly anxious individuals exhibit excessive levels of compulsive checking behavior while other do not. To this end, nonclinical samples of compulsive checkers (n=19), (nonchecking) anxious controls (n=16), and (nonchecking) nonanxious controls (n=12) were compared on a variety of cognitive, behavioral, personality, and affective measures hypothesized to differentiate checkers from anxious controls. Results indicated that checkers exhibited higher levels of perfectionism and worry, and demonstrated greater cognitive impairment on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Furthermore, performance and subjective experiences of performance appeared to be mediated by perfectionism and worry. Findings suggest that both personality and cognitive variables are important correlates of the form of anxiety-related symptomatology.     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: The Way People Work: Job Satisfaction and the Challenge of Change. By Chrlstlne Howarth. Organizational Psychology: An Experiential Approach to Organizational Behavior. By David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin & James M. Mclntyre. Leadership in the British Civil Service. By Richard A. Chapman. Making Work—Self-Created Jobs in Participatory Organisations. By W. Ronco & L. Peattie. Online Communities: A Case Study of the Office of the Future. By Starr Roxanne Hiltz. Living Abroad. By I. Torbörn. The Committed Organisation. By G. Saunders. Women and the Public Sphere. Edited by Janet Siltanen & Michelle Stanworth. The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction. By S. K. Card, T. P. Moran & A. Newell. Directions in Human/Computer Interaction. Edited by A. Badre & B. Shneiderman. The Physical Environment at Work. By D. J. Oborne & M. M. Gruneberg. Role Transitions: Explorations and Explanations. Edited by V. L. Allen & E. Van De Vliert.     

A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism

Abstract

In this paper, I criticize Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, the theory of justification according to which if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. Specifically, I argue that beliefs and hunches provide counterexamples to phenomenal conservatism. I then defend a version of restricted phenomenal conservatism, the view that some but not all appearances confer prima facie justification on their propositional contents. Specifically, I defend the view that S has defeasible justification for believing that p if and only if it seems to S that p and it seems to S that she is acquainted with the fact that makes p true. Finally, I criticize Huemer's self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservatism.     

A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism

Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false.

Cosmopolitan Pacifism

In this paper I argue that cosmopolitanism prohibits war and requires a global approach to criminal justice. My argument proceeds by drawing out some implications of the core cosmopolitan intuition that every human being has a moral status which constrains how they may be treated. In the first part of this paper, I describe cosmopolitanism. In the second part, Cosmopolitanism and War, I analyse violence, consider the standards cosmopolitanism sets for its justification, and argue that war fails to meet them. In the third part, Cosmopolitanism and Criminal Justice, I argue that cosmopolitanism implies a moral obligation to deal justly with human wrongdoing wherever it occurs. Cosmopolitan pacifism follows: war is prohibited, and a consistent global criminal justice system is required. In the fourth part, Why No Cosmopolitan Pacifists?, I consider why cosmopolitans tend not to identify as pacifists, and in the final part, Objections, I discuss some objections.     

Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism

The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physicalism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental, such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of non-mentality”, is an incomplete theory of the world, I believe this analysis will be of value, if for nothing else, at least for bringing some taste of physical reality, as it were, back to the debate. First, I will introduce a broad characterization of the physicalist credo. In Sect. 2, I will provide a rather quick review of quantum mechanics and some of its current interpretations. In Sect. 3, the notion of quantum non-separability will be analyzed, which will facilitate a discussion of the wave function ontology in Sect. 4. In Sects. 5 and 6, I will explore competing views on the implications of this ontology. In Sect. 7, I will argue that the prior results, based on a thoroughly realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, support only a weak version of non-reductive physicalism.     

Brain regions as difference-makers

Contrastive neuroimaging is often taken to provide evidence about the localization of cognitive functions. After canvassing some problems with this approach, I offer an alternative: neuroimaging gives evidence about regions of the brain that bear difference-making relationships to psychological processes of interest. I distinguish between the specificity and what I call the systematicity of a difference-making relationship, and I show how at least some neuroimaging experiments can give evidence for systematic difference-making.     

EVALUATING THE EXTENDED MIND

According to proponents of radically extended cognition, some cognition is located outside the boundaries of biological organisms. In this paper, I offer a new argument for a modest version of this view according to which some cognitive processes are radically extended. I do so by showing that features of a subject's environment—in particular, the pen and paper that a subject uses to solve complex mathematical problems—can have epistemic roles that are indicative of cognitive roles. I end the paper by discussing how epistemology might play a significant role in diagnosing alleged cases of radically extended cognition.     

God and the Hypothesis of No Prime Worlds

Many theists hold that for any world x that God has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y, that God had the power to actualize instead of x. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this scenario is incompatible with traditional theism: roughly, it is claimed that no being can be essentially unsurpassable on this view, since no matter what God does in actualizing a world, it is possible for God (or some other being) to do better, and hence it is possible for God (or some other being) to be better. In reply to an argument of this sort, Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder offer the surprising claim that an essentially unsurpassable being could – consistently with his goodness and rationality – select a world for actualization at random. In what follows, I respond to the most recent contributions to this discussion. I criticize William Rowe’s new reply to the Howard-Snyders (but I endorse the spirit of one of his arguments), and I claim that Edward Wierenga’s new defence of the Howard-Snyders fails. I conclude that the Howard-Snyders’ argument fails to show that an essentially unsurpassable being could randomly choose a world for actualization. Accordingly, it fails to block an important argument for atheism.     

Addendum to: Heterogeneity Coefficients for Mahalanobis' D as a Multivariate Effect Size

In a previous paper (Del Giudice, 2017 [Heterogeneity coefficients for Mahalanobis' D as a multivariate effect size. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 52, 216–221]), I proposed two heterogeneity coefficients for Mahalanobis' D based on the Gini coefficient, labeled H and EPV. In this addendum I discuss the limitations of the original approach and note that the proposed indices may overestimate heterogeneity under certain conditions. I then describe two revised indices H₂ and EPV₂, and illustrate the difference between the original and revised indices with some real-world data sets.     

Counterfactuals: Ambiguities,true premises,and knowledge

In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.     

Working with the intelligent career model

The changing contemporary work environment has brought new career realities that suggest an altered role for the career counselor. This article reaffirms the benefits of working with the subjective aspects of career. The focus is on the intelligent career, a model that provides a framework to integrate career data into a coherent picture. The Intelligent Career Card Sort, specifically developed to elicit and work with subjective career data, is offered as a way for counselors to accommodate personal and dynamic needs of their clients beyond a job focus.     

Identity Politics and Dialectical Reason: Beyond an Epistemology of Provenance

Identity politics is important within feminism. However, it often presupposes an overly subjectivist theory of knowledge that I term an epistemology of provenance. I explore some works of feminist standpoint theory that begin to address the difficulties of such an epistemology. I then bring Sartre's account of knowledge in the Critique of Dialectical Reason to bear on these difficulties, arguing that his work offers tools for addressing them more adequately.     

The ethics of morphing

Here’s one piece of practical reasoning: “If I do this then a person will reap some benefits and suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits outweigh the costs. So I ought to do it.” Here’s another: “If I do this then one person will reap some benefits and another will suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits to the one person outweigh the costs to the other. So I ought to do it.” Many influential philosophers say that there is something dubious about the second piece of reasoning. They say that it makes sense to trade-off costs and benefits within lives, but not across lives. In this paper I make a case for the second piece of reasoning. My case turns on the existence of morphing sequences—sequences of possible states of affairs across which people transform smoothly into other people.

Action sentences

I would like to thank Eddy Zemach, Jonathan Stavi, Julius Moravcsik and Dov Gabbay for some very good discussions on the logical form of action sentences. Also, I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Erkenntnis for some very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

A content semantics for quantified relevant logics. I

We present an algebraic-style of semantics, which we call a content semantics, for quantified relevant logics based on the weak system BBQ. We show soundness and completeness for all quantificational logics extending BBQ and also treat reduced modelling for all systems containing BB ^d Q. The key idea of content semantics is that true entailments AB are represented under interpretation I as content containments, i.e. I(A)I(B) (or, the content of A contains that of B). This is opposed to the truth-functional way which represents true entailments as truth-preservations over all set-ups (or worlds), i.e. (VaK) (if I(A, a) = T then I(B, a)= T).This paper was presented to the Australasian Association for Logic Conference, held at the University of Auckland from 9–12th July, 1986. I wish to thank those present for some helpful comments. I also wish to thank Kit Fine for some useful discussion on some topics of this paper.     

Deficits in set-shifting ability in nonclinical compulsive checkers

Recent studies suggest deficits in set-shifting ability in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) as measured by tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948). The present study examined the extent to which these deficits were demonstrated by nonclinical subjects selected on the basis of their checking scores on the Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory. A multivariate analysis revealed that frequent checkers performed significantly worse on the WCST than noncheckers, making more total errors and more perseverative errors and requiring more time to complete the test. A follow-up analysis on a subset of the original sample found similar performance deficits in checkers. While the poorer performance of checkers could be statistically accounted for by anxiety during the first administration of the WCST, anxiety could not explain the relationship between checking status and WCST performance at follow-up. Therefore, there does appear to be some relationship between checking status and WCST performance beyond what can be explained by affective variables.     

Pollock on probability in epistemology

In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account.