The Unity of Language

This paper identifies the founding project of traditional philosophy of language as an attempt to unify the diversity and individuality of spoken language in order to produce a transpersonal intelligibility. The supposed necessary truth that we cannot directly understand what others say which underlies such a project is exposed as a willful avoidance of the discourse of others typical of masculine styles of communication.     

The Syllogistic with Unity

We extend the language of the classical syllogisms with the sentence-forms “At most 1 p is a q” and “More than 1 p is a q”. We show that the resulting logic does not admit a finite set of syllogism-like rules whose associated derivation relation is sound and complete, even when reductio ad absurdum is allowed.     

The Unity of the Proposition: Reply to Denyer

The paper replies to some criticisms by Nicholas Denyer of my recent book on the unity of the proposition.     

The Unity of a Tractarian Fact

It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity of the whole, for Wittgenstein the unity of a fact is the product of copulative powers inherent in all its elements. All kinds of constituents of Tractarian facts – all kinds (forms) of object – are, to use Fregean terminology, unsaturated.     

The Full Unity of the Virtues

The classical doctrine that the moral virtues are unified is widely rejected. Some argue that the virtues are disunified, or even mutually incompatible. And though others have argued that the virtues form some sort of unity, these recent defenses of unity are always qualified, advocating only a partial unity: the unity of the virtues is limited to certain practical domains, or weak in that one virtue implies only moral decency in the fields of other virtues. I argue that something like the classical doctrine—a full unity of the virtues thesis—remains defensible. After reviewing the arguments of partial unity theorists for the claim that the virtues form at least some sort of unity, I examine their main arguments for thinking that this unity is only partial (limited or weak). I then show that these arguments fail, and address some further criticisms (such as the argument that full unity implausibly requires that a person must attain the virtues “all at once”). I do not seek here to prove the truth of the full unity thesis (in fact I suggest a modification of it), but only to refute important extant criticisms of it, and thus to show that it remains a plausible view.     

A Call to Act Together

This article offers a discussion of the Assembly Message, ‘A Call to Act Together', which unpacks, reframes, critiques and amplifies some key texts and concepts and explores their missiological relevance from an Indian and indigeneous perspective. The Assembly Message highlights love as the moving force for mission, but the article questions if the Ecumenical movement has the boldness and inclusiveness required by love rooted in Christ. The call for reconcilitation is unpacked through reflections on the Ao Naga practice of Aksü, which is a tradition and custom for enabling reconciliation and peacemaking. The article offers Aksü as an illustration of the practices that could ground the Message's claim for reconciliation and names dimensions of the spirituality needed to sustain the Ecumenical movement's future direction. Love and reconciliation point to interrelationship, which the article insists must be inclusive of commonality and difference, but also move forward against the systems of marginalisation.