Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar

Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar’s asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit—which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting—while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar’s reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.     

Ken Wilber's Transpersonal Psychology: An Introduction and Preliminary Critique

Ken Wilber is unquestionably the leading figure in the developing field of Transpersonal Psychology, and his work deserves serious engagement by pastoral theologians and pastoral counselors who seek to find their place in today's postmodern, post-Christian culture. This article summarizes the key concepts of Wilber's model of Transpersonal Psychology, provides an elementary pastoral and theological critique of his ideas, and suggests contributions that Wilber's thought can make to the field of pastoral theology and pastoral counseling.     

Frantz Fanon in the Time of Mad Studies

Abstract

Amidst renewed interest in the psychiatric writings of Frantz Fanon, this article reads his work against the background of contemporary mental health advocacy and scholarship. Epitomized in the emergent field of Mad Studies, whose origins lie in anti-psychiatry and psychiatric user/survivor movements, this body of scholarship espouses a discourse of madness as identity and culture. While Fanon continues to be disassociated from or (occasionally) associated with anti-psychiatry, this article elaborates elements in his work that animate such ambiguity. It proposes that Fanon and Mad studies be put in a relation of mutual critique.     

Must psychologists change the way they analyze their data?

Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, and van der Maas (2011) argued that psychologists should replace the familiar "frequentist" statistical analyses of their data with bayesian analyses. To illustrate their argument, they reanalyzed a set of psi experiments published recently in this journal by Bem (2011), maintaining that, contrary to his conclusion, his data do not yield evidence in favor of the psi hypothesis. We argue that they have incorrectly selected an unrealistic prior distribution for their analysis and that a bayesian analysis using a more reasonable distribution yields strong evidence in favor of the psi hypothesis. More generally, we argue that there are advantages to bayesian analyses that merit their increased use in the future. However, as Wagenmakers et al.'s analysis inadvertently revealed, they contain hidden traps that must be better understood before being more widely substituted for the familiar frequentist analyses currently employed by most research psychologists.     

Social Critique and Transformation in Stout and Butler

If social critique is to play a role in broad social transformation, then it must be able to engage with the terms that people use to understand their lives. This essay argues that we can find an important model for performing social critique in the quite different work of Jeffrey Stout and Judith Butler. For both, social critique must be immanent and it must make explicit the character of the norms by which people currently live. This model is especially important in a situation where various moral and cultural traditions are confronting one another, and where it is necessary to work towards shared social and political goals. Stout and Butler present a method for achieving one's political goals by engaging with others on terms that they would recognize and seeking to transform the political structures they inhabit. Furthermore, their approaches provide helpful insights for further reflection on the critical possibilities in current ethnographic work.     

A Bayes factor meta-analysis of Bem’s ESP claim

In recent years, statisticians and psychologists have provided the critique that p-values do not capture the evidence afforded by data and are, consequently, ill suited for analysis in scientific endeavors. The issue is particular salient in the assessment of the recent evidence provided for ESP by Bem (2011) in the mainstream Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, and van der Maas (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 426-432, 2011) have provided an alternative Bayes factor assessment of Bem's data, but their assessment was limited to examining each experiment in isolation. We show here that the variant of the Bayes factor employed by Wagenmakers et al. is inappropriate for making assessments across multiple experiments, and cannot be used to gain an accurate assessment of the total evidence in Bem's data. We develop a meta-analytic Bayes factor that describes how researchers should update their prior beliefs about the odds of hypotheses in light of data across several experiments. We find that the evidence that people can feel the future with neutral and erotic stimuli to be slight, with Bayes factors of 3.23 and 1.57, respectively. There is some evidence, however, for the hypothesis that people can feel the future with emotionally valenced nonerotic stimuli, with a Bayes factor of about 40. Although this value is certainly noteworthy, we believe it is orders of magnitude lower than what is required to overcome appropriate skepticism of ESP.     

Sellars and the "Myth of the Given"

Sellars is well known for his critique of the "myth of the given" in his "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the "myth". Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of "presentation" or "givenness" of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars' arguments, particularly those directed at the Theory of Appearing, results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. Moreover, though Sellars is clearly opposed to the view that perceptual experience cannot provide justification for beliefs about perceived objects, I argue that Sellars has failed to shake the intuitive plausibility of that view.     

Reduction and emergence: a critique of Kim

In a recent critique of the doctrine of emergentism championed by its classic advocates up to C. D. Broad, Jaegwon Kim (Philosophical Studies 63:31–47, 1999) challenges their view about its applicability to the sciences and proposes a new account of how the opposing notion of reduction should be understood. Kim is critical of the classic conception advanced by Nagel and uses his new account in his criticism of emergentism. I question his claims about the successful reduction achieved in the sciences and argue that his new account has not improved on Nagel’s and that the critique of emergentism he bases on it is question-begging in important respects.     

Interpreting the texts of nature and culture: A reply to Jahoda

In his Tajfel Memorial lecture Gustav Jahoda (1986) proposes that experimental findings infrequently reflect natural laws of human action, but are reflections of cultural conventions. In developing his arguments he finds it useful to criticize a number of my earlier ideas (Gergen, 1982). The present paper demonstrates that this critique is not only misguided, but that if the implications of my earlier work had been properly elaborated neither the argument for cultural convention nor general laws could be adequately sustained. Because of the non-objective character of behavioural interpretation, neither of these positions can be empirically warranted. Their justification is more properly considered in ethical, or ideological terms.     

Critical ethnography and subjective experience

Conclusion I began this essay by advancing three claims with respect to conducting ethnographic research: the analyst should be disposed to engage Other in a genuinely dialogic fashion so as to produce shared understanding; provision should be made for the analyst to disengage from the dialogue for purposes of self-reflection; and there should be some justificatory grounds for ideology critique. At the same time, I noted the problematic status of these claims on conceptual and methodological grounds and pointed to a need for taking account of the analyst as a subject whose being in the world impinges upon the analysis at each stage of research. This awareness, it seems to me, calls for an ethnography which is phenomenologically instigated. This is to say that the ethnographer needs to be no less sensitive to his or her own subjectivity than to the meanings of Other.In order to get clearer as to what might be involved in making the above claims, I discussed critically Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. Although Gadamer is to be commended for his philosophical inquiry into the bases of self-understanding, we saw that his phenomenological hermeneutics suffered a number of limitations, all of which being linked to his inability to adequately free the subject from the limits of self-understanding. Thus, Gadamer's subject-as-analyst is restricted as a participant in dialogue with Other; engages in self-reflection without a firm footing; and is unable thus to mount a justifiable critique either of Other or the subject's own tradition/culture.This critique of Gadamer suggests that once the phenomenological turn is taken, it then requires an additional turn which joins the subject with Other in shared understanding. In this regard I suggested the possible directions that some conceptual emendations of Gadamer's thesis might take us, and gave special reference to the ways in which such emendations might be implemented in ethnographic work. Both my critique and emendation were meant to underscore the need for a joining of subject and Other not merely as this might represent an occasion for understanding Other, nor merely for the understanding of self, but for a shared understanding that opens up a newly formed terrain upon which self-reflection and ideology critique may find suitable and just intersubjective grounding.     

Forum on Paulo Freire's pedagogy: Leaning educationally into our future

This forum revisits Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed on the 50^th anniversary of its publication in 1968. William R. Myers's opening essay reflects on his discovery of the book and the impact it has had on his life as a Christian minister and theological educator. He provides a Freirean critique of his own schooling and of church and society today. He pulls out several themes in Freire's work, demonstrating their usefulness for cultural analysis and critique in a variety of educational contexts. Succeeding essays by Tina Pippin, Neomi De Anda, and Cláudio Carvalhaes describe specific Freirean‐style pedagogies they have used in their classrooms.     

CONTRIBUTIONS OF TIPLER'S OMEGA POINT THEORY

Abstract. An attempt to discover what can be learned from the recent work of Frank Tipler on the Omega Point theory requires an analysis of his framework of understanding from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives. A critique of his crucial ideas, and of the salient points raised by some of his critics, can then be undertaken within the compass of his strengths. A critique of the critiques of Tipler's work allows one to evaluate the extent and limitations of his contributions.     

MacIntyre on Tradition,Rationality, and Relativism

MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism relies crucially on a distinctive moral particularism, for which morality and rationality are fundamentally tradition-constituted. In light of this, some have detected in his work a moral relativism, radically in tension with his endorsement of a Thomist universalism. I dispute this reading, arguing instead that MacIntyre is a consistent universalist who pays due attention to the moral-epistemic importance of traditions. Analysing his teleological understanding of rational enquiry, I argue that this approach shows how it is possible, dialectically, to reconcile the particularity of our starting-points with the assertion of universal truths. What MacIntyre offers, I contend, is a moral universalism that avoids the pitfalls of its liberal counterpart, and invites an important meta-theoretical shift with respect to the scope for toleration and social critique and toleration in contemporary pluralist society.     

THEOLOGIANS OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION: A PROPOSAL FOR READING RENÉ GIRARD THROUGH THE LENSES OF HANS URS VON BALTHASAR AND JOHN CASSIAN

This essay contends that René Girard is not a philosopher or a scientist whose ideas are open to theological appropriation. Instead, contrary to his assertions otherwise, the Girard corpus ought to be read as if it were articulating a form of theology whose primary intellectual home can ultimately be found on a theological map. As the field of Girardian theology grows, it becomes more evident that we need some theological lenses for examining the theology already lying waiting—sometimes inchoately, sometimes not—in Girard's texts, and also for examining how theologians use and misuse his texts. If we can see that he is already doing theology then a theological critique becomes plausible and valid in principle, and indeed becomes an internal critique. Applying good interpretive lenses will provide some rigorous criteria for analyzing the degree to which Girardian theologians are following the internal logic of Girard's thought in their appropriations of it. The interpretive lenses I propose using on Girard are first the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (d. 1988) and then the theology of John Cassian (d. circa 435). These two theologians provide us with lenses that help us see that Girard is fundamentally a Catholic theologian involved in resisting the speculative re‐writing of Christianity by proponents of “false gnosis” and that he belongs within the category of theologians who advocate spiritual transformation and “true gnosis.”     

IAN BARBOUR: THEOLOGIAN'S FRIEND, SCIENTIST'S INTERPRETER

Abstract. Ian Barbour's work, especially Religion in an Age of Science, is a comprehensive, balanced, and theologian-friendly guide to relations between science and religion. As a physicist and a theologian, Barbour is one of a handful of people who know both areas in depth and hence provide a bridge for others who are not dually educat ed. This is a very substantial accomplishment. His own position, however, is presented tentatively and, in the opinion of this author, is less radical than that demanded by his overt commitments vis-à-vis the contemporary scientific worldview. At two points, especially, his position appears modernist when it should be postmodern, in light of his own stated theological and scientific convictions: (1) his critique of the feminist and two-thirds-world position on the social construction of science, (2) his preference for a unified worldview at the cost of slighting issues of diversity and particularity. Nonetheless, he has made an immense contribution by providing the best and deepest survey of the sciences of astronomy, physics, and biology and their implications for Christian theology; it makes him one of the premier thinkers in the twentienth-century discussions of science and religion.     

Attachment Theory, Religious Beliefs, and the Limits of Reason

This paper takes a new look at Freud’s critique of religious beliefs and wishes from the perspective of current attachment theory, particularly with reference to Peter Fonagy. By reconceptualizing Freud’s critique, it can be argued that he anticipated some current empirical studies in religiosity and attachment, and that his critique accurately describes the religiosity of insecurely attached individuals. The paper argues that current social theories, especially as represented in the work of Jürgen Habermas, about religion and its role in politics and the public sphere could benefit from incorporating insights from attachment theory.     

‘With Him in Heavenly Realms’: Lombard and Calvin on Merit and the Exaltation of Christ

Peter Lombard argued that Christ merited his own exaltation. Since all humans attain their end by merit, and since Christ was true man, it follows that Christ merited exaltation for himself. Calvin repeatedly rejects this idea, arguing that Lombard obscures the fully benevolent character of Christ's mission because he abstracts Christ's humanity from his divinity. Calvin's polemic against Lombard leverages his anti‐Pelagian critique against medieval theologies of merit that reduce Christ's capacity as a representative and restrict the church's full participation in Christ's atonement. Instead, Calvin attempts to establish the substitutionary character of Christ's work by rooting Christ's merits in more strictly christological grounds.     

Freud's Illusion: New Approaches to Intractable Issues

In his later theological work The Future of an Illusion, Freud (1927/1961) makes provocative suggestions about the psychological significance of religious ideas. Freud begins by analyzing their meaning in the lives of particular individuals. He then extrapolates to a critique of their effect on human civilization. Religion originally evolved in order to explain difficult concepts such as death and fate. It quickly outgrew its purely theological dimensions and became a social regulator by coercing compliance with a set of cultural norms.

The purpose of this article is not to evaluate whether Freud was right, that is, if religion in fact is an illusion. Rather, using concepts derived from current work in analytical theology, it examines the internal logic of Freud's analysis and some of the assumptions he made to reach this conclusion. Despite his theoretical insights, much of Freud's reasoning is invalid and many of his premises are questionable. Freud adopts assertions without explaining them and does not offer much in the way of deductive or inferential support for his argument. This article advocates an epistemological approach to understanding Freud's use of terms such as “wishes” and “illusions.” Adopting this perspective uncovers tacit presuppositions underlying his theory about the origins of religious belief and its relationship to culture and society, and clarifies the conceptual links holding it together.     

More controversies about panic disorder: A reply to Klein

In his discussion of McNally's article in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (64, 88–91, 1996), Klein (1996a, Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 34, 849–853) clarifies and further defends his argument that cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) researchers must incorporate drug and pill placebo conditions in their trial designs and must demonstrate a significant drug effect before they are entitled to make inferences about CBT's antipanic effects. The purpose of this reply is to provide a critique and rebuttal of Klein's arguments.