Quality Instances and the Structure of the Concrete Particular

In this paper, I examine a puzzle that emerges from what J. P. Moreland has called the traditional realist view of quality instances. Briefly put, the puzzle is to figure out how quality instances fit into the overall structure of a concrete particular, given that the traditional realist view of quality instances prima facie seems incompatible with what might be called the traditional realist view of concrete particulars. After having discussed the traditional realist views involved and the puzzle that emerges from their juxtaposition, I propose an alternative realist view of quality instances which resolves the puzzle. In short, the puzzle is solved by treating the distinction between a concrete particular and its quality instances as a distinction of reason, and by adopting the view that the individuating element of a concrete particular must also serve as its unifying element – a view which Moreland, one of traditional realism’s most stalwart contemporary defenders, rejects.     

Love and anarchy in Romania : A critical review of Mircea Eliade's Autobiography, volume one, 1907–1937

Eliade is a problem: to at least half of today's historians of religion he embodies the discipline; to the other half he is anathema. I do not intend to review this debate here, nor to rehearse the themes of Eliade's massive oeuvre. I will, however, point over my shoulder to the mixed legacy of theoretical debts and doubts Eliade's work has inspired and try to bring them into relationship with the life story Eliade tells in the Autobiography. This review then attempts to show how Eliade's ‘life’ and ‘letters’ cohere and thus how in illuminating one we shed light on the other.     

Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail)

Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or reading some of his works).An interesting third view, which I call ‘weak’ internalism, is a mix of what are arguably the most plausible aspects of the two extreme views. On the one hand, the weak internalist rejects the externalist’s idea that certain propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, socio-linguistic, or historical context; but on the other hand, she rejects the internalist’s claim that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates.One of the most vocal opponents of externalism, John Searle, defends a paradigm case of weak internalism. In this paper I explain his view and why it might seem like the ideal compromise: in particular, it captures intuitions underlying both sides of the debate. I then argue, however, that Searle’s view is untenable; and my objection shows the untenability of weak internalism in general. Despite the attractiveness of a compromise view, we must choose between internalism and externalism full-stop.     

A critical examination of Michael Polanyi's conception of skills

In this paper I will consider some of the main issues in Michael Polanyi's discussion of ‘Skills’ from Chapter 4 of his book Personal Knowledge published in 1958.The concept of ‘skill’ features prominently in psychological theories of human performance in activities such as games, gymnastics, swimming and dance; such theories are often applied to other spheres of human activity in which issues about skill acquisition arise. It is not surprising to discover that skill theory is considered to be essential to the study of human movement and physical education. Physical education teachers in schools have consistently maintained that ‘skill acquisition’ is a major objective for the P.E. curriculum — see Kane 1974. Yet concepts such as ‘skill’, ‘ability’ and ‘know-how’ are constituent features of practical knowledge therefore the notion of ‘skill acquisition’ on its own will not do as a curriculum objective since all instances of skill and practical knowledge are specific to their contexts, namely, to different practical activities. If particular activities are valued in schools in the pursuit of children's learning and education it seems necessary to clarify the epistemological features of such activities in order to understand what it means to teach them and what it means for children to learn and know-how to perform them successfully. It is in these respects that the concept of ‘skill’ in different human activities should attract the interest of physical education students. In order to draw attention to major features of Polanyi's thesis on the nature of ‘skill’ I shall consider the relevance of his ideas about skill and knowledge in relation to human action theory. I suggest that misconceptions may arise in teaching and learning theories relating to ‘playing soccer’ if the basic underlying ideas about ‘skill’ in human activities are inconsistent with ideas about human action or, say, practical reasoning. It is this issue that is not, in my view, attended to by Polanyi in his discussion of ‘skill’. Thus, if my criticisms of Polanyi's ideas are shown to be valid it will be necessary, by implication that is, to exercise caution before any attempt is made to use his thesis as a basis from which to formulate ideas about teaching skills and skill acquisition. The extensive use I make of quotations from Polanyi's writings is necessary because it is towards Polanyi's use of language in his explanation of ‘skills’ that much of my criticism is directed. It is hoped that what follows may provide students of human movement and physical education with an insight into Polanyi's view of ‘skills’ in particular and to issues related to skill theory and human action in general.     

Reasons and Promotion

A number of philosophers accept promotionalism, the view that whether there is a normative reason for an agent to perform an action or have an attitude depends on whether her doing so promotes a value, desire, interest, goal, or end. I show that promotionalism faces a prima facie problem when it comes to reasons for belief: it looks extensionally inadequate. I then articulate two general strategies promotionalists can (and have) used to solve this problem and argue that, even if one of these two strategies can successfully solve the problem with reasons for belief, promotionalists face a symmetrical problem in a range of structurally similar cases. As I'll argue, the problem is that promotionalism cannot account for reasons grounded in the ‘fit’ between an attitude and its object. I offer an alternative to promotionalism and explain how adopting this alternative solves the problems with promotionalism while preserving much of what made promotionalism attractive in the first place.     

Inverse effectiveness, multisensory integration, and the bodily self: Some statistical considerations

A recent report in Consciousness and Cognition provided evidence from a study of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) that supports the multisensory principle of inverse effectiveness (PoIE). I describe two methods of assessing the principle of inverse effectiveness (‘a priori’ and ‘post-hoc’), and discuss how the post-hoc method is affected by the statistical artefact of ‘regression towards the mean’. I identify several cases where this artefact may have affected particular conclusions about the PoIE, and relate these to the historical origins of ‘regression towards the mean’. Although the conclusions of the recent report may not have been grossly affected, some of the inferential statistics were almost certainly biased by the methods used. I conclude that, unless such artefacts are fully dealt with in the future, and unless the statistical methods for assessing the PoIE evolve, strong evidence in support of the PoIE will remain lacking.     

How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle

In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke??s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in ??A Puzzle About Belief?? poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence ??Londres est jolie??, but not to the English sentence ??London is pretty??, both of which he understands perfectly well. The question to be answered is whether Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Kripke argues, of each answer, that it is unacceptable. On my proposal, either answer to the question is to be rejected, but neither answer is to be denied, using the resource of partially-defined predicates. After demonstrating how this serves as a solution to the puzzle, I illustrate some philosophical motivations??independent of Kripke??s puzzle??for adopting a view on which belief is a partially defined predicate. I conclude that there are decent prospects for the proposed response to Kripke??s puzzle.     

Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality

Richard Foley has presented a puzzle purporting to show that all attempts in trying to find a sufficient condition of rationality are doomed. The puzzle rests on two plausible assumptions. The first is a level-connecting principle: if one rationally believes that one's belief that p is irrational, then one's belief that p is irrational. The second is a claim about a structural feature shared by all promising sufficient conditions of rationality: for any such condition, it is possible that one's belief satisfies it and yet one rationally believes that it doesn’t. With the two assumptions, Foley argues that a sufficient condition of rationality is impossible. I explain how exactly the puzzle goes and I try to offer a solution. If my solution works, all theorists of rationality who accept certain level-connecting principles need to add an extra condition to their favourite rationality-making condition.     

Frege's Puzzle for Perception

According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object(s) a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well‐known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception in that strategies that have been developed to respond to Frege's puzzle in the case of belief cannot be employed successfully in the case of perception. Ultimately, I maintain that this perceptual analogue of Frege's puzzle provides a compelling reason to reject the singular content view of perceptual experience.     

Surfing for Salvation

I demonstrate that despite the enormous amount of religion on the Internet, a general classification can be developed based upon the religious participation occurring at the various websites. I recognise these classifications as ‘religion-online’ and ‘online-religion’. Religion-online presents information about religion. It is a controlled environment. The site has been structured to limit participation. In contrast, online-religion provides an interactive religious environment for the web practitioner. Because of this difference, individuals and organisations have different perceptions concerning how the Internet should be used for religious purposes. In many cases there is an active form of religious participation occurring. Rituals are conducted, prayers are posted and even communion is carried out on this medium. In other situations the Internet presents material concerning religion to a passively receptive audience. Despite these levels of control, the web surfer is exposed to an enormous number of belief systems and also varying levels of online religious participation.     

Prologue: Encounters with Mircea Eliade and his legacy for the 21st century

To mark the centennial of Mircea Eliade, the articles in this special issue of Religion analyze various aspects of his life and his scholarship, and suggest what may be of value in Eliade's legacy for the study of religion in the 21st century. In my study, using one of Eliade's favorite terms, ‘the encounter,’ I suggest what my encounters with Eliade reveal about Eliade, his scholarship, and especially his legacy. By delineating and analyzing encounters that were remarkable, disturbing, complex, and contradictory, we may assess both strengths and weaknesses in Eliade's history and phenomenology of religion and what remains in Eliade's legacy that may be of value for the contemporary study of religion. Although Eliade's influence has certainly waned, my position is that there is much of value in his legacy, often in need of more critical reformulation, that offers a valuable critique of much of contemporary scholarship, provides valuable insights, and can serve as a catalyst allowing us to rethink our approaches to the study of religion.     

The most good you can do: a response to the commentaries

Anthony Skelton, Violetta Igneski and Tracy Isaacs share my view that our obligations to help people in extreme poverty go beyond what is conventionally accepted. Nevertheless, the other contributors argue that my view is too demanding, while noting some tensions between my different writings on this issue. I explain my position, drawing on Sidgwick’s distinction between what someone ought to do, and what we should praise or blame someone for doing or not doing. I also respond to the position that Skelton considers preferable to mine, drawing this time on an argument that Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and I have made in our recent book, The Point of View of the Universe. I also address Igneski’s concerns about gender inequality, and indicate my broad agreement with Isaacs’ suggestion that effective altruism could benefit from a more co-ordinated approach.     

Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan

In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.