Plaintiff life-taking: the effect of mock juror attitudes toward suicide on assignment of negligence and damages in a civil suit

Social scientific and legal scholars have examined the potential of a variety of case-relevant biases to distort juror decision-making (inter alia, death penalty attitudes, attitudes toward corporations, attitudes toward physicians, etc.). However, previous research has yet to address empirically the impact of attitudes toward suicide on juror decision-making. This study sought to examine the impact of mock juror's attitudes toward, and experiences with, suicide on assignment of negligence and damages in a civil suit. While results suggest that mock juror attitudes toward suicide do not directly affect a juror's assignment of negligence or damage awards, they do suggest that jurors may be susceptible to a reactance effect. As a result, attorneys should exercise caution when considering whether to directly address issues of possible plaintiff suicide.     

Effects of neuroimaging evidence on mock juror decision making

During the penalty phase of capital trials, defendants may introduce mitigating evidence that argues for a punishment "less than death." In the past few years, a novel form of mitigating evidence-brain scans made possible by technological advances in neuroscience-has been proffered by defendants to support claims that brain abnormalities reduce their culpability. This exploratory study assessed the impact of neuroscience evidence on mock jurors' sentencing recommendations and impressions of a capital defendant. Using actual case facts, we manipulated diagnostic evidence presented by the defense (psychosis diagnosis; diagnosis and neuropsychological test results; or diagnosis, test results, and neuroimages) and future dangerousness evidence presented by the prosecution (low or high risk). Recommendations for death sentences were affected by the neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence: defendants deemed at high risk for future dangerousness were less likely to be sentenced to death when jurors had this evidence than when they did not. Neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence also had mitigating effects on impressions of the defendant. We describe study limitations and pose questions for further research.     

How type of excuse defense, mock juror age, and defendant age affect mock jurors' decisions

The authors investigated the effects of mock juror age (younger vs. older), defendant age (22 vs. 65), and type of excuse defense used by defendants (a highly self-inflicted condition, Cocaine Dependency Disorder, vs. a less self-inflicted condition, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) on mock juror decisions. Ninety-six younger and 96 older adults read a scenario and answered a questionnaire. Results indicated that the defendant using the highly self-inflicted excuse was more likely to receive a guilty verdict and a longer sentence than was the defendant using the less self-inflicted excuse. Older jurors were more certain of their verdicts and saw the defendant as more responsible for his condition than did younger jurors. Defendant age did not affect juror decisions. In addition, excuse type and juror age affected the jurors' perceptions of the victim's responsibility for the attack. The authors discuss the potential influence of juror age on perceptions of defendant responsibility.     

Counterfactual thinking and stereotypes: The nonconformity effect

Past research has shown that counterfactual thinking (‘if only…’) is related to judgements of responsibility for negative events. It has also shown that behaviours deviating from the target's own behavioural standard (intrapersonal norm) are likely to trigger counterfactuals—the so‐called exceptional‐routine effect. In the present research, we demonstrate that behaviours deviating from a social category's behavioural standard (social norm) are also likely to trigger counterfactuals—what may be called the nonconformity effect. Two studies investigated counterfactual thinking regarding a rape case, classifying counterfactuals according to their conformity versus nonconformity to relevant social norms, and their focus on actions versus inactions. In Study 1, participants with higher endorsement of the rape victim stereotype generated more counterfactuals on the victim's non‐conforming inactions than did participants with lower stereotype endorsement. The presence of a nonconformity effect was confirmed in Study 2, where participants rated their agreement with externally generated counterfactuals. Moreover, in Study 2, counterfactuals focused on the victim's non‐conforming inactions predicted responsibility attribution to the victim through the mediating role of perceived avoidability of the event. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of defendant remorse on mock juror decisions in a malpractice case

The purpose of this study was to observe the effects of defendant remorse on monetary damages awarded to a plaintiff in a malpractice case. In two experiments, the physician-defendant expressed remorse at the time of the incident and again at trial, expressed remorse at trial, explicitly demonstrated a lack of remorse at trial, or made no mention of remorse (or a lack thereof). Participants decided how much money to award to the plaintiff and evaluated both the plaintiff and the defendant on several dimensions. Participants awarded greater compensation when the physician expressed remorse at the time of the incident than in the other conditions, both when the plaintiff was the injured patient's spouse in a wrongful death suit (experiment 1) and when the patient sued on his own behalf (experiment 2). This effect of remorse was greater for males than for females (experiment 1) and for relatively severely injured plaintiffs (experiment 2).     

Revealing negative thinking in recovered major depression: a preliminary investigation

Previous research suggests that formerly dysphoric individuals engage in effortful strategies (e.g., thought suppression) that may mask underlying depressive thinking. The addition of a cognitive load, such as recalling a 6-digit number, which interferes with effortful mental control, reveals depressive thinking in formerly dysphoric individuals. This preliminary study tested whether this effect of cognitive load on revealing negative thinking generalizes to formerly clinically depressed patients. Currently depressed patients, recovered depressed patients and never-depressed patients unscrambled sentences that could form either positive or negative statements, after random allocation to either cognitive load or no cognitive load conditions. The number of negative statements unscrambled was used as an index of negative thinking. Without a load, recovered depressed patients did not differ from never-depressed controls: both groups completed fewer negative statements than currently depressed patients. However, the cognitive load increased negative statements in the recovered depressed group, making them resemble the currently depressed group more than the never-depressed group. These preliminary findings extend previous demonstrations of cognitive load unmasking negative thinking in dysphoric students to a clinical population, suggesting that formerly depressed patients utilize effortful strategies to minimize the report of negative thinking, which is undermined by the addition of a cognitive load.     

The effects of consensus requirements and multiple decisions on mock juror verdict preferences

After watching a simulated rape trial, prerecorded on videotape, mock jurors either did or did not expect to sentence a defendant following deliberation with or without a group verdict required. Both sentencing expectation and verdict requirement significantly elevated jurors' preference for conviction (and average ratings of guilt likelihood). Closer analyses of personal changes (before and after deliberation) in the distribution of opinions suggested that majorities favoring not guilty were more influential than guilty-favoring majorities; and, somewhat unexpectedly, minorities in juries which deliberated without a verdict required were more likely to change personal opinions than minorities in juries required to render a verdict. The overall social decision scheme confirmed earlier observations about the importance of the initial majority in determining the verdict; but the majority did not always prevail and there was a marked asymmetry (“defendant protection”) in its action.     

Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis

This research tests the idea that repeatedly generating counterfactual thoughts in response to recurring events can lead to impairments in memory for actual outcomes (i.e., counterfactual inflation hypothesis). Participants (N = 56) played 40 games of blackjack and listed their thoughts after each win. They were instructed to list evaluative counterfactuals, reflective counterfactuals, or any thoughts that came to mind following each loss. Because reflective counterfactuals focus only on the alternatives to reality, and not in addition to reality (like evaluative counterfactuals), they were expected to lead to the greatest degree of overestimations of performance and confidence for future blackjack playing. The results confirmed this hypothesis, and also demonstrated that the relationship between thought-listing instructions and confidence for the future was mediated by overestimations of performance. Thus, repeatedly generating reflective counterfactual thoughts appears to lead to a special case of imagination inflation with dysfunctional implications for future confidence and risk-taking.     

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB.     

Effects of sex of defense attorney,sex of juror,and age and attractiveness of the victim on mock juror decision making in a rape case

In an experimental study, mock jurors heard a 50-minute audiotape of a rape trial and saw pictures of the victim and defendant. The factors in the design were sex of the defense attorney, age of the victim (early 20s or 60s), attractiveness of the victim, and sex of the juror. The most striking finding was a higher acquittal rate under the female defense attorney condition (71%) than under the male defense attorney condition (49%). This may be an instance of the recently described “talking platypus” phenomenon. Main effects for juror's sex, age of the victim, and attractiveness of the victim were not significant, but these factors showed complex interactions. Internal-external scores did not predict decisions. The most frequent reasons given for acquittals were reasonable doubt and the victim's not resisting.     

Counterfactual thinking, persistence, and performance: A test of the Reflection and Evaluation Model

The present research extends previous functional accounts of counterfactual thinking by incorporating the notion of reflective and evaluative processing. Participants generated counterfactuals about their anagram performance, after which their persistence and performance on a second set of anagrams was measured. Evaluative processing of upward counterfactuals elicited a larger increase in persistence and better performance than did reflective processing of upward counterfactuals, whereas reflective processing of downward counterfactuals elicited a larger increase in persistence and better performance than did evaluative processing of downward counterfactuals. Moreover, path analyses indicated that whereas the relationship between counterfactual thinking and persistence was accounted for by emotional responses following upward and downward counterfactual generation, the relationship between counterfactual thinking and performance was accounted for by enhanced persistence following reflective processing of downward counterfactuals, but was accounted for by both enhanced persistence and strategic thinking following evaluative processing of upward counterfactuals.     

Hazards mean luck: Counterfactual thinking in reports of dangerous situations and careless behavior

It has been shown (Teigen, 1995) that experiences of "luck" in daily life are dependent upon the existence a worse and close hypothetical (counterfactual) outcome, rather than upon a positive evaluation of what actually happened. The present investigation focuses on the inverse relationship, namely whether a situation with a negative outcome close at hand will be perceived as lucky. To test this hypothesis, students were asked to describe dangerous situations (Experiment 1) and examples of careless behavior (Experiment 3) from their own lives, which subsequently were rated by the actors and by peer groups for good and bad luck, attractiveness, and for closeness and attractiveness of the counterfactual outcome. Dangerous situations and episodes involving careless behavior were generally regarded as more lucky than unlucky. Furthermore, degree of good luck was positively correlated with degree of dangerousness and with degree of carelessness. Luck was related to closeness, aversiveness, and (in Experiment 2) to estimated probability of the counterfactual outcome. It is concluded that luck is primarily determined by negative outcomes that did not happen, and thus a frequent by-product of risk taking and risk exposure.     

Counterfactual thinking following negative outcomes: evidence for group and self-protective biases

Despite the robustness of self-serving and group-serving biases in attribution, there has been only limited evidence for these effects in counterfactual thinking. The present studies demonstrate that, following a negative outcome, individuals counterfactualize external factors relatively more than internal factors when they are identified with the target (i.e. ingroup members or the self) than when they are not. However, these effects are found only for external factors that are in some way disadvantageous to the target and could have led to the negative outcome. Implications of these findings for understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and judgments of causality, blame and affect are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counterfactual thinking may attenuate polarization of COVID-19 prevention behavior

Data from two U.S. online samples (N = 613) indicated that conservatives consistently perceived face mask use as less important than did liberals. This difference was attenuated with high counterfactual engagement. Both studies provide correlational evidence of this robust moderation. Study 2 provides further insight into differences between liberals' and conservatives' emotional responses to COVID-19 information, and suggests that during on-going negative events, downward counterfactuals may not provide relief. Overall, these studies document the politicization of public health behavior, and find that emphasizing the causal links between behavior and COVID-19 prevention may improve conservatives' attitudes toward CDC guidelines.     

Marriage encounter casualties: A preliminary investigation

Abstract

The purpose of this exploratory study was to investigate the relationship between participation in Marriage Encounter, the largest marriage enrichment program in the world, and subsequent marital or family distress. Analyzing 13 case reports from seven marital therapists, the authors suggest that Marriage Encounter weekends can cause marital or family deterioration for some couples through increased marital conflict, avoidance of constructive problem solving, or marital enmeshment at the expense of children. It appears that the most harmful aspect of the Marriage Encounter experience is its induction of intense couple-centered communication, leading to emotional overload in some couples. The authors offer several recommendations intended to lower the risks associated with participation in Marriage Encounter.     

Delineating generalized anxiety: A preliminary investigation

The present study examined the nature of generalized anxiety, which was defined as the constellation of symptoms listed as diagnostic criteria for generalized anxiety disorder in DSM-III-R. Generalized anxiety was assessed by means of a questionnaire that was especially constructed for this study. Although multidimensional scaling of symptoms reported by a clinically anxious sample produced orthogonal anxiety and panic dimensions, many symptoms were common to both dimensions. Whereas worry was found to be the cardinal feature of generalized anxiety, respiratory symptoms were found to associate closely with panic. These dimensions were replicated in a student sample. It is argued that while generalized anxiety symptoms constitute a unique dimension in the field of anxiety disorders, both panic and generalized anxiety may be linked with a basic anxiety response system. The findings also indicated that worry associated more closely with generalized anxiety than did apprehensive expectations. The heuristic value of the findings are discussed in light of the issue relating to an anxiety-panic continuum.     

Knowledge of spatial relations: A preliminary investigation

The mechanism underlying our knowledge of spatial relationships was investigated. In the first experiment subjects were asked to examine an array of circles, located in different positions on a background; after removal of the array, they answered questions about the spatial relations between the circles. The array was constructed so that the number of circles and the number of relations between circles could be independently varied. The results showed that the number of correct answers decreased as the number of circles increased, but was unaffected by the number of relations between circles. This suggests that subjects learn the positions of the circles, from which relations between circles can be computed, rather than learning the relations directly. Evidence from the second experiment, using a similar experimental paradigm, suggests that the positions of the circles are learned by organizing them into higher-order units or groups.