An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

Young children's use of temporal and spatial order information in short-term memory

Encoding and retrieval of temporal and spatial order information was investigated in the free recall and probed recognition performance of 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds. In both tasks, three line drawings of familiar objects were presented successively in different spatial locations, so that temporal order was not confounded with spatial order. Subjects of all ages revealed an organization for the stimulus display based on the temporal sequence of presentation. With increasing age, subjects began recall more often with the first item so as to take advantage of this sequential organization. In the probed recognition task, subjects were asked questions requiring the use of temporal or spatial order information. Performance by the older subjects indicated that information about temporal and spatial order could be simultaneously encoded. The results are discussed in terms of a context theory derived from Estes's hierarchical association model.     

Children's ability to integrate class information

Coordination and integration of class information was examined using a multidimensional similarity judgment task in which four- and nine-year old children rated the similarity of pairs of stimuli sharing either one or two atribute values. Half the children at each age were assigned to an attention condition requiring they label relevant stimulus atributes before making their similarity ratings. The other children were in the nonattention condition, and rated similarity without labelling the attributes. The results indicated that four-year-olds in the attention condition and nine-year-olds in both conditions integrated class information in making their similarity judgments. Performance of the four-year-olds in the non-attention condition tended to improve across trials; they appeared to integrate class information on later trials.     

Pictorial concreteness and mode of elaboration in children's learning

Paired-associate learning by children was investigated as a function of age (4 vs 7 yr), stimulus type (line drawing, color photograph, or object) and mode of elaboration (visual or verbal). Photographs and objects were associated with more learning than drawings at both ages and with both types of mediational elaboration. Only indirect evidence could be obtained for the prediction that differences among the three types of pictorial stimuli decrease with age. A previously reported Age × Elaboration interaction suggesting a relative disadvantage of visual elaboration for the younger children was not replicated.     

Young children's beliefs about self‐disclosure of performance failure and success

Self‐disclosure of performance information involves the balancing of instrumental, learning benefits (e.g., obtaining help) against social costs (e.g., diminished reputation). Little is known about young children's beliefs about performance self‐disclosure. The present research investigates preschool‐ and early school‐age children's expectations of self‐disclosure in different contexts. In two experiments, 3‐ to 7‐year‐old children (total N = 252) heard vignettes about characters who succeeded or failed at solving a puzzle. Both experiments showed that children across all ages reasoned that people are more likely to self‐disclose positive than negative performances, and Experiment 2 showed that children across all ages reasoned that people are more likely to self‐disclose both positive and negative performances in a supportive than an unsupportive peer environment. Additionally, both experiments revealed changes with age – Younger children were less likely to expect people to withhold their performance information (of both failures and successes) than older children. These findings point to the preschool ages as a crucial beginning to children's developing recognition of people's reluctance to share performance information.     

Children's judgments of numerical quantity: A new view of early quantification

Three experiments investigated the role of length, density, and number dimensions in children's numerosity judgments of linear arrays of beads. The number dimension is physically defined by a length × density rule. Judgments based, even in part, on the number dimension would show signs of a length × density rule. Experiment 1 examined numerosity judgments of large arrays. Results showed that judgments by 3- and 4-year-olds obeyed a length + density rule, providing cogent evidence for a general adding strategy in young children's judgments of quantity. The physical length × density rule emerged gradually with increasing age. Experiment 2 showed that numerosity judgments of small arrays by 3- and 4-year-olds obeyed a length × density rule, indicating response to the number dimension. This result was expected and thereby validated the linearity of the response scale at the youngest ages. Experiment 3 verified the integration rules for individual 3- and 4-year-olds. The integration rules were interpreted in terms of Piaget's stages of the development of quantification. No evidence for Piaget's initial stage was found. This leads to a new view of early quantification which grants young children the ability to integrate stimulus dimensions.     

Children's use of perceptual set

The effects of perceptual set and of “sequential visual noise” on the identification of briefly exposed pictures were examined in 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults. Subjects were asked to indicate whether a brief target matched a standard. The standard picture was presented either before the target picture (to establish a set) or after the target. The target was presented either alone or last in a series of six brief pictures (i.e., in noise). Adults and 8-year-olds were at ceiling when the target was presented alone, but set facilitated their identification of the target in noise. The 5-year-olds benefited from set both when the target was presented alone and when it was presented in noise. These findings suggest that set for a specific target picture functions similarly at all ages.     

Mainland Chinese and Canadian adolescents’ judgments and reasoning about the fairness of democratic and other forms of government

This study examined the judgments and reasoning of adolescents (ages 12–19 years) from three sites in urban and rural China (n = 270) and in an urban Canadian comparison sample (n = 72), about the fairness of various forms of democratic and non-democratic government. Adolescents from both China and Canada preferred democratic forms of government, such as representative or direct democracy, to non-democratic systems, such as a meritocracy and an oligarchy of the wealthy, at all ages. Adolescents appealed to fundamental democratic principles, such as representation, voice, and majority rule, to justify their judgments. Similar age-related patterns in judgments and reasoning were found across cultures and across diverse settings within China.     

Texture gradient registration and the development of slant perception.

The processes underlying the development of slant perception were investigated by manipulating the degree of texture element variability. Subjects at four grade levels were required to make judgments of physical slant of surfaces with three levels of variability. Absolute error of judgment decreased with age, but texture variability had no effect at any grade level. The results suggest that there is no improvement in the ability to extract gradient information. Rather, improvement in the consistency of judgment reflects a developmental change in the relationship between stimulus information and judgment.     

Decision processes in children's recognition memory

Kindergarteners and third graders were given a continuous recognition memory task involving two-digit numbers. In addition, a rating scale consisting of photographs of various facial expressions was used to obtain confidence judgments from the Ss. Conventional analyses as well as signal detection analyses of the data revealed the following results: (a) the overall performance of the third graders was superior to that of the kindergarteners; (b) memory strength decreased as the number of intervening items increased; (c) there was no difference in the forgetting rates of the two grade levels; (d) the third graders exhibited a more liberal response bias than the kindergarteners; (e) both the hit rate (probability of correctly labeling an old stimulus as old) and the false-alarm rate (probability of incorrectly labeling a new stimulus as old) increased across blocks of items; (f) the increases in the hit rate and the false-alarm rate over blocks were due to a change in criterion from a relatively conservative level to a more lenient one; (g) the lower the S's level of confidence in judging an item as old, the lower was the probability of that item actually being old; (h) the third graders were better than the kindergarteners at gauging the accuracy of their recognition responses. It was concluded that with respect to recognition memory, chidren as young as $\text{5}\text{1}\text{2}$ years old are capable, to some extent, of monitoring their own memory states.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Children's component selection with varying degrees of training

With the component selection measure developed by Hale and Morgan (1973), children's use of selective attention was assessed at six levels of learning, ranging from undertraining to overtraining, and this function was examined at each of ages 4, 8, and 12. It was found that, as the children learned the task, they maintained a relatively wide focus of attention, acquiring information about both features of the stimuli, color and shape. Thus, contrary to the model under investigation, the children did not exercise a high degree of selectivity as they approached mastery of the task; nor did overtraining produce the expected “broadening” of attention, as the children acquired little stimulus information beyond the point at which criterion had been reached. The data were interpreted to be more consistent with a model that assumes the bulk of stimulus learning to occur prior to task mastery.     

Thinking about Others versus Another: Three Reasons Judgments about Collectives and Individuals Differ

In this article, we review evidence that people are more positive in assessments of specific individuals than they are about collectives of others, even when people have essentially no information about the individual or collective they are judging. We offer three explanations for this difference. First, evaluative “attacks” on individuals are more aversive than similar attacks on collectives. Second, to encourage or smooth interaction, people sometimes “assume the best” about individuals until proven wrong. Social interaction occurs between specific individuals, so such optimism does not extend to people in general. Third, in making judgments of individuals versus collectives, people naturally focus on different types of information. For an individual, people spontaneously consider influences that operate inside an individual (e.g., one's will, one's moral conscience). But for collectives, people instead contemplate influences that operate at a social level (e.g., social influence, social norms). We explore how these three proposals help predict when judgments of individuals and collectives do or do not differ.     

Children's understanding of natural language hierarchies

Three experiments examined young children's ability to evaluate the relationship between concepts as one of inclusion. In Experiment 1, the same group of 4-to 7-year-old children were given three tasks: one in which they made judgments about whether “all” or “some” members of a category were included in another category, and two tasks in which they made inferences based on knowledge of inclusion relations. The majority of children succeeded on at least one of the tasks, thereby implying that they could evaluate inclusion relations. Two further experiments provided more evidence for this hypothesis: Experiment 2 confirmed that nursery children could answer quantitative questions about conceptual interrelationts; Experiment 3 demonstrated that nursery schoolers could solve certain inference problems involving the construction and evaluation of hierarchies.     

Developmental trends in children's component selection

A new method is introduced for assessing children's component selection—i.e., the disposition to attend to a single feature of multifaceted stimuli. Eight-year-old children were found to exercise component selection to a lesser degree than 4-year-olds; while children at both age levels attended primarily to one stimulus component (shape), the older children showed a moderate amount of attention to a secondary redundant feature (color) as well. However, a comparable age difference in attention deployment was not observed when a single stimulus dimension (shape) was “relevant” in two variant tasks. These results imply a developmentally increasing ability to distinguish between conditions in which attending to redundant stimulus information can and cannot be useful. That this ability undergoes little further development beyond age 8 was suggested in a second experiment with 8- and 12-year-olds in which the three tasks produced relatively similar developmental trends in performance.     

Developmental differences in frequency judgments of words and pictures

Children in kindergarten, third, and fifth grades were presented a list of either pictures or words (with items presented for varying numbers of times on the study trial). In both picture and word conditions, half of the Ss estimated how many times each item had been presented (absolute judgments) and the other half judged which of two items had occurred more often on the study trial (relative judgments). The primary finding was that while frequency judgment performance improved with age for both pictures and words, there was relatively greater improvement for pictures (i.e., the picture-word difference increased with age). These results lend strong support to the frequency theory of discrimination learning and, in particular, may be useful in accounting for effects associated with age and with age by stimulus mode interactions.     

Developmental differences in subjects' associative-learning strategies and performance: Assessing a hypothesis

Fifth-, seventh-, and ninth-grade (11-, 13-, and 15-year-old) subjects were presented with a list of paired associates to learn and were interviewed about the strategies used to learn them. Although a majority of fifth graders reported simply rehearsing the pairs in order to remember them, very few ninth graders relied exclusively on rehearsal. Consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Rohwer (1973), the number of subjects who elaborated some or all of the pairs increased with age. Paired-associate performance increased with age, but the level of paired-associate learning was much more related to the type of strategy reported by the subject than to the age of the subject per se.     

Category-Based versus Attribute-Based Processing in Different-Aged Adults

Adaptive social functioning requires flexibility in processing operations in response to the characteristics of specific situations. Three experiments were conducted in which the ability of different-aged adults to appropriately use category-based versus attribute-based information in making affective judgments was examined. Contrary to expectations, we found that performance was minimally related to age or to working memory efficiency. Adults of all ages made affective judgments based on category information when such information resulted in appropriate inferences, whereas attribute-based information was used when category-based inferences were inaccurate. We interpret these results to be consistent with the hypothesis that the processing of evaluative information occurs at a preconscious level with little drain on processing resources.     

Hindsight bias redefined: It’s about time

Four experiments introduced a new conceptual and methodological approach to hindsight bias, traditionally defined as the tendency to exaggerate the a priori predictability of outcomes after they become known. By examining likelihood estimates rooted to specific time points during an unfolding event sequence (videos and short text stories), judged both in foresight and hindsight, we conceptualized hindsight bias as a contrast between two “inevitability curves,” which plotted likelihood against time. Taking timing into account, we defined three new indicators of accuracy: linear accuracy (how well hindsight judgments capture the linear trend of foresight judgments over time), rate accuracy (how well hindsight judgments reflect the slope of foresight judgments over time), and temporal accuracy (how well hindsight judgments specify the overall timing of the full envelope of foresight judgments). Results demonstrated that hindsight judgments showed linear and rate accuracy, but were biased only in terms of lack of temporal accuracy. The oft-used catchphrase “knew it all along effect” was found to be a misnomer, in that participants were well aware in hindsight that their earlier foresight judgments reflected uncertainty. The current research therefore points to one way in which retrospective judgments can be considered biased, yet simultaneously suggests that considerable accuracy exists when people render such judgments.     

Children's perceptions of helpers and helper motivation

The present study examined children's preferences for help and helpers from the child's viewpoint as help-seeker. Preschool, first-, third-, and fifth-grade children were asked to indicate the persons from whom they would seek help in situations requiring either academic or social assistance. Reasons for selecting specific helpers were also obtained. Examination of spontaneous responses indicated that over all ages and situations teachers, peers, and parents were most frequently chosen as helpers. Age-related changes in selection of and preference for helpers were also found. There was a trend toward decreased preference for parents with increasing age. Whereas preferences for teachers increased only slightly across age groups, there was a strong developmental trend toward increasing selection of peers. In addition, with increasing age children's reasoning about thier helper selections focused less on their own needs and global characteristics of the helper, and focused more on specific attributes of helpers and existing relationships between themselves as help-seekers and the selected helper.