More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism

I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been recognized.

Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor

The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them–the theory ‘divides the phenomenal labor’ in an illicit fashion. This ‘failure of intimacy’ is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy. A version of this paper was presented at the ‘Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness’ conference, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, March 18th–20th, 2005.     

Future development of scientific structures closer to experiments: Response to F.A. Muller

First of all, I agree with much of what F.A. Muller (Synthese, this issue, 2009) says in his article ‘Reflections on the revolution in Stanford’. And where I differ, the difference is on the decision of what direction of further development represents the best choice for the philosophy of science. I list my remarks as a sequence of topics.     

Original Sin and the Hermeneutics of Charity: A Response to Gilbert Meilaender

Looking for a way to read the classic texts of Christian antiquity without treating them either as if they were written yesterday or as if they were archeological artefacts, the author endorses Meilaender's endeavor to develop the insights of Augustine in the modern context. He nevertheless suggests that a different way of drawing the analogy between sex and eating would better capture Augustine's distinctive way of joining theology and ethics and would enable a more vigorous defense of Augustine against modern critics of his treatment of sexuality.     

Vygotsky in English: What Still Needs to Be Done

At present readers of English have still limited access to Vygotsky’s writings. Existing translations are marred by mistakes and outright falsifications. Analyses of Vygotsky’s work tend to downplay the collaborative and experimental nature of his research. Several suggestions are made to improve this situation. New translations are certainly needed and new analyses should pay attention to the contextual nature of Vygotsky’s thinking and research practice.     

Self-esteem and higher-order factors of personality: A reply to Simsek

Simsek (2012) argued that earlier research by Erdle and colleagues on the relationship between self-esteem and higher-order factors of personality used “poor statistical methodology”, that “their results may be untenable”, and that the results of his “high-level data analysis” are “the first to show the importance of self-esteem in the differentiation between stability and plasticity”. In this rejoinder, it is argued that the statistical methodology used by Erdle and colleagues demonstrated the effect of controlling self-esteem on the relationship between stability and plasticity earlier and more accurately than that used by Simsek (2012). Moreover, it is argued that self-esteem might not be a biasing factor, but instead might be a theoretically expected substantive correlate of the Big Five and of higher-order factors of personality. Finally, it is argued that a hierarchical structure of personality, with a general factor of personality (GFP) at the apex, might have a neurological basis in the activity of the prefrontal cortices.     

Einstellung: Still Alive and Well

Predator urine, specifically fox urine, is a noxious but harmless olfactory stimulus. The results of previous studies have shown that fox urine is aversive to rats, and that rats react to fox urine in a similar manner as to other psychostressors. In the present study, the authors further investigated the use of fox urine as an aversive or stressful stimulus, specifically examining behavior change in open-field place-preference task. Three methods of presenting the fox urine were examined. Results indicated that fox urine decreased behavior, especially locomotion, during both fox-urine presentation and during a post-fox-urine recovery session. Data suggested that (a) there were fewer ambulatory episodes and less distance was traveled during the presentation of fox urine, regardless of presentation method, and (b) there were fewer vertical movements during fox-urine presentation when a fox-urine-laced cotton ball was set in the wood shavings than when it was placed on a bare floor or in a cup. The data suggested that fox urine may be an effective but nonharmful stimulus alternative for use in avoidance tasks.     

Still the same dilemma for conceptual engineers: reply to Koch

Philosophical Studies - Steffen Koch (Koch 2020) raises several objections to my critique of conceptual engineering (Deutsch in ‘Speaker’s Reference, Stipulation, and a Dilemma for...     

Formal,systematic, and metasystematic operations with a balance-beam task series: A reply to Kallio's claim of no distinct systematic stage

This reply discusses the measurement of formal, systematic, and metasystematic stages. Recent multidomain studies have shown disparate results and we suggest that these results could be attributed not to actual variations in adult development or the existence or non-existence of stage, but instead may reflect differences in methodology regarding task, domain, and scoring. Our study indicates that when tested in only one domain—balance beams and extensions of those tasks—participants who performed at the higher stage were also able to perform at the lower stages. These results also coincide with similar studies conducted.     

Dual-route models of print to sound: Still a good horse race

Summary Dual-route models assume that pronunciations are generated along both a lexical route and a nonlexical route. The lexical route has been characterized as more automatic. Accordingly, if the naming task is paired with a concurrent task, then the nonlexical route should be more susceptible to interference than the lexical pathway. A relative slowing of the nonlexical route should eliminate the regularity effect obtained with low-frequency words while significantly enhancing the small frequency effect obtained with regular words. These predictions were confirmed. Exception words were actually named 39 ms faster under high load. The results are inconsistent with any straightforward application of single-route models.     

Response to Erich Loewy: commentary

The capacity to suffer, the vulnerability with respect to suffering, confers on all animals with that capacity (not just human beings) a prima facie right not to be caused suffering. Nurturing in order to stave off such suffering is the first act of the community toward the individual, primarily in infancy. Hence for Loewy, autonomy, the gradual growth of self-determination in individuals, is grounded in a broader moral commitment of the community, that of beneficence. This is the critical point in his argument, for it represents a wholesale critique of modern libertarianism. Libertarians, in contrast to Loewy's argument, seem to ground the nature of the community in the prima facie right of autonomy. For Loewy, the community not only has an obligation to refrain from harming individuals (nonmaleficence), but it also has an active duty to ameliorate and prevent, as far as possible, the suffering of its members. Thus, if there is a social contract, it is one of nurturing one another to overcome the vulnerability of suffering, not primarily one of protecting autonomy. This is most significant for clinical ethics as well. Once the primary obligation to ameliorate suffering is no longer necessary, when the individual loses or does not have the primary moral worth prompted by the capacity to suffer, then secondary and symbolic obligations emerge. Loewy is thereby able to suggest a "calculus" of moral worth, wherein our obligations to individuals in a permanent vegetative state or to anencephalics (almost always the individual will have lost the capacity to suffer through some cerebral event) must be weighed against other primary obligations. Although Loewy admits that grounding clinical ethics in the capacity to suffer might be "thin," it nevertheless prompts serious discussion about the nature of the "good" in good clinical ethics decisions.     

Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics

In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky.     

On sensation, perception and thought: A reply to Rönnberg

A traditional partition of cognitive phenomena into sensation, perception and thought is reintroduced in response to recent arguments (Rönnberg, 1990) for conditions that must be met in order to distinguish between perception and cognition. The suggested division seems grossly compatible with Ronnberg's basic aim and receives support from several different lines of inquiry, including single cell recordings in the brain, neurospsychology, computational studies of vision and experimental psychology.     

Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How <Emphasis Type="Italic">Not</Emphasis> to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument

In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to save.

Applying Philosophy: A Response to O'Neill

abstract   I consider the putative originality of applied philosophy and seek to defend a version of it often called 'bottom up'. I review ways in which imagined cases may cause us to reconsider our normative commitments, and endorse a general attentiveness to the matter of how the world is and how it might reasonably be imagined. This is important if practical philosophers want to form the correct normative judgements, to be able to recognize the sui generis character of some moral theorising in particular domains, practically to enact their considered judgments, and properly to acknowledge how the real world, in the form of institutions, practices and a cultural framework, constrains, or facilitates, practical enactment. Throughout I illustrate my abstract claims by reference to the moral judgement and legal regulation of sexual behaviour .     

'Making Exceptions': A Response to Shue

abstract   In what follows I respond to Henry Shue's paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the uses to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal .