What do aggregation results really reveal about group agency?

Discoveries about attitude aggregation have prompted the re-emergence of non-reductionism, the theory that group agency is irreducible to individual agency. This paper rejects the revival of non-reductionism and, in so doing, challenges the preference for a unified account, according to which, agency, in all its manifestations, is rational. First, I offer a clarifying reconstruction of the new argument against reductionism (due to Christian List and Philip Pettit). Second, I show that a hitherto silent premise, namely, that an identified group intention need not be determined by member attitudes according to a rule, e.g., majority, is false. Third, I show that, on rejecting this premise, the aggregation results lead instead to the conclusion that, in contrast to individual agency, group agency is non-rational.     

INDEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND FOR LOCAL REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TESTIMONY

Local reductionism purports to defend a middle ground in the debate about the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs. It does so by acknowledging the practical ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge, while insisting that such an acknowledgment need not entail a default-acceptance view, according to which there exists an irreducible warrant for accepting testimony. The present paper argues that local reductionism is unsuccessful in its attempt to steer a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. In particular, it challenges local reductionism 'from within', without appealing to anti-reductionist intuitions. By offering novel arguments to the effect that local reductionism fails by its own standards, the present paper considerably strengthens the case against this version of reductionism. Local reductionism, it is argued, fails for three main reasons. First, it cannot account for the rationality of testimonial rejection in paradigmatic cases, even though the possibility of rational rejection is thought to be of central justificatory importance. Second, it does not provide a sufficiently distinct non-testimonial basis to which testimonial justification can be successfully reduced. Finally, local reductionism is shown to be an intrinsically unstable position, in danger of collapsing into full-fledged 'credulism' of the kind historically associated with Thomas Reid.     

Supervenience Physicalism: Meeting the Demands of Determination and Explanation

Abstract

Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism—perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism—is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation.     

Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.     

Knowing at Second Hand

Participants on both sides of the contemporary debate between reductionism and anti‐reductionism about testimony commonly describe testimonial knowledge as knowledge acquired at second hand. I argue that fully appreciating the distinctive sense in which testimonial knowledge is secondhand supports anti‐reductionism over reductionism but also that it supports a particular kind of anti‐reductionism very different from that typically offered in the literature. Testimonial knowledge is secondhand in the demanding sense of being justified by the authority of a speaker where this requires that epistemic responsibility for meeting challenges to the audience's testimonial knowledge is shared between speaker and audience. The epistemic credentials of testimonial knowledge are in this sense importantly interpersonal.     

Reduction and the Neighbourhood of Theories: A New Approach to the Intertheoretic Relations in Physics

This paper proposes a classification of the intertheoretic relations in physics by bringing out the conditions for a relation of reduction which is eliminative, so that a theory reduced in terms of reductionism is superfluous in principle, and by distinguishing such a relation from another one based on comparison, which will be called neighbourhood of theories; the latter is a neighbouring relation between theories and is not able to support claims of eliminative reductionism. In the first part, it will be argued that this differentiation between neighbourhood and eliminative reduction permits an adequate classification of the intertheoretic relations in physics. By means of this differentiation, the second part discusses reductionism and shows that there are indeed some historical examples of reduction in the aforementioned sense, but that modern physical theories are typically only neighbouring.     

论心理学中的还原论

心理学中的还原论主要指方法论意义上的“理论的还原论”,可分为心理学理论向物理学、生理学与生物学理论还原等三种还原论类型。它并不像其攻击者所误解的那样,就是本体论的还原论、必然导致决定论、与整体论截然对立或者仅仅就是还原方法。相反地,还原论是研究心理现象的重要途径,与方法论的多元主义并行不悖,符合人类进行认识的规律。只要使用者注意其适用的边界条件,还原论还是不失为心理学研究的一种不错的“没有选择的选择”。     

Leibnizian Soft Reduction of Extrinsic Denominations and Relations

Leibniz, it seems, wishes to reduce statements involving relations or extrinsic denominations to ones solely in terms of individual accidents or, respectively, intrinsic denominations. His reasons for this appear to be that relations are merely mental things (since they cannot be individual accidents) and that extrinsic denominations do not represent substances as they are on their own. Three interpretations of Leibniz's reductionism may be distinguished: First, he allowed only monadic predicates in reducing statements (hard reductionism); second, he allowed also `implicitly relational predicates' such as `loves somebody' (soft reductionism); third, he allowed also `explicitly relational predicates' such as `loves Helen' (nonreductionism). Hard reductionism is problematic with respect to Leibniz's doctrines of universal expression and incompossibility (among other things). Nonreductionism, in turn, faces insurmountable problems with Leibniz's doctrine of self-sufficiency and internal identification of substances, as well as with that of individual accidents. The remaining option, soft reductionism, standing between the other two interpretations, arguably avoids at least some of their problems.     

Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles

In this paper I consider Derek Parfit's attempt to respond to Rawls' charge that utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons. I proceed by arguing that there is a moderate form of reductionism about persons, one stressing the importance of what Parfit calls psychological connectedness, which can hold in different degrees both within one person and between distinct persons. In terms of this form of reductionism, against which Parfit's arguments are ineffective, it is possible to resuscitate the Rawlsian charge that the utilitarian maximizing approach to matters of distribution ignores something that is of moral relevance, viz., the difference between the degrees of connectedness that hold between different stages of the same person, and between that person and his nearest and dearest, and the lack of connectedness between that person and distant others who may be benefitted at his cost. To Parfit's charge that reductionism sees the differences between persons as being 'less deep', I reply that the sense in which they are less deep is not at odds with their retaining their original moral importance, perhaps now better understood.     

Toward A New Eternalist Paradigm for Afterlife Studies: The Case of the Near-Death Experiences Argument

In contemporary Western culture, death has been widely censured because of its conceptual implications; it lies at the boundaries between reductionism and metaphysics. There is not yet an efficacious epistemology able to solve this contraposition and its consequent collision with science and tradition. This article analyzes Near Death Experiences (NDEs) as a prototypical argument in which the two perspectives conflict. Specifically, it analyzes the epistemological antinomies of the ontological representations of death, inhering in passage versus absolute annihilation. Indeed, the NDEs theme permits the examination of the logical contradiction between monistic reductionism and its ontological counterpart to improve the discovery of a new paradigm that integrates the ecological with eternalist views.     

认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

从词汇量角度再探汉语婴儿是否存在“名词优势”

本研究采用交叉聚合设计,从词汇量角度考察了两岁左右汉语婴儿是否存在“名词优势”现象。在前测中,110名18、24和30个月龄的儿童接受了PCDI量表和父母问卷调查;6个月后,18个月和24个月组接受了PCDI量表的再测。本研究将“名词优势效应”定义为“（名词得分–动词得分）/词汇总分”（以k值表示）,将名词得分大于动词得分者定义为“名词优势者”。结果发现：（1）从各年龄组均值来看,18个月组名词优势效应较小（k = .07）,24及30个月组名词优势效应显著增大（k = .11~.19）。（2）从个体水平来看,18个月组名词优势者和动词优势者约各占50%（p > .05）,而24、30个月组中81~100%的儿童都是名词优势者。该结果提示,以往不同研究之间的分歧可能是由于名词优势是随年龄而动态变化的。     

Neurophysiologic evaluation of early cognitive development in high-risk infants and toddlers

New knowledge of the perceptual, discriminative, and memory capabilities of very young infants has opened the door to further evaluation of these abilities in infants who have risk factors for cognitive impairments. A neurophysiologic technique that has been very useful in this regard is the recording of event-related potentials (ERPs). The event-related potential (ERP) technique is widely used by cognitive neuroscientists to study cognitive abilities such as discrimination, attention, and memory. This method has many attractive attributes for use in infants and children as it is relatively inexpensive, does not require sedation, has excellent temporal resolution, and can be used to evaluate early cognitive development in preverbal infants with limited behavioral repertories. In healthy infants and children, ERPs have been used to gain a further understanding of early cognitive development and the effect of experience on brain function. Recently, ERPs have been used to elucidate atypical memory development in infants of diabetic mothers, difficulties with perception and discrimination of speech sounds in infants at risk for dyslexia, and multiple areas of cognitive differences in extremely premature infants. Atypical findings seen in high-risk infants have correlated with later cognitive outcomes, but the sensitivity and specificity of the technique has not been studied, and thus evaluation of individual infants is not possible at this time. With further research, this technique may be very useful in identifying children with cognitive deficits during infancy. Because even young infants can be examined with ERPs, this technique is likely to be helpful in the development of focused early intervention programs used to improve cognitive function in high-risk infants and toddlers.     

The attribution of attention: 9-month-olds' interpretation of gaze as goal-directed action

The current study distinguishes between attributions of goal-directed perception (i.e. attention) and non-goal-directed perception to examine 9-month-olds' interpretation of others' head and eye turns. In a looking time task, 9-month-olds encoded the relationship between an actor's head and eye turns and a target object if the head and eye turns were embedded in a sequence of multiple, variable actions with equifinal outcomes, but not otherwise. This evidence supports the claim that infants of this age may attribute perception, at least goal-directed perception, to others and undermines arguments that gaze-following at this age consists only of uninterpreted reflexes. The evidence also suggests alternative interpretations of the typical errors infants make in standard gaze-following procedures. Implications for infants' understanding of perception and attention in both human and non-human agents are discussed.     

Small and large number processing in infants and toddlers with Williams syndrome

Previous studies have suggested that typically developing 6‐month‐old infants are able to discriminate between small and large numerosities. However, discrimination between small numerosities in young infants is only possible when variables continuous with number (e.g. area or circumference) are confounded. In contrast, large number discrimination is successful even when variables continuous with number are systematically controlled for. These findings suggest the existence of different systems underlying small and large number processing in infancy. How do these develop in atypical syndromes? Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare neurocognitive developmental disorder in which numerical cognition has been found to be impaired in older children and adults. Do impairments of number processing have their origins in infancy? Here this question is investigated by testing the small and large number discrimination abilities of infants and toddlers with WS. While infants with WS were able to discriminate between 2 and 3 elements when total area was confounded with numerosity, the same infants did not discriminate between 8 and 16 elements, when number was not confounded with continuous variables. These findings suggest that a system for tracking the features of small numbers of object (object‐file representation) may be functional in WS, while large number discrimination is impaired from an early age onwards. Finally, we argue that individual differences in large number processing in infancy are more likely than small number processing to be predictive of later development of numerical cognition.     

Theism, Dualism, and the Scientific Image of Humanity

Recently, some philosophers of religion have suggested that a reduction of the classical image of humanity may jeopardize classical theism. To obstruct reductionism, some theologians have argued for dualism on the basis of the argument of consciousness. In this essay, I argue that even consciousness must be considered a brain-based phenomenon. This does not commit one to reductionism, however. Nonreductive physicalism appears to offer a promising alternative to either dualism or reductionism, without necessarily compromising more traditional views of humanity. I do suggest that a modification of the classical image of God may be inevitable.     

Enactivist Big Five Theory

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The distinguishing feature of enactivist cognitive science is arguably its commitment to non-reductionism and its philosophical allegiance to first-person...     

Infants' concept of animacy

Nine- and 12-month-old infants' concept of animacy was investigated by exposing them to autonomous motion by an animate and by an inanimate object in a series of three experiments. In the first experiment, increases in negative affect in comparison to a baseline condition were taken to indicate that children considered an event to be anomalous. Results showed that 12-month-old infants consider self-propulsion by a small robot to be anomalous, but not self-propulsion by a human stranger. Experiment 2 indicated that 9- and 12-month-old infants expressed similar affective reactions when the robot's motion was contingent on verbal commands given by the mother, suggesting that these children are aware that it is not appropriate for an inanimate object's movements to be contingent on events occuring at a distance. The third experiment was designed to rule out the possibility that the infants' reactions in Experiment 2 were a function of the incongruity of the mother's behavior rather than due to the violation of the infant's concept of animacy. In this experiment, 12-month-olds' levels of attentiveness are increased when the robot obeyed verbal commands but not when a human stranger did so. These results suggest that infants discriminate animate from inanimate objects on the basis of motion cues by the age of 9 months.     

Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science

Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the ‘causal exclusion’ of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being ‘higher‐order’ properties functionally defined over ‘lower‐order’ properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience that shows that this is the case for the psychological property of fear. Though this may suggest that some psychological properties should be revised in order to conform to those of neurophysiology, the history of science demonstrates that this is not always the outcome, particularly with properties that play an important role in our folk theories and are central to human concerns.     

Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?

The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a “second wave” of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second wave of challenges provides important aid and comfort to reductionists. In this paper, however, I provide reasons for thinking it does not. This is not to the detriment of psychoneural reductionism because, as I also argue here, and unrecognized by the current non-reductive orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, one key argument among the first wave of criticisms of the multiple realization argument has never been adequately rejoined.