Economics and technological change: An evolutionary epistemological inquiry

The failure of neoclassical economic theories to explain the nature and significance of the phenomenon of technological change is critically looked at in this article. Although there are numerous excellent works in the literature on technological change that criticize the inadequacy of neoclassical economists’ approach to this phenomenon, my objective, however, is to open a new discourse on technological change by emphasizing the epistemological significance of technology. It is argued that the concept of technology as essentially a process of knowledge created for doing things and solving problems, and technological change as essentially a process of knowledge change occurring within the contexts of the political economic and social constructivist frameworks that inform the dynamics of this essentially qualitative process can address this failure. Empirically based analytical methodologies may be able to measure the impact of technological change, an evolutionary epistemology of technological change may be better equipped to understand and explain this phenomenon. He has previously taught at Illinois Institute of Technology and Virginia Tech. An earlier version of this paper was presented in a seminar to the Industrial Policy Management Group at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad on November 2, 1992. Thanks are due to Steve Fuller for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Economics and technological change: An evolutionary epistemological inquiry

The failure of neoclassical economic theories to explain the nature and significance of the phenomenon of technological change is critically looked at in this article. Although there are numerous excellent works in the literature on technologicial change that criticize the inadequacy of neoclassical economists’ approach to this phenomenon, my objective, however, is to open a new discourse on technological change by emphasizing the epistemological significance of technology. It is argued that the concept of technology as essentially a process of knowledge created for doing things and solving problems, and technological change as essentially a process of knowledge change occurring within the contexts of the political economic and social constructivist frameworks that inform the dynamics of this essentially qualitative process can address this failure. Empirically based analytical methodologies may be able to measure the impact of technological change, an evolutionary epistemology of technological change may be better equipped to understand and explain this phenomenon. Reprinted from Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization, Spring 1994, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 79–91. He has previously taught at Illinois Institute of Technology and Virginia Tech.     

面孔吸引力和配偶价值:进化心理学视角

面孔吸引力是对个体容貌的审美评价。根据进化心理学的观点,面孔吸引力是配偶价值的线索。这一假设是进化心理学视角下的面孔吸引力研究的前提所在。本文就涉及这一核心假设的研究进行梳理,重点关注影响面孔吸引力的形态特征与配偶价值的关系。这些形态特征包括面孔的性别二态性特征,面孔的波动性不对称特征以及面孔的肥胖特征。     

Psychology,progress, and the problem of reflexivity: A study in the epistemological foundations of psychology

Buss's thesis that, throughout the history of psychology, psychological theories have alternated between two contradictory models of human nature is examined and supported. One model sees humans as actively constructing themselves; the other model sees humans as constructed from the outside. The thesis that the inherent reflexive quality of psychological inquiry is the cause of this alternation is then examined. Three different hypotheses as to how “reflexivity” might explain this alternation are offered. Finally, brief attention is given to the question of whether psychology can be seen as progressing if it is as philosophically indecisive as the analysis suggests.     

The outlook for policy-making: An epistemological perspective

Improving the quality of public policy-making is a matter of great importance for nearly everyone. Significant improvements, however, require major (and unlikely?) changes in the epistemological foundations accepted by social inquirers—changes that make possible a conception of “policy” that can be used to achieve real world purposes reliably. A theory of knowledge adequate for that purpose is outlined, and some of its major implications for inquiry (and for policy-making) are explored very briefly.     

An evolutionary psychology perspective on sex differences in exercise behaviors and motivations

Researchers have found that men and women pursue sex-appropriate strategies to attract mates. On the basis of intrasexual competition, men should be more likely to enact behaviors to look larger, whereas women should be more likely to enact behaviors to look smaller. The types of exercises that each performs should reflect this expectation. The present study replicates and extends work by L. Mealey (1997) on sex differences in exercise behavior. In the present study, male participants focused their energy on gaining muscle mass and enhancing their upper body definition, whereas female participants focused their energy on losing weight with emphasis on their lower body. Both sexes reported efforts to improve their abdominal region. It appears that men and women adopt sex-appropriate exercise behavior as a method of self-enhancement for intrasexual competition.     

Traits and trade-offs are insufficient for evolutionary personality psychology

Comments on the article by D. Nettle, who has clearly shown that evolutionary psychologists need to focus more attention on individual differences, not just species-typical universals. Such differences are not mere "noise," and evolutionary theory will gain by understanding how they are produced and maintained. However, by focusing on personality traits and the five-factor personality model, Nettle left unaddressed many of the most important aspects of human personality. An evolutionary psychology of personality must ultimately explain not just trait differences but also differences in personal goals, values, motives, identities, and life narratives--essential elements of human individuality and functionality. K. M. Sheldon et al suggest four reasons why traits and the five-factor personality model do not provide an optimal approach for explaining the evolution of personality: (a) As constructs, traits provide little purchase for explaining the causes of behavior; (b) trait concepts do not acknowledge or explain people's variations around their own baselines, variations that are likely crucial for adaptation; (c) traits do not explain or even describe true human uniqueness, i.e. the ways in which a person is different from everybody else; and (d) traits do not explain personality from the inside, by considering what people are trying to do in their lives. In raising these issues Sheldon et al are suggesting that the important question for evolutionary personality study is not why people fall at different points on a continuum regarding traits x, y, and z, but rather why each person is inevitably unique while still sharing the same evolved psychology.     

Comparative evolutionary psychology of sperm competition

A comparative evolutionary psychological perspective predicts that species that recurrently faced similar adaptive problems may have evolved similar psychological mechanisms to solve these problems. Sperm competition provides an arena in which to assess the heuristic value of such a comparative evolutionary perspective. The sperm competition that results from female infidelity and polyandry presents a similar class of adaptive problems for individuals across many species. The authors first describe mechanisms of sperm competition in insects and in birds. They suggest that the adaptive problems and evolved solutions in these species provide insight into human anatomy, physiology, psychology, and behavior. The authors then review recent theoretical and empirical arguments for the existence of sperm competition in humans and discuss proposed adaptations in humans that have analogs in insects or birds. The authors conclude by highlighting the heuristic value of a comparative evolutionary psychological approach in this field.     

Of snakes and faces: An evolutionary perspective on the psychology of fear

Snakes and faces are unique stimuli because they are deeply grounded in evolutionarily shaped behavior systems. Snakes are the prototypical stimulus in a predatory defense system promoting escape from predators, which prepares primates for efficient processing, attentional priority, and rapid fear acquisition to snakes and other stimuli related to predation. The social submissiveness system plays a similar role on the social arena by promoting yielding to dominant individuals without jeopardizing the protection of the group. Supporting these theoretical propositions, empirical data from a research program spanning four decades demonstrate enhanced fear conditioning to snakes and threatening faces compared to neutral stimuli, as well as fast nonconscious processing of, and prioritized attention to, snakes and threatening faces. Human brain‐imaging data show that these effects are mediated by an extensive fear‐network centering on the amygdala.     

Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung's epistemological basis for psychic reality

The author investigates the relation of Kant, Schopenhauer and Heidegger to Jung's attempts to formulate theory regarding the epistemological conundrum of what can and what cannot be known and what must remain uncertain. Jung's ambivalent use and misuse of Kant's division of the world into phenomenal and noumenal realms is highlighted in discussion of concepts such as the psychoid archetype which he called 'esse in anima' and his use of Schopenhauer's concept of 'will' to justify a transcendence of the psyche/soma divide in a postulation of a 'psychoid' realm. Finally, the author describes Jung's reaction to Heidegger's theories via his assertion that Heidegger's 'pre-given world design' was an alternate formulation of his concept of the archetypes. An underlying theme of the paper is a critique of Jung's foundationalism which perpetuates the myth of an isolated mind. This model of understanding subjectivity is briefly contrasted with Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' which focuses on a non-Cartesian 'understanding' of the 'presencing of being' in everyday social and historical contexts.     

Oversimplifying evolutionary psychology leads to explanatory gaps

Comments on Evolutionary psychology: Controversies, questions, prospects, and limitations (see record 2010-02208-001) by Confer et al. They argued that SST cannot explain the existence of either homosexuality or suicide within the human species. We contend that a sufficiently nuanced evolutionary position has no difficulties explaining either phenomenon. Also in this account, it is assumed that all psychological functioning must serve survival and reproduction. However, since evolution selects against certain qualities (it does not select for qualities, as it is commonly, but incorrectly, described), two types of qualities should remain intact for any species: (a) those that facilitate survival and reproduction and (b) those that do not impede survival and reproduction at the population level.     

Evolution and learning: An epistemological perspective

The deep formal and conceptual link existing between artificial life and artificial intelligence can be highlighted using conceptual tools derived by Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology. Starting from the observation that the structure itself of an organism embodies knowledge about the environment which it is adapted to, it is possible to regard evolution as a learning process. This process is subject to the same rules indicated by Popper for the growth of scientific knowledge: causal conjectures (mutations) and successive refutations (extinction). In the field of machine learning such a paradigm is represented by genetic algorithms that, simulating biological processes, emulate cognitive processes. From a practical viewpoint, that perspective allows to identify the two different kinds of learning considered by artificial intelligence, knowledge acquisition and skill improvement, and to get a different view of the problem of heuristic knowledge in learning systems. From a theoretical point of view, these considerations can shade a new light on an old epistemological problem: why do we live in a learnable world?     

The growth of developmental thought: Implications for a new evolutionary psychology

Evolution has come to be increasingly discussed in terms of changes in developmental processes rather than simply in terms of changes in gene frequencies. This shift is based in large part on the recognition that since all phenotypic traits arise during ontogeny as products of individual development, a primary basis for evolutionary change must be variations in the patterns and processes of development. Further, the products of development are epigenetic, not just genetic, and this is the case even when considering the evolutionary process. These insights have led investigators to reconsider the established notion of genes as the primary cause of development, opening the door to research programs focused on identifying how genetic and non-genetic factors coact to guide and constrain the process of development and its outcomes. I explore this growth of developmental thought and its implications for the achievement of a unified theory of heredity, development, and evolution and consider its implications for the realization of a new, developmentally based evolutionary psychology.     

An epistemological analysis of gossip and gossip-based knowledge

Gossip has been the object of a number of different studies in the past 50 years, rehabilitating it not only as something worth being studied, but also as a pivotal informational and social structure of human cognition: Dunbar (Rev Gen Psychol 8(2):100–110, 2004) interestingly linked the emergence of language to nothing less than its ability to afford gossip. Different facets of gossip were analyzed by anthropologists, linguists, psychologists and philosophers, but few attempts were made to frame gossip within an epistemological framework (for instance Ayim in (Good gossip, pp. 85–99, 1994)). Our intention in this paper is to provide a consistent epistemological (applied and social) account of gossip, understood as broadly evaluative talk between two or more people, comfortably acquainted between each other, about an absent third party they are both at least acquainted with. Hence, relying on the most recent multidisciplinary literature about the topic, the first part of this paper will concern the epistemic dynamics of gossip: whereas the sociobiological tradition individuates in gossip the clue for the (theoretically cumbersome) group mind and group-level adaptations Wilson et al. (The evolution of cognition, pp. 347–365, 2002), we will suggest the more parsimonious modeling of gossip as a soft-assembled epistemic synergy, understood as a function-dominant interaction able to project a higher organizational level—in our case, the group as group-of-gossips. We will argue that the aim of this synergy is indeed to update a Knowledge Base of social information between the group (as a projected whole) and its members. The second and third part will instead focus on the epistemological labeling of the inferences characterizing gossip: our contention is that the ever-present moral/evaluative dimension in gossip—be it tacit or explicit, concerning the objects or the partners of gossip—is best analyzed through the epistemological framework of abduction. Consequently, we will suggest that a significant role of gossip is to function as a group-based abductive appraisal of social matter, enacted at various levels.