Accuracy and perspective in involuntary autobiographical memory

This study investigated accuracy (veridicality) and perspective (point of view) in everyday involuntary memories (i.e. spontaneous recollections of the past). Using the naturalistic diary method, subjects were asked to give confidence ratings on the accuracy of their involuntary memories as well as contact others who were present in them, having them also give confidence ratings. Memory perspective was assessed by asking subjects to indicate whether their memories had a field (original) or observer (the perspective of another) point of view. The results showed subjects assigning high confidence ratings to involuntary memories, which did not differ from the confidence ratings given by others, or from the confidence ratings that they had assigned to their voluntary memories. The perspective query showed that involuntary memories come with both field and observer perspectives, and that their relative proportions did not differ from those reported for their voluntary memories. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.     

Switching memory perspective

The perspective in which memories were spontaneously recalled, field (original perspective) or observer (see oneself in the memory), was examined for both recent and remote memories. Recent memories were dominated by field perspective whilst remote memories were dominated by observer perspective. Further, field memories contained reliably more episodic detail than observer memories. After a 1-week interval, the same memories were recalled again but with a switched memory perspective. Switching from an observer to a field perspective did not reliably increase the amount of episodic details in a memory. Switching from field to observer perspective did, however, reliably reduce the number of episodic details. These findings suggest that memories may be represented in long-term memory with a fixed perspective, either field or observer, which can be temporarily altered sometimes changing the nature of a memory, i.e. how much detail remains accessible.     

The nature of the task-stimulus interaction in the tachistoscopic recognition of kana and kanji words

To investigate the nature of the task-stimulus interaction in tachistoscopic recognition of kana and kanji, right-handed normal subjects performed two phonological tasks and two visual tasks. In the phonological tasks, the subjects compared the members of a pair of kana or kanji appearing in the right or left visual field on the basis of phonological identity; while in the visual tasks, they compared the members of a pair of kana or kanji on the basis of visual identity. The results showed a significant Visual Field × Task interaction as well as a significant Task × Stimulus interaction, indicating that both the type of stimuli and the nature of task demands contribute importantly to the determination of visual field asymmetry and hence the relative participation of each hemisphere.     

Treat and trick: A new way to increase false memory

This paper reports a new experimental manipulation that increased false memories 1 month after the manipulation. Mirroring the standard three‐stage misinformation paradigm (original event, misinformation, and test), subjects in the experimental group were first given a colour‐slide presentation of two stories (events), then given an accurate account (instead of misinformation) of the events in narrations, and finally tested for their memory of the original events. One month later, they underwent the standard misinformation paradigm with two new events. The comparison group was given the standard misinformation tasks at both time points. Results showed that the experimental group produced more false memories in the subsequent misinformation paradigm than did the comparison group. We focus on trust and credibility as possible mechanisms underlying this effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Point of view in personal memories

A structural aspect of personal memories was examined in four studies. In some memories, one has the perspective of an observer, seeing oneself “from the outside.” In other memories, one sees the scene from one's own perspective; the field of view in such memories corresponds to that of the original situation. The existence of “observer” and “field” memories was confirmed in Study 1, using a recall questionnaire. In Study 2, the similarity structure of a specified set of eight to-be-recalled situations was established: the significant dimensions were “emotionality” and “self-awareness.” Study 3 related these dimensions to the observer-field distinction; situations involving a high degree of emotion and selfawareness were most likely to be recalled with an observer perspective. Recall set was varied in Study 4: a focus on feelings (as opposed to objective circumstances) produced relatively more field memories. Studies 3 and 4 also showed that events reported as more recent tend to be recalled in the field mode. Thus a qualitative characteristic of personal memories—the perspective from which they are experienced—is apparently related to characteristics of the original event, to the individual's purpose in recalling that event, and to the reported recall interval.     

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.     

The costs of suppressing stressful memories

We investigated the costs of suppressing emotional and nonemotional memories, as evidenced in response times on a concurrent sentence verification task with three levels of syntactic complexity. Participants suppressing memories of personal negative experiences (n=26) had slower response times compared to the control group (n=23) and to participants suppressing nonemotional memories (n=25) particularly on the most complex sentences. Participants suppressing nonpersonal negative experiences (n=26) did not differ from either of the other two suppression groups. Suppression failures did not differ between conditions, but failures during the sentence task were related to the intrusiveness of the memory being suppressed. The findings indicate that different kinds of memories have different suppression costs and that even successful thought suppression can impair performance on concurrent tasks, supporting Wegner's ironic processing model in which suppression attempts must compete with other ongoing tasks for scarce mental resources.     

Vantage point in traumatic memory

Abstract— Persons with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) spontaneously recalled the traumatic event that led to their condition from either a field or an observer vantage point. In the former case, participants recollected the event as if they were seeing it again through their own eyes; in the latter case, the event was recalled from the perspective of a detached spectator. Analysis of the two types of recollections revealed marked differences in their contents. Whereas field memories afforded richer accounts of the affective reactions, somatic sensations, and psychological states that participants experienced during the focal trauma, observer memories contained more information about participants' physical appearance and actions and the spatial layout of the traumatic scene. Observer trauma memories were also experienced as less emotional and anxiety provoking than field trauma memories. The discussion focuses on the clinical implications of these findings and prospects for future research on traumatic memory.     

不同任务情境中的前瞻记忆是一致的吗？

对47名大学生被试依次进行自然情境中的人为任务、自然情境中的自然任务、实验室情境中的人为任务和实验室情境中的自然任务的测试。结果发现,相同任务情境中的不同性质的前瞻记忆具有一致性,特别是在自然情境中的一致性更为明显;相同任务性质但不同任务情境下的前瞻记忆没有一致性,实验室中的前瞻记忆与自然情境中的前瞻记忆不能相互预测。     

Underestimation of prior remembering and susceptibility to false memories: two sides of the same coin?

In two studies, we explored whether susceptibility to false memories and the underestimation of prior memories (i.e., forgot-it-all-along effect) tap overlapping memory phenomena. Study 1 investigated this issue by administering the Deese/Roediger–McDermott task (DRM) and the forgot-it-all-along (FIA) task to an undergraduate sample (N = 110). It was furthermore explored how performances on these tasks correlate with clinically relevant traits such as fantasy proneness, dissociative experiences, and cognitive efficiency. Results show that FIA and DRM performances are relatively independent from each other, suggesting that these measures empirically apparently refer to separate dimensions. However, they do not seem to define different profiles in terms of dissociation, fantasy proneness, and cognitive efficiency. Study 2 replicated the finding of relative independence between false memory propensity (as measured with the DRM task) and the underestimation of prior memories (as measured with an autobiographical memory dating task) in people with a history of childhood sexual abuse (N = 35).     

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for positive,negative, and neutral events

We investigated memory qualities for positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical events. Participants recalled two personal experiences of each type and then rated their memories on several characteristics (e.g. sensorial and contextual details). They also reported whether they ‘see’ the events in their memories from their own perspective (‘field’ memories) or whether they ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would (‘observer’ memories). Positive memories contained more sensorial (visual, smell, taste) and contextual (location, time) details than both negative and neutral events, whereas negative and neutral memories did not differ on most dimensions. Positive and negative events were more often recollected with a field perspective than neutral events. Finally, participants were classified in four groups according to the repressive coping style framework. Emotional memories of repressors were not less detailed than those of the other groups. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are preference reversals reduced when made explicit?

Previous research has shown that preferences for options, such as gambles, can reverse depending on the response mode. These preference reversals have been demonstrated when tasks were performed sequentially. That is, subjects completed one task before beginning another. In an attempt to eliminate preference reversals, we asked subjects to perform tasks simultaneously. That is, subjects made two types of responses for each pair of gambles before evaluating the next pair. In the condition with no financial incentives, preference reversal rates were slightly reduced. In another condition, subjects were paid for their participation and they were allowed to play a gamble with real monetary compensation. A gamble pair was randomly selected, and if a subject's responses in the two tasks were consistent for that pair, he or she was allowed to play the ‘preferred’ gamble. Otherwise, the experimenter selected the gamble from the pair. With these financial incentives, systematic preference reversals were eliminated for two of the three task combinations. Preference reversals continued to occur for attractiveness ratings versus selling prices, although, even for that pair of tasks, the reversal rate was significantly reduced. For all three task pairs, preference orders from the two tasks appeared to merge into more consistent orders.     

Emotion and vantage point in autobiographical

Autobiographical memories may be recalled from two different perspectives: Field memories in which the person seems to remember the scene from his/her original point of view and observer memories in which the rememberer sees him/herself in the memory image. Here, 122 undergraduates participated in an experiment examining the relation between field vs. observer perspective in memory for 10 different emotional states, including both positive and negative emotions and emotions associated with high vs. low intensity. Observer perspective was associated with reduced sensory and emotional reliving across all emotions. This effect was observed for naturally occurring memory perspective and when participants were instructed to change their perspective from field to observer, but not when participants were instructed to change perspective from observer to field.     

Managing Sequential Task Portfolios in the Face of Temporal Atypicality and Task Complexity

The authors use a portfolio of sequential tasks to investigate how accurately study participants stick to assigned deadlines when they need to transition from one task to another. Atypical deadlines, task complexity, and individual differences all affect transition error size, error correction, and task performance. In Experiment 1 (N?=?108), larger task transition errors were related negatively to task performance and were associated with atypical deadlines (e.g., 4:53 or 4:57), complex tasks, and individuals lower in the general hurry characteristic. In Experiment 2 (N?=?95), individuals facing atypical deadlines or lower in need for cognition were less likely to correct transition errors (i.e., getting back to the original schedule), which negatively affected performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task

To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180° rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available for this article at     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Unilateral versus bilateral presentation methods in the reaction time paradigm

The use of bilateral presentation in lateralized tachistoscopic reaction time (RT) tasks has been precluded by problems of how to instruct the subject to respond to the left visual field (LVF) or right visual field (RVF) stimulus and by the necessity of fixation control with bilateral presentation. Schmuller and Goodman, 1979 and Schmuller and Goodman, 1980, Brain and Language, 11, 12–18) offered a method, applied to date only in recognition accuracy studies, which can overcome these problems. They used an “arrowhead pointer” at fixation. This instructs the subject as to which stimulus to report first and also controls fixation. We adapted the method to the RT paradigm by having subjects report only the stimulus indicated and applied it in a bilateral presentation version of the Object Naming Latency Task (W. F. McKeever & T. L. Jackson, 1979, Brain and Language, 7, 175–190). Fifty subjects received the unilateral task and 50 received the bilateral task. The bilateral task yielded right visual field superiority in 98% of the subjects and the magnitude of the superiority was over three times as large as in the unilateral task. Different sex × familial sinistrality × VHF interactions obtained on the tasks. Combining the advantages of reaction time and bilateral presentation methods may substantially increase the resolving power of lateralized tachistoscopic tasks.