The cognitive representation of persons and groups and its effect on recall and recognition memory

A conceptualization of the manner in which trait and behavioral information is organized in memory is proposed and applied in predicting both the recall and recognition of information about persons and groups. Three information presentation conditions were considered: (1) Subjects are told to form an impression of a target (person or group) on the basis of the target's behaviors, and are given a trait-based concept of what the target is like before learning about these behaviors. (2) Subjects are told to form an impression of the target, but a general traitbased concept of the target is not induced until after they learn about the target's behaviors. (3) Subjects receive information about the target's behaviors with instructions to remember the information, and only subsequently are told to form an impression and are given more general information about the target's traits. The proposed model accounted for between-condition differences in both the recall and recognition of behaviors that were consistent and inconsistent with a general trait-based concept of the target, and for contingencies of these differences on whether the target was a single person or a group.     

The role of logical and nonlogical factors in making inferences about category membership

Three postulates are proposed concerning the manner in which persons infer the validity of propositions that do not necessarily follow logically from the information available. These postulates assume that subjects first attempt to identify the propositions that are most and least likely to follow from the information given. They then use their beliefs in these propositions as anchors, relative to which the validity of other propositions is evaluated on the basis of both logical and nonlogical criteria. Two experiments are reported in which these postulates are used successfully to diagnose the logical and nonlogical factors that underlie inferences based upon both single statements and sets of syllogistically related propositions. The implications of the proposed postulates for existing formulations of social inference and cognitive organization are discussed.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

The recall and use of belief statements as bases for judgments: Some determinants and implications

When people are asked to report their beliefs in a (target) statement, they may search memory for other, “informational” propositions that bear on its validity, and may use their beliefs in these propositions as bases for their judgments. Several factors were hypothesized to affect the particular propositions that subjects are likely to recall under such conditions. Subjects first familiarized themselves with a list of informational and target propositions. Then, they reported either their beliefs in these propositions or their attitudes toward them. In a second session 1 week later, they recalled as many of the propositions as they could. Both informational and target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions were unlikely to be true. In addition, the target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions associated with them had unclear implications for their validity. Recall of one proposition was more likely to cue the recall of the other when subjects had previously reported belief in the target proposition (rather than attitudes toward it). However, it was more likely to occur when subjects had reported attitudes toward the informational proposition (rather than beliefs in it). The effects of these variables were interpreted in terms of their mediating influence on the strength of association between the informational proposition and both (a) the target proposition and (b) contextual and environmental cues in the situation where target beliefs are reported.     

An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

Further test of a subjective probability model of social inference

Subjects read paragraphs suggesting that a fictitious person (O) either did or did not possess an attribute X. Then, they reported their beliefs that they would like O (P_L), that O possessed X (P_X), that O was intelligent (P_I) and that O was sarcastic (P_s). Other beliefs necessary to test the predictive accuracy of Wyer's subjective probability model of cognitive organization were also reported. The model accurately predicted P_L on the basis of beliefs about X (the attribute to which information about O directly pertained); this accuracy was greater than that obtained in an earlier study in which real persons were evaluated, and did not depend upon the favorableness of X. However, predictions of P_L based upon beliefs about O's intelligence overestimated obtained values, while predictions based upon beliefs about O's sarcasm underestimated these values; moreover, P_I and P_S were underestimated and overestimated, respectively, by beliefs about X. It was speculated that these discrepancies were due to temporary inconsistencies among beliefs resulting from the information presented which did not have time to be resolved before beliefs were reported. Changes in P_L, P_I, and P_S resulting from additional information about X were accurately predicted in all cases. Implications of the model for other formulations of social evaluation processes are noted.     

Attribution of responsibility: A theoretical note

Research on factors influencing attribution of responsibility has resulted in inconsistent and inconclusive findings. A theoretical analysis suggests that Heider's levels of causality represent two dimensions underlying attribution of responsibility. It is suggested that conflicting findings result from failures to control at least one of these two dimensions.     

On construct validity: A critique of Miniard and Cohen's paper

Miniard and Cohen's conclusion that our measures of attitudes and subjective norms lack construct validity is rejected. It is shown that the data from their study are entirely consistent with data from previous investigations and that the data provide additional evidence for the predictive validity of our theory and for the construct validity of our operations.     

Self-punitive behavior with changing percentages of reinforcement: The proper role of discrimination

Past research on self-punitive behavior has been interpreted as supporting a theoretical éxplanation based on a vicious circle rather than a discrimination hypothesis. Using rats, Melvin (1964) found that self-punitive behavior is not reduced when discrimination is aided by changing the percentage of shock trials from acquisition to extinction. This past research is inconclusive because it is based on a misinterpretation of what is the critical discrimination for extinction, namely the new response-punishment contingency. Using humans, the present study provides evidence that subjects can and do discriminate the change in percentage, but continue to show self-punitive behavior until they make the discrimination that responding results in shock rather than escape.     

Compounds of conditioned fear stimuli

A differential conditioning procedure was used with rats to establish different levels of suppression to two different stimuli. One stimulus was paired with shock every time it was presented, while the other stimulus cued shock on only 25% of its presentations. When these two component stimuli were subsequently tested as a simultaneous compound, two different types of component-compound relationships were observed. Some subjects showed greater suppression to the compound than they did to either component stimulus, while other subjects showed an intermediate level of suppression to the compound. The difference in type of component-compound relationship appeared to be related to the degree of stability (over trials) of each subject's reaction to the probabilistic (25%) cue.When a similar discrimination was established based on the intensity of the shock, rather than its probability of occurrence, all subjects showed more suppression to the compound than to its individual component stimuli. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for choice of model for characterizing the interaction of conditioned states.     

Physiological and behavioral concomitants of mild stress: The effects of accuracy of temporal information

Sixty human subjects were exposed to a mild auditory stress after a fixed anticipatory period during which they performed a reaction time task. Suspense subjects were correctly informed of the time of onset of stress; Surprise subjects were told to expect the stress 10 min. later than it actually occurred. Subjects were provided with elapsed time information either automatically or on demand. Suspence subjects showed larger anticipatory electrodermal responses and smaller responses to stress than Surprise subjects but the two groups did not differ in their ratings of the unpleasantness of the stress. Female subjects showed greater anticipatory responses and consistently slower reaction times than males. The data are discussed in terms of explanations of the negative preception effect.     

Some implications of temporal drift in social parameters

Social and political factors often have an effect on the way we perceive and think about particular events. While it is generally acknowledged that these factors are likely to change over time, the implications of such temporal changes for empirical research are not often considered. In this paper, some of these are illustrated by examining data collected from a sequence of studies conducted over a 3-year period (1973–1976). Subjects viewed the same videotaped mock (rape) trial and, prior to experimental manipulations, gave their own personal verdict. An examination of the proportion of mock jurors preferring guilty in each of the studies revealed a drift of 16% (.53 to .69) from 1973–1976. This trend toward harsher judgments was observed for both sexes, with females uniformly more likely than males to favor conviction. Ancillary evidence suggests that the upward drift reflected changes in the perception of rape during that period. The implications of temporal drift in parameter values for empirical research were illustrated by simulating jury size effects using social decision scheme theory (J. H. Davis, Psychological Review, 1973,80, 97–125). The results indicate that the magnitude of theoretical differences due to jury size must have decreased as the probability of an individual guilty vote increased over time. Thus, failures to replicate findings may not be due entirely to sampling error, methodological imprecision, or the like, but to temporal changes in the social phenomenon under investigation.     

Misconceptions about the Fishbein model: Reflections on a study by Songer-Nocks

Songer-Nocks has questioned the generality and sufficiency of Fishbein's model of intentions. It is shown that her conclusions reflect a basic misunderstanding of the model and its implications. Several misconceptions are identified and an attempt is made to clarify some of the theoretical and methodological issues involved.