Can Only Human Lives Be Meaningful?

Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one’s life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one’s intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists’ intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, but I disagree with Purves and Delon’s theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one’s life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon’s objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects’ existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this consequence, I argue that it only seems counterintuitive because of two false beliefs they appear to hold: that some X cannot have a meaningful existence without that meaning (a) making X better off or (b) giving X reasons for pride.     

Can Doctors Maintain Good Character? An Examination of Physician Lives

Can doctors maintain good character? This paper shifts the focus from patient care to ethical considerations that bear on the physician and impact her as a person. By decentering patient care, the paper highlights certain factors that habituate a particular way of reasoning that is not conducive to inculcating good character. Such factors include, standards of professionalism, being influenced by external monitors, and emphasis on adherence to guidelines. While such factors may benefit patients, they often adversely affect the character of physicians.     

Can a machine tickle?

It has been observed at least since the time of Aristotle that people cannot tickle themselves, but the reason remains elusive. Two sorts of explanations have been suggested. Theinterpersonal explanation suggests that tickling is fundamentally interpersonal and thus requires another person as the source of the touch. Thereflex explanation suggests that tickle simply requires an element of unpredictability or uncontrollability and is more like a reflex or some other stereotyped motor pattern. To test these explanations, we manipulated the perceived source of tickling. Thirty-five subjects were tickled twice-once by the experimenter, and once, they believed, by an automated machine. The reflex view predicts that our “tickle machine” should be as effective as a person in producing laughter, whereas the interpersonal view predicts significantly attenuated responses. Supporting the reflex view, subjects smiled, laughed, and wiggled just as often in response to the machine as to the experimenter. Self-reports of ticklishness were also virtually identical in the two conditions. Ticklish laughter evidently does not require that the stimulation be attributed to another person, as interpersonal accounts imply.     

Can Psychoanalysis be a Science?

This essay proposes to examine a limited number of critical assessments regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis with reference to intents and purposes, claims and disclaimers, contrasting views of what constitutes a science and the nature of scientific thinking and how these might apply to psychoanalysis epistemologically. It assumes a certain degree of familiarity with criticisms that have been leveled against psychoanalysis from those who insist on absolutist testing for what some call true science, particularly on the part of those who are not practitioners of the art. It wonders about the concern with scientizing by those who actually practice it, or value it in some way or another. It suggests an open minded approach without premature or even warranted closure on the subject of human beings and of ways of getting to know them, let alone understanding them and perhaps being of help to them.     

Can a Robot Be a Good Colleague?

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the robotization of the workplace, and particularly the question of whether robots can be good colleagues. This might appear to be a strange...     

Can delusions play a protective role?

After briefly reviewing some of the empirical and philosophical literature suggesting that there may be an adaptive role for delusion formation, we discuss the results of a recent study consisting of in-depth interviews with people experiencing delusions. We analyse three such cases in terms of (1) the circumstances preceding the development of the delusion; (2) the effects of the development of the delusion on the person’s situation; and (3) the potential protective nature of the delusional belief as seen from the first-person perspective. We argue that the development of the delusional belief can play a short-term protective function and we reflect on the implications that this might have for our understanding of psychotic symptoms, for the stigma associated with mental health issues, and for treatment options.     

Can there be a feature-placing language?

The aim of this article is to argue against the real possibility of languages without subject-predicate structure, so-called feature-placing languages. They were first introduced by Strawson (1959/1990), later given formal expression through Quine's Predicate Functor Logic (Quine, 1960, Quine, 1971/Quine, 1976, Quine, 1992), and further elaboration in (Hawthorne & Cortens, 1995). I argue that, on the presumption that feature-placing languages are not mere notational variants on first-order languages, the idea of such languages is incoherent. The argument for this view rests on two highly plausible views about the conditions for the possibility of sentential meaning in natural languages. If accepted, these two views jointly imply that the sentences of feature-placing languages lack sufficient internal structure to meet the conditions for sentential meaning. Feature-placing languages cannot then count as genuine languages.     

Can chimpanzees learn a phonemic language?

Two groups of investigators have recently reported some success in teaching language to chimpanzees. This finding has been generally attributed to the choice of a favorable communication modality. However, the fact that the languages employed were not phonemic also seems critical. It is doubtful whether chimpanzees could learn a phonemic language.This research was supported in part by PHS Grants No. GM01789 and GM16735 to The Rockefeller University.     

Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.     

Can Bioethics Survive in a Dying World?

Significant changes in the natural environment over the past 40 years pose key challenges to health and health care in the 21st century. Health care has not yet given serious attention to what the current environmental situation means for human health, or for maintaining an effective health care system. Bioethics is in a good position to help health professionals engage environmental questions. But bioethics, as a field, will first need to explore and integrate “ecological thinking”—thinking based in the concept of connectedness and committed to viewing humans are part of nature rather than exempt from it.     

Fostering a Spirituality That Can Transform Mission?

To be moved by the Spirit into transforming discipleship, we need to know how to make ourselves available to God to receive God's gifts. We also need to practise discernment regarding what gives life and what does not. This paper considers themes for the 2018 Mission Conference, including money, love, and prayer. Examples, parables, and illustrations are given from experience and the practice of missionary discipleship. There is a particular emphasis on means of grace and the spiritual disciplines outlined by St. Ignatius of Loyola. The conclusions point to a focus on prayer in the planning, preparation, and programming for the 2018 Conference.     

Can subjects maintain a constant criterion in a memory task?

In two recognition memory experiments, subjects rated how certain they were that a given test item had been shown previously. Subjects either received standard instructions about their rating criteria or were explicitly instructed to maintain criteria defined in the manner of Healy and Jones (1973) or along the lines of signal detection theory. When a priori probability varied, subjects in all instruction groups held constant the criteria defined by signal detection theory at the expense of shifting the criteria proposed by Healy and Jones. The results were taken as evidence for the psychological validity of recognition memory analyses based on signal detection theory.