How Morality Can Be Absent from Moral Arguments

What is a moral argument? A straightforward answer is that a moral argument is an argument dealing with moral issues, such as the permissibility of killing in certain circumstances. I call this the thin sense of ‘moral argument’. Arguments that we find in normative and applied ethics are almost invariably moral in this sense. However, they often fail to be moral in other respects. In this article, I discuss four ways in which morality can be absent from moral arguments in the thin sense. If these arguments suffer from an absence of morality in at least one of these ways, they are not moral arguments in what I will call the thick sense of ‘moral argument’. Because only moral arguments in the thick sense could possibly qualify as proper responses to moral problems, the absence of morality in thin arguments means that these arguments will fail to give us a reason to do whatever they claim that we ought to do, even if we see no independent reason to question the truth of the premises or the logical validity of the argument.     

Mind The Gap: How Gaps in Neuroscience Can Inform Theological Understanding

Abstract

Gaps are a reality in neuroscience, but are also a rich metaphor toward understanding/dialog in other life aspects with points of separation. Starting with the transportation gap in London, we examine other gaps that may be illusory, along a spectrum, more serious/complex and almost defying resolution. By attending to these gaps, we can then better decide when and where dialog can occur with an appropriate action. Such collaboration, especially between neuroscience and theology, reveals the utility of a model depicting interaction/wholeness of the human brain/mind/spirit in relationship to consciousness and with social implications for better health in a gap-filled society.     

Affect,Moral Intuition,and Risk

The natural way to deal with moral issues involving risk is to rely on our intuitive feelings. “How bad is it? Well, how bad does it feel?” We can also rely on reason to determine right and wrong but, as Jonathan Haidt has demonstrated, intuition comes first and dominates our responses unless we make an effort to critique and, if necessary, override it. We argue that our intuitive feelings are insensitive to large losses of life and thus mislead us in the face of natural disasters or human disasters associated with poverty, disease, and violence. Our intuitions seduce us into calmly turning away from these catastrophes, when we should be driven by outrage or sorrow to act. We propose ways to overcome this insensitivity through new forms of education and communication coupled with reliance on moral deliberation aimed at designing laws and institutions that compel attention to such problems.     

Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge

The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition is often a source of moral knowledge.

Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses

Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and then show that this causes problems for Singer, since utilitarianism itself is liable to be debunked. Finally, I suggest how we can take lessons for ethics from the empirical work, but that the result is a far more restricted kind of anti-intuitionism than Singer was hoping for.     

道德直觉背景下的道德决策：影响因素探究

以往对道德直觉的研究表明了情绪因素在道德决策中的重要作用, 研究者提出道德决策中存在有意识认知和无意识情绪两种加工过程, 二者之间不能够完全分离与孤立。针对这种认知—情绪过程解释、经典电车和人行桥困境中的道德判断差异等问题, 近年来大量研究通过对道德行为者和道德判断者自身原因、道德情境等主客观因素的深入考察, 试图从不同角度来揭示认知—情绪过程解释的合理性及道德决策差异背后的其他原因, 形成了道德直觉背景下相关领域诸多新的关注点。未来研究有必要针对道德决策研究的方法学、情境的扩展及认知—情感系统内部交互等问题作进一步探讨。     

论道德理想：世俗生活中医学美德何以可能

道德理想在现代道德哲学理论建构与医学道德实践生活中占有非常重要的地位和作用。道德理想作为道德行动的卓越目标,体现为个人、社会与国家三个层次。在道德理想与道德义务的关系上存在着三种不同的观点。医学美德的实现有赖于医生的超义务行为或份外行善,道德英雄和道德圣人展现出了卓越的道德品质。道德理想虽然不像道德义务那样具有强制性,但完全缺乏任何道德理想的社会生活是不可欲的。医学美德不仅在世俗生活中是可能的,而且我们应该在医学职业中给予它应有的道德地位,它的崇高性、典范性、激励性深刻地展示了人类道德的价值和主体性尊严。

     

Intuition

At least since the Enlightenment Western thought has been dominated by a skeptical attitude towards intuition, although it is vital for mental and creative functions. In contrast, in recent times, a re-evaluation has emerged. Intuition is now considered by many to be of significant assistance not only in everyday life but also in making complex decisions in business, people management and psychotherapy. This article describes different dimensions of intuition ranging from unconscious intelligence in everyday life through intuitive processes with their connection to the collective unconscious up to its spiritual dimension. The question of how intuition works is extensively discussed. A distinction is made between intuitive work, resonance phenomena and gut feelings. The author concludes that it is not a question as to whether we want to use intuition as a source of knowledge for ourselves but if we recognize and appreciate that we do it constantly.     

Can There Be Brute,Contingent Moral Facts

In this paper I argue that whether or not a world is good can be a contingent fact about the world that is not dependent upon that world's natural facts, or, indeed, upon anyother facts. If so, the property, good, does not supervene upon the facts of nature (or upon any other facts). My argument for this claimis that it is possible to view the very world in which we live (viz. the natural facts that constitute it) as good and to view it as bad.     

道德判断中的情绪因素——从认知神经科学的角度进行探讨

道德判断中的情绪与认知因素是社会认知神经科学研究的重要议题。本文对近年来社会认知神经科学领域中有关情绪影响道德判断的研究发现和相关理论进行了回顾和总结。介绍了外源性情绪影响道德判断的行为研究证据,大脑情绪功能障碍者在道德判断中的异常表现以及道德两难任务所对应的大脑激活模式,着重探讨了情绪因素影响道德判断的神经机制和道德判断中情绪加工与认知加工相互作用的过程。揭示了情绪是道德判断的必要因素,道德判断是情绪加工和认知加工协同作用的结果,并在此基础上提出了该领域未来发展的设想。