Biomedicine: an ontological dissection

Though ubiquitous across the medical social sciences literature, the term “biomedicine” as an analytical concept remains remarkably slippery. It is argued here that this imprecision is due in part to the fact that biomedicine is comprised of three interrelated ontological spheres, each of which frames biomedicine as a distinct subject of investigation. This suggests that, depending upon one’s ontological commitment, the meaning of biomedicine will shift. From an empirical perspective, biomedicine takes on the appearance of a scientific enterprise and is defined as a derivative category of Western science more generally. From an interpretive perspective, biomedicine represents a symbolic-cultural expression whose adherence to the principles of scientific objectivity conceals an ideological agenda. From a conceptual perspective, biomedicine represents an expression of social power that reflects structures of power and privilege within capitalist society. No one perspective exists in isolation and so the image of biomedicine from any one presents an incomplete understanding. It is the mutually-conditioning interrelations between these ontological spheres that account for biomedicine’s ongoing development. Thus, the ontological dissection of biomedicine that follows, with particular emphasis on the period of its formal crystallization in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth century, is intended to deepen our understanding of biomedicine as an analytical concept across the medical social sciences literature.

The materialist mentality revisited

My thanks to Jacob Joshua Ross for his helpful advice, and to an anonymous reviewer for detailed and useful comments on an earlier version of this essay.     

Implicit ontological commitment

Quine’s general approach is to treat ontology as a matter of what a theory says there is. This turns ontology into a question of which existential statements are consequences of that theory. This approach is contrasted favourably with the view that takes ontological commitment as a relation to things. However within the broadly Quinean approach we can distinguish different accounts, differing as to the nature of the consequence relation best suited for determining those consequences. It is suggested that Quine’s own narrowly formal account fails. Then a consideration of the necessitation approach championed by Jackson and Lewis shows that it does not do justice to the role of acknowledging consequences in determining rationality. I suggest that an approach which puts a priori consequence as the key relation does a better job. The task of spelling out the nature of a priori consequence is sketched, along with reasons to doubt the adequacy of the double indexing approach to analysing the a priori. The sorts of relations we can stand in to theories which allow us to inherit ontological commitments are touched on with a number of important philosophical strategies for introducing belief-like attitudes which nevertheless avoid ontological commitment.

Murdoch's ontological argument

Anselm's ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch's ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm's argument, her own distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality's wide scope, the basicness of vision to morality, moral realism, and Platonism.     

恩格斯与唯物主义

唯物主义认为存在或发生的一切都是物质的,可以用纯粹自然的术语来描述和理解,不必求助于神圣创造者或非物质的心灵。这种哲学是自然科学方法的基础。但恩格斯强调,将这种一般的哲学观与特定思想家在特定时期提出的特定形式区别开来是重要的。唯物主义往往作为狭隘的、机械论的和还原论的哲学出现,恩格斯称这种形式的唯物主义为"机械"唯物主义,如今它通常被冠以"物理主义"之名。在恩格斯看来,这并非唯物主义的唯一形式。恩格斯致力于发展一种非机械论的、非还原性的哲学的唯物主义,这种唯物主义是原创性的,并且具有重要的当代哲学意义。