Conditional reasoning following contradictory evidence: A developmental analysis

Recent evidence suggests that young adults do not correctly understand the logical relationship of the conditional (if p the q) as it applies to hypothesis testing, and most training procedures have not been productive. However, the introduction of contradictory evidence following faulty inferences has led to accurate inferences with conditional statements. Third and seventh grade and college studients (9, 13, and 21 years of age, respectively) were tested to assess developmental differences in improvement following contradiction training and to test whether improved performance transfers to other conditional reasoning tasks. Significant improvement in conditional reasoning was found for the young adult group following the introduction of contradictory evidence, and the positive effect of the treatment transferred across tasks. The third grade students showed no effects from the introduction of the contradiction, but the seventh graders were often confused by the introduction of the contradiction. Seventh grade and college student performances were generally worse than that of the third graders for the positive instances (p · q), but while the contradiction training improved college studients' performance it did not affect the seventh graders. The results are discussed in terms of changes in cognitive structures.     

Classes,collections, and distinctive features: Alternative strategies for solving inclusion problems

This study analyzed the strategies that children ages 5 through 8 years used on two modified versions of Inhelder and Piaget's (The early growth of logic in the child. New York: Norton, 1964) class inclusion task. In two experiments, children were tested on Wilkinson's (Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 64–85) “percept” inclusion task in which distinctive features marked both supraordinate and subclasses. It was hypothesized that children who fail standard Piagetian inclusion tasks succeed on the “percept” task by counting and comparing mutually exclusive features rather than using features as markers for classes and subclasses. The hypothesis was supported by children's performances on “percept” tasks in which solutions based on feature counting conflicted with solutions based on consideration of class inclusion relations. In two other experiments, children answered part-whole and part-part comparison questions in which both terms were described as classes and/or subclasses, or in which one of the two terms was described as a collection (e.g., a bunch of grapes). These experiments contrasted Markman and Seibert's (Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 561–577) “organization” hypothesis that the greater psychological integrity of collections facilitates reasoning on part-whole comparison problems with the hypothesis that the faciltative effect results from the “large number” connotation of collective nouns. Results on collection problems in which parts were described as collections supported the “large number” hypothesis. Results were discussed in terms of their implications for Piaget's theory.     

The effect of pretraining and feedback on the reasoning of young children

Three experiments are reported in which kindergarten and first-grade children were given one-trial multidimensional reasoning tasks that were modifications of those used by T. C. Toppino (1980, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 30, 496–512). In the first two experiments, the nature of the stimulus compounds (partitioned or unitary) was varied in a series of tasks of increasing complexity. First-grade children (Experiment 1) and kindergarten children (Experiment 2) performed extremely well on all of the tasks presented. Experiment 3 was designed to identify factors that contribute to these high levels of performance, relative to those obtained under the conditions used by Toppino (1980). The results indicated that a combination of feedback information and preliminary experience with simple forms of the tasks are sufficient to produce the high performance levels, and that the verbal labeling of stimulus components is not an essential constituent of the training.     

Semantic organization in the young child: Evidence for the development of semantic feature systems

In two experiments, 5-, 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children and college students were presented on each trial with a sentence followed by a probe word. Their task was to indicate whether the probe was in the sentence or not. Of primary interest were the false recognitions and the correct latencies that occurred when the probe word was a synonym or antonym of one of the words in the sentence (Experiment I) or when the probe was a subordinate, superordinate, part, or whole (Experiment II). The younger children were more affected by synonymy than antonymy, although the older children and adults were not. At all ages, the categorical relationships caused more recognition confusion than the partwhole relationships. Subjects were more affected when the probe was a superordinate than when it was a subordinate, and somewhat more affected when the probe was the whole than when it was the part. These results suggest that children as young as 5 years of age have well-organized conceptual systems based on shared meaning components.     

The development of analogical reasoning processes.

Two experiments were conducted to test the generalizability to children of a theory of analogical reasoning processes originally proposed for adults (R. J. Sternberg, Psychological Review, 1977a, 84, 353–378; R. J. Sternberg, Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning: The componential analysis of human abilities, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977b) and to examine the development of analogical reasoning processes in terms of five proposed sources of cognitive development: (a) availability of component operations; (b) strategy for combining multiple component operation; (c) strategy for combining multiple executions of the same component operation; (d) consistency in use of strategy; (e) component-operation latency and difficulty. Between 15 and 21 subjects in each of grades 2, 4, 6, and adulthood (ages 8, 10, 12, and 19 years, respectively) were tested in their ability to solve analogies of systematically varied difficulty. Performance was measured in terms of latencies for items solved correctly, latencies for all items solved, and error rates. A slightly modified version of the Stenberg, 1977(a), Stenberg, 1977(b) theory was found to be applicable to the data for each of the age levels tested. In analogies with perceptually separable attributes, change over age was found in sources (d) and (e) noted above. In analogies with perceptually integral attributes, change over age was found in sources (a), (c), (d), and (e). Developmental trends were discussed in terms of past theory and findings, and possible reasons for differences in developmental patterns between the two kinds of analogies were suggested.     

Finite and infinite state confusion models

A confusion model is defined as a model that decomposes response probabilities in stimulus identification experiments into perceptual parameters and response parameters. Historically, confusion models fall into two groups. Models in Group I, which includes Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50) overlap model, were developed on the basis of the notion that stimulus identification is mediated by a finite number of internal states. We call the general class of models that have this processing interpretation finite state confusion models. Models in Group II, which includes Luce's (R. O. Luce et al., Eds., Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. I), New York: Wiley, 1963) biased choice model, were not developed on the basis of an explicit processing interpretation. It is shown here that models in Group II are not finite state confusion models. We prove in addition that except for Falmagne's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 206–224) simply biased model models in Group II belong to a certain class of infinite state confusion models, namely, models asserting that stimulus identification is mediated by a continuous space of vectors representing detector activation levels.     

Equity judgments in hypothetical,four-person partnerships

Subjects' ratings of the fairness of a set of suggested allocations in hypothetical, four-person partnerships demonstrated that an ordinal relationship between inputs and outcomes is not a sufficient definition of equity. Subjects' suggestions for fair distributions of outcomes failed to conform to G. W. Walster's (Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 65–67) increasing-profits and profit-sign criteria, and were better fit by R. J. Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear formula than by any other formula thus far proposed.     

On the evidence for linguistic abilities in signing apes.

F. Patterson (Brain and Language, 5, 56–71) described signing behavior by a gorilla, Koko, which she interpreted as evidence for linguistic abilities in apes. We evaluate her claim with respect to her evidence, additional evidence from other ape language studies, and studies of the sign language of the deaf. We conclude that her report does not include the appropriate data or analyses and that her conclusions are unjustified. Ape signing shows little resemblance to either the speech of hearing children or the signing of deaf children. Some nonlinguistic interpretations of this behavior and methodological issues are considered.     

The effect of pictorial detail and elaboration on children's retention.

In a visual memory task, two degrees of stimulus detail were compared to test Reese's hypothesis that stimulus detail would facilitate retention of paired associates for young children. Stimuli were presented in an elaborated or nonelaborated fashion so that the effect of detail on retention of both types of materials could be investigated. Four and 5 year-old children were included to assess a reported developmental trend that elaboration facilitates retention for older children but fails to do so for younger children. Both age groups performed equally well, and detail had no effect. Elaboration aided retention significantly. A second study, in which difficulty of the task was increased, yielded equivalent results. The constraints on performance by recall and recognition tasks were discussed.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

The production and verification tasks in mental addition: An empirical comparison

We respond to A. Baroody's comment (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 148–156) with an empirical comparison of the production and verification tasks. With the exception of performance at the first grade level, the two tasks yield essentially identical conclusions. The results of an adjunct task, in which the rate of mental counting was assessed, suggest that children as young as second grade are relying on memory retrieval to a significant degree. In contrast to Baroody's speculation, there appear to be no widespread difficulties associated with results from the verification task. Furthermore, the task permits a more analytic examination of performance and underlying mental process than is afforded by the production task. We conclude by reiterating the empirical support for a model of fact retrieval, and suggesting that accessibility of the arithmetic facts is the basic factor which underlies both fact retrieval and procedural knowledge performance.     

Is social comparison irrelevant for producing choice shifts?

After 15 years of research on group induced shifts in individual choice, two hypotheses, social comparison (involving image maintenance) and persuasive arguments (involving attitude change), have emerged as the leading explanatory contenders. Burnstein and his associates have recently reported a series of studies that they feel clearly establish the persuasive arguments hypothesis as the best explanation for the shifts. The present paper takes issue with their conclusion. A study is presented that supports a social comparison interpretation of one of the experiments reported in Burnstein and Vinokur (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1973, 9, 123–137). In addition, a critical analysis of several other key studies reported by Burnstein and his associates yields the conclusion that neither hypothesis completely accounts for the available data. Rather, both image maintenance and attitude change processes may operate in a complementary manner, with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison. Parallels are drawn between the factors that affect choice shifts and those that affect conformity behavior.     

Selective attention and the processing of integral and nonintegral dimensions: A developmental study

In two experiments, first- and fourth-grade subjects (age 6 and 9 years) performed a speeded card-sorting task with either integral or nonintegral dimensions. The dimensions were so arranged that subjects sorted on three types of task: (1) single dimension, (2) correlated dimensions, and (3) orthogonal dimensions. Results of the first experiment indicate that both first- and fourth-grade subjects sorted integral dimensions in a manner not qualitatively different from that of the adult (Garner & Felfoldy, Cognitive Psychology, 1970, 1, 225–241). In comparison with single-dimension tasks, performance was facilitated on the correlated-dimensions tasks and interference was observed on the orthogonal-dimensions tasks. Performances with nonintegral dimensions revealed an age-related processing difference. Fourth graders sorted nonintegral dimensions like the adult; no differences in performance were observed between the tasks. In contrast, first-graders sorted nonintegral dimensions as if they were integral. Interference was consistently observed on orthogonal-dimensions tasks. On correlated-dimensions tasks, interference was observed on easy tasks and redundancy facilitated difficult tasks. In the second experiment, first graders showed consistent facilitation on the correlated-dimensions task; all other results were indentical to those of Experiment I. The results were interpreted as consistent with perceptual learning theory (Gibson, Principles of perceptual learning and development. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969).     

Inferential processing of context: Studies of cognitively impaired subjects

Language comprehension tasks involving pronoun coreference were administered to a group of demented patients, a group of patients with cardiac disease, and groups of normal elderly persons and young adults. Pronoun coreference was constrained by either lexical, syntactic, or contextual cues. No differences were found between old and young subjects for any task. While the demented patients were impaired on all tasks, the cardiac patients were specifically impaired in the inferential processing of context.     

The role of esteem and coping in response to a threat communication

Two experiments examined the relations among self-esteem, perceived competency to cope, and actual coping behaviors following a threat communication. Leventhal's “parallel response model” (in Advances in experimental social psychology, L. Berkowitz (Ed.), New York: Academic Press, 1970, Vol. 5) predicts that low-esteem subjects will show deficits in both competency and coping behaviors. Experiment 1 manipulated threat level of a tetanus communication. Low-esteem subjects showed coping deficits on measures of free associations, free recall, fatalism, and coping. Threat groups differed only on fear and danger measures. Experiment 2 manipulated the fear level of an antismoking film and used false feedback to alter perceived competency. Positive feedback increased perceived competency to quit smoking among low-esteem subjects only. Without feedback, low-esteem subjects reduced smoking less than high-esteem subjects; positive feedback reversed the pattern. The discussion argued that, consistent with Leventhal's model, the low-esteem coping deficit has two independent causes: (1) excessive concern with fear, and (2) inadequate perceived competency.     

The development of same and different judgments

Junior kindergarten children, third-grade children, and college students were given a simultaneous pattern discrimination task, with simple and complex patterns, under either unlimited or limited (150 msec) viewing time. Under unlimited viewing, RTs to same patterns were faster than to different patterns for younger children and older males. Under limited viewing, same and different RTs were equivalent, but more errors were made in judging different patterns by all age groups. The RTs were longer to complex than to simple patterns, but the increase was differentially less for the youngest Ss, especially on same pairs. Since this age difference was found under both limited and unlimited viewing, it was not attributable to age differences in perceptual scanning strategies. The same-different asymmetry in RT under unlimited viewing and in error rate under limited viewing confirms across a wide age range previous findings with adults using codable stimuli. A two-process model for same and different judgments appears to be required, although young children may have had a response bias for same in Expt II.     

Development of comprehension of “or”: Evidence for a sequence of competencies

Comprehension of various usages of “or” was investigated in children 5–6, 7–8, and 9–10 years old, and in college students. One task used imperatives containing “or.” and investigated the set union interpretation. In a second task, one puppet asserted a statement and another puppet contradicted it: subjects were asked whether both could be right, and whether one had to be right. A third task investigated the truth conditions for disjunctions. The fourth task presented reasoning problems that tested principles of inference involving “or.” It was found that all age groups, even the youngest, could make the logical inferences involving “or.” All age groups could also perceive contradictions, but subjects were less than unanimous that one of the puppets contradicting each other had to be right. Sensible truth judgments for disjunctions began to develop around 7–8 years. Set union was elicited in only a few adults. In general, except when it indicates set union, “or” is understood substantially earlier than the current literature suggests. Logical inference is one of the first uses in which children become competent, suggesting that the basic meaning of “or” is given by inference forms for reasoning with alternatives, not by truth conditions.     

Brain responses related to semantic meaning

Evoked Potentials from electroencephalogram (EEG) recording were averaged to many visually presented word stimuli whose semantic meanings were specified along Osgood's semantic dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity [Miron &; Osgood, 1966, in R. B. Cattell (Ed.), Handbook of multivariate experimental psychology, Chicago: Rand-McNally; Osgood, 1971, Journal of Social Issues, 27, 5–63; Osgood, May, &; Miron, 1975, Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press]. Multivariate analyses classified the Evoked Potentials to six semantic classes with success rates more than twice chance expectation. The pattern of brain activity related to the six semantic classes was similar for (i) two sets of words, (ii) 10 subjects used to develop the analyses, and (iii) an added, new subject.     

Encoding and incidental memory in children

First, third, and fifth graders (7.1, 8.8, 11.1 years old) performed semantic, acoustic, and orthographic orienting activities to different words in a list. Without forewarning, their free recall of the words was tested after the orienting activity. The semantic task yielded better recall than the acoustic or orthographic tasks, but the latter two did not differ. Age differences in recall were absent, and the effect of the three orienting tasks did not vary as a function of the child's age. The results support a direct extension of levels of processing theory (Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1972, 11, 671–684) to children's memory. An obligatory-optional encoding distinction was suggested as a developmentally relevant addition to the levels of processing framework.     

Unclogging the bogus pipeline: A critical reanalysis of the Cherry,Byrne, and Mitchell study

The assignment of subjects to conditions on the basis of social desirability scores could not have been done in the manner described by Cherry, Byrne, and Mitchell (Journal of Research in Personality, 1976, 10, 69–75). Even if subject assignment procedures were not challenged the data do not support the authors' conclusions. Additional statistical analyses were carried out to test the hypotheses of the original study. It is concluded that either the demand cue manipulation was not successful or else paper-and-pencil and bogus pipeline measurement procedures are equally reliable measurement devices for the attitude similarity effect.