形式显示的现象学--海德格尔早期弗莱堡讲座研究

本文讨论海德格尔早期弗莱堡讲座中的现象学。作者从题域和方法两个角度上探讨海德格尔这个时期的形式显示现象学。就题域来说,海德格尔试图突破胡塞尔现象学的“知识”或“理论”局限,深入到“前理论的”层面,即所谓前理论的“原始东西”;就方法来说,海德格尔沉思和实践了他所谓的“形式显示”的思路和言路,以此力求与传统哲学的形式化思想方法划界。作者认为,“形式显示”的现象学方法乃是海德格尔在《存在与时间》之前的现象学哲思的最富特色和创意的成分;而由于这种方法上的探索也影响到后期海德格尔的思想道路,因此一般而言,它也标志着海德格尔全部思想的现象学特质。     

Similarities derived from 3-d nonlinear psychophysics: Variance distributions

Many-one mappings between stimulus properties and pairwise generated similarities are intrinsic to definitions of similarity. This of itself is not sufficient as a basis for predicting the variance associated with any single similarity judgment. An extension to cover this has to be made either by making ancillary assumptions about noise, or by using nonlinear models. The derivation of the variance of similarity judgments is made from the 3 process in nonlinear psychophysics. The idea of separability of dimensions in metric space theories of similarity is replaced by one parameter which represents the degree of a form of interdimensional crosscoupling     

Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology

Pragmatism’s naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition’s anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition’s criticisms of naturalism.     

Phenomenology and Cultural Considerations

The author discusses how his early exposure to Dr. Beck’s work shaped and directed his development as an emerging psychologist. Focusing on Beck’s assessment of hopelessness, the author discusses how he developed an appreciation for both the multidimensionality and multifunctionality of the construct in his own works focusing on cultural differences. The author argues that Beck’s early strategy to use a phenomenological approach to understanding clinical conditions remains important for appreciating the different functional meanings that cognitions might embody for different individuals.     

Phenomenology and the project of naturalization

In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.     

Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.     

生命伦理学的知识场域与现象学问题

生命伦理学还不是一个成熟的学科,研究者还要做许多重要的工作。目前,生命伦理学研究中首要的是对相关知识、基本概念、语词的统一,诸如对生命、医学、疾病、死亡等确立生命伦理语境下的认知,是一项重要的任务。应该挖掘所有人类的理性遗产和文化资源,建立和构建生命伦理学理论框架和体系,从而解决对具体生命伦理问题和现象评价的困难。生命伦理学存在一个多维的知识场域,揭示、解释和勾绘这个场域,对生命伦理学的学科建设具有重要意义。     

Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology

This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.     

Sacrifice In Hegel's Phenomenology Of Spirit

In this paper I rely on recent literature that emphasises the importance of recognition in Hegel's philosophy in order to apply the recognition-theoretic approach to the notion of sacrifice in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Firstly, I conduct a preliminary analysis by examining the general meaning of sacrifice as a form of determinate negation. Secondly, I focus on two phenomenological moments (the struggle between ‘faith’ and ‘pure insight’, and the cult) in order to answer the question, ‘Is a real (effective and unselfish) sacrifice possible?’ Finally, I argue that sacrifice should be considered as a Darstellung, and I explain the twofold connection between sacrifice and recognition. I conclude that there is no sacrifice without recognition, and the process of recognition is intrinsically sacrificial.     

生命伦理学的知识场域与现象学问题

目前,生命伦理学研究中最首要的是,对相关知识、基本概念、语词的统一。应该挖掘所有人类的理性遗产和文化资源,建立和构建生命伦理学理论框架和体系,从而解决对具体生命伦理问题和现象评价的困难。生命伦理学存在一个多维的知识场域,揭示、解释和勾绘这个场域,对生命伦理学的学科建设,具有重要意义。     

Phenomenology of delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenia by religious convictions

This study was conducted to assess the impact of religious affiliations on the phenomenology of delusions and hallucinations. Fifty-three Pakistani Muslim patients with schizophrenia were interviewed using the Present State Examination and Religiosity Index. The results indicated that the more religious patients had greater themes of grandiose ability and identity. These differences were more obvious in groups divided on the basis of practice of Islam. Similar results were obtained in the content of hallucinations. More religious patients were more likely to hear voices of paranormal agents and had visions of the same. The results of this study have strong implications for mental health professionals who, without reinforcing threatening and pathological beliefs of patients, can utilise this knowledge to create and maintain a therapeutic alliance with the patients as well as to more effectively manage the disorder.     

Russian Phenomenology,or The Interrupted Flight

In this article the author notes that Russian phenomenology has a long history that has contributed to European progress in philosophy. He presents the main ideas of Gustav Shpet, a well‐known Russian thinker and original follower of Husserl. The heart of Shpet's positive philosophy is a special, skeptical state of mind—hermeneutic phenomenology. This positive philosophy, with its synthesis of hermeneutics and phenomenology, opposes Kant's negative, relativistic thought. In his work, Shpet focuses on the concept of a text. A text's meaning is objective and grasped via the nonpsychological methods of hermeneutics. Language largely determines the development of the human spiritual world, and so the problematics of language merge with the problematics of consciousness. Because texts are human products that express the influence of linguistic consciousness, our understanding of texts should be based on the analysis of language consciousness. Shpet characterizes the whole culture as a sign‐symbolical, objectified expression of the human spirit.     

Phenomenology,idealism, and the legacy of Kant

Martin Heidegger closes his Winter Semester 1927–28 lectures by claiming that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, read through the lens of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, confirmed the accuracy of his philosophical path culminating in Being and Time. A notable interpretation of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, advanced by William Blattner, presents Heidegger as a temporal idealist. I argue that attention to Husserl’s adaptation of Kant’s critical philosophy shows that both Husserl and Heidegger are realists. I make my case by tracing a unified philosophical problematic through three puzzling passages: the Schematism chapter of the first Critique, Husserl’s thought experiment of the destruction of the world in Ideas, and the passage in Being and Time that motivates Blattner’s idealist reading. Husserl and Heidegger give accounts, derived from Kant, of how the consciousness of time makes it possible for objects to be perceived as enduring unities, as well as ‘genealogies of logic’ that show how a priori knowledge, including ontology, is possible. These accounts are idealistic only in the sense that they concern the ideal or essential features of intentionality in virtue of which it puts us in touch with things as they are independently of the contributions of any mind of any type.     

Visual Consciousness and The Phenomenology of Perception

Ideally, psychological and phenomenological studies of visual experience should be mutually informative. In that spirit, this article outlines parts of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty's phenomenological view of visual experience as a kind of independently active opaque bodily synthesis, and uses those views to (a) help ground and extend Alva Noë's rejection of the “snapshot” theory of visual experience in favor of a more enactive view of visual content, (b) critique a failing of Noë's account, and (c) show how the assumptions underlying more internalist and Cartesian views of visual experience can illegitimately creep in even when they are being carefully criticized.     

试论现象学的特征及其对心理学中人文主义的影响

现象学对于心理学家来说,它的意义是明显的：支持了意识的研究、内省方法的使用,并且为表象等内在心理现象的研究提供了理论基础;现象学的科学观是一种非实证主义的观点,为人文主义心理学家以非自然科学模式塑造心理学奠定了哲学基础;作为一种方法论,它与实证主义的方法论截然对立,它在心理学方法论上的特色是整体描述、问题中心、非还原论等原则。     

Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience

Abstract

Phenomenology is considered a philosophy of experience. But in the wake of French post‐structuralism beginning in the 1970s, the concept of experience within phenomenology has fallen under heavy critique. Even today, in the context of feminist philosophy the phenomenological concept of experience has yet to recover from the poststructuralist critique.

In this article, I will closely examine the poststructuralist critique of the concept of experience within the context of feminist theory. I will thereby refer first and foremost to the poststructuralist theorist Joan Scott, and her influential text “‘Experience’”. In my examination of the poststructuralist critique of experience, the leading question will be whether or not this critique, down to its details, can in fact be applied to phenomenology. My thesis is that phenomenology is able to withstand the poststructuralist critique of experience. Further, I will argue that post‐structuralism and phenomenology have more in common as regards the concept of experience than is usually admitted. For several reasons, it seems – as I will maintain – that both poststructuralist feminism and phenomenology are equally interested in a strong concept of experience and thus do not promote doing away with the concept.     

Bios politikos and bios theoretikos in the Phenomenology of Hannah Arendt

Abstract

Hannah Arendt frequently referred to herself as a phenomenologist in that she wished to reveal how action, in the Greek sense of praxis, engenders a public space of appearances or of phenomenality. The life of the Greek city‐state, of the polis, was made possible through this activity, this bios politikos. However, beginning with Plato and continuing right down to Hegel and Heidegger, there has been a sustained attempt to cover up and conceal the specific phenomenality of the bios politikos in favour of the bios theoretikos, involving the substitution of poiesis and theoria for the life of praxis. At the roots of this concealment of the active life is a misunderstanding of the true nature of the theoretical and its highest form, namely, thinking.