Punishment,Consent and Value

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing.     

病人、医生与知情同意

医务人员应当视病人为治疗疾病过程中的参与者.知情同意的目的是,使病人充分理解他的困境后做出理性的决定.医生与病人分享信息、分担责任与做出决定,以保持良好的医患关系.     

Global Public Reason,Diversity, and Consent

Abstract

In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason.     

对知情同意书和知情同意过程的探讨

在《医疗事故处理条例》实施中,存在着一种现象:重视一张由患者签字的知情同意书,轻待知情同意过程。签字的知情同意书不等于知情同意,知情同意书不等于“生死契约”。知情同意的本义:对患者权利、尊严、人格和自由的尊重,只有在知情同意过程中获得。因此知情同意过程应该重要于知情同意书。医生严格履行好法定的告知和说明义务,尊重患者的知情同意权,就是尊重法律,也是医生保护自己的最好方式。     

对知情同意书和知情同意过程的探讨

在<医疗事故处理条例>实施中,存在着一种现象:重视一张由患者签字的知情同意书,轻待知情同意过程.签字的知情同意书不等于知情同意,知情同意书不等于"生死契约".知情同意的本义:对患者权利、尊严、人格和自由的尊重,只有在知情同意过程中获得.因此知情同意过程应该重要于知情同意书.医生严格履行好法定的告知和说明义务,尊重患者的知情同意权,就是尊重法律,也是医生保护自己的最好方式.     

Powers,Non‐Consent and Freedom

There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possibility of power implantation. A brainwasher, rather than directly manipulating a subject's movements, can instead implant in them a desire, to be understood as a disposition to act, and allow the subject to exercise such a power. It seems that, according to the dispositionalist theory of freedom, such an agent would still count as acting freely. There is a strong non‐consent intuition that a is not free in such a case because they did not consent to having the power P—the desire in question. Filling out this intuition is not straightforward. But it can be done in terms of the exercise of P being regulated by higher‐order powers of self‐reflection. Such regulation is what allows an agent to either take ownership of a power or to reject it.     

知情权 选择权 责任与义务

讨论患者的知情权、选择权与医生的责任义务很有现实意义。病人一旦就医,安全和早日康复是第一位的,当医生面对患者时,救死扶伤不惜一切地去挽救患者的生命是医生的天职,患者一旦推动生命,其他权力都是空话。     

Consultation,Consent, and the Silencing of Indigenous Communities

Over the past few decades, Indigenous communities have successfully campaigned for greater inclusion in decision-making processes that directly affect their lands and livelihoods. As a result, two important participatory rights for Indigenous peoples have now been widely recognized: the right to consultation and the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Although these participatory rights are meant to empower the speech of these communities—to give them a proper say in the decisions that most affect them—we argue that the way these rights have been implemented and interpreted sometimes has the opposite effect, of denying them a say or ‘silencing’ them. In support of this conclusion we draw on feminist speech act theory to identify practices of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary group silencing that arise in the context of consultation with Indigenous communities.