An overcorrection framing effect

With the “typical” attribute framing manipulation, assimilation effects have often been obtained; people often judge the attributes of a judgmental target more positively when the attributes are framed positively (e.g., 99% pure) than negatively (e.g., 1% impure). Research has not, however, explored or demonstrated the effects of correcting or overcorrecting for the frame's influence. Overcorrection framing occurs when a more positive response is produced by the negative frame. Across three experiments, overcorrection as well as typical framing effects were obtained. In Experiments 1 and 2, overcorrection effects were obtained when participants were prompted to consider complementary information and, in Experiment 3, when the frame's source was described as untrustworthy. In contrast, typical framing effects were obtained when prompts were not supplied and when the frame's source was not described as being untrustworthy. These results supported the unification model that uses a priming analysis to account for assimilation (typical framing) and contrast (overcorrection framing) effects. We discussed how overcorrection is expected with other framing manipulations, such as risky-choice framing. We provided reasons for asymmetrical correction effects and discussed implications of our analysis for holistic/analytical as well as System 1/System 2 processing styles, the influence of different amounts of cognitive resource allocations, and the possibility of a correction process involving averaging.     

Choices and opportunities: another effect of framing on decisions

Many decisions can be framed either as ‘choices’ between alternative courses of action (e.g. Should I move to New York or stay in Chicago?) or as ‘opportunities’ to pursue a particular course of action (i.e. Should I move to New York?). Although there is no logical difference between these two different decision frames, there may be important psychological differences between them. In four studies, we explore the differences between ‘choices’ and ‘opportunities’. The results of Studies 1 and 2 show that college students view many of the decisions they typically face as opportunities, rather than choices. Further, the results of Study 2 suggest that the frame students adopt is systematically related to the preferences they express. The latter finding led to Studies 3 and 4, where we show that preferences can be influenced by encouraging people to adopt one decision frame rather than another. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

I'm feeling lucky: the relationship between affect and risk-seeking in the framing effect

Engagement in risky behavior has traditionally been attributed to an underestimation of the associated risks, but recent perspectives suggest that affective reactions toward a risky option may better explain risk-seeking than risk perception. However, the precise relationship between emotion and risk-seeking remains unclear. The current set of studies elucidates the relationship between emotion and risk-seeking in risky choice framing, using a gambling task. In Study 1, reliance on emotion was related to risk-seeking, but goals to regulate emotion mitigated these effects. In Study 2, positive affect was associated with risk-seeking in loss frames, but unrelated to risk aversion in gain frames. Collectively, these findings indicate a general role for emotion reliance on risk-seeking and a specific role of positive affect on risk-seeking in the loss trials of the framing effect.     

社会偏好中的框架效应

社会偏好中的框架效应是指, 个体在决策中受到选择方案框架形式的影响而表现出合作、互惠及利他行为及倾向改变的现象, 是框架效应在社会偏好领域的运用。预期理论、错误知觉说、心理动力模型、情绪维护理论以及解释水平理论分别从价值函数、知觉偏差、内部心理动力、情绪及认知表征角度解释了社会偏好中的框架效应, 心理距离、价值取向、人格特质和文化等因素对社会偏好中的框架效应具有重要影响。未来的研究需要从社会偏好中的框架效应的心理机制与神经机制、研究范式及外部效度改进等方面作进一步探讨。     

框架效应的应用研究及其应用技巧

个体的决策及偏好常会因信息的表达方式而变, 研究者将这种违背期望效用理论不变性的现象称之为“框架效应”。框架效应体现了人类非理性决策的普遍性, 也为合理利用人类的决策特点以干预其决策行为提供了重要契机。本文总结了框架效应在健康行为、市场营销及环保领域中的应用研究, 着重分析了数量信息的表达技巧, 如风险信息的呈现、数量单位的选择以及图形的物理属性设计, 旨在探讨如何在实践过程中通过变化信息呈现方式以实现对人类决策行为的重要影响。     

Decision-making and the framing effect in a foreign and native language

Recent research using scenarios such as the Asian disease problem has demonstrated a “foreign-language effect”, whereby the framing effect (tendency to be risk-averse in a gain frame and risk seeking in a loss frame) is not (or not as) apparent in the foreign language as the native language. The aim of the current study was to further investigate decision-making and the framing effect in a native language, Thai and a foreign language, English, using the Asian disease/Financial crisis problem (Study 1) and a novel financial decision-making task (Study 2). Results from Study 1 confirmed previous findings as a foreign-language effect emerged. In contrast, in Study 2, a framing effect emerged in both the native and foreign languages of the Thai participants. These contradictory results point to language factors as well as emotional and cognitive demands of the task contributing to the occurrence of the foreign-language effect.     

Positive emotional context eliminates the framing effect in decision-making

Dual-process theories have suggested that emotion plays a key role in the framing effect in decision-making. However, little is known about the potential impact of a specific positive or negative emotional context on this bias. We investigated this question with adult participants using an emotional priming paradigm. First, participants were presented with positive or negative affective pictures (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant photographs). Afterward, participants had to perform a financial decision-making task that was unrelated to the pictures previously presented. The results revealed that the presentation framed in terms of gain or loss no longer affected subjects' decision-making following specific exposure to emotionally pleasant pictures. Interestingly, a positive emotional context did not globally influence risk-taking behavior but specifically decreased the risk propensity in the loss frame. This finding confirmed that a positive emotional context can reduce loss aversion, and it strongly reinforced the dual-process view that the framing effect stems from an affective heuristic belonging to intuitive System 1. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Induced mood states and the framing effect: a comparison of systematic and heuristic processing.

We investigated the influence of mood states on the framing effect on tasks that involve systematic processing and on a task that involves heuristic processing. On the systematic processing tasks, the framing effect was not exhibited under induced mood states, while on the heuristic processing task, the framing effect was exhibited under induced mood states. The relationship between mood states and the framing effect was discussed from the standpoint of an information-processing mechanism.     

The illusion of the framing effect in risky decision making

The present study elucidates that the illusion of framing in risky decisions is induced by the expected losses with the shift of independent or complementary schemata. Throughout three studies, the reversal of risk preferences in the gain and loss frames was confirmed when the expected number of losses was unknown. When it was known, however, the reversal was reduced in Study 2 where the decision makers were informed of all the options in both frames, and eliminated in Study 3 where they elaborated the numbers of lives at stake before making decisions. Further, the complementary schema was more pervasive when the number of expected losses was known, while the independent schema was more common when the number was unknown. These results imply that the illusion of framing is due to the shift of schemata concerning the lives saved and lost. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of rational and experiential processing in influencing the framing effect

Research on individual differences and the framing effect has focused primarily on how variability in rational processing influences choice. However, we propose that measuring only rational processing presents an incomplete picture of how participants are responding to framed options, as orthogonal individual differences in experiential processing might be relevant. In two studies, we utilize the Rational Experiential Inventory, which captures individual differences in rational and experiential processing, to investigate how both processing types influence decisions. Our results show that differences in experiential processing, but not rational processing, moderated the effect of frame on choice. We suggest that future research should more closely examine the influence of experiential processing on making decisions, to gain a broader understanding of the conditions that contribute to the framing effect.     

Approach/avoidance motivation, message framing, and health behavior: understanding the congruency effect

Health messages framed to be congruent with individuals’ approach/avoidance motivations have been found to be more effective in promoting health behaviors than health messages incongruent with approach/avoidance motivations. This study examines the processes underlying this congruency effect. Participants (undergraduate students, N=67) completed a measure of approach/avoidance orientation (the BIS/BAS scales) and read either a gain- or loss-framed message promoting dental flossing. Results demonstrated a congruency effect: Participants who read a congruently framed message had greater flossing efficacy, intended to floss more, and used more dental flosses than did the participants who read an incongruent message. Moreover, intention to perform the behavior predicted the congruency effect and self-efficacy mediated participants’ intentions to perform the health behavior. Discussion centers on the role of personality factors and situational factors in models of behavior change.

Modularity in cognition: framing the debate

Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well.     

Group differences in size estimation

Fifty-two subjects differing in sex, age, education and domicile (rural or urban) were given the problem of judging the height of an upright board in a natural setting. A preliminary analysis was made on the basis of the simple initial ratio method, both for the original data in feet and for original data converted to log units. Because the effects of interaction of the several variables made the results of this method inconclusive, the analysis of variance technique, as described by Yates (11) for data where the classes are not equally represented, was applied. This technique showed that, while together the four factors markedly affected judgment, sex had no significant individual effect, age had the biggest individual effect but possibly a spurious one, education and domicile had suspiciously large individual effects, and the effect of the four factors may be regarded as simply additive. The relation of the findings to those of previous investigators is discussed. The authors regard as an important result of the analysis the guidance it offers in the design of further experiments, since it demonstrates the value of equal representation for all classes into which data are to be segregated.Responsible for the experiment and general interpretation.Responsible for the statistical analysis.     

Utility and framing

Standard principles of rational decision assume that an option’s utility is both comprehensive and accessible. These features constrain interpretations of an option’s utility. This essay presents a way of understanding utility and laws of utility. It explains the relation between an option’s utility and its outcome’s utility and argues that an option’s utility is relative to a specification of the option. Utility’s relativity explains how a decision problem’s framing affects an option’s utility and its rationality even for an agent who is cognitively perfect and lacks only empirical information. The essay rewrites standard laws of utility to accommodate relativization to propositions’ specifications. The new laws are generalizations of the standard laws and yield them as special cases.     

Recency judgments as a function of word frequency: A framing effect and frequency misattributions

The effects of word frequency on judgments of recency of item presentation were examined in two experiments. Subjects in Experiment 1 were presented two mixed lists of high- and low-frequency words followed by a list assignment task for recognized items. It was found that subjects were biased toward assigning low-frequency words to the more recently presented list. Subjects in Experiment 2 were presented a single mixed list of high- and low-frequency words followed by either a relative recency of presentation judgment task or a relative primacy of presentation judgment task. Each word pair on the tests contained one high-frequency word and one low-frequency word. It was found that, for the recency judgment task, subjects were biased to select the low-frequency item as having been presented more recently. However, on the parallel primacy judgment task, there were no effects of word frequency; moreover, overall accuracy levels were higher with primacy than with recency instructions. We interpret the effects of word frequency on recency judgments in Experiments 1 and 2 in terms of a misattribution of frequency-related differences in recollection-based recognition. The finding that recency and primacy instructions produced different patterns of results provides further evidence (Flexser & Bower, 1974) for an effect on performance of the way in which the temporal judgment task was framed.     

Temporal framing and the hidden‐zero effect: rate‐dependent outcomes on delay discounting

Recent research suggests that presenting time intervals as units (e.g., days) or as specific dates, can modulate the degree to which humans discount delayed outcomes. Another framing effect involves explicitly stating that choosing a smaller–sooner reward is mutually exclusive to receiving a larger–later reward, thus presenting choices as an extended sequence. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 201) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the Monetary Choice Questionnaire in a 2 (delay framing) by 2 (zero framing) design. Regression suggested a main effect of delay, but not zero, framing after accounting for other demographic variables and manipulations. We observed a rate‐dependent effect for the date‐framing group, such that those with initially steep discounting exhibited greater sensitivity to the manipulation than those with initially shallow discounting. Subsequent analyses suggest these effects cannot be explained by regression to the mean. Experiment 2 addressed the possibility that the null effect of zero framing was due to within‐subject exposure to the hidden‐ and explicit‐zero conditions. A new Amazon Mechanical Turk sample completed the Monetary Choice Questionnaire in either hidden‐ or explicit‐zero formats. Analyses revealed a main effect of reward magnitude, but not zero framing, suggesting potential limitations to the generality of the hidden‐zero effect.