Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample-based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person-based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye-witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample-based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person-based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base-rate information) of these findings are discussed.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony and Mock Juror Judgments1

The influence of the degree of detail of eyewitness testimony on two sides of a court case was investigated in two experiments. In the first experiment subject-jurors read a civil court case involving an automobile-pedestrian accident. The plaintiff and the defendant presented conflicting eyewitness accounts. Judgments of the relative credibility of the eyewitnesses on each side and the percentage of negligence of the parties were influenced by the relative degree of detail of the eyewitness testimony on each side. In the second experiment subject-jurors read a criminal court case involving robbery and murder. The prosecution and defense presented conflicting eyewitness accounts. The degree of detail of the prosecution eyewitness testimony influenced judgments of guilt and judgments of the credibility of the eyewitnesses. An examination of the reasons for verdicts and credibility judgments revealed that some subjects inferred that an eyewitness who gave testimony with a greater degree of detail had a better memory for the trivial details and the culprit than an eyewitness who gave testimony with a lesser degree of detail. Implications of these results for the legal system are discussed.     

Preventing the Application of Stereotypic Biases in the Courtroom: The Role of Detailed Testimony1

To determine whether detailed testimony has equivalent effects on judgments of stereotyped and nonstereotyped defendants, subjects read a synopsis of a criminal court case in which the defendant either was a stereotyped offender or was not. Additionally, the degree of detail in the prosecution testimony and defense testimony was varied. Results indicated that defendant stereotypicality had a greater impact under conditions in which witnesses provided equal amounts of detail in their testimony. When witnesses differed in the degree of detail in their testimony, the stereotypicality of the defendant was disregarded and judgments favored the witness who provided greater detail. These findings suggest that stereotype application is not inevitable; rather, stereotypes may bias jurors' decision-making processes when the quality and quantity of the evidence does not easily lead to a confident judgment.     

Improving the Credibility of Child Sexual Assault Victims in Court: The Impact of a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner

The present study investigated the influence of a sexual assault nurse examiner's (SANE's) testimony on mock juror perceptions of a child or adolescent victim of child sexual assault. Community members (N = 252, 156 females) read a fictional criminal trial summary of a child sexual assault case in which the victim was 6 or 15 years old and the prosecution presented medical testimony from a SANE or a traditional registered nurse (RN), or did not present medical testimony. Mock jurors were more likely to render guilty verdicts when a SANE testified compared with the other two testimony conditions. In addition, pro-victim judgments (e.g., sympathy toward the victim) and negative defendant judgments (e.g., anger toward the defendant) mediated this relation. Finally, cognitive network representations of the case demonstrated that the RN and no-medical-testimony groups were similar and the SANE group was distinct from the other two conditions. We discuss these results in terms of the implications of SANE testimony in child sexual assault court cases. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Juror Responses to Direct and Mediated Presentations of Expert Testimony1

One hundred twenty-one King County (Washington) jurors viewed one of four videotaped versions of medical testimony relevant to the determination of a claim for damages against an employer in an industrial accident case. Two versions presented the claimant's physician (direct testimony), and two presented an attorney reading the physician's testimony verbatim (mediated testimony). Two professional actors (one female, one male) portrayed the physician in one version and the attorney in the other. Videotape presentations were introduced by written material and followed by a questionnaire in which Ss answered a number of legal, attitudinal, and factual questions. Responses to direct testimony differed from those to mediated testimony on several dimensions: number of items listed as significant to the determination of a cash award, estimates of sufficiency of material presented to determine an award, estimates of physician's competence, estimates of confidence in ratings of physician's competence, and number of correct items in a factual retention test. Significant correlations were found between scores on some of these dimensions and number of dollars awarded as compensation. Differences between the actors produced no significant effects, nor were there any significant interactions. It is concluded that, ceteris paribus, direct testimony is to be preferred to mediated testimony.     

Trivial persuasion in the courtroom: the power of (a few) minor details

Investigated the influence of trivial testimonial detail on judgments of 424 undergraduates who served as mock jurors. Ss read a summary of a court case involving robbery and murder. In Experiment 1, detailed testimony influenced judgments of guilt, even when the detail was unrelated to the culprit. In Experiment 2, detailed testimony was especially powerful when an opposing witness testified that she could not remember the trivial details. Subsequent analyses suggest that the impact of detailed testimony on guilt judgments is mediated by inferences about the eyewitnesses. When eyewitnesses provided more detail, they were generally judged to be more credible, to have a better memory for the culprit's face and for details, and to have paid more attention to the culprit.     

Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgments: The Effects of Harm Information and Witness Demeanor1

Victim impact testimony (i.e., testimony concerning the harmful consequences on the victim's surviving family) was examined to determine its effect on the sentencing judgments of mock jurors. Undergraduate students (N= 293) watched a videotaped murder trial simulation, rendered verdicts, and made sentencing judgments. During the penalty phase of the trial, participants were either given no victim impact testimony, or they were given victim impact testimony that varied both the severity of the harm information (mild harm/ severe harm) and the demeanor of the witness (low affect/high affect). The results indicate that information concerning the harm experienced by the victim's relatives, not the affective demeanor of the witness, influenced sentencing judgments. Implications for the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) are discussed.     

The effects of varied retrieval cues on reminiscence in eyewitness memory

Eyewitnesses sometimes recall things at later interviews that they did not recall at previous interviews (reminiscence). When these cases are argued in the courtroom, attorneys may claim (and judges may warn jurors) that eyewitnesses who provide reminiscences are necessarily inaccurate witnesses. Consequently, their testimony may be prematurely discredited or dismissed. We examined here the role of varying the retrieval cues across interviews to account for reminiscence. Participants watched a videotaped mock crime and were tested for recall on two occasions using the same or different cues. Results supported the hypothesis that varying retrieval cues increases the amount of reminiscence. Furthermore, nearly all participants exhibited some reminiscence. Finally, reminiscence was not significantly correlated with overall accuracy of testimony. These findings suggest that many of the assumptions underlying legal tactics and judges' instructions regarding reminiscent inconsistencies are erroneous. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Looking Behavior on Perceptions of a Communicator's Credibility1

A courtroom simulation technique was employed to examine the effects of a communicator's looking behavior on observers' perceptions of his credibility. Half of the subjects heard testimony presented on behalf of a defendent by a witness (one of three confederates) who was visually presented as either looking directly toward the target of his communication (gaze maintenance) or slightly downward (gaze aversion) while testifying. The other half of the subjects merely heard the audio portion of the testimony. The results indicated that witnesses who averted their gaze were perceived to be less credible and, ultimately, the defendant for whom they testified was judged as more likely to be guilty. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for research concerned with the communicative effects of visual behavior.     

情绪状态对大学生道德判断能力的影响

采用道德判断测验(MJT中文版),以300名大学生为被试,考察了情绪状态对大学生道德判断能力的影响。结果发现:(1)大学生道德判断能力的年级差异显著;(2)情绪状态对大学生道德判断能力具有显著影响,快乐状态下的道德判断能力高于悲伤状态,这与国外的研究结论正好相反;(3)道德判断任务的自我相关性对大学生道德判断能力的影响不显著。     

How jurors use and misuse character evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence allow defendants to offer testimony about their good character, but that testimony can be impeached with cross-examination or a rebuttal witness. It is assumed that jurors use the defense's character evidence (CE) to form guilt and conviction judgments but use impeachment evidence only to assess the character witness's credibility. Two experiments tested these assumptions by presenting mock jurors with various forms of CE and impeachment. Participants made trait ratings for the character witness and defendant and guilt and conviction judgments. Positive CE did not affect guilt or conviction judgments, but cross-examination caused a backlash in which judgments were harsher than when no CE was given. Using path analysis, the authors tested a model of the process by which CE and impeachment affect defendant and witness impressions and guilt and conviction judgments. Implications for juror decision making are discussed.     

Habla Ingles? The Effects of Language Translation on Simulated Juror Decisions1

Two studies were conducted in which college students, acting as simulated jurors, heard the testimony of a defendant in an assault case. The testimony was presented in English or in another language (Spanish in Study 1 and Thai in Study 2) which was translated into English by an interpreter. In Study 1, non-Hispanics judged the defendant to be more guilty than did Hispanics when the defendant's testimony was presented in Spanish than when it was presented in English. This bias was offset when the judge's instructions admonished the jurors to ignore the fact that the defendant's testimony was translated. Similarly, in Study 2, subjects (all non-Thai) judged the defendent more guilty when his testimony was presented in Thai than when it was presented in English. Again, this bias was eliminated by the judge's instructions to the jurors to ignore the fact that the testimony was translated. The increased guilty verdicts for defendants who did not testify in English appeared to be due to prejudice and language ethnocentrism, the belief that defendants in U.S. courts should speak English.     

Processing idioms with multiple meanings

Three experiments are presented that examine understanding of idioms with one or more meaning. The results of Experiment 1 showed that subjects took longer to read and make paraphrase judgments for idioms when both their idiomatic and literal meanings are intended than it did to comprehend idioms meant only literally or idiomatically. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects were faster at making phrase classification judgments for idioms with several different nonliteral interpretations than they were to make the same judgments for idioms with only one idiomatic interpretation. These findings suggest that idioms with more entries in the mental lexicon are accessed faster because it is more likely that one of their meanings will be encountered in a short time. The data overall support the idea that idioms are represented differently depending on their number of associated meanings.This research was supported by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of California, Santa Cruz. We wish to thank Dennis Johnston for his assistance in running subjects.     

Susceptibility to postidentification feedback is affected by source credibility

How much a person is affected by postidentification feedback is dependent on the credibility of the person giving the feedback. Seven hundred and ninety participants across three experiments viewed a crime video, made judgments from a line‐up, were provided with co‐witness and/or outcome feedback (from police officers [high credibility] or children [low credibility]), and answered testimony‐relevant questions (e.g. How good a view did you get of the person in the video?). The aim was to find out how high versus low credibility co‐witness feedback affects a witness' retrospective judgments (Experiment 1) as well as estimations of these co‐witnesses' judgments (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 showed that the feedback effect was only observed when the co‐witness responses were attributed to a high credibility source. Experiment 2 showed that high credibility co‐witnesses were estimated to score higher on the testimony‐relevant questions as compared to low credibility co‐witnesses. Experiment 3 showed that outcome feedback (e.g. ‘you identified the suspect’) produces stronger effects on testimony‐relevant questions than co‐witness feedback. The implications of these findings are that when postidentification feedback is present, it is important to determine the source of this feedback. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective phrase structure: An empirical investigation

The present study represents an attempt to investigate the basis of subjective groupings of words in sentences, employing Edwin Martin's subjective phrase structure technique. Results indicate that subjects base their judgments not only on grammatical structure but also on constituent length and on stress and intonation patterns.A shorter version of this paper was presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Linguistic Association at McGill University, Montreal, May 1972.