The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation

Based on work by Fiske (1992), we argue that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Experiment 1 showed that negotiators with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than incongruent questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Experiment 2 suggested that this result was caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators. Experiment 3 showed that belief-congruent rather than incongruent questions produce more positive impressions during negotiation. And when less powerful negotiators are asked leading questions about their willingness to cooperate (compete), they responded with lower (higher) demands. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

‘Just leave it blank’ non-religious children and their negotiation of prayer in school

ABSTRACT

This article examines how non-religious children experience acts of collective worship and prayer in primary school settings and analyses how they negotiate religion and their non-religious identities in these events. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork examining non-religious childhoods and collective worship in three English primary schools, the authors explore how non-religious children demonstrate their agency when confronted with particular boundaries and concepts related to religion and non-religion in school contexts. Attending to the experiences, perspectives, and practices of non-religious children adds to our understanding of the varieties of non-religion, which has to date largely focused on elite, adult populations. Focusing on non-religious children’s experiences of prayer reveals how these children did not experience tensions between praying to God and their non-religious identities and articulated their own interpretations of these practices, deepening understanding of the lived realities of non-religious cultures and identities.     

The reality principle, tragic knots, and the analytic process

Civilization and Its Discontents is shown to occupy a special place in Freud's development of psychoanalytic theory and technique. Especially emphasized is its implications for an inclusive understanding of the reality principle. The concept tragic knots is then defined and used to emphasize Freud's readiness to include tragic elements in that principle. An extended section then illustrates the spread of tragic knots into several diverse aspects of human existence: victimization, intimacy, and maintaining privacy. Finally, implications are drawn for the clinical assessment of working through unconscious conflicts.     

Tolerance of ambiguity, information, and negotiation.

This study examines the relationship between the tolerance of ambiguity and the outcomes of negotiation and the misrepresentation of information. The data were obtained from 98 middle managers of a bank in Turkey. A positive correlation of .74 (p < .01) obtained between scores on tolerance of ambiguity with the outcomes of negotiation and a negative correlation of -.66 (p < .01) with misrepresentation of information.     

The perception of closed flat knots and completion by folding

The aim of the present research was to study a well-defined set of line drawings that have never been analyzed before, and that are perceived as closed flat knots (CFKs). These knots are obtained by folding two-dimensional laminae. From this study it emerged that the perception of CFKs is always accompanied by a type of amodal completion, which had not previously been studied, and which we have called "completion by folding". It occurs when three quadrilaterals are so arranged that they look like a sheet of paper folded around one of them, partly occluded and partly occluding. Two experiments were carried out on this phenomenon revealing that a three-level stratification is produced in the completion by folding that facilitates unification between occluded figures, even when current models do not foresee such a perceptual solution, either because the distance between the two figures that become a unit is too big (experiment ) or because the slope between the two figures is not favorable (experiment 2). A third experiment, which took up the problem of the perception of CFKs, revealed the following: (1) Besides the prototype CFK, obtained by the interlacing of a rectangular lamina, there is a theoretically infinite class of CFKs. (2) The drawing of all the possible closed flat knots involves geometrically precise rules. (3) Not all feasible knots with these rules are seen as such. (4) Only the knots with characteristics of alignment and regularity are recognized as knots. (5) The closed flat knots are seen as the result of a transformation which the figure undergoes. This evidence constitutes a remarkable perceptual problem, discussed with reference to the recent theories of amodal completion.     

The power motive, n power, and fear of weakness

Among 85 male undergraduates, high need for power as measured by the 1968 Winter scoring system is shown to relate to high drinking frequency (p less than .01), high alcohol consumption (p less than .05), and taking the first drink at age 16 or less (p less than .05); to the Disinhibition ("Swinger") factor on Zuckerman's Sensation Seeking Scale (p less than .05) to poor academic performance (p less than .05); and to generate a regression equation with the California Psychological Inventory that suggests qualities of personal disorderliness and intellectual aggression. These findings, considered in terms of power motive theory, are seen as replicating earlier evidence that high n Power is maladaptie, voyeuristic and power avoidant.     

The pursuit of missing information in negotiation

A large body of research has focused on how people exchange and use information during the negotiation process. This work tends to treat information as if it all were readily available upon request. The current research investigated how delays in the pursuit of missing information can influence people’s ex-ante priorities and the final settlements they reach. Study 1 found that negotiators achieved more value on an issue after seeking missing information about that issue compared to when the same information was readily accessible. Study 2 found that the effect of searching for information on outcomes was mediated by changes in how important negotiators perceived the issue to be. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

I feel,therefore you act: Intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation as a function of social power

We examine how emotion (anger and happiness) affects value claiming and creation in a dyadic negotiation between parties with unequal power. Using a new statistical technique that analyzes individual data while controlling for dyad-level dependence, we demonstrate that anger is helpful for powerful negotiators. They feel more focused and assertive, and claim more value; the effects are intrapersonal, insofar as the powerful negotiator responds to his or her own emotional state and not to the emotional state of the counterpart. On the other hand, effects of emotion are generally not intrapersonal for low-power negotiators: these negotiators do not respond to their own emotions but can be affected by those of a powerful counterpart. They lose focus and yield value. Somewhat surprisingly, the presence of anger in the dyad appears to foster greater value creation, particularly when the powerful party is angry. Implications for the negotiation and power literatures are discussed.     

Choosing the path to bargaining power: an empirical comparison of BATNAs and contributions in negotiation

Although the negotiations literature identifies a variety of approaches for improving one's power position, the relative benefits of these approaches remain largely unexplored. The empirical study presented in this article begins to address this issue by examining how the size of the bargaining zone affects the relative benefit of an advantage in one's BATNA (i.e., having a better alternative than one's counterpart) versus contribution (i.e., contributing more to the relationship than one's counterpart) for negotiator performance. Results indicate that whereas BATNAs exerted a stronger effect on resource allocations than contributions when the bargaining zone was small, an advantage in contributions exerted a stronger effect on resource allocations than BATNAs when the bargaining zone was large. These findings provide needed insight and supporting evidence for how to alter one's power relationship in negotiation.     

Obligation, contracts, and negotiation: Outlining an approach

In this paper I outline an ambitious project to incorporate into a normative language the tools necessary for an account of hierarchical organizations and the changing roles and obligations of agents within them, and an analogous account of contracts and the changing roles and obligations of agents who are parties to contracts. While such an enriched language is likely to be considerably more complex than those most often considered for deontic logic, it promises for that very reason to enlarge considerably the range of normative problems that can be accurately expressed and effectively addressed.     

Paying a price: culture, trust, and negotiation consequences

Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators' self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators' reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.     

Supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret

This study examined the social effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation. In a computer-simulated negotiation, participants in Experiment 1 were confronted with a disappointed or worried opponent (supplication), with a guilty or regretful opponent (appeasement), or with a nonemotional opponent (control). Compared with controls, participants conceded more when the other experienced supplication emotions and conceded less when the other experienced appeasement emotions (especially guilt). Experiment 2 replicated the effects of disappointment and guilt and showed that they are moderated by the perceiver's dispositional trust: Negotiators high in trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy one, but those with low trust were unaffected. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated through information about the other's personality (cooperative vs. competitive), and a similar moderation was obtained.     

Interdependence,social motives,and outcome satisfaction in multiparty negotiation

What makes negotiators satisfied with their outcomes? In this study, we examined whether interpersonal interdependence, in the context of multi‐party multi‐issue negotiation, affected negotiators' satisfaction with their individual and group outcomes. We integrated principles from interdependence, social comparison, and social value theories to generate hypotheses about the social‐evaluative nature of satisfaction with negotiation outcomes. Controlling for differences in quality of individual outcomes, we found a positive association between satisfaction and individual outcome and a negative association between satisfaction and group outcome. Relative to those with prosocial social value orientation, negotiators with an individualistic social value orientation were less satisfied with the group outcome, regardless of induced motivational orientation. Neither motivational orientation nor an interaction between motivational orientation and social value orientation were related to satisfaction. We discuss the implications of our results for research on interdependence processes in negotiations and the role of social motives. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The unexpected benefits of final deadlines in negotiation

Two experiments explored actual and predicted outcomes in competitive dyadic negotiations under time pressure. Participants predicted that final deadlines would hurt their negotiation outcomes. Actually, moderate deadlines improved outcomes for negotiators who were eager to get a deal quickly because the passage of time was costly to them. Participants’ erroneous predictions may be due to oversimplified and egocentric prediction processes that focus on the effects of situational constraints (deadlines) on the self and oversimplify or ignore their effects on others. The results clarify the psychological processes by which people predict the outcomes of negotiation and select negotiation strategies.     

The agony of opportunity in negotiation: Number of negotiable issues,counterfactual thinking,and feelings of satisfaction

It has long been believed in the negotiation literature that increasing the number of issues in a negotiation is a positive feature because it increases integrative opportunities. But does this also increase negotiator satisfaction? Two studies are presented that examine this relationship between the number of issues in a negotiation and feelings of satisfaction immediately following the negotiation. Results indicate that those who negotiated the most issues felt the worse about their outcome. The proposed mechanism for this effect, that negotiators who deal with more issues generate more counterfactual thoughts imagining better possible outcomes, was tested and confirmed.     

The consistency of the items of an activity preference blank

Results of an experiment to obtain data on the consistency of the items of two forms of an Activity Preference Blank are presented. Both Form I and Form II, which was a revised edition of Form I, were administered twice, so consistency data are available for both forms. A sub-item is said to be consistent if a high proportion of men marked it the same way,M for preferred Most andL for preferred Least, on both administrations of the test. The data of the experiment were investigated to see what happens to the consistency of sub-items when the items are changed in context, when the number of sub-items in an item is reduced, and when the time-interval between the administration and the re-administration of the test is increased. The author also gives data on the consistency of the responses made to particular combinations of sub-items and data on item consistency when all sub-item combinations are taken into consideration.     

Interdependence in negotiation: effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation

This study extends past research on the impact of alternatives in dyadic negotiation by (a) providing negotiators with the mere possibility to negotiate with an outside party and (b) examining the moderating role of the negotiators' social motive. Business students engaged in face‐to‐face negotiations, which were audio‐taped and transcribed. None, one, or both dyad members were provided with an exit option—the possibility to leave the current negotiation and start new negotiations with someone else. Dyads were also given instructions to maximize own outcomes (egoistic motive) or to consider both own and the other's outcomes (prosocial motive). Results showed that, as expected, dyads with a one‐sided exit option engaged in more distributive and less integrative behavior, and obtained lower joint outcomes than dyads having either two‐sided or no exit options. However, this effect occurred only under an egoistic rather than a prosocial motive. No differences were found for negotiations with two‐sided exit options compared to negotiations without exit options, suggesting one's own exit option is counterbalanced by the other's escape possibility. Our results indicate that negotiators who wish to maximize personal as well as joint outcomes should try to combine a power advantage in terms of exit options with a shared prosocial orientation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Team negotiation: social, epistemic, economic, and psychological consequences of subgroup conflict

Large collectives (e.g., organizations, political parties, nations) are seldom unitary players. Rather, they consist of different subgroups that often have conflicting interests. Nonetheless, negotiation research consistently regards negotiating teams, who represent these collectives, as monolithic parties with uniform interests. This article integrates concepts from social psychology, management, political science, and behavioral game theory to explore the effects of subgroup conflict on team negotiation. Specifically, the present research introduced a conflict of interests within negotiating teams and investigated how this internal conflict affects the outcome of the negotiation between teams. An experiment with 80 four-person teams found that conflict between subgroups had a detrimental effect on the performance of negotiating teams. This research also employed a recent model of motivated information processing in groups to investigate possible processes underlying the effect of subgroup conflict on team negotiation.