The Revival of Rejective Negation

Whether assent (acceptance) and dissent (rejection) are thought of as speech acts or as propositional attitudes, the leading idea of rejectivism is that a grasp of the distinction between them is prior to our understanding of negation as a sentence operator, this operator then being explicable as applying to A to yield something assent to which is tantamount to dissent from A. Widely thought to have been refuted by an argument of Frege"s, rejectivism has undergone something of a revival in recent years, especially in writings by Huw Price and Timothy Smiley. While agreeing that Frege"s argument does not refute the position, we shall air some philosophical qualms about it in Section 5, after a thorough examination of the formal issues in Sections 1–4. This discussion draws on – and seeks to draw attention to – some pertinent work of Kent Bendall in the 1970s.     

Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support

‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two kinds of Frankfurt counter-arguments against the PAP: the direct and the indirect counter-arguments. I then argue that Levy’s argument, if valid, can shed doubt on the indirect argument but leaves the direct argument untouched. I conclude that FSCs can still do their job, even if we grant that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener can modify an agent’s abilities.     

A truth-conditional formulation of Karttunen's account of presupposition

Karttunen's seminal 1973 article Presuppositions of compound sentences, lays the groundwork for the elegant and fruitful theory of this subject which he subsequently presented in (1974). In (1973, pp. 185–8), however, he fallaciously argued that the regularities he discovered concerning the behavior of and, or, and if ... then in English cannot be embodied in any three-valued logic giving a truth-functional interpretation to these connectives. The present paper refutes Karttunen's argument by exhibiting an interpretation with the desired properties, and shows further how the full articulation of his 1974 system can be developed naturally within a truth-conditional semantics for English if bivalence is abandoned — contrary to what Karttunen expected.     

On comparison of theories by their contents

Popper's definition of verisimilitude was criticized for its paradoxical consequences in the case of false theories. The aim of this paper is to show that paradoxes disappear if the falsity content of a theory is defined with help of dCn or Cn ^–1.To the memory of Jerzy SupeckiI am grateful to David Pearce, Gerhard Schurz, Peter Simons, Maciej Spasowski and Jan Zygmunt for their helpful discussions on issues analysed in this paper. Particularly, Zygmunt's and Spasowski's comments enabled me to correct several mistakes of the earlier drafts.     

Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.     

Logics of some kripke frames connected with Medvedev notion of informational types

Intermediate prepositional logics we consider here describe the setI() of regular informational types introduced by Yu. T. Medvedev [7]. He showed thatI() is a Heyting algebra. This algebra gives rise to the logic of infinite problems from [13] denoted here asLM ₁. Some other definitions of negation inI() lead to logicsLM _n (n ). We study inclusions between these and other systems, proveLM _n to be non-finitely axiomatizable (n ) and recursively axiomatizable (n < ). We also show that formulas in one variable do not separateLM from Heyting's logicH, andLM _n (n < ) from Scott's logic (H+S).     

Clarifying Cohen: A Response to Jubb and Hall

In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.     

Refutation by Parallel Argument

This paper discusses the method when an argument is refuted by a parallel argument since the flaw of the parallel argument is clearly displayed. The method is explicated, examined and compared with two other general methods.

Yu and your mind

This note is a brief reply to the main argument of Qiuen Yu: 1992, Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind,Synthese 90, 145–79.     

Die Entwicklung der Diskussion um die formale Logik in der Sowjetunion

Ohne ZusammenfassungDie Literatur zur Logik in der Sowjetunion ist sehr bescheiden. Nebst einigen Kapiteln in grösseren Werken sind es folgende Schriften: Bochénski, I. M., Soviet Logic,SST, 1, 29–38. — Dahm, H., Renaissance der formalen Logik,Ost-Probleme, 1957,8, 254–267. — Philipov, A.,Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union, New York 1952, XI+89 pp. — Winkelmann, A., Die Stellung der formalen Logik im Sowjet-system,Scholastik, 1956,1, 85–89.     

The English contribution to logic before Ockham

Summary The change of medieval philosophy, known to have taken place in the 14th century, is accompanied by a new and extensive application of terminist logic and by a growing importance of the university of Oxford. This essay asks the question whether this development can be explained as a development of a specific English tradition within medieval logic. In the first part of the paper it is briefly shown that a certain discontinuity can be observed in the most important continental intellectual centers; the sociological conditions which make possible such distinct local traditions within the general development of medieval scholasticism are considered shortly. The second and larger part of the paper is a census of the English contribution to logic before Ockham, ordered according to the various literary genres: Summulae, Syncategoremata/sophismata, Grammar, Commentaries on the Organon. This census tends to prove that terminist logic had a continuous tradition in Oxford, a fact which may account for the preponderance of Oxford logic in the early 14th century.A first draft of this paper was read by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump. I am very grateful to them for their valuable suggestions which have made substantial parts of the text more readable and less obscure. That it still remains very speculative and fragmentary could not be avoided even with their generous aid.     

Is gerontology a branch of astrology? The role of advanced age in scientific explanation

Although gerontologists have been troubled by meta-scientific problems such as the proper definition of their discipline, the nature of time and age, and the lack of a nonarbitrary distinction between the old and the not old [e.g., Baltes & Goulet (1970) In Life-span developmental psychology (pp. 4–23). New York: Academic Press; Birren (1959) In Handbook of aging and theindividual (pp. 3–42). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; McKee (1982) Philosophical foundations of gerontology. New York: Human Sciences Press; Reese & Overton (1970) In Life-span developmental psychology (pp. 116–149). New York: Academic Press; Wohlwill (1970) Psychological Review, 77, 49–647], philosophers of science have paid little attention to the meta-scientific problems of gerontology. In this paper some philosophical problems in gerontology are examined through an analysis of the nature of scientific explanation. An argument is presented that claims that gerontology avoids many of the meta-scientific problems associated with time and advanced chronological age because these terms will tend to be obviated or “screened off” in scientific explanations in gerontology.     

Bocheński's Formalization of Summa Theologiae (Ia,75,6) Reconsidered

I investigate Bocheński's first-order logic formalization of the argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul given by Aquinas in Summa Theologiae (Ia,75,6). I suggest a slightly different axiomatization that reflect better Aquinas' informal argument. Along the way, I also fix a mistake in Bocheński's derivation that the human soul is not corruptible per se.     

Deflating skolem

Remarkably, despite the tremendous success of axiomatic set-theory in mathematics, logic and meta-mathematics, e.g., model-theory, two philosophical worries about axiomatic set-theory as the adequate catch of the set-concept keep haunting it. Having dealt with one worry in a previous paper in this journal, we now fulfil a promise made there, namely to deal with the second worry. The second worry is the Skolem Paradox and its ensuing Skolemite skepticism. We present a comparatively novel and simple analysis of the argument of the Skolemite skeptic, which will reveal a general assumption concerning the meaning of the set-concept (we call it Connexion M). We argue that the Skolemite skeptics argument is a petitio principii and that consequently we find ourselves in a dialectical situation of stalemate.Few (if any) working set-theoreticians feel a tension – let alone see a paradox – between, on the one hand, what the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems and related results seem to be telling us about the set-concept, and, on the other hand, their uncompromising and successful use of the set-concept and their continuing enthusiasm about it, in other words: their lack of skepticism about the set-concept. Further, most (if not all) working settheoreticians have a relaxed attitude towards the ubiquitous undecidability phenomenon in set-theory, rather than a worrying one. We argue these are genuine philosophical problems about the practice of set-theory. We propound solutions, which crucially involve a renunciation of Connexion M. This breaks the dialectical situation of stalemate against the Skolemite skeptic.     

Some Useful 16-Valued Logics: How a Computer Network Should Think

In Belnaps useful 4-valued logic, the set 2={T,F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4=(2)={,{T},{F},{T,F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16=(4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR₂ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN₃ with an information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEEN₃ coincide with the logic of FOUR₂, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arielis and Avrons notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research.Dedicated to Nuel D. Belnap on the occasion of his 75th Birthday     

Relationship of Connected and Separate Knowing to the Learning Styles of Kolb,Formal Reasoning,and Intelligence

The present investigation examined the relationship between the Connected and Separate Knowing dimensions of the Knowing Styles Inventory [K. H. Knight, M. H. Elfenbein, and J. A. Messina (1994) A Scale to Measure Connected and Separate Knowing: The Knowing Styles Inventory, paper presented at the meeting of the New England Educational Research Organization, Rockport, ME; (1995) A Preliminary Scale to Measure Connected and Separate Knowing: The Knowing Styles Inventory, Sex Roles, Vol. 33, pp. 499–513] and the Concrete Experience and Abstract Conceptualization learning modes of D. A. Kolb [(1984) Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall], formal reasoning ability [B. Inhelder and J. Piaget (1958) The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence, New York: Basic Books; (1975) The Origin of the Idea of Chance in Children, New York: W. W. Norton; K. G. Tobin and W. Capie (1981) The Development and Validation of a Group Test of Logical Thinking, Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 41, pp. 413–423], and vocabulary and abstract thinking ability [W. C. Shipley, (1940) A Self-Administering Scale for Measuring Intellectural Impairment and Deterioration, Journal of Psychology, Vol. 9, pp. 371–377], Study 1 (126 females, 117 males) found that males who were more connected were more likely to describe their learning style as emphasizing feeling rather than thinking (i.e., scored higher on Concrete Experience). Studies 2 (59 females, 39 males) and 3 (56 females, 58 males) found no relationship between Connected or Separate Knowing and formal reasoning and vocabulary or abstract thinking ability, respectively. Suggestions for future research were presented.     

Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.     

The transcendental dimension of “praxis” in Husserl's phenomenology

This paper is a revised and reformed version of Husserl-genshogaku to jissen no mondai (Husserl's phenomenology and the problem of praxis) in: The Japanese Society for Ethics ed., Rinrigaku-nenpo (Annals of Ethics) No. 35 (Tokyo: Keiotsushin, 1986), pp. 105–121. It is my duty to express my gratitude to Mrs. Yu Tani for her advices about English and stylization.     

The neuropsychology of depression and its implications for cognitive therapy

The past few years have witnessed a growing interest in the specialty of neuropsychology as well as continued support for cognitive therapy of depression. The purpose of this paper is the examination of the neuropsychology of depression and its implications for A. T. Beck's cognitive theory and therapy of depression ([1963] Thinking and Depression: Idiosyncratic Content and Cognitive Distortions,Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 9, pp. 324–333; [1964] Thinking and Depression,Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 10, pp. 561–571; [1967]Depression: Clinical, Experimental, and Theoretical Aspects, New York: Harper & Row). Specifically, the neuropsychological and cognitive theory and therapy literatures related to depression are reviewed followed by an antegration of these areas. Neuropsychological evidence is presented that both supports cognitive theory and therapy of depression and helps explain why such therapy may prove ineffective in treating depression. Implications for clinical practice, including neuropsychological assessment of depressives, and potential future research directions are also provided.     

Re-acquaintance with qualia

Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on ‘Epiphenomenal qualia’[Jackson 1982 Jackson, F. C. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray.

Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis of the reasons why, he now thinks, his knowledge argument against materialism fails to prove the falsity of materialism [Jackson 2005 Jackson, F. C. 2005. Foreword to There's Something About Mary: Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Edited by: Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. and Stoljar, D. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  [Google Scholar]. He argues that you can block the knowledge argument against materialism—but only if you tie yourself to a dubious doctrine called representationalism.

We argue that the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of either representational or nonrepresentational materialism. It does, however, furnish both materialists and dualists with a successful argument for the existence of distinctively first-person modes of acquaintance with mental states. Jackson's argument does not refute materialism: but it does bring to the surface significant features of thought and experience, which many dualists have sensed, and most materialists have missed.