Reichenbach's concept of prediction

Reichenbach emphasizes the central importance of prediction, which is—for him—the principal aim of science. This paper offers a critical reconstruction of his concept of prediction, taking into account the different periods of his thought. First, prediction is studied as a key factor in rejecting the positivism of the Vienna Circle. This part of the discussion concentres on the general features of prediction before Experience and Prediction (EP) (section 1). Second, prediction is considered in the context of Reichenbach's disagreements with his contemporaries—Carnap and Popper—(section 2). Pointing out these differences gives an additional basis for understanding how Reichenbach saw “prediction” in the period when EP was written. Third, Reichenbach's theoretical framework of prediction is analysed following EP. This analysis studies the semantical, logical, epistemological and methodological bases of his concept of prediction (section 3). Fourth, Reichenbach's conception of prediction, based on an objectivist interpretation of probabilities, is compared with the perspective on prediction of subjective Bayesians (the present personalists). This comparison (section 4) illustrates Reichenbach's views regarding the links of prediction with probability. Fifth, innovations and elements of continuity after EP are noted which give a more complete picture of Reichenbach's thought on prediction (section 5). This contributes to a comprehensive characterization of his concept of prediction. Finally, there is an assessment of his whole view of the matter and a presentation of the ingredients for a satisfactory alternative (section 6).     

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

Philosophical Studies - On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of ‘value definiteness’, according to which the...     

Hans Reichenbach's relativity of geometry

Hans Reichenbach's 1928 thesis of the relativity of geometry has been misunderstood as the statement that the geometrical structure of space can be described in different languages. In this interpretation the thesis becomes an instance of trivial semantical conventionalism, as Grünbaum calls it. To understand Reichenbach correctly, we have to interpret it in the light of the linguistic turn, the transition from thought oriented philosophy to language oriented philosophy, which mainly took place in the first decades of our century. Reichenbach — as Poincaré before him — is undermining the prejudice of thought oriented philosophy, that two propositions have different factual content, if they are associated with different ideas in our mind. Thus Reichenbach prepared the change to language oriented philosophy, which he also accepted later.     

Van Fraassen's metaphysical move

Various aspects of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism are discussed. His concept of observability is said to have opened few unresolvable dilemmas. It is because of the confusion between observable/non‐observable and testable/metaphysical distinctions. Finally, the constructive empiricist is said to have failed in his attempt at reducing the metaphysical component of science.     

Logical space and metaphysical systems

The paper applies the theory presented in “A Formal Ontology of Situations” (this journal, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations. Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the “situation semantics” of Perry and Barwise is discussed.     

Rawls and the metaphysical tradition

Abstract

Political philosophers, like all philosophers, can be divided into roughly two camps. There are those who are principally metaphysical in their conclusions; feeling that there is something in the nature of things to find or locate to settle the disputes commonly considered to be political disputes, and those others who explicitly reject that type of formulation. Placing the work of John Rawls into one of these categories is, I think, rather challenging; crudely, Rawls can be seen as having made noises of both sorts. The attempt to situate Rawls’s A Theory of Justice both within and beyond the grand metaphysical tradition lies at the center of this paper’s ambitions. This paper also aims to reflect, more generally, on the strengths and weaknesses of Rawls’s Theory. While it will be argued that John Rawls’s early conception of justice is, for the most part, admirable, it will be shown that firstly, Rawls does not fully leave behind the metaphysical inclination that he, as a self-declared non-metaphysical philosopher, is adamant on setting aside, and secondly, although this is very much related to the first point, Rawls’s theory of justice is too heavily grounded in and dependent on the truth of liberalism and thus fails to be adequately mindful of historicism. An examination of the metaphysical flavors in the early articulation of Rawls’s Theory is significant for two main reasons (1) such an examination compels us to ask whether or not Rawls’s Theory was successful, given what we assume were Rawls’s non-metaphysical ambitions, and (2) that the legacy of John Rawls should probably be better off, philosophically speaking (ceterus paribus and by our present lights), if metaphysics were absent in his Theory.     

The intelligibility of metaphysical structure

Philosophical Studies - Theories that posit metaphysical structure are able to do much work in philosophy. Some, however, find the notion of ‘metaphysical structure’ unintelligible. In...     

Debunking arguments and metaphysical laws

Philosophical Studies - I argue that one’s views about which “metaphysical laws” obtain—including laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what,...     

后期墨家形而上学研究

后期墨家指墨子》中的《经上》、《经下》、《经说上》、《经说下》、《大取》和《小取》等六篇所构成的一种学派。在这些文献中,思想家们通过端、体、故等范畴的属性,揭示了本体的特征：基础性、原始性和不可知性。通过披露景、止、亡等特点,后期墨家分析了现象的不确定性。通过分析名与言,后期墨家指出符合说的真理观与认识的图像说。最后,后期墨家还将思维和生存结合起来,以为思维是人类的一个基本存在形式。这一观念具有相当的现代意义。