Sex differences in cooperation: a meta-analytic review of social dilemmas

Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here, we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes-sampled across 50 years of research-on social dilemmas to examine several potential moderators. The overall average effect size is not statistically different from zero (d = -0.05), suggesting that men and women do not differ in their overall amounts of cooperation. However, the association between sex and cooperation is moderated by several key features of the social context: Male-male interactions are more cooperative than female-female interactions (d = 0.16), yet women cooperate more than men in mixed-sex interactions (d = -0.22). In repeated interactions, men are more cooperative than women. Women were more cooperative than men in larger groups and in more recent studies, but these differences disappeared after statistically controlling for several study characteristics. We discuss these results in the context of both sociocultural and evolutionary theories of sex differences, stress the need for an integrated biosocial approach, and outline directions for future research.     

Group transformation: How demonstrability promotes intra-group cooperation in social dilemmas

Intra-group cooperation in a social dilemma is increased after a group has discussed and reached a decision, especially if the dilemma is easily understood (‘demonstrable’). This paper examines how demonstrability affects the decision of a group that consists entirely of participants who are initially non-cooperative. Thirty-eight 6-person groups with unanimous prior preference for cooperation or non-cooperation discussed a prisoner’s dilemma before making a group decision. When demonstrability was low groups reflected the prior (either cooperative or non-cooperative) preferences of their members. When demonstrability was high we found that groups showed no effect of prior preference. Specifically, groups of prior non-cooperators made more cooperative group decisions and subsequently their members remained cooperative when asked to express preferences individually. The combined advantages of group process and high demonstrability for facilitating optimal cooperation are discussed.     

"Me versus just us versus us all" categorization and cooperation in nested social dilemmas

In its generic form, a social dilemma poses a conflict between private and collective interests. People are often faced, however, with a conflict between private, (sub)group, and collective interests. This study examines participants' simultaneous weighing of these 3 nested interests. The results show that increasing the salience of social categorization of any level of the hierarchy (i.e., 6 individuals, 2 subgroups. 1 collective) increases participants' concern for and contributions to the corresponding level of interest (Experiment 1). One can promote concern for and contributions to the collective interest, which are lowest under categorization as 2 subgroups, by individuating the members of the individuals' own subgroup and/or the opposing subgroup (Experiment 2) and by cross-categorization with the opposing subgroup (Experiment 3).     

The benefits of empathy: When empathy may sustain cooperation in social dilemmas

Cooperation in social dilemmas is often challenged by negative noise, or unintended errors, such that the actual behavior is less cooperative than intended—for example, arriving later than intended for a meeting due to an unusual traffic jam. The present research was inspired by the notion that doing a little more for one's interaction partner, which may be movitvated by empathetic feelings, can effectively reduce the detrimental effects of “negative noise,” or unintended incidents of noncooperation. Consistent with hypotheses, negative noise exhibited detrimental effects on cooperation, but such effects were absent when empathy‐motivated cooperation was present. We conclude that empathy has broad benefits for social interaction, in that it can be an effective tool for coping with misinterpreted behaviors, thereby maintaining or enhancing cooperation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas

Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often meant to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. We argue, however, that sanctioning systems may also give people the idea that others act in their own self-interest and undermine the belief that others are internally motivated to cooperate. We developed the “Removing The Sanction” paradigm and a new trust manipulation, and showed in three experiments that when there is a sanction on defection, trust in others being internally motivated to cooperate is undermined: Participants who had experienced the presence of a sanctioning system trusted fellow group members less than participants who had not. In a similar vein, the sanction undermined cooperation when trust was initially high. The implications of these paradoxical findings are discussed.     

Retrospection in social dilemmas: how thinking about the past affects future cooperation

This article reports 2 studies investigating the effects of retrospective thought on future cooperation in social dilemmas. Some general theories of cooperation presume, but have not tested, whether retrospection has impact: People may think about the choices they could have made instead, realize that cooperation would have produced larger outcomes, and change their strategy as a result. Across both studies, the authors show that rate of future cooperation is directly related to the number of best-case scenarios and inversely related to the number of worst-case scenarios generated. The 2nd study also shows that the number and type of retrospective thoughts generated can be predicted from the person's social value orientation.     

Group‐level effects of forgiveness: Group cohesiveness and collective action in social dilemmas

Forgiveness research has predominately focused on individual/relational outcomes such as well‐being and closeness. Less research has examined group outcomes such as cohesiveness or collective action. Forgiveness studies have also emphasized the victim's or transgressor's perspective, neglecting the effects of forgiveness on ingroup members who have neither given nor received forgiveness. We theorize that forgiveness promotes collective action among ingroup members through group cohesiveness and that transgressors' apologetic reactions impact this process. In a laboratory experiment, 229 students (175 females) were led to believe they were in a social dilemma with three others. Some participants witnessed group members forgive an apologetic, obstinate, or neutral defector, whereas others witnessed an unforgiving response. Forgiveness of apologetic and neutral defectors increased later cooperation among ingroup members. This effect was generally mediated by group cohesiveness. Our findings suggest that forgiveness can impact cooperation on a group level, providing a path to successful resolutions to collective action problems. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to cope with "noise" in social dilemmas: the benefits of communication

Interactions in social life may be seriously affected by negative noise, whereby actual or perceived behavior is less cooperative than was intended (e.g., arriving late due to an unforeseen traffic jam). The present research examines whether negative noise exerts detrimental effects on impressions and cooperation and whether such effects could be reduced by communication. Consistent with hypotheses, Study 1 revealed that negative noise exerts detrimental effects on both impressions of partners' benign intent and cooperation and that these detrimental effects could be effectively reduced by communication about noise. Study 2 replicated both findings but only for individuals with low trust. Mediation analysis revealed that impressions of benign intent and prosocial interaction goals underlie the positive effects of communication on cooperation.     

Preferences for leadership in social dilemmas: Public good dilemmas versus common resource dilemmas

It has been argued that a structural solution to social dilemmas is to install a leader, but here we consider the possibility that group members will oppose giving up their decisional freedom. Previous studies have shown that feedback indicating collective failure results in a stronger preference for the leadership option. We argue that preferences for the leadership option depend not only on the feedback group members receive, but also on the type of dilemma they are facing. The results of our experiment, in which we manipulated dilemma type as well as feedback, corroborate our reasoning. The distribution of initial property in public good and common resource dilemmas helps to explain these findings.     

Cooperation with leaders in social dilemmas: On the effects of procedural fairness and outcome favorability in structural cooperation

The present research examined the effectiveness of leadership in influencing cooperation in social dilemmas by focusing on the procedural fairness and favorability of leaders’ outcome decisions. We predicted that leader’s influence on cooperation would be determined by the fairness of the procedures used, but only so when received outcomes were unfavorable. Across two experimental studies, support for this hypothesis was found. Both in Study 1 (using accuracy as a manipulation of procedural fairness) and Study 2 (using voice as a manipulation of procedural fairness), it was found that procedural fairness influenced contributions in a public good dilemma only if outcomes were unfavorable (i.e., participants received less than an equal share), whereas procedural fairness did not influence level of contributions when outcomes were favorable (i.e., participants received more than an equal share).     

When sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: considering the presence of an alternative option to defect

Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "social trilemma" (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.     

Cooperation in social dilemmas and allocentrism: a social values approach

Research examining the relationship between the allocentrism–ideocentrism cultural variable and cooperation in social dilemmas is inconsistent. This relationship is considered in the context of social values within the prisoner's dilemma (PDG) in two studies. We hypothesised that allocentrics (relative to ideocentrics) would more likely express the social value of minimising differences rather than maximising joint outcomes. In Study 1 the hypothesis was supported. Study 2, including British and Malaysian respondents, replicated and extended these results to rankings of PDG outcomes. These findings are integrated with previous research, in particular to explain mixed results concerning allocentrism and cooperation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Components of reward in social dilemmas

A social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) may be defined as a situation in which a collection of individuals is faced with a conflict between maximizing selfish interests and maximizing collective interests. The dilemma is based on the fact that if all choose to maximize selfish interests, all are worse off than if all choose to maximize collective interests. In a decomposed social dilemma (Pruitt, 1967), the outcomes are divided into two components: one component is based on one's own choice and the second component is based on the choices made by the others. Using 3-person decomposed games, two types of incentives were contrasted: a positive incentive (bonus) for cooperative choices and a negative incentive (penalty) for noncooperative choices. Two experiments were conducted using male college students. The results of both experiments showed that the positive incentive evoked a higher level of cooperation than the negative incentive. The results are discussed in terms of nonadditive utility components, Pruitt's motivational interpretation, and Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) theory of interdependence.     

The psychology of social dilemmas: A review

Broadly defined, social dilemmas involve a conflict between immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interests. These are challenging situations because acting in one’s immediate self-interest is tempting to everyone involved, even though everybody benefits from acting in the longer-term collective interest. As such, greater knowledge of social dilemmas should help us understand not only the theoretical puzzles of why people cooperate (or not) but also the ways in which cooperation in groups and organizations can be maintained or promoted. This article reviews different types of social dilemmas, highlights recent developments in the field (especially within psychology), and suggests some new avenues for future research. We illustrate that the field of social dilemma is growing and flourishing in terms of theory, interdisciplinary collaboration, and applicability, producing insights that are novel, replicable, and applicable to many social situations where short-term self-interest is at odds with the long-term interests of teams, organizations, or nations.     

The attraction of social power: The influence of construing power as opportunity versus responsibility

Social power can be construed as opportunity (focusing on the possibility of one's own goal achievement resulting from the control over others' outcomes) or as responsibility (focusing on the implications of one's own actions resulting from the control over others' outcomes). Four experiments tested the impact of different construals of social power on the attraction of power. Due to the salience of the possibility for goal achievement, power construed as opportunity was expected to be more attractive than power construed as responsibility. This effect was predicted to be particularly pronounced among individuals with a strong promotion orientation, because of their focus on gains and achievements. Results supported these predictions and indicate that future research should take different construals of power into account.     

Decision-induced focusing in social dilemmas: give-some, keep-some, take-some, and leave-some dilemmas

Previous research on asymmetric social dilemmas has suggested that public good dilemmas evoke different choice behaviors than do resource dilemmas. The authors propose that these differences reflect a differential focus that is dependent on the way decisions are generally presented in the dilemma types. In agreement with this, the results of 2 experimental studies suggest that, in public good dilemmas, group members are less focused on the consequences of their actions for the final outcome distribution when deciding how many endowments they give to the public good than when deciding how many endowments they keep for themselves. In resource dilemmas, group members are less focused on the final outcome distribution when deciding how many endowments they leave in the collective resource than when deciding how many endowments they take.     

Social identification effects in social dilemmas: a transformation of motives

Three experimental studies were conducted to examine two alternative explanations for the widely established positive effect of social identification in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. We hypothesised that social identification effects could be either ascribed to (1) an increase in the value assigned to the collective good (i.e. goal‐transformation hypothesis) or (2) an enhancement of trust in the cooperation of other group members (i.e. goal‐amplification hypothesis). To disentangle these two explanations, we examined the effects of social identification on the contributions to a public good of people with a different social value orientation (i.e. pre‐existing differences in preferred outcome distribution between self and others). Following the goal transformation hypothesis, we predicted that an increased group identification would raise contributions, in particular for people essentially concerned with their personal welfare (i.e. pro‐self value orientation). Alternatively, following the goal amplification hypothesis it was expected that increased group identification would primarily affect decisions of people concerned with the collective welfare (i.e. prosocial value orientation). The results of all three studies provided support for the goal‐transformation rather than goal‐amplification hypothesis, suggesting that ‘selfish’ individuals can be encouraged to cooperate by increasing the salience of their group membership. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Autocratic leadership in social dilemmas: A threat to group stability

This paper investigated the impact of leadership style on the stability of small social dilemma groups. In two experiments, group members were more likely to exit their group and take their resources elsewhere if they were supervised by an autocratic style leader than by a democratic or laissez-faire style leader. The destabilizing influence of autocratic leadership is due to the procedural rather than distributive aspects of this leadership style: More members exited their group under an autocratic style leader, relative to a democratic style leader, regardless of whether or not they received favorable personal outcomes from the leader. Hence, autocratic leadership is not a stable long-term solution to the problem of public goods in groups.     

Cooperation in social dilemmas: free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment

Cooperation among nonrelatives can be puzzling because cooperation often involves incurring costs to confer benefits on unrelated others. Punishment of noncooperators can sustain otherwise fragile cooperation, but the provision of punishment suffers from a "second-order" free-riding problem because nonpunishers can free ride on the benefits from costly punishment provided by others. One suggested solution to this problem is second-order punishment of nonpunishers; more generally, the threat or promise of higher order sanctions might maintain the lower order sanctions that enforce cooperation in collective action problems. Here the authors report on 3 experiments testing people's willingness to provide second-order sanctions by having participants play a cooperative game with opportunities to punish and reward each other. The authors found that people supported those who rewarded cooperators either by rewarding them or by punishing nonrewarders, but people did not support those who punished noncooperators--they did not reward punishers or punish nonpunishers. Furthermore, people did not approve of punishers more than they did nonpunishers, even when nonpunishers were clearly unwilling to use sanctions to support cooperation. The results suggest that people will much more readily support positive sanctions than they will support negative sanctions.