Historicism and Critique in Herder's Another Philosophy of History: Some Hermeneutic Reflections

In Another Philosophy of History, J.G. Herder claims that his aim is not to compare and judge different cultures, but merely to describe and explain how each came into being and thus to adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer. I argue, however, that there is a tension between Herder's understanding of his own project—his stated doctrine of historicism and cultural relativism—and the way in which it is actually put into practice. That is, despite Herder's stated aims, he is nevertheless unable to avoid justifying premodern forms of life and making context‐transcending evaluative judgments in the process of trying to understand cultures on their own terms and holding them up as exemplars vis à vis the Enlightenment. This tension presents the challenge of accounting for it in the most charitable and illuminating way. I argue that this goal can be achieved by appealing to the resources of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, which enables us to disclose two enabling conditions for Herder's project of which he was not explicitly aware, viz., the internal connection between understanding and justification and the enabling character of prejudice as the condition for the possibility of understanding as such.     

Historiography of Indian Philosophy: Reflections on Periodization and Conceptualization

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper provides one of the many ways of doing historiography, specifically concerning Indian philosophy. After making some general...     

Clinical Study Reflections: Another View

Federal regulations are the minimum requirements for conducting clinical studies. Some innovation would improve the situation of many involved in these studies, including: study subjects, those who monitor studies, and clinical investigators as well as Institutional Review Boards. Respecting patient and whistle-blower input; appreciating research staff contributions; and implementing a systems and partnership approach would foster quality and advance clinical research.     

非典事件引发的关于科技哲学的几点思考

如何从“科技哲学”切入关于“非典”事件的研究 ?由此提出来何种“科技哲学”问题 ,这成为“清华大学科学哲学和技术哲学沙龙 (第 19次 ,2 0 0 3 /5 /19)”的主题。吴彤教授的演讲“健康与疾病 :不仅仅是医学问题———从复杂性科学视野看防治SARS” ,侧重于从多学科视野切入对于“非典”引发的种种科技哲学思考 ,讨论中进一步引出如何从科技哲学的视野对“非典”引发的种种问题进行思考的问题。首先 ,“非典”事件使得人和自然的关系问题再一次凸显。人与自然关系的演变主要是科学技术这个最终意义上的推动力量的作用结果 ,它主要关涉到…     

The Importance of Philosophy: Reflections on John Rawls

This paper tackles the question whet her we should punish a remorseful offender. Traditional retributive and consequentialist theories on punishment are struggling with the question of the justification of punishment, but I think a more basic question needs to be solved first; namely, how can we interpret the practice of punishment. I state that a theory of symbolic restoration can help us to understand the meaning of this practice. A theory of symbolic restoration depends on an expressivist account of punishment, like Joel Feinberg's. Expressivism gives us an insight into the importance of the feeling of moral condemnation and it is this feeling that gives rise to the longing for punishment and remorse. Because of moral condemnation after a crime we ask for punishment and expect some kind of remorse. The question is whether punishment can be exchanged for remorse and I argue that in certain cases it cannot. The punishment of a remorseful offender is, I argue, – in certain cases – justified.     

Phenomenological Reflections on the Possibility of First Philosophy

In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic features of first philosophy in a relative sense.     

Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Conversation: Some Comments on the Project of Comparative Philosophy

This paper seeks to highlight the East-West asymmetry in philosophical exchanges. It draws attention to the absence of Eastern thought in the curriculum of philosophy in the West and suggests that cliches and stereotypes about cultures in general and thought-traditions in particular are perpetuated in this manner. The aim of the paper is to encourage 'cross-cultural conversation' among philosophers. A critical review of the project of 'comparative philosophy' is made to disclose the fact that despite the difficulties of such an endeavor, it is an attempt to bring thought-traditions together and is thereby useful for promoting intercultural understanding.     

Reality and Philosophy: Reflections on Cora Diamond's Work

The publication of Cora Diamond's important 2002 “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” (in Philosophy and Animal Life) stimulated the writing of this essay. “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” attempted to show that there are experiences of reality (recounted especially in literature like John Coetzee's novels and Ted Hughes' poetry) in relation to which philosophical concepts and words encounter difficulty. The experiences resist conceptualization. By examining several of Diamond's earlier writings, I try to show that the difficulty of philosophical conceptualization of reality is due to the fact that reality does not exist external to experience. Reality being internal to experience means that reality contains an unfixed set of possibilities. Being experiential, reality is historical. The historical dimension of reality – such as the reality of animal life suffering – makes the words through we describe this reality too weak, i.e. they are not powerful enough to capture reality, hence the difficulty. Consequently, as I argue, for Diamond, the weakness of words means that words are never complete concepts. The meaning of them seems always still to come since reality seems always to have a surplus of possibilities. I suggest that because of this always still “to come” aspect of the meaning of words, we might characterise Diamond's thought as a messianism.     

Reflections on Israel Scheffler's Philosophy of Religion

The burden of this piece is to draw together into a coherent whole the somewhat diverse strands of Israel Scheffler's thought on the philosophy of religion. Extrapolating from personal discussions with Professor Scheffler, various of his books, articles, and other unpublished materials authored and kindly provided by him, I contend that he adumbrates a post-empiricist rendering of religious belief which masterfully avoids some philosophical problems, while unwittingly giving rise to others. Committed to the view that the methodology of science – in one or other of its more acceptable guises – provides the most reliable measure of the content and structure of reality. Scheffler is bound conceptually to redefine Jewish belief in such a way that the traditional conflict between religion and science never emerges. Consistent with this end, he is concerned to divest traditional Judaism of its metaphysical garb, so that what remains are simply the matters of living to which religion ought properly on his view address itself. The Bible is thus reconceptualized as a piece of rich literature, of no real difference in logical kind to any other piece of rich literature, except that it defines uniquely, along with the Torah and other relevant Jewish literature, the history of the particular community whose perception of human values and meaningfulness forms the core of what it is to be Jewish.While I have no quibble whatsoever with Scheffler that the Bible and other religious teachings provides a profound reservoir for cognitive insight into the matters of quality living and appropriate social interaction, I argue that the divorce of religious values from the metaphysics of religion is in the end misguided. My problem with Scheffler's philosophy of religion is not so much with what he has found to be central to religion, as what he has failed to find in religion. By jettisoning its metaphysical basis, he has jettisoned what is inevitably fundamental to Judaism – namely, a resolute belief in God. This being so, an atheist could more readily adopt Scheffler's version of Judaism than could the theist – an outocme which should be problematic for both the theist and the atheist.     

Some Reflections around the Concept of Value: On Valéry's Claim that Philosophy is Poetry

In response to Paul Valéry's claim that “philosophy is poetry,” Simone Weil set out to examine the nature of philosophical thinking. She argues that it is above all concerned with value. In the course of her argument, she lays out the grammatical differences between thinking about value, and other epistemological endeavours. These differences mean that inconsistencies are not to be avoided in philosophy, and that philosophy is not a matter of system building. In the end, she also believes that thinking philosophically requires one to possess the value of detachment, and hence a readiness to be transformed.     

Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul: Some Reflections

Aquinas's thoughts about the human soul present us with a puzzle. On the one hand, Thomas has been applauded within the analytic tradition as an anti-dualistic thinker, who emphasises the animal nature of human beings and denies that there could be disembodied human persons. Yet on the other hand he holds, as a faithful Catholic theologian, that the human soul survives death, and maintains that the post-mortem soul, prior to its reunification with the body is the subject of characteristically personal intellectual activities. This paper reviews the state of the debate regarding whether these commitments of Aquinas's can be reconciled, and concludes that they cannot in his own terms. However, a recognisably thomist approach to the post-mortem survival of the soul is available, proceeding on the basis that to be rationally ensouled is to have a life-story.