Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

道德判断的分级现象

Blair(1996)发现即使没有心理理论的孤独症儿童,也具备道德判断能力。而Kahn(2004)认为没有心理理论就不可能完成道德判断。已有研究表明,道德判断可能需要一定程度的心理理论。孤独症儿童心理理论存在困难,影响他们理解道德情景并进行正确的道德判断,但这是否与任务的要求道德判断能力的程度不同有关呢?研究增加道德情景的复杂程度,进一步考察儿童道德判断规律。结果发现,道德判断有分级现象,第一级是直接对道德行为进行判断,孤独症和正常儿童都能完成该任务,可能是以原始情绪为基础的;第二级道德判断是对简单道德情景进行判断,需要以心理理论为基础,只有正常儿童才能完成;而对行为与意图不一致的复杂道德判断则需要以更加丰富的经历或者经验为基础,但其属于三级道德判断还是二级道德判断的高级形式还需要进一步的研究。     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation.     

Ethical evaluation of "retainer fee" medical practice

This article examines the reasons that some physicians have recently opted to reduce the size of their practice rosters to allow more time for each patient in exchange for a retainer fee from patients. These physicians also offer supplementary, nonmedical amenities to patients as part of their service. Because physicians have reduced the size of their practice rosters and have increased the price tag for their services, some patients have lost access to their care. We have tried to assess the ethical propriety of such a change in the design of medical practices by weighing plausible, ethically relevant arguments favoring and opposing RFMP. Physicians are ethically obligated first and foremost to promote and protect the health of their patients. RFMP fulfills this duty directly by ensuring prompt and ample professional time for the care of patients. It does so indirectly by allowing time for physicians' continuing education, which in turn should upgrade the quality of care. It also advances the ethical goals of autonomy as it allows patients to choose their own physicians and to spend their money as they please. On the other hand, these ethical positives are offset by the cost of retainer fees that may exclude access of patients to their physicians' care. Even if ethical tradition obligates physicians primarily to patients under their specific care, as professionals and as private citizens, they also have a responsibility to support the health of the entire community. RFMP does little to advance this cause, except that by optimizing the conditions under which their own private patients receive healthcare, they call attention to shortcomings in prevailing public healthcare policies, which by comparison fall short of that standard. An assumption that health is not properly a market commodity, and that all people should receive healthcare on equal terms, would expose RFMP to moral reproof. From an ethical perspective, we find sufficient cause for concern and caution in this innovative style of practice. Nevertheless, the weight of arguments presented here does not seem to justify unequivocal moral condemnation of RFMP. As neither pro nor con views seem to have settled the ethical question, definitive moral judgment on RFMP will probably depend on the outcome of future experience and ongoing evaluation. The implications of RFMP for any future healthcare system are not clear, at least to us.     

A Theory of Blame

We introduce a theory of blame in five parts. Part 1 addresses what blame is: a unique moral judgment that is both cognitive and social, regulates social behavior, fundamentally relies on social cognition, and requires warrant. Using these properties, we distinguish blame from such phenomena as anger, event evaluation, and wrongness judgments. Part 2 offers the heart of the theory: the Path Model of Blame, which identifies the conceptual structure in which blame judgments are embedded and the information processing that generates such judgments. After reviewing evidence for the Path Model, we contrast it with alternative models of blame and moral judgment (Part 3) and use it to account for a number of challenging findings in the literature (Part 4). Part 5 moves from blame as a cognitive judgment to blame as a social act. We situate social blame in the larger family of moral criticism, highlight its communicative nature, and discuss the darker sides of moral criticism. Finally, we show how the Path Model of Blame can bring order to numerous tools of blame management, including denial, justification, and excuse.     

Testimony,simulation, and the limits of inductivism

Although theorists disagree about precisely how to characterize the link between anger and moral judgment, that they are linked is routinely taken for granted in contemporary metaethics and philosophy of emotion. One problem with this assumption is that it ignores virtues like patience, which thinkers as different as Cassian, ?āntideva, and Maimonides have argued are characteristic of mature moral agents. The patient neither experience nor plan to experience anger in response to (at least some) wrongs. Nevertheless, we argue, they remain capable of judging such actions to be wrong. This indicates that a different account of the relationship between anger and moral judgment is required. We conclude by proposing one such account, showing how a metaethicist who was more attentive to the normative ethics of anger might set about reconstructing her position.     

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.     

公正判断中的“非理性”：加工特征、主要表现和影响因素

公正判断中的“非理性”研究是社会认知双过程加工理论在公正领域的拓展, 也是不确定性管理和道德心理研究的延续。就加工过程而言, 个体的公正判断可能同时依存“理性”和“非理性”两个结构和进化都不同的认知体系。置换过程、首因效应、极端判断、补偿偏见、责备无辜受害者和道德命令效应是公正判断中“非理性”的主要表现。自我因素、公正敏感性、道德认同、情绪状态和公正世界信念等个体变量是其主要影响因素。综合来看, 目前公正判断的“非理性”研究还比较庞杂, 其进化根源、生理机制、如何与理性过程交互作用等还有待深入研究。此外, 结合社会现实问题、关注第三方视角、多理论解释的整合及多水平因素的交互影响可能是未来的研究方向。     

Consumer recycling: An ethical decision‐making process

Although recycling is often experienced as a moral dilemma, studies that systematically approach this issue from an ethical perspective are scarce. Moreover, previous studies have explored recycling by mainly using single ethical constructs, such as moral norms, values or obligations, rarely approaching it as an ethical decision‐making process. Our study takes a more holistic approach and integrates the recycling literature with business ethics theory in order to develop a conceptual model of ethical decision making involved in recycling. The model is based on Jones' issue‐contingent model and its key concept, that is, moral intensity, which we extend by adding altruism as an important personality trait that influences pro‐social behaviour. The data were collected from a sample of 367 adult consumers, representative of the Slovenian population by gender and age. The hypotheses were tested using structural equation modelling. The results of our study confirmed the relationships between three key facets of ethical decision making: moral recognition, moral judgment and moral intention. Higher levels of moral recognition were found to lead to more positive moral judgments, which in turn positively influenced the formation of intentions to recycle. Moreover, moral intensity was found to be a significant predictor of moral recognition and moral judgment, while altruism was found to be a significant predictor of moral recognition. These findings hold important implications for public policy makers and social marketers who have to consider not only the consumer characteristics but also the issue characteristics in seeking to understand and influence consumer recycling. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is the moral domain unique? A social influence perspective for the study of moral cognition

The nature of the cognitive processes that give rise to moral judgment and behavior has been a central question of psychology for decades. In this paper, we suggest that an often ignored yet fruitful stream of research for informing current debates on the nature of moral cognition is social influence. We introduce what we call the “social‐moderation‐of‐process” perspective, a methodological framework for leveraging insights from social influence research to inform debates in moral psychology over the mechanisms underlying moral cognition and the moral domains in which those mechanisms operate. We demonstrate the utility of the social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective by providing a detailed example of how research on social influence in behavioral ethics can be utilized to test a research question related to a debate between two prominent theories in moral psychology. We then detail how researchers across the field of moral psychology can utilize our social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective.     

解释水平视角下的道德判断

道德判断对社会合作有重要意义。近20年来涌现出大量对道德判断的研究。经典的社会直觉模型和双加工模型已经不足以解释所有的研究发现。近年来,解释水平理论为道德判断的研究提供了一个新的视角。通过文献梳理发现,基于解释水平理论的道德判断研究可以分为两难的道德判断研究和一般的道德判断研究。两难的道德判断研究已经有了较为一致的结论,但是一般的道德判断研究还存在争议。解释水平影响道德判断的深层原因可能是通过关注点影响道德判断的标准。未来的研究可以着眼于跨文化研究和深层机制的剖析,为解释水平视角下的道德判断研究提供更多的实验证据,加深人们对道德判断的理解。     

Suicide risk assessment: Clinicians’ confidence in their professional judgment

Suicide risk assessment is a critical component of mental health practice for which the stakes are high and the outcomes uncertain. This research examines the consistency with which clinicians make determinations of suicide risk and factors influencing clinical confidence. Seventy-one social workers interviewed two standardized patients performing in scenarios depicting suicidal ideation, judged whether the patient required hospitalization, and completed standardized suicide risk assessment measures. Self-ratings and qualitative interviews explored participants’ confidence in their judgment of risk. Participants had highly divergent views regarding whether or not the risk of suicide was sufficiently high to require hospitalization. However, regardless of the ultimate decision reached, participants were equally confident when recommending either clinical course of action. The variation in risk assessment appraisals in this study, despite at times high rates of confidence in risk appraisals, speaks to the need for ongoing training, consultation, and increased decision support strategies.     

The Good and the Gross

Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and pollution, so moral disgust tracks social contamination. I begin by examining the arguments for skepticism about disgust and show that these arguments threaten to overgeneralize and lead to a widespread skepticism about the justifiability of our moral judgments. I then look at the positive arguments for according disgust a role in moral judgment, and suggest that disgust tracks invisible social contagions in much the same way as it tracks invisible physical contagions, thereby serving as a defense against the threat of socio-moral contamination.     

The moral emotions: a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social-functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1-3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.     

The relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour of Chinese adolescents

The present study investigated the relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour from a first‐person perspective. The major findings support the following four hypotheses. (la) The moral orientation of girls is higher than that of boys, and (1b) boys are more delinquent than girls; (2) the moral orientation of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents; (3) the moral judgment of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents; and (4) the moral development of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents. Few researchers have attempted to investigate how moral orientation and moral judgment relate to prosocial and antisocial behaviour in a single study. The present study fills this research gap. Moreover, the study of moral judgment from a first‐person perspective appears to be a meaningful and useful approach. Future studies should be conducted to investigate whether moral judgment from a first‐person perspective is more predictive of moral behaviour than moral judgment from a third‐person perspective. It would also be meaningful to conduct a cross‐cultural study to investigate the relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour in different cultures. The use of a self‐report method in a study of prosocial and antisocial behaviour has certain limitations; for example, respondents may not give honest responses. However, this method has been found to be useful and acceptable, especially for researching the correlations among a large number of variables.     

Psychopaths and Filthy Desks

Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept the necessity-thesis. My argument draws on the idea that emotions play the same role for moral judgment that perceptions play for ordinary judgments about the external world. I develop a rationalist interpretation of the sufficiency-thesis and show that it can successfully account for the available empirical evidence. The general idea is that the rationalist can accept the claim that emotional reactions are sufficient for moral judgment just in case a subject’s emotional reaction towards an action in question causes the judgment in a way that can be reflectively endorsed under conditions of full information and rationality. This idea is spelled out in some detail and it is argued that a moral agent is entitled to her endorsement if the way she arrives at her judgment reliably leads to correct moral beliefs, and that this reliability can be established if the subject’s emotional reaction picks up on the morally relevant aspects of the situation.     

Frontline Healthcare Staffs’ Experience of Organizing Complex Hospital Discharges: An Ethnographic Study

Existing studies show that nurses often experience moral distress when the care they deliver to patients does not meet their professional values. We draw on ethnographic data collected in June 2015 from one acute care trust in England and present how frontline healthcare staff experience organizing complex hospital discharges. Our findings demonstrate how problems with the panel responsible for allocating funding for National Health Service continuing healthcare cases contributed to healthcare staff experiencing moral distress. Our findings offer a basis for further research on how other aspects of the complex hospital discharge-planning process may contribute to nurses’ experiencing moral distress.