Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change

Friedman’s perspective on scientific change is a sophisticated attempt to combine Kantian transcendental philosophy and the Kuhnian historiographical model. In this article, I will argue that Friedman’s account, despite its virtues, fails to achieve the philosophical goals that it self-consciously sets, namely to unproblematically combine the revolutionary perspective of scientific development and the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. As I attempt to show, the impossibility of putting together these two aspects stems from the incompatibility between (a) Friedman’s neo-Kantian conception of the role of philosophy and the role of the notion of incommensurability, and (b) the framework of transcendental idealism and the radical character of scientific revolutions. Hence, I suggest that pace Friedman and pace Kuhn’s own self-understanding, the Kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions cannot be seen as ‘Kantianism with moveable categories’ and consequently we should either abandon the notion of radical scientific revolution or place the Kuhnian account into another, non-Kantian philosophical framework.     

Normative Naturalism and the Relativised <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Priori</Emphasis>

Summary  In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan’s rejection of the “meta-methodology thesis”, or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan’s account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan’s. To do this, I discuss Michael Friedman’s account of a relativised a priori and show that it is consistent with naturalistic philosophy of science and that it can help form the basis of a plausible normative naturalism. In particular, this discussion shows that Laudan’s rejection of any a priori justification of methodological rules is unjustified and inconsistent with scientific practice. Finally, I point the way to a version of normative naturalism that includes MMT and accounts for the role of constitutive a priori principles within science.     

Normative Naturalism and Epistemic Relativism

In previous work, I defended Larry Laudan against the criticism that the axiological component of his normative naturalism lacks a naturalistic justification. I argued that this criticism depends on an equivocation over the term ‘naturalism’ and that it begs the question against what we are entitled to include in our concept of nature. In this paper, I generalize that argument and explore its implications for Laudan and other proponents of epistemic naturalism. Here, I argue that a commitment to naturalism in the methods and aims of science inevitably entails a kind of epistemic relativism. However, I argue that this should not be interpreted as a reductio of naturalism, since the admission of contextually based standards and aims of science does not result in quietism when it comes to important questions concerning scientific rationality.     

Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?

Bird (2007) argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén (2016a) objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required for scientific understanding.     

Technology from the Standpoint of Sunyata

Keiji Nishitani's critique of technology as a dehumanizing force is objected to by showing that it is possible to establish a relationship with technology characterized by the standpoint of sunyata. In order to support my claim, I offer an interpretation of sunyata as a lived experience in which knowing and being are unified. One method used to experience the identity of knowing and being is the method of negatio negationis. I argue that technology embodies this method, and that thus has a built-in process that allows users of technology to achieve a samadhi experience in the use of tools and machines. Hubert Dreyfus’ theory of embodiment is offered in support of this claim. If it is possible to establish an intimate relation with certain technologies, then the nature of technology cannot be reduced to its most obvious dehumanizing and destructive effects.     

“TANCRED’S WOUND”:

A recent debate over trauma theory in Holocaust studies has implications for writing by the “generation after.” This article looks at Anne Karpf’s The War After (1996) and the 1998 movie Left Luggage (based on a novel by Carl Friedman), as well as David Grossman’s See Under: Love (1985), as examples of how traumatic knowledge is accessed through literary narratives and the imagination, rather than the historical events. In particular, the trope of “autism” serves to symbolize the difficulty of communicating repressed traumatic memory, while images of containment symbolize the unspeakable contents of the psychic envelope.     

Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion

Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so‐called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the methodology behind her rejection of eliminativism – I focus on ordinary objects. Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue that, contrary to Thomasson's claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion. Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals the importance of pragmatism in ontology. In §1 I compare Thomasson's account and the eliminativist views to which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re‐construct Thomasson's reasons for rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean criterion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion's importance when properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise the methodology of ordinary‐object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake.     

Making Sense of the Philosophy of Sport

Beginning from an earlier claim of mine that there was really no such area of study as the philosophy of sport, Part One of the paper reconsiders the place previously given to David Best’s distinction between purposive sports and aesthetic sports. In light of a famous cricketing event in the 1977 contest between England and Australia (‘The Ashes’), in which Derek Randall turned a cartwheel after taking the winning catch, the paper clarifies that not all aesthetically-pleasing events taking place in sporting competitions can be understood as the aesthetic in sport. Then, in Part Two, the force of the claim that philosophy is one subject is explored. The conclusion is that a focus just on the philosophy of sport is necessarily inappropriate, since it will present the student with only cases from sport to then apply to sport. Rather, one’s understanding must be informed by (much of) the breadth of philosophy. Charles Travis’s view of occasion-sensitivity provides a clear example of appropriately contextual appeal. Part Three of the paper returns to the need for an institutional account of sport, one recognizing that there is no one occasion on which a particular sport is played; and hence no single set of conditions which can uniquely identify that sport. Thus, soccer played with one’s children typically differs from elite soccer: but both are (genuinely) soccer. When one turns to the appreciation of sport (in the light of Stephen Mumford’s excellent Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion [2012a]), one recognizes that, in order to genuinely appreciate sport, one cannot detach oneself from the outcome as completely as Mumford’s extreme purist seems to. But reflection on that case may also return us to contextualism by moving us away from attachments to the complete or the exceptionless in our accounts of spectating as of sport: maybe there is no one thing that occurs in all the relevant cases.     

The Pari[ndot]āma Aesthetics as Underlying the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a

This paper offers a literary and ideological deconstruction of the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a; it traces the Purā[ndot]a's formation through the convergence of the Vedāntin, the Aesthetic and the Vai[sdot][ndot]ava traditions, and argues that it is the doctrine of Pari[ndot]āma which underlies the treatise. I first examine the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's literary components; the roots of these are traced back historically to the Vedānta and ālvār traditions, and the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's nature as an opus universale, representing an all Indian cultural ‘melting pot’, is highlighted. The paper then looks at the relations of Vai[sdot][ndot]avism and dramaturgy, both historically as well as theologically, and argues that the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a was traditionally read as a drama. It proceeds to decipher the aesthetic theory underlying the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a, and argues that it is Bharata's dramaturgical rasa theory. Within the rasa tradition, Abhinavagupta's and Bhoja's positions are highlighted and compared through three seminal points and it becomes apparent that the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's underlying aesthetic theory is close to the Pari[ndot]āma doctrine of Bhoja where ?[rdot][ndot]gāra is considered to be the supreme rasa. As Bhoja's date is no doubt later than the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a's it is assumed that the Bhāgavata Purā[ndot]a was influenced by one of Bhoja's predecessors. The paper ends by reinforcing this analysis by highlighting a later tradition which had actually accepted this point of view and that is the Gau[ddot]iya Vai[sdot][ndot]ava tradition.     

Toward a new transcendental aesthetic: Merleau-Ponty’s appraisal of Kant’s philosophical method

ABSTRACT

In light of the central role scientific research plays in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the question has arisen whether his phenomenology involves some sort of commitment to naturalism or whether it is better understood along transcendental lines. In order to make headway on this issue, I focus specifically on Merleau-Ponty’s method and its relationship to Kant’s transcendental method. On the one hand, I argue that Merleau-Ponty rejects Kant’s method, the ‘method-without-which’, which seeks the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. On the other hand, I show that this does not amount to a methodological rejection of the transcendental altogether. To the contrary, I claim that Merleau-Ponty offers a new account of the transcendental and a priori that he takes to be the proper subject matter of his phenomenological method, the method of ‘radical reflection’. And I submit that this method has important affinities with aesthetic themes in Kant’s philosophy.     

The Jagannath Temple and Online Darshan

Darshan—the act of seeing the divine in an image—is an important form of worship for most Hindus. Darshan is now available via the Internet. In this article I consider the possible significance of online darshan for the important Jagannath Temple in Puri in the Indian State of Orissa and for devotees of the Hindu god Jagannath who resides there. From this case study I conclude that online darshan does not necessarily bring about a decline in the importance of temples and their deities. This challenges those globalisation theorists who claim that local sites decline in importance as a result of advanced communications technologies and instead supports Roland Robertson's theory of ‘glocalization’. I further conclude that despite this, online darshan is an important development for devotees of Jagannath, because it allows access to the deity which may previously have been difficult or even impossible for most of the year. I also consider online darshan in general and suggest that the glocalization processes that it is giving rise to are worthy of future research.     

Grounding, scientific explanation, and Humean laws

It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered.     

On Parfit’s Ontology

Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural Senses View and the Argument from Empty Ontology. I argue that, first, the Plural Senses View for ‘exists’ can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his ontological claims; second, the Argument from Empty Ontology can be debunked by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true unless these statements include reference to objects in reality. These arguments show the instability of Parfit’s claimed metaethical advantages over naturalism.     

Teaching by Example: An Interpretation of the Role of Upamāna in Early Nyāya Philosophy

In this paper I will discuss the significance of upamāna (knowledge by analogy or comparison) in the Nyāyasūtra as a source of knowledge and its role in understanding and learning about the world. Some philosophers, particularly Buddhists, have argued that upamāna is reducible to inference. I am going to defend the Nyāya view that upamāna is in fact a fundamental source of knowledge which plays a significant role in teaching and learning. In fact, I am going to argue that by introducing upamāna as a pramā[ndot]a the Naiyāyikas accounted for the way humans acquire certain types of knowledge. Finally, I will highlight the similarities between the role of upamāna in the Nyāyasūtra and some of Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance and proof.     

Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences

We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.     

Di Algemeyne Entsiklopedye,the Holocaust and the changing mission of Yiddish scholarship

The first attempt to publish a comprehensive encyclopedia in the Yiddish language began in Berlin in the early 1930s. The editors of Di algemeyne entsiklopedye (The General Encyclopedia) were initially concerned with bringing the latest discoveries from fields such as history, demography, biology, economics and political science to readers in need of assistance in comprehending the larger world. Almost from its inception, however, the project was forced to reconsider its agenda because of the Nazi rise to power. Dropping their original timetable, the first seven volumes were published in Paris (to where its editors first fled after Hitler’s 1933 appointment as Chancellor) and the final volumes were published in New York (to where they subsequently fled the 1940 German invasion of France). With its final volume in 1966, Di algemeyne entsiklopedye totaled twelve volumes—one more than originally planned. Only five ultimately fell within the editors’ original edifying mission, while the remaining seven volumes were dedicated to the subject “Yidn” (“Jews”). Originally planned as a supplement to the Normale volumes, the Yidn series became the primary focus of the Entsiklopedye on account of the rapidly deteriorating circumstances of the Jews in Europe. In this, the Entsiklopedye serves as a useful map of the changing representational imperatives that shaped Jewish scholarship as a consequence of the Holocaust.     

Underdetermination and provability: a reply to Olaf Müller

Newton claims to have proven the heterogeneity of light through his experimentum crucis. However, Olaf Müller has worked out in detail Goethe’s idea that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness by inverting Newton’s famous experiment. Müller concludes that this invalidates Newton’s claim of proof. Yet this conclusion only holds if the heterogeneity of light and the heterogeneity of darkness is logically incompatible. This paper shows that this is not the case. Instead, in Quine’s terms, we have two logically compatible theories based on mutually irreducible theoretical terms. From a Quinean point of view, this does no harm to the provability of the corresponding statements.     

Does Confucian Ethics Integrate Care Ethics and Justice Ethics? The Case of Mencius

In recent years, scholars of Confucian ethics have debated on important issues such as whether Confucian ethics embraces, or should embrace, universal values and impartiality. Some have argued that Confucian ethics integrates both care and justice, and that Confucian ethics is both particularistic and universalistic. In this essay, I will defend a view of the relation between care and justice and the relation between care ethics and justice ethics on the basis of the notion of ‘configuration of values,’ and show why care ethics and justice ethics cannot be integrated. I will support this view by a reading of some pertinent passages in the Mencius.     

Historicism,Entrenchment, and Conventionalism

W. V. Quine famously argues that though all knowledge is empirical, mathematics is entrenched relative to physics and the special sciences. Further, entrenchment accounts for the necessity of mathematics relative to these other disciplines. Michael Friedman challenges Quine’s view by appealing to historicism, the thesis that the nature of science is illuminated by taking into account its historical development. Friedman argues on historicist grounds that mathematical claims serve as principles constitutive of languages within which empirical claims in physics and the special sciences can be formulated and tested, where these mathematical claims are themselves not empirical but conventional. For Friedman, their conventional, constitutive status accounts for the necessity of mathematics relative to these other disciplines. Here I evaluate Friedman’s challenge to Quine and Quine’s likely response. I then show that though we have reason to find Friedman’s challenge successful, his positive project requires further development before we can endorse it.