Patterns and evolution of moral behaviour: moral dynamics in everyday life

Recent research on moral dynamics (the processes and phenomena – collective or individual – by which moral behaviour and moral attitudes emerge, evolve, spread, erode or disappear) shows that an individual's ethical mind-set (i.e. outcome-based vs. rule-based) moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitates Moral Balancing (behaving ethically or unethically decreases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behaviour again later), whereas a rule-based mind-set facilitates Moral Consistency (engaging in an ethical or unethical behaviour increases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behaviour later on). The objective was to look at the evolution of moral choice across a series of scenarios, that is, to explore if these moral patterns (Balancing vs. Consistency) are maintained over time. The results of three studies showed that Moral Balancing is not maintained over time. On the other hand, Moral Consistency could be maintained over time, if the mind-set was reinforced before making a new moral judgment (but not otherwise).     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.     

Narcissism and Performance on Behavioral Decision‐making Tasks

Three studies examined narcissism and behavioral decision making. Decision‐making tasks included the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Studies 1–3), Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Studies 1–3), Columbia Card Task (CCT; Studies 2 and 3), and Game of Dice Task (Study 3). To tease apart the contributions of grandiose narcissism (i.e., narcissism found in the general population), pathological narcissism, and narcissistic traits (i.e., grandiosity, entitlement, and exploitativeness) in decision making, we assessed grandiose narcissism in Studies 1 (n = 380) and 2 (n = 244), pathological narcissism in Study 2, and the narcissistic traits in Study 3 (n = 312). Grandiose and pathological narcissism failed to predict decision making regardless of whether or not decision making included immediate feedback. In Study 3, the narcissistic trait of grandiosity (i.e., having an inflated sense of self‐importance) was associated with greater risk taking on the CCT‐hot (i.e., provided immediate feedback), and entitlement was associated with greater risk taking on the IGT. Measurement and applied implications are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

移情在道德强度对企业道德决策影响中的作用

摘 要 本研究将一种重要的道德情绪--移情引入问题权变模型中,以探讨移情因素在道德强度对企业道德决策影响中的作用。本研究基于情景研究法,随机选取256名MBA学生为被试,要求被试基于所提供情景中假想参与者的行为,回答随后测量道德决策(道德识别、道德判断和道德意图)、移情反应、主观道德强度及移情特质的问题。结果发现,1）移情反应在道德强度对企业道德决策的影响中具有中介作用;2）移情关怀特质会通过影响主观道德强度和移情反应而作用于企业道德决策;3)结果大小、社会舆论和效应可能性对道德判断和道德意图的影响机制各有特点。     

Moral Orientation as a Component of Ethical Decision Making

Morals are foundational to professional and ethical counseling practice. Moral orientation may play an integral role in ethical decision making. The authors review the literature regarding moral orientation and discuss the connection to ethical decision making. Implications for counselor preparation and practice are addressed.     

Moral conviction: another contributor to attitude strength or something more?

Attitudes held with strong moral conviction (moral mandates) were predicted to have different interpersonal consequences than strong but nonmoral attitudes. After controlling for indices of attitude strength, the authors explored the unique effect of moral conviction on the degree that people preferred greater social (Studies 1 and 2) and physical (Study 3) distance from attitudinally dissimilar others and the effects of moral conviction on group interaction and decision making in attitudinally homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups (Study 4). Results supported the moral mandate hypothesis: Stronger moral conviction led to (a) greater preferred social and physical distance from attitudinally dissimilar others, (b) intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., owner of a store one frequents), (c) lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups, and (d) a greater inability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements.     

Functional Psychopathy in Morally Relevant Business Decisions

Literature addressing organizational ethical behavior has focused intensely on cognitive moral development, and more recently the automatic and natural moral inclinations (i.e., moral intuitions). Research addressing the incapacity for moral reasoning, such as psychopathy, is rarely addressed in organizational behavior (Smith & Lilienfeld, 2013; Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2011). Our first aim is to develop a construct definition for functional psychopathy that is appropriate for organizational science and theoretically consistent with the extensive previous clinical and criminal research in this field. Second, we apply two versions of a scale not previously used in business research relative to moral judgments. This scale is a self-reported measure of functional psychopathy and is useful for its relationships with ethically relevant business decisions. Further, we examine which factors emerge as having the highest relationship with ethical decision making. Third, we seek to advance the usefulness of this construct by more precisely placing psychopathy within its nomological network. With these goals in mind, a combined sample of business school seniors (N = 418) participated in three studies. Findings indicate a significant influence of psychopathy over a range of ethically relevant business decisions, as well as negative correlations with factors of the Moral Approbation (Ryan & Riordan, 2000) and the Moral Awareness (Reynolds, 2006a) scales. We conclude with directions for future research and considerations for practice.     

道德推脱对员工道德决策的影响：德行领导的调节作用

运用问卷调查的方法,以819名员工为研究被试,探讨了德行领导在道德推脱影响道德决策过程中的调节作用。采用层次回归分析的方法研究发现：德行领导对道德推脱与道德识别、道德判断之间的关系具有调节作用;但德行领导不会对道德推脱与道德意图之间的关系产生调节作用,而会对道德意图产生显著的直接影响。     

Consumers Object to Algorithms Making Morally Relevant Tradeoffs Because of Algorithms’ Consequentialist Decision Strategies

Why do consumers embrace some algorithms and find others objectionable? The moral relevance of the domain in which an algorithm operates plays a role. The authors find that consumers believe that algorithms are more likely to use maximization (i.e., attempting to maximize some measured outcome) as a decision-making strategy than human decision makers (Study 1). Consumers find this consequentialist decision strategy to be objectionable in morally relevant tradeoffs and disapprove of algorithms making morally relevant tradeoffs as a result (Studies 2, 3a, & 3b). Consumers also object to human employees making morally relevant tradeoffs when they are trained to make decisions by maximizing outcomes, consistent with the notion that their objections to algorithmic decision makers stem from concerns about maximization (Study 4). The results provide insight into why consumers object to some consumer relevant algorithms while adopting others.     

员工伦理型领导原型对伦理型领导有效性的影响：员工崇敬感的中介作用

基于工作场所中具体积极情绪的理论模型和内隐领导理论, 探究了伦理型领导对员工工作绩效的影响机制, 具体是检验了崇敬感的中介作用和员工伦理型领导原型的调节作用。通过对一项问卷调查研究(193份上下级配对数据)和两个情境实验获得的实证数据进行统计分析, 结果表明: 伦理型领导能够正向影响员工的崇敬感; 崇敬感能够中介伦理型领导对组织公民行为的积极作用, 但对任务绩效的中介效应并不显著; 此外, 员工的伦理型领导原型会强化伦理型领导与员工崇敬感之间的正向关系, 即相比于拥有低伦理型领导原型的员工, 拥有高伦理型领导原型的员工更容易对伦理型领导产生崇敬感; 崇敬感能够中介伦理型领导与员工伦理型领导原型的交互作用对组织公民行为的影响。     

Moral chronicity and social information processing: Tests of a social cognitive approach to the moral personality

Following Higgins, King, and Mavin (1982) chronicity paradigm, we examined the effects of chronically accessed moral constructs for prototypic moral character using two different research paradigms, spontaneous trait inferencing and lexical decision. Study 1 presented target sentences in a deliberate or spontaneous processing condition. Recall was cued with either a dispositional or semantic cue. Moral chronics made more spontaneous trait inferences with dispositional cues than semantic cues. In Study 2, participants read stories about characters who did or did not help. Moral chronics were faster responding to probes reflecting negative evaluations of story characters who did not help when requested (e.g., “disloyal”). Findings support claims that the moral personality is usefully conceptualized in terms of the chronic accessibility of moral knowledge structures.     

Ethics Beyond Moral Theory

I develop an anti‐theory view of ethics. Moral theory (Kantian, utilitarian, virtue ethical, etc.) is the dominant approach to ethics among academic philosophers. But moral theory's hunt for a single Master Factor (utility, universalisability, virtue . . .) is implausibly systematising and reductionist. Perhaps scientism drives the approach? But good science always insists on respect for the data, even messy data: I criticise Singer's remarks on infanticide as a clear instance of moral theory failing to respect the data of moral perceptions and moral intuitions. Moral theory also fails to provide a coherent basis for real‐world motivation, justification, explanation, and prediction of good and bad, right and wrong. Consider for instance the marginal place of love in moral theory, compared with its central place in people's actual ethical outlooks and decision making. Hence, moral theory typically fails to ground any adequate ethical outlook. I propose that it is the notion of an ethical outlook that philosophical ethicists should pursue, not the unfruitful and distorting notion of a moral theory.     

Behaviors speak louder than explicit reports: Implicit metacognition in 2.5‐year‐old children

Recent research has shown that children as young as age 3.5 show behavioral responses to uncertainty although they are not able to report it explicitly. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that some form of metacognition is already available to guide children's decisions before the age of 3. Two groups of 2.5‐ and 3.5‐year‐old children were asked to complete a forced‐choice perceptual identification test and to explicitly rate their confidence in each decision. Moreover, participants had the opportunity to ask for a cue to help them decide if their response was correct. Our results revealed that all children asked for a cue more often after an incorrect response than after a correct response in the forced‐choice identification test, indicating a good ability to implicitly introspect on the results of their cognitive operations. On the contrary, none of these children displayed metacognitive sensitivity when making explicit confidence judgments, consistent with previous evidence of later development of explicit metacognition. Critically, our findings suggest that implicit metacognition exists much earlier than typically assumed, as early as 2.5 years of age.     

The strategic pursuit of moral credentials

Moral credentials establish one's virtue and license one to act in morally disreputable ways with impunity (Monin & Miller, 2001). We propose that when people anticipate doing something morally dubious, they strategically attempt to earn moral credentials. Participants who expected to do something that could appear racist (decline to hire a Black job candidate in Studies 1 and 2, or take a test that might reveal implicit racial bias in Study 3) subsequently sought to establish non-racist credentials (by expressing greater racial sensitivity in Studies 1 and 2, or by exaggerating how favorably they perceived a Black job candidate in Study 3). Consistent with prior research, a follow-up study revealed that the opportunity to establish such credentials subsequently licensed participants to express more favorable attitudes towards a White versus a Black individual. We argue that strategically pursuing moral credentials allows individuals to manage attributions about their morally dubious behavior.     

Mindfulness-based stress reduction effects on moral reasoning and decision making

Previous research has demonstrated that mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) improves psychological functioning in multiple domains. However, to date, no studies have examined the effects of MBSR on moral reasoning and decision making. This single group design study examined the effect of MBSR on moral reasoning and ethical decision making, mindfulness, emotion, and well-being. Additionally, we investigated whether there was an association between the amount of meditation practice during MBSR and changes in moral reasoning and ethical decision making, emotions, mindfulness, and well-being. Results indicated that MBSR was associated with improvements in mindful attention, emotion and well-being. Further, amount of meditation practice was associated with greater improvement in mindful attention. Two-month follow-up results showed that, MBSR resulted in improvements in moral reasoning and ethical decision making, mindful attention, emotion, and well-being. This study provides preliminary evidence that MBSR may potentially facilitate moral reasoning and decision making in adults.     

自发走神和有意走神及其与元认知的关系

走神包括有意走神和自发走神两种类型,元认知对二者的影响可能不同。研究使用两维度走神量表和元认知-30量表,对国内部分高校学生的走神和元认知(元认知信念、元认知加工和认知自信判断)进行调查,结果显示:(1)走神可以划分为有意走神和自发走神;(2)失控和危险感既能预测自发走神也能预测有意走神,但认知自信只能预测自发走神,认知的自我意识只能预测有意走神。说明元认知对自发走神和有意走神的影响存在差异。     

Permitting immoral behaviour: A generalized compensation belief hypothesis

When are we more likely to permit immoral behaviours? The current research examined a generalized compensation belief hypothesis that individuals, as observers, would morally tolerate and accept someone paying forward unfair treatment to an innocent person as a means to compensate for the perpetrator's previously experienced mistreatment. Across five experiments (N = 1107) based on economic games (Studies 1–4) and diverse real-life scenarios (Study 5), we showed that participants, as observing third parties, were more likely to morally permit and engage in the same negative act once they knew about previous maltreatment of the perpetrator. This belief occurred even when the content of received and paid-forward maltreatment was non-identical (Study 2), when the negative treatment was received from a non-human target (Study 3) and when the maltreatment was intangible (e.g. material loss) or relational (e.g. social exclusion; Study 5). Perceived required compensation mediated the effect of previous maltreatment on moral permission (Studies 4 and 5). The results consistently suggest that people's moral permission of immoral behaviours is influenced by perpetrator's previous mistreatment, contributing to a better understanding of the nature and nuances of our sense of fairness and contextualized moral judgement.     

Adjusting to death: the effects of mortality salience and self-esteem on psychological well-being, growth motivation, and maladaptive behavior

This research builds on terror management theory to examine the relationships among self-esteem, death cognition, and psychological adjustment. Self-esteem was measured (Studies 1-2, 4-8) or manipulated (Study 3), and thoughts of death were manipulated (Studies 1-3, 5-8) or measured (Study 4). Subsequently, satisfaction with life (Study 1), subjective vitality (Study 2), meaning in life (Studies 3-5), positive and negative affect (Studies 1, 4, 5), exploration (Study 6), state anxiety (Study 7), and social avoidance (Study 8) were assessed. Death-related cognition (a) decreased satisfaction with life, subjective vitality, meaning in life, and exploration; (b) increased negative affect and state anxiety; and (c) exacerbated social avoidance for individuals with low self-esteem but not for those with high self-esteem. These effects occurred only when death thoughts were outside of focal attention. Parallel effects were found in American (Studies 1-4, 6-8) and Chinese (Study 5) samples.     

A study of the foundations of ethical decision making of clinical medical ethicists

A study of clinical medical ethicists was conducted to determine the various philosophical positions they hold with respect to ethical decision making in medicine and their various positions' relationship to the subjective-objective controversy in value theory. The study consisted of analyzing and interpreting data gathered from questionnaires from 52 clinical medical ethicists at 28 major health care centers in the United States. The study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists tend to be objectivists in value theory, i.e., believe that value judgments are knowledge claims capable of being true or false and therefore expressions of moral requirements and normative imperatives emanating from an external value structure or moral order in the world. In addition, the study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists are consistent in the philosophical foundations of their ethical decision making, i.e., in decision making regarding values they tend not to hold beliefs which are incompatible with other beliefs they hold about values.