When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

Theoretical note: When is a coping strategy not a coping strategy?

Abstract

This paper discusses the issue of differentiating between cognitive coping behaviors and appraisal processes. Although these can be separated in theory, and experimental procedures can manipulate appraisals independantly of coping, it is difficult to separate these constructs in naturalistic studies on appraisal and coping responses to real life stressors. The ability to separate these constructs requires knowledge of an individual's precise motivation, an age-old stumbling block in psychological research. It is proposed that, at least in naturalistic studies on stress, appraisal and coping, perhaps the best that can be achieved is to record a particular behavior and report it as such, without attempting to guess at the motivation underlying it.     

When is a compliment not a compliment? Evaluating expressions of positive stereotypes

Unlike negative stereotypes, positive stereotypes are often perceived as admirable qualities, and expressions of such beliefs may be intended as compliments toward group members. Two experiments were conducted to examine how the targets of positive stereotypes evaluate others who express such stereotypic “compliments.” In Study 1, Black participants evaluated a White student who praised the athletic ability of African Americans more negatively than a control condition. In Study 2, Black and White participants watched an interracial interaction that involved the White actor expressing positive stereotypes or a control interaction with no stereotypes. In the positive stereotype condition, Black participants evaluated the White actor and the interaction as a whole more negatively than did White participants, but there were no differences in the control condition. The implications for the perpetuation of interracial distrust and avoidance are discussed.     

When is an error not a prediction error? An electrophysiological investigation

A recent theory holds that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) uses reinforcement learning signals conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system to facilitate flexible action selection. According to this position, the impact of reward prediction error signals on ACC modulates the amplitude of a component of the event-related brain potential called the error-related negativity (ERN). The theory predicts that ERN amplitude is monotonically related to the expectedness of the event: It is larger for unexpected outcomes than for expected outcomes. However, a recent failure to confirm this prediction has called the theory into question. In the present article, we investigated this discrepancy in three trial-and-error learning experiments. All three experiments provided support for the theory, but the effect sizes were largest when an optimal response strategy could actually be learned. This observation suggests that ACC utilizes dopamine reward prediction error signals for adaptive decision making when the optimal behavior is, in fact, learnable.     

When is a Deleuzian becoming ?

Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently across the trajectory of Deleuze's work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuze's work, and specifically in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of the concept in general.     

When is a cognitive system embodied?

For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification.     

When is a Concrete Property Basic?

We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B + C. This paper examines composition in the case of concrete natural properties. It explains why property composition is so much less straightforward than object composition. Then it distinguishes strictly basic properties (like the mass of an electron), compositely basic properties (like the mass of a planet), and fully non-basic properties (like the saltiness of blood). It shows how strictly basic properties compose, or result in, compositely basic and fully non-basic properties, which differ from, yet depend for their natures on, the strictly basic properties they result from. It explains the characteristics and differences of these types of properties. It notes that the existence of compositely basic and non-basic properties grounds an argument for the genuine existence of composite properties as well as the composite objects they characterize. Finally, it defends the usefulness of these distinctions by identifying projects they assist, and by applying them both to mark off distinct metaphysical views too often conflated and to correct sundry metaphysical mistakes.     

When is a counselor …?

A work experience project for low income adults is described. “Counselors” in this project were found to have little experience; little training in interviewing, statistics, psychological analysis, or other guidance and counseling techniques; and inadequate supervision. Results on aptitude tests were reported on the average 26 days after test administration. Occupational information was sadly lacking. The question is raised: When is a counselor… ?     

When is a map not a map? Task and language in spatial interpretation with digital map displays

Cognitive studies of map interpretation, for both paper‐based and digital maps (e.g. in geographic information systems), have generally assumed awareness of the map's geographic representational characteristics. However, many tasks using a digital map do not require visualization of the geographic environment it represents, but a conflicting focus on the geometric properties of the visual array. An experimental study demonstrated that the tasks performed and linguistic terms used with a digital map influenced the user's mental representation, as reflected by ease of orientation within the actual geographic environment (as measured by an unexpected photograph interpretation task). The map was still present during this task, since the concern was with interpretation rather than recall. No gender, age or expertise effects were found. Results are discussed with regard to the concept of reference frames and other spatial distinctions. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko

Studia Logica - A 1971 paper by Roman Suszko, ‘Identity Connective and Modality’, claimed that a certain identity-free schema expressed the condition that there are at most two objects...     

When is motion 'motion'?

Examples of visual motion have become more and more abstract over the years, leading up to 'third-order' stimuli where direction is actually determined by the observer through top - down attention. But how far can this be pushed--are there motion stimuli that are yet more arbitrary and abstract? Actually, there is a broad class of 'conceptual motion' stimuli--things like a moving grating of faces, or a shifting pattern of words--that are perfect analogs to traditional 'perceptual motion' stimuli, solvable by the same motion computation and for which observers can readily make direction-of-motion judgments. Interestingly though, these do not produce a sensation of motion (among other automatic consequences of motion detection). Here we compare a luminance-based perceptual motion stimulus to a semantic-based conceptual motion stimulus to contrast the psychophysical hallmarks of these motion categories.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

When can attention not be divided?

Humans can guide simple concurrent and seemingly independent movements of digits between hands, but it is shown here that they find it impossible to do this with digits within a hand. This inability demonstrates a basic characteristic of the relation between attention and the control of the skeletal musculature. Mechanisms that are available to provide the illusion of concurrent and independent guidance of separate movements between hands are not available within a single-hand control system. There is no reason to believe that the inability to divide focal attention in the guidance of two concurrent controlled activities, as exemplified in the example of within-hand movements, does not also extend to nonmotor processes.     

At the first sign of trouble or through thick and thin? When nonconformity is and is not disengagement from a group

The current research tests the prediction that nonconformity can reflect engagement with rather than disengagement from social groups. We present two studies that contained indices of both nonconformity and disengagement to examine their relationship under different circumstances and to dissociate two forms of nonconformity: individually oriented vs. collectively oriented. Study 1 demonstrates that thinking about how a group norm may cause individual harm triggers a type of nonconformity that is associated with disengagement from the group, whereas thinking about how a norm may cause collective harm triggers a type of nonconformity that is not associated with disengagement. Study 2 investigates the relationship between nonconformity and disengagement among group members that vary in their level of collective identification. We demonstrate that whereas nonconformity among weakly identified group members is associated with disengagement, this is not the case among strong identifiers.