Can the skepticism debate be resolved?

External world skeptics are typically opposed to admitting as evidence anything that goes beyond the purely phenomenal, and equally typically, they disown the use of rules of inference that might enable one to move from premises about the phenomenal alone to a conclusion about the external world. This seems to bar any a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate. This paper argues that the situation is not quite so hopeless, and that an a posteriori resolution of the debate becomes possible once it is recognized that the skeptic holds overly defensive and ill-motivated positions vis-à-vis both evidence and inference, and that more reasonable ones are available. In stating these more reasonable positions, as well as in showing how they make possible an a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate, the paper draws on the machinery of Bayesian epistemology.     

Can the monster Errour be slain?

One cannot discount experimental errors and turn the attention to the logicomathematical structure of a physical theory without distorting the nature of the scientific method. The occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes an inherent feature of the attempt to test theories in the physical world. This feature deserves proper attention which has been neglected. An attempt is made to address this problem.     

Can the criminal law ever be therapeutic?

This paper addresses the question of whether criminal law, especially in its sentencing and penological aspects, can be adjusted in its workings to incorporate the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence. A conceptual framework developed by Wexler, Winick, and their colleagues is employed to provide a basis for reflection on the operation and impact of sentencing processes. Of considerable importance in this exercise is a mounting volume of evidence concerning the outcomes of work with adjudicated offenders, which illustrates the potential of psycho-educational, behavioral-cognitive skills-training, and therapeutic programs for reduction of recidivism. Such intervention programs are currently offered within the limits set by, but are not intrinsic components of, judicial decisions. The psycho-legal implications of these findings are discussed and some possibilities surveyed for tentative exploration of actively therapeutic departures within crimino-legal decision-making.     

Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device?

Although quantum mechanics allows consciousness to have some effect on the collapse of wave functions, most conventional scientists expect the effect to be quite small. Their experience with expert systems, computer-aided design, etc., would cause them to deny the possibility that a specific human intention could be imprinted into a simple electronic device via a meditative process and that this device could then influence a target experiment in accordance with the specific intention. Here, via two very different target experiments, that prevailing supposition has been experimentally tested and found to be fallacious! For each target experiment, one starts with two identical physical devices, isolates them from each other and “charges” one with the specific intention for the particular experiment. This charging process involved the services of four highly qualified meditators to imprint the device with the specific intention. The devices were then wrapped in aluminum foil and separately shipped, via Federal Express ∼2,000 miles to a laboratory where the actual target experiments were conducted by others. For the two experiments, the intentions were (1) to decrease (increase) the pH of water by one pH unit and (2) to increase the ATP/ADP ratio in fruit fly larvae so as to significantly decrease their development time. For (1), changes of 0.5 to 1.0 pH units were achieved while, for (2), reductions of ∼15 percent in larval development time for the imprinted vs. unimprinted device were observed (p<0.005). From a theoretical perspective, (1) a thermodynamic basis is provided for the effect of intention on both the electrochemical potential and flux of molecular species, (2) a conceptual model for linking subtle domains with the physical domain devices is given, and (3) a conceptual model is also given of how such devices may broadcast specific prime directive information via intention—augmented electromagnetism which can “tilt” chemical reactions in appropriate ways within the target experiment.     

Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device?

Although quantum mechanics allows consciousness to have some effect on the collapse of wave functions, most conventional scientists expect the effect to be quite small. Their experience with expert systems, computer-aided design, etc., would cause them to deny the possibility that a specific human intention could be imprinted into a simple electronic device via a meditative process and that this device could then influence a target experiment in accordance with the specific intention. Here, via two very different target experiments, that prevailing supposition has been experimentally tested and found to be fallacious! For each target experiment, one starts with two identical physical devices, isolates them from each other and "charges" one with the specific intention for the particular experiment. This charging process involved the services of four highly qualified meditators to imprint the device with the specific intention. The devices were then wrapped in aluminum foil and separately shipped, via Federal Express approximately 2,000 miles to a laboratory where the actual target experiments were conducted by others. For the two experiments, the intentions were (1) to decrease (increase) the pH of water by one pH unit and (2) to increase the ATP/ADP ratio in fruit fly larvae so as to significantly decrease their development time. For (1), changes of 0.5 to 1.0 pH units were achieved while, for (2), reductions of approximately 15 percent in larval development time for the imprinted vs. unimprinted device were observed (p<0.005). From a theoretical perspective, (1) a thermodynamic basis is provided for the effect of intention on both the electrochemical potential and flux of molecular species, (2) a conceptual model for linking subtle domains with the physical domain devices is given, and (3) a conceptual model is also given of how such devices may broadcast specific prime directive information via intention-augmented electromagnetism which can "tilt" chemical reactions in appropriate ways within the target experiment.     

Can there be a science of the symbolic?

Science means not just 'knowing', but knowing verified by replicability. Science is particularly hard to bring to depth psychology because the individual uniquenesses that can't be repeated are what make people most deeply themselves. Everyone, including the analytic investigator, however, has a science, in the sense of a world-view that is replicated by experience. Jung offered hermeneutics as an alternative mode to science for getting to know the psychological subject. But as Heidegger emphasized, hermeneutics always begins with the projection of a world-view, i.e., the science of the would-be interpreter. In the analytic situation, dialogue is available to test the world-view and enlarge its horizon, in accord with Gadamer's expansion of hermeneutics, 'the classical discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts', into a method of inquiry open to the possibilities of otherness. An example is given from an analytic training seminar, in which the author began by projecting his version of the theory of psychological types onto the dream material a candidate offered in response to the seminar. A dialogue with the candidate ensued which enabled the teacher to correct his original, somewhat rigid, application of his scientific viewpoint. In such a dialogue, psyche emerges as the final interpreter of what is, generating hypotheses that can fruitfully be applied to the understanding of other cases.     

Can rail pedestrian violations be deterred? An investigation into the threat of legal and non-legal sanctions

Collisions between trains and pedestrians continue to be the most likely accident to result in severe injuries and fatalities on the rail network. While a range of countermeasures have been utilised in an attempt to reduce the incidence of risky behaviours at level crossings, limited focus has been directed towards deterrence-based approaches to improve crossing safety. As a result, this study explored pedestrians’ perceptions of legal and non-legal sanctions at level crossings, with particular emphasis directed towards identifying factors that maximise perceptual deterrence and reduce the occurrence of rule violations. In total, 636 individuals volunteered to participate in the study that required completion of either an online or paper version of a questionnaire that focused on behaviours and perceptions. Participants were more likely to report intentionally violating level crossing rules (24.52%, n = 156) compared to making crossing errors (3.46%, n = 22). Knowledge of the possibility of sanctions (e.g., monetary fines) was low. The threat of being injured and feeling shame when breaching crossing rules were the highest reported perceptual deterrent factors, higher even than the certainty and severity of sanctions. Regression analysis revealed that males who had lower perceptions of certainty of apprehension and displayed a tendency to repeat the behaviour were most likely to deliberately break crossing rules. However, this group also recognised the physical risks of violating rules and that it breached social norms. In regards to identifying effective countermeasures, increasing police presence was considered the most effective approach to reduce violations, which is directly linked to deterrence processes such as increasing perceptual certainty. This paper will further outline the study findings in regards to perceptual deterrence-based research as well as provide direction for future research efforts to develop effective countermeasures designed to improve pedestrian safety.     

Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?

Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his Deflationary Truth and the Liar (JPL 28:455–488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism.     

Can Bioethics be Lutheran?

Abstract :  A Lutheran bioethics must rest on a reconstructed version of Martin Luther's ethics. In the article it is shown that this ethics is Christian in that it has faith in Jesus Christ as its source. But the ethics of neighbor love is practiced in the secular world where it to some extent corresponds with natural law ethics. A Christian believer acts ethically both as an individual and as a citizen. Against the background of this understanding of Lutheran ethics, the position of Ted Peters and Gilbert Meilaender on genetics and stem cells is presented and criticized. One conclusion is that there is no Lutheran doctrine on the status of the human embryo.     

Can semantics be syntactic?

The author defends John R. Searle's Chinese Room argument against a particular objection made by William J. Rapaport called the Korean Room. Foundational issues such as the relationship of strong AI to human mentality and the adequacy of the Turing Test are discussed. Through undertaking a Gedankenexperiment similar to Searle's but which meets new specifications given by Rapaport for an AI system, the author argues that Rapaport's objection to Searle does not stand and that Rapaport's arguments seem convincing only because they assume the foundations of strong AI at the outset.The author wishes to thank Brad Bergeron, David J. Cole, James H. Fetzer, Charles E. Jahren, Michael Losonsky, William J. Rapaport, and Robyn Roslak for reading earlier drafts of this paper and/or their general discussions on cognitive science and AI. An earlier version of this paper was given at the Student Conference of the Minnesota Philosophical Society, Bethel College, 1988.     

Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?

The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ-ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ-ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare.     

Can Philosophy be International?

There is a difference between internationalism in politics and philosophy. This paper takes the position that internationalism is possible in politics but not in philosophy, although it is an objective worth pursuing in both domains.     

Can Architecture be Barbaric?

The title of this article is adapted from Theodor W. Adorno’s famous dictum: ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.’ After the catastrophic earthquake in Kocaeli, Turkey on the 17th of August 1999, in which more than 40,000 people died or were lost, Necdet Teymur, who was then the dean of the Faculty of Architecture of the Middle East Technical University, referred to Adorno in one of his ‘earthquake poems’ and asked: ‘Is architecture possible after 17th of August?’ The main objective of this article is to interpret Teymur’s question in respect of its connection to Adorno’s philosophy with a view to make a contribution to the politics and ethics of architecture in Turkey. Teymur’s question helps in providing a new interpretation of a critical approach to architecture and architectural technology through Adorno’s philosophy. The paper also presents a discussion of Adorno`s dictum, which serves for a better understanding of its universality/particularity.     

Can subthreshold summation be observed with the Ehrenstein illusion?

Subthreshold summation between physical target lines and illusory contours induced by edges such as those produced in the Kanizsa illusion has been reported in previous studies. Here, we investigated the ability of line-induced illusory contours, using Ehrenstein figures, to produce similar subthreshold summation. In the first experiment, three stimulus conditions were presented. The target line was superimposed on the illusory contour of a four-arm Ehrenstein figure, or the target was presented between two dots (which replaced the arms of the Ehrenstein figure), or the target was presented on an otherwise blank screen (control). Detection of the target line was significantly worse when presented on the illusory contour (on the Ehrenstein figure) than when presented between two dots. This result was consistent for both curved and straight target lines, as well as for a 100 ms presentation duration and unlimited presentation duration. Performance was worst in the control condition. The results for the three stimulus conditions were replicated in a second experiment in which an eight-arm Ehrenstein figure was used to produce a stronger and less ambiguous illusory contour. In the third experiment, the target was either superimposed on the illusory contour, or was located across the central gap (illusory surface) of the Ehrenstein figure, collinear with two arms of the figure. As in the first two experiments, the target was either presented on the Ehrenstein figure, or between dots, or on a blank screen. Detection was better in the dot condition than in the Ehrenstein condition, regardless of whether the target was presented on the illusory contour or collinear with the arms of the Ehrenstein figure. These three experiments demonstrate the ability of reduced spatial uncertainty to facilitate the detection of a target line, but do not provide any evidence for subthreshold summation between a physical target line and the illusory contours produced by an Ehrenstein figure. The incongruence of these results with previous findings on Kanizsa figures is discussed.