共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Ross P. Cameron 《Synthese》2007,156(1):143-159
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian
realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory
because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can
only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity
is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall
victim to the objection I lay against Lewis. 相似文献
2.
Timothy Mooney 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(4):359-381
Merleau-Ponty’s explication of concrete or practical movement by way of the Schneider case could be read as ending up close
to automatism, neglecting its flexibility and plasticity in the face of obstacles. It can be contended that he already goes
off course in his explication of Schneider’s condition. Rasmus Jensen has argued that he assimilates a normal person’s motor
intentionality to the patient’s, thereby generating a vacuity problem. I argue that Schneider’s difficulties with certain
movements point to a means of broadening Merleau-Ponty’s account of concrete movement, one that he broaches without exploiting.
What could do more work is his recognition of a transposition capacity - and hence of a plasticity - in the healthy body’s
skill schema. As well as avoiding vacuity, he could forestall the appearance of a dichotomy between practical coping and creativity. 相似文献
3.
Mark Chekola 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):51-78
The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual
core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views
of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness
as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a
high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness.
So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are
also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life. 相似文献
4.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
5.
Adina Preda 《Res Publica》2011,17(3):227-243
This paper asks whether (human) rights enforcement is permissible given that it may entail infringing on the rights of innocent
bystanders. I consider two strategies that adopt a rights-sensitive consequentialist framework and offer a positive answer
to this question, namely Amartya Sen’s and Hillel Steiner’s. Against Sen, I argue that trade-offs between rights are problematic
since they contradict the purpose of rights, which is to provide a pluralist solution to disagreement about values, i.e. to
allow agents to act in accordance with their values. I further argue that Steiner’s compensation strategy does not succeed
in avoiding trade-offs so it falls prey to the same criticism. I propose a non-trade-off solution that is implicit in the
accounts discussed and is more consistent with the meta-ethical framework advocated by Sen. This solution relies on an enforceable
duty to share in the costs of rights enforcement hence it entails a degree of redistribution for enforcement purposes. 相似文献
6.
Emer O’Hagan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):525-537
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge
requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt
the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral
constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as
sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception
of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a
protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness
of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. 相似文献
7.
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik 《Science and engineering ethics》2010,16(1):33-41
Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are
both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition
of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science.
Its rationality cannot be seen as merely instrumental––as it was seen by the ideal of value-free science––for this would result
in limiting the autonomy of science and reducing scientists to “minds to hire”. The scientific rationality must be seen as
practical rationality which takes into account the full horizon of values. The scientific responsibility must also be broaden
in scope and type. On this basis I draw three practical conclusions concerning the organization of research and training of
young scientists, appealing to Plato’s claim that those most capable of healing are also those most capable of harming. 相似文献
8.
Stefaan E. Cuypers 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):171-196
In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is
as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy
in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition
of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first
appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC manipulation problem. After briefly reflecting on the present
status of responses to the manipulation problem in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists of various stripes,
I will draw the over-all pessimistic conclusion that no party deals with this problem satisfactorily. 相似文献
9.
10.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
相似文献
Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
11.
Joseph LaPorte 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):321-336
Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s
interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect
to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual
properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of
designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the
work of grounding a posteriori necessity.
I thank Steve Schwartz and Bernard Linsky for helpful feedback on this
paper 相似文献
12.
In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing
is always a component of one’s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle’s view to establish that there are actions
in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps
us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
13.
Patokos T 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2011,32(4):245-258
In game theory, the word ‘game’ is used to describe any interdependence between interacting parties, and the Nash equilibrium
is a prominent tool for analysing such interactions. I argue that the concept of the Nash equilibrium may also be used in
non-gaming contexts. An individual is in a Nash equilibrium if his or her beliefs are consistent with his or her actions.
Given that discordance between beliefs and behaviour is a typical cause of psychiatric disorders, individuals who are not
in a Nash equilibrium are likely to be affected by such disorders. In this regard, the concept of the Nash equilibrium could
aptly be introduced into the medical practitioner’s vocabulary for describing a patient’s mental health status. 相似文献
14.
Aaron Rizzieri 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):235-242
Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation
between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs
on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced
belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition. 相似文献
15.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
16.
Sungho Choi 《Synthese》2006,148(2):369-379
Lewis claims that Martin’s cases indeed refute the simple conditional analysis of dispositions and proposes the reformed conditional
analysis that is purported to overcome them. In this paper I will first argue that Lewis’s defense of the reformed analysis
can be understood to invoke the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. I will go on to argue that advocates
of the simple analysis, just like Lewis, can also defend their analysis from alleged counterexamples including Martin’s cases
by invoking the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. This means that Lewis’s own necessary defense
of the reformed analysis invalidates his motivation of it. Finally, I will argue that we have a good reason to favor the simple
analysis over Lewis’s analysis. 相似文献
17.
While there is much literature on autonomy and the conditions for its attainment, there is less on how those conditions reflect
on agents’ ordinary careers. Most people’s careers involve a great deal of subservient activity that would prevent the kind
of control over agents’ actions that autonomy would seem to require. Yet, it would seem strange to deny autonomy to every
agent who regularly follows orders at work—to do so would make autonomy a futile ideal. Most contemporary autonomy accounts
provide purely theoretical analysis without reference to any practical goal that autonomy could serve. These accounts are
likely to resolve this issue in one direction: either almost entirely including or excluding subservient workers from autonomy.
Either solution would fail to distinguish agents who sufficiently control their lives, in spite of limited subservience, according
to their own standards, from agents for whom subservience precludes a fulfilling life. I suggest the solution lies in a return
to goal-oriented autonomy accounts, which can use the goal to distinguish when subservience overwhelms autonomy from when
subservience and autonomy can coexist. I present an account that anchors autonomy in the happiness that it provides for agents
who sufficiently control their lives as determined by their more important prudential standards. On this account, agents in
subservient careers can be autonomous if they determine how to make their careers consistent with their happiness. 相似文献
18.
Nelson JL 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2011,32(5):289-300
Most people accept that if they can save someone from death at very little cost to themselves, they must do so; call this
the ‘duty of easy rescue.’ At least for many such people, an instance of this duty is to allow their vital organs to be used
for transplantation. Accordingly, ‘opt-out’ organ procurement policies, based on a powerfully motivated responsibility to
render costless or very low-cost lifesaving aid, would seem presumptively permissible. Counterarguments abound. Here I consider,
in particular, objections that assign a moral distinctiveness to the physical boundaries of our bodies and that concern autonomy
and trust. These objections are singled out as they seem particularly pertinent to the stress I place on a distinctive benefit
of the particular policy I defend. An opt-out system, resting not on the authority of ‘presumed consent’ but on the recognition
of a duty to one another, has the prospect of prompting people to understand more richly the ways in which they are both physically
embodied and communally embedded. 相似文献
19.
Carl Hammer 《Journal of applied philosophy》2014,31(2):169-187
Kant's ethics is used by some as a defence of the exploitation of animals and is criticised by others for not recognising any moral relevance of the plight of animals. These appeals overlook the broad applicability of Kant's principles. In this article, I argue that Kant's ethics implies a duty to abstain from most meat and some other animal products derived from farming. I argue that there is a Kantian principle not to choose goods that have been derived from wrongdoing, with certain qualifications. This principle isolates the wrong of using others to commit wrongdoing on one's behalf. As has been argued by others, Kant's ethics implies that animal farming as we know it in our society almost universally involves wrongdoing and the slaughter of animals is especially tied to wrongdoing. I argue for a broad sense in which these ideas together imply that choosing farmed meat, and probably other animal products, is treating animal industry workers as mere means. Thus, we have a Kantian duty to abstain from these products. 相似文献
20.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):357-367
In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to
this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide
a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s
criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way
of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections. 相似文献