Pacifism, Just War, and Self-Defense

This essay distinguishes two main forms of pacifism, personal pacifism and political pacifism. It then contrasts the views on self-defense of political pacifism and just war theory, paying special attention to notions of the state and sovereignty.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

The Ethics of Killing in War

This paper argues that certain central tenets of the traditional theory of the just war cannot be correct. It then advances an alternative account grounded in the same considerations of justice that govern self-defense at the individual level. The implications of this account are unorthodox. It implies that, with few exceptions, combatants who fight for an unjust cause act impermissibly when they attack enemy combatants, and that combatants who fight in a just war may, in certain circumstances, legitimately target noncombatants who bear a significant degree of moral responsibility for a wrong, when the prevention or rectification of that wrong constitutes a just cause for war.

Self-Defense,Forfeiture, and Necessity

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that it is possible to explain why a culpable aggressor forfeits his right not to suffer the harm necessary to prevent his aggression if a killer forfeits his right to life. I argue that this strategy accounts also for the necessity restriction on self-defense. I respond to several objections, including the worry that it makes no sense to attempt a derivation of the relatively uncontroversial (aggressor’s forfeiture) from the highly controversial (killer’s forfeiture).     

The Road to Hell: Neutralization of Killing in War

We explore how societies convince citizens to “go to hell,” where they kill strangers and risk their own lives. Our premise is that killing is difficult for most, regardless of context and widely considered a form of extreme deviance. Using Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralization, we show how this aversion to killing is neutralized by placing individuals in organized—both macro-level bureaucratic and micro-level small primary groups—to justify killing. Consequently, the neutralization of mass killing illustrates the role of power in defining deviance, and the failure of neutralizations may sometimes explain Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.     

Terrorism and Innocence

This paper begins with a discussion of different definitions of “terrorism” and endorses one version of a tactical definition, so-called because it treats terrorism as involving the use of a quite specific tactic in the pursuit of political ends, namely, violent attacks upon the innocent. This contrasts with a political status definition in which “terrorism” is defined as any form of sub-state political violence against the state. Some consequences of the tactical definition are explored, notably the fact that (unlike the political status definition) it allows for the possibility of state terrorism against individuals, sub-state groups and other states. But a major problem for the tactical definition is the account to be given of “the innocent.” In line with justwar thinking, the idea of “the innocent” is unpacked in terms of the concept of non-combatants and this in turn is treated as the category of those who are not prosecuting the harm that allows for a legitimate violent response. Problems with this approach are explored, with particular reference to criticisms made by Gregory Kavka. The recent drive to expand the class of those who may be legitimately attacked is subjected to scrutiny. Particular attention is paid to the role of “collective responsibility” and “deserving your government” in these arguments. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

White Picket Fences,White Innocence

Focusing on the cultural implications of the relationship between white segregationist Senator Strom Thurmond and his biracial daughter Essie Mae Washington‐Williams, this essay explores national narratives of whiteness, femininity, morality, and the institutionalization of sexual violence against black women.     

Killing, wrongness, and equality

This paper examines accounts of the moral wrongness of killing persons in addition to determining what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the morality of killing persons about the (in)equality of persons, and vice versa. I will argue that a plausible way of thinking about the moral wrongness of killing implies that the permissibility of killing innocent, nonthreatening persons depends on a person’s age. I address objections to this conclusion and discuss some potential implications of the view.     

Self-Defense against Verbal Assault: Shame, Anger, and the Social Bond

With many years of experience and refinement, the arts of self-defense against physical assault are highly developed. Without an effective theory and a useful practice, there is little in the way of self-defense against verbal assault. For THEORY, I draw upon ideas from aikido, family systems theory, and the sociology of emotions. Since unacknowledged shame seems to generate rage and damage social bonds, I emphasize the management of shame, anger, and bonds. To illustrate the meaning of these principles, I offer several episodes as examples, using the METHOD of discourse analysis. I apply this theory and method to the PRACTICE of psychotherapy by describing some rudimentary principles of defense of self against verbal aggression, especially the subtle aggression of innuendo. Psychotherapy is often an arena of verbal aggression by both therapist and client, even though it is usually unintentional and outside of awareness.     

Aquinas's Opposition to Killing the Innocent and its Distinctiveness within the Christian just War Tradition

This essay argues that Aquinas's position regarding the killing of innocent people differs significantly from other representatives of the Christian just war tradition. While his predecessors, notably Augustine, as well as his successors, from Cajetan and Vitoria onward, affirm the legitimacy of causing the death of innocents in a just war in cases of necessity, Aquinas holds that causing the death of innocents in a foreseeable manner, whether intentionally or indirectly, is never justified. Even an otherwise legitimate act of just war cannot legitimate causing the death of innocent people, as this can never advance the common good. This stance also contrasts sharply with much modern and contemporary double effect theorizing in relation to jus in bello. In this regard, Aquinas's position, shaped decisively by his biblical and theological commitments, may point the way towards an ethical orientation beyond the typical divisions of “pacifism” and “just war.”