The emergence of social cognitive neuroscience

Social cognitive neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field of research that seeks to understand phenomena in terms of interactions between 3 levels of analysis: the social level, which is concerned with the motivational and social factors that influence behavior and experience; the cognitive level, which is concerned with the information-processing mechanisms that give rise to social-level phenomena; and the neural level, which is concerned with the brain mechanisms that instantiate cognitive-level processes. The social cognitive neuroscience approach entails conducting studies and constructing theories that make reference to all 3 levels and contrasts with traditional social psychological and cognitive neuroscientific research that primarily makes reference to 2 levels. The authors present an introduction to and analysis of the field by reviewing current research and providing guidelines and suggested directions for future work.     

Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.     

Self-serving bias in the attribution of responsibility: Cognitive versus motivational explanations

The purpose of this study is to compare the cognitive and motivational explanations of differences in the responsibility assigned to the victim of a crime. It has generally been found that the victim of a crime is assigned more responsibility for that crime by similar others if its consequences are severe. The motivational explanation for this finding is that subjects are threatened by the idea that a serious crime can happen by chance. The cognitive explanation is that serious crimes are rarer and subjects attribute more of the responsibility for rarer events to those who experience them. This study tested these two explanations by independently varying the severity and the likelihood of a crime and examining attributions of responsibility to its victim. The results of the study support the cognitive explanation. Similar others were found to attribute more responsibility for a crime to the victim when that crime was presented as rare, irrespective of whether its consequences were mild or severe. In addition, when likelihood was controlled experimentally no effect of severity upon attributions of responsibility was found. These results suggest that, within the context of attributions of responsibility to victims, patterns of attribution consistent with those predicted by theories suggesting motivational influences upon attribution may actually represent the operation of cognitive processes.     

Exploring Causes of the Self‐serving Bias

The self‐serving bias refers to a tendency for people to take personal responsibility for their desirable outcomes yet externalize responsibility for their undesirable outcomes. We review a variety of explanations for this attribution bias. Although researchers have historically pitted cognitive and motivational explanations for the self‐serving bias against one another, cognitive and motivation processes often work in tandem to lead people to conclude that they are responsible for the desirable but not the undesirable outcomes.     

Pavlov's methodological behaviorism as a pre-Socratic contribution of the melding of the differential and experimental psychology

The differential/experimental distinction that Cronbach specified is important because any adequate account of psychological phenomena requires the recognition of the validity of both approaches, and a meaningful melding of the two. This paper suggests that Pavlov's work in psychology, based on earlier traditions of inquiry that can be traced back to the pre-Socratics, provides a potential way of achieving this melding, although such features as systematic rather than anecdotal methods of observation need to be added. Pavlov's methodological behaviorist approach is contrasted with metaphysical behaviorism (as exemplified explicitly in Watson and Skinner, and implicitly in the computer-metaphorical, information-processing explanations employed by current "cognitive" psychology). A common feature of the metaphysical approach is that individual-differences variables like sex are essentially ignored, or relegated to ideological categories such as the treatment of sex as merely a "social construction." Examples of research both before and after the "cognitive revolution" are presented where experimental and differential methods are melded, and individual differences are treated as phenomena worthy of investigation rather than as nuisance factors that merely add to experimental error.     

Recent contributions to the theory of defense mechanisms: a comparative view

Some of the most recent contributions to the theory of defense mechanisms are critically reviewed including theories of complex motivational properties of the ego (Schafer, 1968; Kris, 1984), a functional theory of defense (Brenner, 1982), an object-representational theory of defense (Kernberg, 1976), a "two-person" theory of defense (Modell, 1984) and a self-psychologically based theory of defense (Kohut, 1984). These recently proposed theories of defense mechanisms utilize differing levels of analytic observation and theoretical discourse. One of the major differences among theorists involves the variety of referents of defense mechanisms (i.e., what is being defended against) including impulse, drive derivative, object loss, or environmental failure. Another fundamental difference involves the variety of ways theorists regard the relation between internal homeostasis and the external world. Questions are raised about the recent tendency in psychoanalytic theory to develop or invoke different theories of defense to explain a broad range of clinical phenomena.     

判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

Friends at last? Distributed cognition and the cognitive/social divide

Distributed cognition (d-cog) claims that many cognitive processes are “distributed” across groups and the surrounding material and cultural environment. Recently, Nancy Nersessian, Ronald Giere, and others have suggested that a d-cog approach might allow us to bring together cognitive and social theories of science. I explore this idea by focusing on the specific interpretation of d-cog found in Edwin Hutchins' canonical text Cognition in the wild. First, I examine the scope of a d-cog approach to science, showing that there are important disputes between cognitive and social theorists on which d-cog remains silent. Second, I suggest that, where social explanations can be recast in d-cog terms, this reformulation will not be acceptable to all social theorists. Finally, I ask how we should make sense of the claim that, on a d-cog analysis, social factors are cognitive factors.     

CULTURE AND WORK ALIENATION: WESTERN MODELS AND EASTERN REALITIES

This paper argues that the existing theoretical explanations of work alienation and corrective management practices developed in the Western world have limited cross-cultural applicability. This argument is supported first by identifying the cultural bias inherent in the Western explanatory models of alienation and then by indicating how such a bias fails to adequately explain work alienation and its opposite work involvement phenomena in Eastern societies like India. Finally, the paper probes into the role of some critical indigenous variables responsible for the development of alienation among workers in India. The case of Indian workers provides an illustrative example of what is needed for alienation research in a developing country context: to avoid the folly of uncritically accepting the Western explanatory models and to encourage the discovery of indigenous explanations.     

Psychological approaches to panic disorder: a review

Panic disorder has been the subject of considerable research and controversy. Though biological conceptualizations have been predominant, psychological theorists have recently advanced conditioning, personality, and cognitive hypotheses to explain the etiology of panic disorder. The purpose of this article is to provide an empirical and conceptual analysis of these psychological hypotheses. This review covers variants of the "fear-of-fear" construal of panic disorder (i.e., Pavlovian interoceptive conditioning, catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations, anxiety sensitivity), research on predictability (i.e., expectancies) and controllability, and research on information-processing biases believed to underlie the phenomenology of panic. Suggestions for future research are made.     

语言的群体间偏差研究

个体在用语言来描述他人的行为时,会因为描述对象的群体种类不同而有偏差,具体表现为在描述群体内成员的积极行为和群体外成员的负向行为时,会使用较高抽象水平的词;在描述群体外成员的积极行为和群体内成员的负向行为时,会使用较低抽象水平的词。这种抽象水平的差异由语言范畴模型来具体表明。Maass等人把这种描述上的偏差命名为语言的群体间偏差。并认为在这一现象下有两种机制：动机机制和认知机制,研究表明认知机制能解释大部分语言的群体间偏差现象,而动机机制会在群体内形象受到威胁时发挥作用。     

The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources

Cognitive biases, such as the anchoring bias, pose a serious challenge to rational accounts of human cognition. We investigate whether rational theories can meet this challenge by taking into account the mind’s bounded cognitive resources. We asked what reasoning under uncertainty would look like if people made rational use of their finite time and limited cognitive resources. To answer this question, we applied a mathematical theory of bounded rationality to the problem of numerical estimation. Our analysis led to a rational process model that can be interpreted in terms of anchoring-and-adjustment. This model provided a unifying explanation for ten anchoring phenomena including the differential effect of accuracy motivation on the bias towards provided versus self-generated anchors. Our results illustrate the potential of resource-rational analysis to provide formal theories that can unify a wide range of empirical results and reconcile the impressive capacities of the human mind with its apparently irrational cognitive biases.     

An examination of the relation of individual difference variables to loneliness

This study investigated the relation of five individual difference variables (extroversion, depression, self-esteem, neuroticism, and attitude toward others) to loneliness. The relative contributions of two different models that might explain these relations were examined. One model suggests that individual difference variables are related to loneliness through the mediation of social network variables; that is, individual difference variables may reduce people's motivation and/or ability to build and maintain social relationships, which in turn leads to loneliness. The second model, the cognitive bias model, states that both the individual difference variables and loneliness are influenced by the same intrapersonal, cognitive processes. Some people are prone to negative affect and tend to evaluate themselves and their relationships negatively. The relations of self-esteem, neuroticism, and depression to loneliness were hypothesized to reflect the cognitive bias model, while extroversion and attitudes toward others were hypothesized to be related to loneliness through the mediation of social network variables. Eighty-two female and 42 male adults completed measures of loneliness and the five individual difference variables, as well as an instrument assessing their social networks. The results indicated partial support for both models for each of the individual difference variables. Together, the two models did a good job of explaining the correlations of the individual difference variables and loneliness. The implications of these findings, as well as their relation to previous research, are discussed.     

Gender differences in automatic in-group bias: why do women like women more than men like men?

Four experiments confirmed that women's automatic in-group bias is remarkably stronger than men's and investigated explanations for this sex difference, derived from potential sources of implicit attitudes (L. A. Rudman, 2004). In Experiment 1, only women (not men) showed cognitive balance among in-group bias, identity, and self-esteem (A. G. Greenwald et al., 2002), revealing that men lack a mechanism that bolsters automatic own group preference. Experiments 2 and 3 found pro-female bias to the extent that participants automatically favored their mothers over their fathers or associated male gender with violence, suggesting that maternal bonding and male intimidation influence gender attitudes. Experiment 4 showed that for sexually experienced men, the more positive their attitude was toward sex, the more they implicitly favored women. In concert, the findings help to explain sex differences in automatic in-group bias and underscore the uniqueness of gender for intergroup relations theorists.     

Modelling cognition in emotional disorder: The S-REF model

Cognitive therapy techniques are applied to an ever-increasing range of psychological disorders. However, both basic methods and general theory of therapy have evolved more slowly. Although cognitive therapy is based on experimentally testable concepts derived from cognitive psychology, an integration of these areas capable of explaining cognitive-attentional phenomena and offering treatment Implications remains to be achieved. In this paper, we outline the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model of emotional disorder, which integrates information processing research with Beck's schema theory. The model advances understanding of the roles of stimulus-driven and voluntary control of cognition, procedural knowledge (beliefs), and of the interactions between different levels of information-processing. It also accounts for cognitive bias effects demonstrated in the experimental psychopathology literature. The model presents implications concerning not only what should be done in cognitive therapy, but how cognitive change may be most effectively accomplished.     

生态学习观:一种审视学习的新视角

学习理论作为教育心理学的重要组成部分,百余年来发展繁盛。然而,无论是行为主义、信息加工、建构主义、还是目前流行的社会文化观,每一种学习理论所能描述和解释的不过是学习现象的某些方面或某一层次,都未能反映出人类学习的完整图景。本文尝试提出生态学习的思想,试图展现学习的整体、适应和多元的面孔。     

Biases in social comparative judgments: the role of nonmotivated factors in above-average and comparative-optimism effects

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior.     

On the Independent Roles of Cognitive & Political Sophistication: Variation Across Attitudinal Objects

People are motivated to maintain consistency between importantly held identities, preferences, and judgments. In political contexts, motivated reasoning can help explain a wide range of political phenomena, including extremism, polarization, and misperceptions. However, recent findings in psychology have challenged this account. These perspectives emphasize the role of cognitive sophistication (e.g., analytical reasoning, numerical literacy) in political attitudes, but differ in terms of whether it is expected to attenuate or exacerbate politically motivated reasoning and belief in conspiracy theories. Yet prior investigations have not examined the relative and independent effects of both political and cognitive sophistication. Using data from two samples, including one sampled to approximate representativeness in the U.S., we demonstrate that both types of sophistication have independent and (at times) countervailing effects on belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and other political attitudes. Our results are critical for theories of cognitive sophistication, political cognition, and attitudes, and the psychology of conspiracy theories.     

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.     

Noise,uncertainty, and interest: Predictive coding and cognitive penetration

This paper concerns how extant theorists of predictive coding conceptualize and explain possible instances of cognitive penetration. Section 1 offers brief clarification of the predictive coding framework and of cognitive penetration. Section 2 develops more precise ways that the predictive coding framework can explain genuine top-down causal effects on perceptual experience. Section 3 develops these insights further with an eye towards tracking one extant criterion for cognitive penetration, namely, that the relevant cognitive effects on perception must be sufficiently direct. In Section 4, we analyze and criticize a claim made by some theorists of predictive coding, namely, that (interesting) instances of cognitive penetration tend to occur in perceptual circumstances involving substantial noise or uncertainty. We argue that, when applied, the claim fails to explain (or perhaps even be consistent with) a large range of important and uncontroversially interesting possible cases of cognitive penetration. We conclude with a general speculation about how the recent work on the predictive mind may influence the current dialectic concerning top-down effects on perception.