Epistemology, the History of Epistemology, Historical Epistemology

A brief discussion of the ways in which awareness of and sensitivity to the history of philosophy can contribute to epistemology even if epistemology is understood as a distinctively philosophical and not primarily historical enterprise.     

Religion,Reductionism, and the Seduction of Epistemology

This paper examines phenomenology and its psychological relationship to religious education. It comments on this relationship in the light of the critique of phenomenology which Piaget himself made towards the end of his life (Piaget, 1965), though it also draws attention to other aspects of phenomenology theory which are dissonant with Piagetian psychology. This paper, therefore, is not a broad philosophical critique of phenomenology, though an element of this is included. but concentrates on the philosophical and developmental factors which impede the capacity of young people to perform either of the ‘reductions’ demanded by the phenomenological method.     

Individualism,Normativity and the Epistemology of Understanding

Philosophical Studies -     

Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God

This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly . However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes'doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity.     

Experimental,Cross-Cultural,and Classical Indian Epistemology

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper connects recent findings from experimental epistemology to several major themes in classical Indian epistemology. First, current...     

Social Epistemology,scientific practice and the elusive social

Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to brute facts about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though Fuller's proposal signifies an important step in the ongoing attempt by scholars to eradicate the last traces of Descartes' epistemological device of a disembodiedres cogitans, I conclude that his conception of the social is too weak to serve as the basis for a socially-embedded discipline in anything but name only.     

Epistemology, family patterns, and psychosomatics: the case of obesity

A family systems model of obesity is developed that attempts to integrate systems epistemology, Minuchin's work on psychosomatic disorders, and a review of the literature on obesity. The model presents obesity as being inextricably embedded in relationship patterns that fundamentally influence its etiology and maintenance. It is argued that the emergent properties of these relationships need to be the focus of analysis, rather than the elementary components residing within the individual, which are emphasized in traditional theories of obesity. The radical shift involved in moving from the traditional mechanistic models to a systems perspective is also discussed because these approaches are based on different epistemologies. The fundamental differences between these epistemologies are important and often underemphasized, which has led to much confusion in past research. Based on the model developed here and supportive data from the obesity literature, the conclusion is reached that obesity research and treatment are likely to be advanced by adopting a systemic approach.     

Engineered Knowledge,Fragility and Virtue Epistemology

Philosophia - There is a clean image of knowledge transmission between thinkers that involves sincere and reliable speakers, and hearers who carefully assess the epistemic credentials of the...     

Epistemology,critical thinking,and critical thinking pedagogy

Epistemology, critical thinking, and critical thinking pedagogy     

French Philosophy of Science,Structuralist Epistemology,and the Problem of the Subject

This article examines the multiple relations between the rationalist tradition of French philosophy of science exemplified by the work of Gaston Bachelard, and the rethinking of the relation between science and ideology undertaken by Louis Althusser and a young Alain Badiou in the 1960s. Both Bachelard and Althusser are interrogated for the philosophy of language that underpins their respective visions of scientificity; in turn, the problem of the subject is posed, in part through an investigation of Althusser's inheritance and transformation of Lacanian psychoanalysis.     

Lewisian Realism: Methodology,Epistemology, and Circularity

In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.     

Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics

This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists exchange and take into account information about each others’ beliefs may greatly influence the accuracy and speed with which the scientific community as a whole approximates the truth. On the other hand, social epistemologists concerned with peer disagreement have so far neglected the question of how practices of responding to disagreements with peers fare with respect to the goal of approximating the truth. Again, work on opinion dynamics shows that this may be a mistake, and that how we ought to respond to disagreements with our peers may depend on the specific purposes of our investigations.     

Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology

Psychologism is a philosophical ideology that seeks to explain the principles of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology as psychological phenomena. Psychologism has been the storm center of concerted criticisms since the nineteenth century, and is thought by many to have been refuted once and for all by Kant, Frege, Husserl, and others. The project of accounting for objective philosophical or mathematical truths in terms of subjective psychological states has been largely discredited in mainstream analytic thought. Ironically, psychologism has resurfaced in unexpected guises in the form of intuitionistic logic and mathematics, cognitivism, and naturalized epistemology. I examine some of the principal objections to psychologism – distinguishing roughly between good and bad or philosophically acceptable versus unacceptable psychologism – and consider the extent to which a new wave of psychologism may be gaining prominence in contemporary philosophy, and the light its successes and failures may shed on the original concept and underlying perspective of classical psychologism.     

Epistemology and probability

Probability is sometimes regarded as a universal panacea for epistemology. It has been supposed that the rationality of belief is almost entirely a matter of probabilities. Unfortunately, those philosophers who have thought about this most extensively have tended to be probability theorists first, and epistemologists only secondarily. In my estimation, this has tended to make them insensitive to the complexities exhibited by epistemic justification. In this paper I propose to turn the tables. I begin by laying out some rather simple and uncontroversial features of the structure of epistemic justification, and then go on to ask what we can conclude about the connection between epistemology and probability in the light of those features. My conclusion is that probability plays no central role in epistemology. This is not to say that probability plays no role at all. In the course of the investigation, I defend a pair of probabilistic acceptance rules which enable us, under some circumstances, to arrive at justified belief on the basis of high probability. But these rules are of quite limited scope. The effect of there being such rules is merely that probability provides one source for justified belief, on a par with perception, memory, etc. There is no way probability can provide a universal cure for all our epistemological ills.