The Balance of Power: Effects of Role and Market Forces on Negotiated Outcomes1

Role and market forces provide two sources of power that affect negotiated outcomes. To test their effects, 48 subjects participated in one of two negotiation markets that favored either buyers or sellers. Profit was influenced by both power sources: Buyers outperformed sellers, and negotiators in a favorable market outperformed negotiators in an unfavorable market. This effect was shown to be additive, indicating that the effects of the two sources of power were independent of one another. Whereas negotiators advantaged by market forces showed increases in profit over time, profits for negotiators disadvantaged by the market remained stable. Joint profit rose throughout both markets. However, this did not reflect increasing integrativeness in the markets; rather, the increase could be attributed to increases in high power negotiator profits. Markets became more distributive over time, and both the effectiveness and efficiency of bargaining decreased, particularly in the market favoring buyers.     

买卖交易中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的机制

现实生活中的谈判通常发生在特定的社会情境中, 谈判者也总在扮演着某种角色。本研究探索了买卖交易谈判中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制。研究提出了一个关于谈判者角色诱发框架效应的理论模型, 然后通过两个模拟谈判实验对这一模型进行验证。实验1表明, 买家知觉到的馅饼大于卖家知觉到的馅饼, 且谈判者知觉到的馅饼在谈判者角色与谈判者绩效间起部分中介作用。实验2发现, 即使保留买家与卖家的角色标签, 如果剥离了金钱作为交易介质这一重要特征, 两个谈判角色知觉到的馅饼也没有差异。研究揭示了谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制, 对谈判者如何利用情境因素取得更好的谈判结果具有实践意义。     

Integrative bargaining in a competitive market

The behavioral decision theory literature was used to identify the determinants of negotiation success in an integrative bargaining, free-market exercise. This study provides a novel methodology for studying negotiation. Specifically, buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in negotiations with as many competitors as possible in a fixed time period. The results suggest that integrative bargaining behavior increases and the market converges toward a Nash equilibrium as negotiators gain experience. In addition, the results suggest that (1) positively framed negotiators (“What will be my net profit from the transaction?”) complete more transactions than negatively framed negotiators (“What will be my expenses on this transaction?”), (2) negotiators who are given moderately difficult profit constraints in order to be allowed to complete a transaction achieve more profitable transactions than negotiators without such constraints, and (3) both framing and the existence of constraints affect the total profitability of the negotiator.     

The framing of negotiations: Contextual versus task frames

The purpose of this paper was to examine sources of the framing bias. While previous research has focused on task-responsive (experimentally manipulated) frames, it was argued that the context of the task may also frame the decision. Citing previous empirical studies which illustrated that buyers systematically outperformed sellers in symmetrical, negotiation simulations, it was suggested that the role of a participant may influence performance, independent of the task-characteristic demands. A study was conducted using an economically symmetrical negotiation simulation. Results indicated that negotiators positively framed by task characteristics completed more transactions, independent of the presence or absence of role-relevant information. When role-relevant information was absent, negotiators negatively framed by task characteristics completed transactions of greater mean value. When role-relevant information was present, buyers completed transactions of greater mean value than sellers, while task characteristics had no effect on mean transaction value. Implications of these results and directions for continued study were discussed.     

Cultural norms and cultural agents in buyer–seller negotiation processes and outcomes

Although a good number of studies have significantly investigated the role of culture in buyer–seller negotiation processes and outcomes, fewer studies have investigated the role of individual negotiators and organizations in shaping the cultural norms that affect negotiation processes and outcomes. Through a multi-case study of buyer–seller negotiations in five organizations that are illustrative of the informal economy of Nigeria, the study unpacks the role of individuals and organizations in shaping the cultural norms that affect the scope and outcomes of negotiation in an emerging market economy. We find that buyers and sellers play the role of inhabiting cultural norms which in turn narrow the scope of the negotiation to price considerations. On the other hand, the templates used by organizations to execute selling activities either maintain or deter the cultural norms that influence negotiation outcomes. Insights from the study extend the literatures on institutional work, culture and negotiation, sales negotiation in emerging markets.     

Face threat sensitivity in negotiation: Roadblock to agreement and joint gain

Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long noted the impact of face, or social image, concerns on negotiation outcomes. When face is threatened, negotiators are less likely to reach agreement and to create joint gain. In this paper, we explore individual differences in face threat sensitivity (FTS), and how a negotiator's role moderates the relationship of his or her FTS to negotiation outcomes. Study 1 describes a measure of FTS. Study 2 finds that buyers and sellers are less likely to reach an agreement that is in both parties' interests when the seller has high FTS. Study 3 finds that job candidates and recruiters negotiate an employment contract with less joint gain when the candidate has high FTS, and that this relationship is mediated by increased competitiveness on the part of the high FTS candidates. The results support Deutsch's (1961) application of face theory ( Goffman, 1967) to negotiation.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Anchoring in Simulated Competitive Market Negotiation

The competitive market simulation (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985) was used to explore anchoring effects in negotiation. Two possible anchoring effects were examined in the present study. One effect involved the profit schedule format; although individual profit schedules for buyers and sellers were normatively equivalent, in most previous studies the buyer's schedule was presented in decreasing order, whereas the seller's schedule was increasing. Anchoring on the first number in the profit list would contribute to the buyer's advantage, often found in this research. The effect of schedule format was tested here by running a separate simulation with inverted formats. As predicted, the relative advantage of buyers over sellers reversed with the change in profit schedule format. The second anchoring effect involved the initial offers. In running the simulated market, initial offers were recorded as well the initiator's assigned role. Initial offer values, for both the initiator and the non-initiator significantly affected final profit. The impact of schedule format on final agreement appeared mostly due to its effect on initial offers. Finally, the role of experience was examined. As in Bazermanet al.(1985), joint profit increased with learning. The increase stemmed from improved value of the initial offer from the perspective of the non-initiator. The results provided no indication of a decline in format schedule effect or in the major impact of initial offers, as negotiators gain experience. The implications of results concerning the role of anchoring in negotiation are discussed.     

谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

Paying a price: culture, trust, and negotiation consequences

Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators' self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators' reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.     

The Effect of Negotiator Creativity on Negotiation Outcomes in a Bilateral Negotiation

This study examined creative negotiators to determine if they are able to achieve more successful outcomes in a negotiation context with integrative potential. Creativity scores were obtained from 70 participants, who performed a 2-party, multi-issue negotiation in 35 dyads. This negotiation led to economic and relational negotiation outcomes. The use of creative skills by negotiators was hypothesized to positively affect both classes of negotiation outcomes. Results indicated no significant effect of negotiators' creativity on economic negotiation outcomes. A negative effect of negotiators' creativity on relational negotiation outcome for the buyer was observed. For the relational negotiation outcome of the seller, the same negative tendency was observed, though no significant effect of negotiators' creativity. These findings extend the understanding of the relationship between negotiators' creativity and negotiation outcomes, which is highly underemphasized in current research. Further research should identify which aspects of creativity are crucial to negotiators and determine how they can be adequately measured. The issue of interaction between negotiators' creativity and situational variables should also be addressed, as it likely determines the effect of creativity on negotiation outcomes.     

Interdependence in negotiation: effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation

This study extends past research on the impact of alternatives in dyadic negotiation by (a) providing negotiators with the mere possibility to negotiate with an outside party and (b) examining the moderating role of the negotiators' social motive. Business students engaged in face‐to‐face negotiations, which were audio‐taped and transcribed. None, one, or both dyad members were provided with an exit option—the possibility to leave the current negotiation and start new negotiations with someone else. Dyads were also given instructions to maximize own outcomes (egoistic motive) or to consider both own and the other's outcomes (prosocial motive). Results showed that, as expected, dyads with a one‐sided exit option engaged in more distributive and less integrative behavior, and obtained lower joint outcomes than dyads having either two‐sided or no exit options. However, this effect occurred only under an egoistic rather than a prosocial motive. No differences were found for negotiations with two‐sided exit options compared to negotiations without exit options, suggesting one's own exit option is counterbalanced by the other's escape possibility. Our results indicate that negotiators who wish to maximize personal as well as joint outcomes should try to combine a power advantage in terms of exit options with a shared prosocial orientation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

以计算机为中介的交流与权力对谈判结果的影响

采用2×2被试问实验设计,通过128名被试组成64个两人组参加的一项模拟商业谈判,考察了CMC与权力对分配式谈判结果的影响。结果发现：（1）EM与IM两种不同CMC条件下,成交价没有显著差异;（2）卖方权力较大时,成交价显著高于买卖双方权力平等的条件;（3）IM条件下,权力不平等时,女性组的成交价显著高于男性组;（4）IM条件下,权力平等的谈判者的主观价值感显著高于权力不平等者;权力不平等的条件下,男性的主观价值感显著高于女性。     

Experts, amateurs, and refrigerators: Comparing expert and amateur negotiators in a novel task

Recently a controversy has arisen among behavioral decision theory researchers concerning the generalizability of research based upon student subject samples to the behavior of expert decision makers. This study compared the influence of framing and performance constraints (goals or limits) on the ability of expert and amateur negotiators to reach integrative agreements in a negotiation task novel to both. The results suggested that while experts did outperform amateurs on comparable competitive market simulations, the patterns of their performance as influenced by framing and performance constraints were consistent.     

Groups and Solos in Context: The Effects of Accountability on Team Negotiation

This study examines whether and how accountability to constituents affects the cognitions, performance, and outcomes of team and solo negotiators. Previous findings for solos were replicated here: solo negotiators respond competitively when they are accountable to constituents. For teams, however, accountability pressures were distributed across the members resulting in each team member experiencing little responsibility for outcomes. As a consequence, teams did not respond to accountability pressures by behaving contentiously as solos did. Analysis of negotiators' perceptions of advantage reveals that solos who negotiate under conditions of high accountability consider themselves to be at a disadvantage in the negotiation even before the negotiation begins. These perceptions may underlie the accountability/competitive relation that characterizes solo negotiation. Implications for negotiation research as well as the study of groups in organizations are discussed.     

Negotiating over Time: Impediments to Integrative Solutions

Most negotiation relationships consist of interactions that occur across time. This paper explores the influence of two variables on the outcomes of such negotiations: the mobility of negotiators and the frame of the short-term sacrifice required to reach long-term gain. Specifically, we focus on the integrativeness of agreements both within a static negotiating period as well as across several negotiations. Subjects participated in an experiment that consisted of 10 similar negotiations across time, with two issues being addressed in each negotiation. The experiment was created to allow for the possibility of a moderately advantageous integrative agreement within each static negotiation, as well as a superior integrative agreement across negotiations. A higher level of negotiator mobility was predicted to decrease the integrativeness of outcomes across negotiations. This prediction was supported. The frame of the sacrifice required of subjects was predicted to affect integrativeness both within as well as across negotiations, such that subjects would be less likely to sacrifice on an issue, or issues, if it meant accepting a perceived loss rather than a reduced gain. This prediction was not supported. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for managerial negotiation and decision making.     

The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation

Based on work by Fiske (1992), we argue that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Experiment 1 showed that negotiators with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than incongruent questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Experiment 2 suggested that this result was caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators. Experiment 3 showed that belief-congruent rather than incongruent questions produce more positive impressions during negotiation. And when less powerful negotiators are asked leading questions about their willingness to cooperate (compete), they responded with lower (higher) demands. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.