When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

The status-enhancement theory of overconfidence proposes that overconfidence pervades self-judgment because it helps people attain higher social status. Prior work has found that highly confident individuals attained higher status regardless of whether their confidence was justified by actual ability ( Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). However, those initial findings were observed in contexts where individuals’ actual abilities were unlikely to be discovered by others. What happens to overconfident individuals when others learn how good they truly are at the task? If those individuals are penalized with status demotions, then the status costs might outweigh the status benefits of overconfidence – thereby casting doubt on the benefits of overconfidence. In three studies, we found that group members did not react negatively to individuals revealed as overconfident, and in fact still viewed them positively. Therefore, the status benefits of overconfidence outweighed any possible status costs, lending further support to the status-enhancement theory.     

The affective costs of overconfidence

Positive illusions, though often beneficial (Taylor & Brown, 1988 ), can diminish the pleasure of outcomes. This prediction follows from decision affect theory. We investigated this prediction by measuring the confidence that recreational basketball players felt while making shots and the pleasure they felt with subsequent outcomes. Results showed that most players were overconfident. Those who were more overconfident tended to experience less enjoyment with their outcomes. Using individual parameter estimates from decision affect theory, we estimated how each player would have felt if their self assessments had been accurate. For the vast majority, better calibration would have led to greater pleasure. In a second study, we randomly assigned players to a debiasing treatment condition or a control condition. Relative to the control players, debiased players were better calibrated and derived greater average pleasure from the task. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A status-enhancement account of overconfidence

In explaining the prevalence of the overconfident belief that one is better than others, prior work has focused on the motive to maintain high self-esteem, abetted by biases in attention, memory, and cognition. An additional possibility is that overconfidence enhances the person's social status. We tested this status-enhancing account of overconfidence in 6 studies. Studies 1-3 found that overconfidence leads to higher social status in both short- and longer-term groups, using naturalistic and experimental designs. Study 4 applied a Brunswikian lens analysis (Brunswik, 1956) and found that overconfidence leads to a behavioral signature that makes the individual appear competent to others. Studies 5 and 6 measured and experimentally manipulated the desire for status and found that the status motive promotes overconfidence. Together, these studies suggest that people might so often believe they are better than others because it helps them achieve higher social status. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

True overconfidence: The inability of rational information processing to account for apparent overconfidence

The better-than-average effect describes the tendency of people to perceive their skills and virtues as being above average. We derive a new experimental paradigm to distinguish between two possible explanations for the effect, namely rational information processing and overconfidence. Experiment participants evaluate their relative position within the population by stating their complete belief distribution. This approach sidesteps recent methodology concerns associated with previous research. We find that people hold beliefs about their abilities in different domains and tasks which are inconsistent with rational information processing. Both on an aggregated and an individual level, they show considerable overplacement. We conclude that overconfidence is not only apparent overconfidence but rather the consequence of a psychological bias.     

The three faces of overconfidence

Overconfidence has been studied in 3 distinct ways. Overestimation is thinking that you are better than you are. Overplacement is the exaggerated belief that you are better than others. Overprecision is the excessive faith that you know the truth. These 3 forms of overconfidence manifest themselves under different conditions, have different causes, and have widely varying consequences. It is a mistake to treat them as if they were the same or to assume that they have the same psychological origins.     

The trouble with overconfidence

The authors present a reconciliation of 3 distinct ways in which the research literature has defined overconfidence: (a) overestimation of one's actual performance, (b) overplacement of one's performance relative to others, and (c) excessive precision in one's beliefs. Experimental evidence shows that reversals of the first 2 (apparent underconfidence), when they occur, tend to be on different types of tasks. On difficult tasks, people overestimate their actual performances but also mistakenly believe that they are worse than others; on easy tasks, people underestimate their actual performances but mistakenly believe they are better than others. The authors offer a straightforward theory that can explain these inconsistencies. Overprecision appears to be more persistent than either of the other 2 types of overconfidence, but its presence reduces the magnitude of both overestimation and overplacement.     

The overconfidence effect in social prediction

In five studies with overlapping designs and intents, subjects predicted a specific peer's responses to a variety of stimulus situations, each of which offered a pair of mutually exclusive and exhaustive response alternatives. Each prediction was accompanied by a subjective probability estimate reflecting the subjects' confidence in its accuracy--a measure validated in Study 5 by having subjects choose whether to "gamble" on the accuracy of their prediction or on the outcome of a simple aleatory event. Our primary finding was that in social prediction, as in other judgmental domains, subjects consistently proved to be highly overconfident. That is, regardless of the type of prediction item (e.g., responses to hypothetical dilemmas, responses to contrived laboratory situations, or self-reports of everyday behaviors) and regardless of the type of information available about the person whose responses they were predicting (e.g., predictions about roommates or predictions based on prior interviews), the levels of accuracy subjects achieved fell considerably below the levels required to justify their confidence levels. Further analysis revealed two specific sources of overconfidence. First, subjects generally were overconfident to the extent they were highly confident. Second, subjects were most likely to be overconfident when they knowingly or unknowingly made predictions that ran counter to the relevant response base rates and, as a consequence, achieved low accuracy rates that their confidence estimates failed to anticipate. Theoretical and normative implications are discussed and proposals for subsequent research offered.     

A test of the overconfidence phenomenon using audio signals

The existence of the overconfidence phenomenon was examined using a signal detection paradigm. Fifty-five participants were asked to decide whether they heard a signal or noise only, and to rate how certain they were of their decisions. The results confirmed the existence of overconfidence as well as the "hard-easy" effect.     

Option fixation: A cognitive contributor to overconfidence

The ASC model of choice and confidence in general knowledge proposes that respondents first Assess the familiarity of presented options, and then use the high-familiarity option as a retrieval cue to Search memory for the purposes of Constructing an explanation about why that high-familiarity option is true. The ASC process implies that overconfidence results in part from a tendency to fixate on the high-familiarity option, to the neglect of the other option. If this implication is true, then judgment tasks requiring respondents to evaluate each option independently should result in reduced overconfidence as compared with standard judgment tasks. Two experiments tested this implication, and found that confidence and overconfidence were reduced when respondents evaluated options independently. The findings support the proposal that option fixation contributes to overconfidence, and also clarify the limitations of random error explanations of overconfidence.     

Multiple facets of overconfidence: Implications for driving safety

This study sought to advance understanding of overconfidence in driving, and its relationship to safety-relevant individual difference factors. We compared the traditional, general above average affect (AAE) in driving ability with an assessment of AAE in relation to compensation for impairments, such as intoxication, fatigue and distraction. General driving and driving impairment AAEs were found to be distinct with unique relationships to illusory control, driver stress, and self-reported unsafe driver behaviors (errors, violations, lapses). Illusory control was associated with driving impairment AAE but not with general driving AAE. Both AAEs were negatively related to dislike of driving but related differently to other criteria. Risk factors related to self-estimation (violations, thrill-seeking) were distinct from factors related to competence relative to peers (aggression). Men scored more highly than women did on both AAEs. Trivia and driving calibration tasks were used to discriminate three aspects of a recent Bayesian belief updating model of overconfidence: overestimation, overplacement (AAE), and overprecision. Findings indicated that overplacement in the calibration tasks was related to AAE, its conceptual equivalent. There was a significant gender difference in overplacement but no gender difference in overprecision. The unique relationships between various types and facets of overconfidence, and driving-relevant individual differences, support the need for tailoring safety interventions to drivers of differing psychological characteristics.     

Two methods for obtaining electrocardiograms of chair-restrained monkeys

EKG’s of chair-restrained Rhesus monkeys were recorded using 1. implantation of subdermal electrodes, and 2. surface electrodes. Both procedures resulted in reliable registration of EKG’s in experiments involving both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning and recording. The advantages and disadvantages of the methods are discussed and detailed instructions for implementation are given.     

Unskilled but aware: reinterpreting overconfidence in low-performing students

People are generally overconfident in their self-assessments and this overconfidence effect is greatest for people of poorer abilities. For example, poor students predict that they will perform much better on exams than they do. One explanation for this result is that poor performers in general are doubly cursed: They lack knowledge of the material, and they lack awareness of the knowledge that they do and do not possess. The current studies examined whether poor performers in the classroom are truly unaware of their deficits by examining the relationship between students' exam predictions and their confidence in these predictions. Relative to high-performing students, the poorer students showed a greater overconfidence effect (i.e., their predictions were greater than their performance), but they also reported lower confidence in these predictions. Together, these results suggest that poor students are indeed unskilled but that they may have some awareness of their lack of metacognitive knowledge.     

Adding information may increase overconfidence in accuracy of knowledge retrieval

Feelings of retrospective confidence concerning the accuracy of a chosen answer might rely, among other things, on the amount of available information, regardless of its correctness. 43 participants, 26 women and 17 men (M age = 23.4 yr., SD = 3.5) in an intact group design, answered nine easy and nine difficult binary forced-choice questions and rated their confidence regarding the correctness of their choices. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups, differing in the additional information provided regarding the questions: a control group provided with no additional information, a correct information group, and a misleading information group. Performance was worst in the misleading information group, yet no difference in confidence was found between the correct and misleading information groups. The findings were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that feelings of confidence partly reflect peripheral factors, indirectly related to choice processes.     

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

Synthese - In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard...     

The recalcitrance of overconfidence and its contribution to decision aid neglect

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people's overconfidence in the quality of their intuitive judgment strategies contributes to their reluctance to use helpful actuarial judgment aids. Participants engaged in a judgment task that required them to use five cues to decide whether a prospective juror favored physician‐assisted suicide. Participants had the opportunity to examine the judgments of a statistical equation that correctly classified 77% of the prospective jurors. In all experiments, participants infrequently examined the equation, performed worse than the equation, and were highly overconfident. In Experiments 1 and 2, outcome feedback and calibration feedback failed to reduce overconfidence. In Experiment 3, enhanced calibration feedback reduced overconfidence and increased reliance on the equation, thus leading to improved judgment performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective probability intervals: how to reduce overconfidence by interval evaluation

Format dependence implies that assessment of the same subjective probability distribution produces different conclusions about over- or underconfidence depending on the assessment format. In 2 experiments, the authors demonstrate that the overconfidence bias that occurs when participants produce intervals for an uncertain quantity is almost abolished when they evaluate the probability that the same intervals include the quantity. The authors successfully apply a method for adaptive adjustment of probability intervals as a debiasing tool and discuss a tentative explanation in terms of a naive sampling model. According to this view, people report their experiences accurately, but they are naive in that they treat both sample proportion and sample dispersion as unbiased estimators, yielding small bias in probability evaluation but strong bias in interval production.