Perceptual organization and White's illusion

The apparent lightness of a surface can be strongly modulated by the spatial context in which it is embedded. Early theories of such context dependence emphasized the role of low-level mechanisms that sense border contrast, whereas a number of recent authors have emphasized the role of perceptual organization in determining perceived lightness. One of the simplest and most theoretically challenging lightness illusions was described by White. This illusion has been explained with a variety of different models, ranging from low-level filter outputs to computations underlying the extraction of mid-level representations of surfaces. Here, I present a new method for determining the organizational forces that shape this illusion. I show that the spatial context of White's pattern not only transforms the apparent lightness of homogeneous target patches. but can also induce dramatic inversions of figure-ground relationships of textured target regions. These phenomena provide new evidence for the role of scission in causing the lightness illusion experienced in White's effect.     

A three dimensional test for White's effectance motive

A scale was developed based on Robert W. White's construct of effectance motivation. Effectance was conceptualized as involving three dimensions--Effect on Self, Effect on Objects, and Effect on People. It was found that reliabilities for the three subscales were good. Validity was determined using three methods: criterion groups, multitrait-multimethod matrix, and convergent and discriminant validity. Validity was supported under all three methods.     

Functionalism and inverted spectra

Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of philosophical interest is the possibility of an inverted spectrum. Hilary Putnam argues that the physical possibilty of acquired spectrum inversion refutes functionalism. I argue, however, that in the absence of empirical results no a priori arguments against functionalism, such as Putnam's, can be cogent. I sketch an experimental situation which would produce acquired spectrum inversion. The mere existence of qualia inversion would constitute no refutation of functionalism; only its persistence after behavioral accommodation to the inversion would properly count against functionalism. The cumulative empirical evidence from experiments on image inversion suggests that the results of actual spectrum inversion would confirm rather than refute functionalism.     

I don't get you. Action observation effects inverted by kinematic variation

Recent studies have reported an intricate interplay between affordance and mirror effects (the imitation of another agent) when participants attend to the concurrent presentation of an object and another agent interacting with it. In the present paper, we compare two experimental settings in which an observed action was presented as a prime for a task involving the categorization of a graspable object. In experiment 1a, the action depicted a reach and grasp gesture whereas in experiment 1b, only the reach phase was presented. This modification led to very different outcomes. Experiment 1a reflected the traditional imitation effect elicited by human motion. Conversely, experiment 1b showed the facilitation of contralateral responses. Affordance effects were found in experiment 1a only for the RVF. Our results support the view that motor simulation processes underlying imitation or joint actions are extremely sensitive to specific phase kinematics.     

Autokinetic movement and inverted vision

It was considered that inverted vision could influence the condition of the subject's relative framework. The aim of this study was to investigate whether autokinetic movement observed during inverted vision might differ from that in normal vision. One subject wearing inverting spectacles and another one subject in normal vision observed autokinetic movement for five days. The results showed that directional changes increased with the time spent in visual inversion, while in normal vision such tendency was not observed. One speculative interpretation was suggested in terms of subject-related framework.     

Tye-dyed teleology and the inverted spectrum

Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum (2000, in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a, in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on a teleological approach to the evolution of vision to secure the grounds upon which people with normal color vision can be justly called ‘right’ and those with inverted color vision can be called ‘wrong’. I demonstrate that since the inverted spectrum thought experiment requires that both sorts of vision be behaviorally indistinguishable, no biologically acceptable concept of teleology will allow Tye to draw the distinction he needs.     

Psychometric characteristics of Carver and White's BIS/BAS scales in Dutch adolescents and their mothers

The psychometric characteristics of Carver and White's (1994) BIS/BAS scales were examined in 2 groups of Dutch adolescents (497 early adolescents and 237 middle adolescents, M (Age) = 13.0 years and 16.4 years, respectively) and their middle-aged mothers (M (Age) = 45.2 years; N = 734). Confirmatory factor analyses revealed an acceptably fitting 2-factor model for adapted BIS /BAS scales in all 3 groups, reflecting separate BIS and BAS factors. Reliabilities of the 2 scales were satisfactory. The results supported the convergent validity of BIS and BAS scales. BIS was positively correlated with internalizing problem behaviors and neuroticism. BAS was positively correlated with externalizing problem behaviors and extraversion. The discriminant validity of the BIS/BAS scales received mixed support in our data. BIS was negatively correlated with extraversion, and BAS was not correlated with depression. However, BIS was also found to be correlated with externalizing problem behaviors, and BAS was positively correlated with neuroticism. In sum, the scales are suitable for use in research settings, but caution is advocated in application for clinical practice.     

White's effect: removing the junctions but preserving the strength of the illusion

White's effect (also known as the Munker White effect) is a lightness illusion in which, contrary to expectations based on simultaneous contrast and Wallach's rule, a gray rectangle predominantly surrounded by white appears lighter than an identical rectangle that is mainly surrounded by black. The illusion is often explained in terms of T-junctions that are formed by the three-way intersection of the gray rectangle, a black stripe, and a white stripe. I present a circular variant of White's effect in which all the junctions have been removed without significantly affecting the strength of the illusion, suggesting that junctions are not an important consideration in all versions of White's effect.     

Classical conditioning and retention of the infant's eyelid response: effects of age and interstimulus interval

Independent groups of 10-,20-, and 30-day-old infants were subjected to a classical eyelid conditioning procedure involving either a 500- or a 1500-msec interstimulus interval (ISI). Ten days later, all received a second conditioning session. A reliable increase in conditioned responding was observed at all ages but only by infants receiving the 1500-msec ISI. Although age was not a significant factor in any conditioning measure except final performance level, which was greater for the oldest than for the youngest group, it did influence long-term retention. A reliable memory component was observed in the Session 2 performance of infants initially trained at 20 and 30 days but not at 10 days. These data demonstrate the importance of temporal parameters in the formation of conditioned associations very early in infancy and provide evidence for the long-term behavioral consequences of those associations.     

Panentheism and Classical Theism

Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the world is an extrinsic property of God – it is only contingently true that there is a world. Therefore, as long as we do not have an argument showing that necessarily there is a world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism.     

On Retaining Classical Truths and Classical Deducibility in Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logics

In this paper, I identify the source of the differences between classical logic and many-valued logics (including fuzzy logics) with respect to the set of valid formulas and the set of inferences sanctioned. In the course of doing so, we find the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for any many-valued semantics (again including fuzzy logics) to validate exactly the classically valid formulas, while sanctioning exactly the same set of inferences as classical logic. This in turn shows, contrary to what has sometimes been claimed, that at least one class of infinite-valued semantics is axiomatizable.     

Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties.