Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Ethical androcentrism and maternal substance addiction

In this paper, I argue that bioethics suffers from a masculinist approach--what I call "ethical androcentrism." Despite the genesis of other legitimate approaches to ethics (such as feminist, narrative, and communicative ethics), this masculinist tradition persists. The first part of my paper concerns the problem of ethical androcentrism, and how it is manifest in our typical ways of "doing" bioethics (as teachers, ethicists, policymakers, and medical practitioners). After arguing that bioethics suffers from a masculinist ethic, I consider the case of maternal substance addiction to show how this ethic negatively affects the treatment of pregnant addicts. I argue that by treatment maternal substance addiction from an androcentric approach, we fail to serve both pregnant addicts and their fetuses; furthermore, we misrepresent the intentional state of pregnant substance addicts and label them "prenatal abusers." If maternal substance addiction is to be ethically addressed--and if pregnant substance addicts are to be effectively treated--we cannot tacitly accept an androcentric ethic.     

Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility

The self‐deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self‐deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self‐deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self‐deceived agents, nor that they posses contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self‐deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self‐deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors.     

SELF‐DECEPTION ABOUT EMOTION

In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self‐deception—instances in which one is self‐deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self‐deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self‐deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self‐deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two variants of self‐deception about emotion: cognitively motivated self‐deception and phenomenologically motivated self‐deception. After providing an account of each variant, I discuss the importance of the role that perception plays in cases of self‐deception about emotion. I conclude with a comment on the relevance of this discussion for contemporary debates in moral theory.     

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

Using the BIDR to Distinguish the Effects of Impression Management and Self‐Deception on the Criterion Validity of Personality Measures: A Meta‐Analysis

Although the use of personality tests for personnel selection has gained increasing acceptance, researchers have raised concerns that job applicants may distort their responses to inflate their scores. In the present meta‐analysis, we examined the effects of the two dimensions of social desirability, impression management and self‐deception, on the criterion validity of personality constructs using the balanced inventory of desirable responding (BIDR). The results indicate that impression management and self‐deception did not create spurious effects on the relationship between personality measures and performance, nor did they function as performance predictors. Moreover, removing the influence of impression management or self‐deception from personality measures did not substantially attenuate the criterion validity of personality variables. Implications of the results and directions for future research are also discussed.     

Sober social networks: The role of online support groups in recovery from alcohol addiction

In the context of addiction research, positive recovery outcomes are affected by the quality of people's social interactions and perhaps to an even greater extent, by the defining norms of the groups they identify with—that is, using versus recovery groups. Here, we examine the role of online supportive networks in the process of recovery from alcohol addiction. We analyse the relationship between negative and positive aspects of recovery capital (i.e., self‐stigma, and respectively, positive recovery identity and self‐efficacy) as they relate to well‐being outcomes among alcohol users in an online recovery support group. Based on a computerised linguistic analysis of the naturally occurring data extracted from an online recovery support group (i.e., 257 posts made by 237 group members), we found that self‐stigma negatively predicts self‐efficacy and well‐being, and social identification with a recovery identity mediates these relationships. Overall, these findings highlight that positive engagement with supportive recovery networks is central to an effective and sustainable recovery.     

Motivational cues: The role of perceived senders' self‐control ability in raters' deception judgements

Previous studies have found that senders' personal traits may be used by others to make judgements about the senders' truthfulness. Two studies were conducted to examine whether perceived self‐control ability has an effect on deception judgement. Perceived self‐control was hypothesized to act as a motivational cue that participants would use to assess the sender's motivation to lie, which in turn would influence their deception judgement. Results revealed that when participants assessed the sender as having higher self‐control ability, they would consider the sender to be less motivated to lie in daily life (Study 1), and judge the sender more truthful in a text‐based deception judgement task (Study 2). However, the effect of perceived self‐control ability disappeared in a video‐based task (Study 2), likely due to the multitude of various cues available in audio‐visual stimuli. The theoretical and applied implications of the results are discussed.     

Gegenstände and other matters

In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action‐guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre‐consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self‐transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self‐deception is possible. In Part II, I analyze the conditions of self‐deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self‐deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self‐deception.     

Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us?

ABSTRACT

Choice theorists such as George Ainslie and Gene Heyman argue that the drug-seeking behaviour of addicts is best understood in the same terms that explain everyday choices. Everyday choices, they claim, aim to maximise the reward from available incentives. Continuing drug-use is, therefore, what addicts most want given the incentives they are aware of but they will change their behaviour if and when better incentives become available. This model might explain many typical cases of addiction, but there are hard cases that pose a problem. In these hard cases the addicted individual does not cease using drugs in the face of consequences that are so adverse it is implausible that they are unaware of more rewarding paths of action. These cases force the choice theorist into a dilemma: either these addicts’ drug use does not count as action and so is best described by a neurobiological model, or reference to ‘reward’ in these cases means merely ‘motivated’ and so provides no explanatory power. We propose a different model of motivation that takes self-conception into account. We show how that can better explain the hard cases of addiction and also inform our understanding of recovery and self-control.     

The Duty of Self‐Knowledge

Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction “Know Yourself” is the basis of all self‐regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self‐knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self‐deception (§2). Finding none of Kant’s solutions to the problem of self‐deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self‐knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3).     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Drugs as instruments: a new framework for non-addictive psychoactive drug use

Most people who are regular consumers of psychoactive drugs are not drug addicts, nor will they ever become addicts. In neurobiological theories, non-addictive drug consumption is acknowledged only as a "necessary" prerequisite for addiction, but not as a stable and widespread behavior in its own right. This target article proposes a new neurobiological framework theory for non-addictive psychoactive drug consumption, introducing the concept of "drug instrumentalization." Psychoactive drugs are consumed for their effects on mental states. Humans are able to learn that mental states can be changed on purpose by drugs, in order to facilitate other, non-drug-related behaviors. We discuss specific "instrumentalization goals" and outline neurobiological mechanisms of how major classes of psychoactive drugs change mental states and serve non-drug-related behaviors. We argue that drug instrumentalization behavior may provide a functional adaptation to modern environments based on a historical selection for learning mechanisms that allow the dynamic modification of consummatory behavior. It is assumed that in order to effectively instrumentalize psychoactive drugs, the establishment of and retrieval from a drug memory is required. Here, we propose a new classification of different drug memory subtypes and discuss how they interact during drug instrumentalization learning and retrieval. Understanding the everyday utility and the learning mechanisms of non-addictive psychotropic drug use may help to prevent abuse and the transition to drug addiction in the future.     

DO THE SELF‐DECEIVED GET WHAT THEY WANT?

Abstract: Two of the most basic questions regarding self‐deception remain unsettled: What do self‐deceivers want? What do self‐deceivers get? I argue that self‐deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele's account of self‐deception, I argue that self‐deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end‐state of self‐deception is a false higher‐order belief. This shows all self‐deception to be a failure of self‐knowledge.     

Spontaneous Self‐Practice of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) by Aboriginal Counsellors During and Following CBT Training: A Retrospective Analysis of Facilitating Conditions and Impact

Previous cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) training studies have suggested that therapists who practice CBT strategies on themselves during training may experience professional and personal benefits. However, it has also been reported that some CBT trainees are reluctant to engage in self‐practice. The present study reports an incidental finding from a CBT training study with Aboriginal counsellors: all five counsellors reported that they practiced CBT techniques on themselves without specific encouragement by the trainers to do so. This paper therefore posed three questions: (a) Why—in contrast to some other trainees—did this group choose to apply CBT to themselves? (b) How did they apply it—with what purpose, in what contexts, and which skills? (c) What was the impact of CBT self‐practice? Data from the group's reflections were qualitatively analysed by two of the researchers, and “member checked” by the remainder. Results indicated that the counsellors were motivated to practice CBT on themselves for two principal reasons: the value they placed on CBT, and their personal need resulting from the high number of crises experienced while living and working in their communities. The counsellors reported practicing CBT in a wide variety of contexts as part of their learning. As in previous studies, the impact of CBT self‐practice was that it increased their confidence and competence as therapists. It also appeared to be a valuable burnout prevention strategy. If the results are generalisable, they suggest that self‐experiential training in CBT may be a culturally responsive and adaptive way for Aboriginal counsellors to enhance their learning of CBT skills.     

Better than average and better with time: relative evaluations of self and others in the past,present, and future

Evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future were examined by asking 385 students to rate themselves or an acquaintance relative to their peers on a number of personality traits. We predicted, and found, evidence for self‐enhancement, as most participants regarded themselves superior to ‘most others’ at all points in time. We also found a better than average improvement effect, as participants considered themselves more superior now, than they were in the past, and expected to become even more superior in the future. Expected improvement in the future was larger than improvement over an equal span of time in the past. It is suggested that favorable self‐constructions are possible to the extent that the past and the future are perceived as ambiguous. Singular acquaintances were also rated better than most others, and were believed to improve over time, but their rate of improvement in the future was smaller than the expected improvement for oneself. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

How Much do Chinese Applicants Fake?

More and more organizations have applicants who come from different cultural backgrounds, and according to new research, these cultural backgrounds matter for applicants' self‐presentational behavior (i.e., faking). If applicants come from China, can organizations assume that they will present themselves modestly, as suggested by Chinese norms? Or should organizations assume that there will be much self‐presentational behavior due to the high unemployment rate, at least among Chinese graduates? To answer this question, we obtained data from 307 Chinese applicants on their self‐presentational behavior, using the randomized response technique to ensure anonymity. We compared these data with similar data sets from the United States, Switzerland, and China. Contrary to the proposed modesty hypothesis in Chinese samples, perhaps due to high unemployment, self‐presentation was as prevalent in Chinese samples as in American samples.